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The ‘New Pacific Diplomacy’: 
An introduction
Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte
Since 2009 there has been a fundamental shift in the way that Pacific Island 
states engage with regional and world politics. The region has experienced what 
President Anote Tong of Kiribati has aptly called a ‘paradigm shift’ in ideas about 
how Pacific diplomacy should be organised, and on what principles it should 
operate. Many leaders have called for a heightened Pacific voice in global affairs 
and a new commitment to establishing Pacific Island control of this diplomatic 
process. This change in thinking has been expressed in the establishment of 
new channels and arenas for Pacific diplomacy at the regional and global levels, 
and new ways of connecting the two levels through active use of intermediate 
diplomatic associations. 
This shift to a ‘new Pacific diplomacy’ is as fundamental as the move by the 
independent Pacific Island states, four decades ago, to create a postcolonial 
diplomatic system, through the establishment of the South Pacific Forum 
(renamed Pacific Islands Forum in 2000) (see Fry 1994). Indeed, in many ways, 
the current activity is reminiscent of that time — in its assertive attitude, the 
emphasis on Pacific Island control of the diplomatic agenda, the creation of new 
institutions, its appeal to regional identity, and its concern with negotiating 
global agendas that are impacting Pacific societies. It is not, in our view, 
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too dramatic to see this as a time of transformation of the regional diplomatic 
culture equivalent to the move from the colonial to the postcolonial era, a time 
that represents a transformation of regional order.1 
This book brings together a range of analyses and perspectives on these 
dramatic new developments in Pacific diplomacy at sub-regional, regional and 
global levels, and in the key sectors of global negotiation for Pacific states: 
oceans management, fisheries, climate change, sustainable development, 
decolonisation, seabed mining, and trade.2 It also examines state and 
non-government roles in this new Pacific diplomacy. The book also focuses on 
the question of the significance of these new developments in negotiating global 
issues of key importance to the Pacific, and the implications for the future of 
the regional diplomatic architecture. Some of these perspectives are analyses 
of new developments, others are proposals that can be seen as part of the new 
Pacific diplomacy. Examples of the latter include the call by Cook Islands Prime 
Minister Henry Puna to ‘re-imagine’ the region, President Tong’s appeal for the 
Pacific to ‘chart its own course’, and Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola’s proposal for 
a Pacific-controlled Pacific Islands Forum (without Australia and New Zealand) 
to better meet the strategic necessities of the Pacific Island states in global 
diplomacy.
To create a context for considering these perspectives, this introductory chapter 
explores five questions. Firstly, what do we mean by ‘Pacific diplomacy’? 
Secondly, what are the expressions of the new Pacific diplomacy? Thirdly, how 
significant is the new Pacific diplomacy? Fourthly, how should we understand 
its emergence? Fifthly, what are the implications of the new Pacific diplomacy 
for the negotiation of Pacific Island interests and for the future regional 
architecture? 
‘Pacific Diplomacy’
As employed in the following chapters, the ‘Pacific’ refers to the thousands 
of islands and island societies scattered across the Pacific Ocean, stretching 
from the Micronesian islands just south of Japan and east of the Philippines, 
south to Papua New Guinea and down the Melanesian chain of islands to New 
Caledonia, then east across the Polynesian Pacific to Tahiti. These societies are 
politically organised into 14 postcolonial states (Cook Islands, Federated States 
1  Sandra Tarte makes the detailed case for seeing the new Pacific diplomacy as constituting a shift in 
regional order (Tarte 2014).
2  Most of these chapters were first delivered as papers to the New Pacific Diplomacy Workshop organised 
by the School of Government, Development and International Affairs, the University of the South Pacific, 
Suva, 4–5 December 2014.
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of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) and the 
remaining dependent territories of France (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, 
and French Polynesia), Britain (Pitcairn Island), New Zealand (Tokelau) and 
US (American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands). Taking into account its sea area (largely made up of 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zones of the constituent states and territories), this region is 
roughly the size of Africa. 
By ‘Pacific diplomacy’ we mean the diplomacy pursued by Pacific states in 
global forums, or in multilateral arenas in which the Pacific bloc is negotiating 
with just one external power (as in the case of tuna negotiations with the US). 
This includes negotiations within the Pacific group to determine joint positions 
to be taken to global talks. It refers to their engagement in the joint negotiation 
of such matters as trade, sustainable development, climate change, nuclear 
issues, decolonisation, and fisheries. We also include the diplomatic activity 
concerned with establishing the diplomatic institutions in which regional 
diplomacy is carried out and a Pacific joint position is negotiated. Finally, we 
include in our definition of Pacific diplomacy, the accepted principles, norms 
and practices which underpin regional diplomacy and might be usefully 
described as constituting a regional diplomatic culture. 
The history of Pacific diplomacy, so defined, begins in a concerted way in 
the mid-1960s as the first Pacific Island states became independent from 
colonial rule. The new Pacific states conducted their own foreign policies, but 
as small island states their capacity for extensive unilateral diplomacy was 
limited.3 From  the start, there was a commitment to regional diplomacy and 
joint diplomatic approaches in global forums to effect diplomatic outcomes. 
In this volume, Transform Aqorau refers to this as ‘the diplomacy of the past, 
the “Pacific Way”, and doing things by consensus’.
The key vehicle for this Pacific diplomacy was the South Pacific Forum. It was 
established partly to promote cooperation on regional ventures but, just as 
importantly, also to take a Pacific voice to the world. The Pacific Island states 
were preoccupied with working together to advance their interests in global 
diplomacy as well as integrating their economies. They did so by creating a 
regional organisation, the South Pacific Forum. In the 1970s and 1980s, the forum 
was very active in expressing a Pacific diplomacy on key issues. Their successful 
joint diplomacy, which took place under the auspices of the forum, culminated 
in a series of international treaties on resource protection, environmental 
issues, and tuna access, and prohibitions on drift-net fishing, the dumping 
3  These constraints are explored in Boyce and Herr (1974).
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of radioactive wastes in Pacific waters, nuclear testing, and trade (Fry 1994). 
They also collectively achieved the reinscription of New Caledonia on the list of 
territories falling under the oversight of the United Nations (UN) Decolonisation 
Committee. These were notable achievements for joint diplomacy by the Pacific 
states as they took on the world’s most powerful countries on issues of great 
concern to the national interest of those powers.
From the mid-1990s the forum was much less active in global diplomacy. Led by 
an Australian and New Zealand concern with promoting regional integration 
and a new regional economic order along neoliberal lines, the forum became 
focused on regional integration (Fry 2005). This was joined by a War on Terror 
security agenda from 2001, focusing on countering transnational organised 
crime and terrorism. While there were examples of the earlier diplomacy being 
pursued by the forum secretariat — on trade negotiations with Europe, and 
with Australia and New Zealand, for example (as described by Wesley Morgan 
in this volume) — this had largely disappeared by 2000. By then, the forum 
appeared to have moved away from its founding objective of assisting Pacific 
states to negotiate jointly on global issues impacting the region.
The New Diplomatic System
The most dramatic expression of what we are calling the ‘new’ Pacific diplomacy 
has been associated with Fiji’s activist foreign policy since its suspension from the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2009. The Bainimarama Government enunciated 
several new foreign policy principles aimed at circumventing its isolation in 
regional and global diplomacy: that Fiji should garner and represent a Pacific 
voice that could be heard in global forums; that Fiji should promote itself as the 
hub of the Pacific and as a leader of Pacific Island states; that it should engage 
in south–south cooperation in the Pacific and the wider world; that regional 
diplomacy and regional institutions should be firmly controlled by Pacific 
Island states and not constrained by metropolitan powers (especially Australia 
and New Zealand); and that the Pacific should be better organised to engage in 
global diplomacy. The Fiji government also introduced the idea of including civil 
society, the private sector, and dependent territories, alongside independent 
governments, as equal partners in a new kind of ‘network diplomacy’. 
Fiji expressed these ideas in a series of major initiatives: in giving leadership 
to a renaissance of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG); in creating the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF); and by invigorating the existing 
Pacific Small Island Developing States at the UN as a Pacific Island-only bloc to 
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a point where it replaced the PIF as the main representative of the Pacific voice 
at the UN. These developments in Fiji’s new Pacific diplomacy are described and 
examined in the chapters by Ambassador Mawi and Makereta Komai.
It is, however, a central premise underlying the approach of this book that it 
would be a mistake to see the new Pacific diplomacy as solely a Fiji phenomenon. 
Fiji policy and leadership has obviously been the key catalyst, but it is important 
to note the wider support for these new institutions and ideas across the region 
as evidenced in the support for a new array of Pacific-controlled institutions. 
Significantly, the new Pacific diplomacy has been expressed in the actions of 
the Pacific Island states since 2009 in developing a new diplomatic architecture 
outside the PIF system, both to conduct some important aspects of regional 
affairs, and to represent the Pacific Islands region to the world on the key 
issues of concern such as climate change and fisheries management. For Pacific 
leaders, these moves do not represent a wholesale rejection of the PIF; rather 
they suggest recognition of a need for complementary forums to undertake 
diplomatic functions and pursue needs which can no longer be met in the 
PIF system.4 The new Pacific diplomatic system now handles the core global 
diplomatic needs of the Pacific Island states in relation to key issues such as 
trade, climate change, decolonisation, fisheries management, and sustainable 
development. This new system has worked well to meet those needs, and is 
widely supported by Pacific Island states. 
Pacific Small Island Developing States
One significant institutional development has been the rise of the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States Group (PSIDS) at the UN. Although this group had 
existed since the early 1990s in relation to global sustainable development 
negotiations in the Rio process, the PSIDS has taken on a dramatically new 
diplomatic role for the Pacific Island states since 2009, to the point where it has all 
but replaced the PIF as the primary organising forum for Pacific representations 
at the global level. 
The PSIDS has also become the key diplomatic vehicle for Pacific participation 
in global southern coalitions such as the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) and the Group of 77. It is, for example, the main organising arena for 
determining and prosecuting Pacific positions on climate change mitigation 
4  This refers to the forum itself and the other institutions in the Council of Regional Organisations in 
the Pacific (CROP) such as the Forum Fisheries Agency, Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
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in the UN  Framework Convention on Climate Change, and also in relation 
to the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, and the 
Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States in Apia, 
Samoa, in 2014. It is important to note that while the enhancement of PSIDS 
was undoubtedly a Fiji-led initiative, it has been strongly supported by all 
Pacific Island state UN members. Fulori Manoa explores the significance of this 
development of the PSIDS at the UN in this volume.
Melanesian Spearhead Group
A second major expression of the ‘new Pacific diplomacy’ has been the 
reinvigoration of the MSG and its emergence as a major forum for sub-
regional integration, and for diplomacy on decolonisation. Again, although Fiji 
leadership provided the catalyst for its reinvigoration, it is important to note that 
all Melanesian countries embraced the new and deeper integration proposed 
as part of the new MSG since 2009. Papua New Guinean leadership was also 
very important in this reinvigoration. The achievements have been significant. 
Most prominent has been the achievement of significant free trade in goods and 
services, including the movement of skilled labour, which is explored by Sovaia 
Marawa in this volume. The MSG has been able to achieve a level of integration 
not yet achieved in the wider PIF grouping in relation to trade and movement 
of professional workers.
The Pacific Islands Development Forum
The third and perhaps most controversial element in the new regional diplomatic 
architecture is the PIDF, which was a Fiji-led initiative established in 2013. It 
developed out of the ‘Engaging with the Pacific’ meetings, which Fiji organised 
from 2010 as a means of building ties with its Pacific neighbours following 
suspension from the PIF. While clearly the flagship of the Fiji government’s 
efforts to lead regional diplomacy after suspension from the PIF, the new kind 
of regional diplomacy it represented also appealed to many other Pacific leaders. 
This is described in the chapter by Sandra Tarte.
There were three novel elements of the PIDF that particularly seemed to capture 
the imagination of Pacific Island leaders. The first was that the new institution 
emphasised inclusivity, a connection between leaders and society, which had 
been lacking in the PIF. It brought together civil society groups, the private 
sector, international agencies and governments in a process that stressed 
partnerships and network diplomacy. Second is its focus on ‘green growth’, 
which seemed to offer hope of overcoming the stalling of regional action in key 
areas such as climate change and sustainable development. Finally, the PIDF was 
9
1 . THE ‘NEW PACIFIC DIPLOMACY’
motivated by the desire for self-determination. At the PIDF secretariat opening 
in 2014, Prime Minister Bainimarama said the Fiji-based group had a single 
purpose:
It is not a question of prestige or establishing yet another talkfest, it is about 
creating an organisation that is more attuned to our development needs as Pacific 
countries. It is about creating an organisation that is relatively free of interference 
from outsiders (Cooney 2014).
Although Prime Minister Bainimarama has said that the PIDF was not intended 
to compete with the PIF, he seemed to give a different impression in other 
statements about the organisation’s purpose:
Why do we need a new body, a new framework of cooperation? Because the 
existing regional structure for the past four decades — the Pacific Islands Forum 
— is for governments only and has also come to be dominated only by a few 
(Pareti 2013).
Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
The fourth institutional development was the establishment of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) Headquarters in 2009. The PNA represented the island 
states with the region’s largest tuna stocks and served as a vehicle for gaining 
greater control over their shared resource. The tiny but effective Majuro-based 
secretariat has been highly successful in implementing novel ideas in fisheries 
management, which have translated into dramatic increases in revenue to the 
member countries. This development is independent of Fiji’s suspension from 
the PIF, since Fiji is not a member of PNA, and therefore demonstrates a broader 
assertion of Pacific control over regionalism. The role and impact of the PNA are 
described in the chapters by Transform Aqorau and Jope Tarai.
New Trade Negotiation Agencies
Finally, Pacific Island states have created new Pacific-run institutions outside 
the PIF to negotiate trade and economic relationships with Australia and New 
Zealand, and Europe. In the case of negotiations with Australia and New Zealand 
on the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus (described 
in the chapter by Wesley Morgan), they argued for an independent office outside 
the PIF to provide advice on the negotiations. The Vila-based Office of the Chief 
Trade Adviser was established in 2009, despite Australian and New Zealand 
efforts first to oppose its creation, then to dictate who the adviser would be, 
and finally to sideline it. In the case of negotiations with the European Union 
over a regional economic partnership agreement, and in relation to developing 
Pacific positions to take to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) meetings, the 
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Pacific Island states decided in 2012 to create a Pacific ACP Office based in 
Port Moresby. The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat had previously been the 
responsible agency for this function (Komai 2014).
Pacific Islands Forum
It could be argued that we are now seeing evidence of ‘new Pacific diplomacy’ 
ideas in developments within the PIF. Dame Meg Taylor’s chapter talks about 
inclusivity, and making the forum fit for purpose and responsive to critical 
reviews (allowing the leaders to make effective decisions). Significantly, the 
forum has also begun to redefine its mandate to include joint diplomacy, rather 
than just integration and cooperation as in the recent past, and has made new 
claims to diplomatic agendas, which it had seemingly abandoned in the previous 
decade. This is partly in response to the new Pacific diplomacy, and indicates 
the influence of the thinking and ideas shaping the new diplomacy. Whereas 
the new Pacific diplomacy is in many ways a response to what was seen as 
the limitations of the PIF (that it was elitist, statist, and unable to act on key 
diplomatic needs such as climate change), the forum has now sought to remedy 
some of these areas. As Dame Meg Taylor asserts: ‘The forum secretariat must 
engage with civil society and the private sector more routinely in its work. 
We need to recognise the important role that civil society plays in the regional 
space.’ As Claire Slatter argues in this volume, the new Pacific framework goes 
a long way in addressing the key concerns of civil society about inclusion and 
openness, although she argues it is still too early to judge how substantive these 
moves are. 
A Paradigm Shift?
Underpinning these institutional changes is a new set of ideas about how the 
Pacific should engage in global and regional diplomacy. The coherence and 
novelty of these ideas and their departure from prevailing ideas suggests that 
President Tong of Kiribati was prescient in calling this a ‘paradigm shift’. First and 
foremost of these ideas is that the Pacific should, in President Tong’s words, 
‘chart its own course’. This is reflected in various calls for the development of 
an effective Pacific voice, in Prime Minister Puna’s call for reimagining Oceania 
and in the founding ideas of the PIDF. This call for regional self-determination 
is expressed in the creation of new institutions and ventures. 
Secondly, there is the claim that the Pacific needs to engage assertively in global 
diplomacy in relation to key challenges impacting the region; that it should 
indeed aspire to global diplomatic leadership in key areas such as climate change, 
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tuna diplomacy and oceans management. Thirdly, it is claimed that there should 
be effective representation of a genuine ‘Pacific voice’ in global forums and that 
Pacific Island states need to work together in joint diplomacy at the global level. 
Fourthly, there is growing recognition and acceptance of the role of sub-regional 
groupings and initiatives, in line with the view that a ‘one-region’ approach 
need not be the best approach. As Aqorau notes in his contribution to this 
volume: ‘Having a single region arrangement is useful for some purposes but 
not for others.’ Chapters by Dame Meg Taylor and Tess Newton Cain also make 
this argument.
Fifthly, there should be a capacity to participate in southern diplomatic 
alliances and to leverage Pacific Island positions on the global agenda through 
these intermediaries. Specifically, Pacific diplomatic architecture needs to be 
configured to provide the capacity to participate in middle level ‘southern’ 
diplomatic alliances, such as AOSIS, the ACP, and Group of 77 plus China. 
Sixthly, the generation of the ‘Pacific voice’ needs to be inclusive (of civil 
society, private sector, and governments).
The Significance of the ‘New Pacific Diplomacy’
How then should we assess the significance of this ‘new Pacific diplomacy’? 
As already suggested, we argue that it represents a fundamental transformation 
in diplomatic ideas, institutions and practices. The transformative nature of this 
new paradigm and its institutional expression in a new diplomatic system is 
more clearly seen if we compare the current developments with other stages in 
the history of Pacific diplomacy. Seen in this historical context, the significance 
of the current changes is clearly of the order of the shift from the colonial to the 
postcolonial diplomatic system in 1971. 
Those developments set up a regional diplomatic culture with certain 
assumptions about who should belong, who should speak, and how diplomacy 
should be conducted. This prevailed until the early 1990s. In the 1990s and 
2000s there was a slow unravelling of this regional diplomatic culture, and a 
move away from the assumptions of equality and respect for self-determination. 
When compared with the regional diplomatic culture which developed in the 
1990s and early 2000s — which was hierarchical and disrespectful to the self-
determination principle — the new Pacific diplomacy represents a new regional 
diplomatic culture. At the same time, because it represents the same values 
and principles of the original regional political settlement of 1971, it could 
also be represented as a restoration of the original regional diplomatic culture 
established by the forum in 1971 (Fry 2015). More broadly, the new Pacific 
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diplomacy can be seen as effecting a fundamental change in the contemporary 
regional order given its impact on the pattern of power, and the transformation 
of dominant ideas and institutions (Tarte 2014). 
The significance of the new Pacific diplomacy is also accentuated by the lack 
of attention to the joint diplomacy side of regionalism within the PIF for the 
last two decades, seemingly encouraged by a definition of regionalism focused 
on regional integration. This emphasis had overlooked that the forum was 
established to do both — support regional integration and represent the Pacific 
interests in global diplomacy. In the first two decades it was not doing well on 
regional integration, but it was highly successful in collective diplomacy. In the 
next two decades it focused more on regional integration and less on its role of 
representing the region in global diplomacy. This makes the emergence of the 
new Pacific diplomacy, from around 2009, an even more marked development. 
Finally, significance is derived from the fact that support for this new paradigm, 
and the new institutions, has come from across the Pacific. Thus this is not 
just to be seen as only Fiji-supported, and as therefore disappearing once Fiji 
re-enters the forum system. The PSIDS, for example, is supported by all Pacific 
Island states (including Samoa), and the significant MSG achievements since 
2009 could only be achieved with the support of all Melanesian states and the 
joint leadership of Fiji and PNG. There is widespread Pacific support for the 
principles and objectives of the PIDF. They are not about to be wound back to 
the status quo ante with Fiji’s return to democracy.
Why the New Pacific Diplomacy?
How then to explain this transformative development in Pacific diplomacy 
since the late 2000s? For many observers, the answer is Fiji. Fiji foreign policy 
post-2009 was the catalyst for many of the key institutional developments. 
Suspended from the forum, and from forum trade talks with the European 
Union, Fiji sought other ways of linking to the world and alternate regional 
arenas. It obviously had the key role in initiating the reinvigoration of MSG and 
the establishment of the PIDF, and the development of the Pacific group at the 
UN was a Fiji initiative. However, other leaders and countries supported Fiji’s 
initiatives and nearly all Pacific Island states signed on to these initiatives. 
Other observers have emphasised China’s influence or the support of other 
geopolitical influences as being behind these developments. As argued by 
Michael O’Keefe in this volume, while the heightened global interest in the 
Pacific — particularly from China — acted as a facilitating environment for 
some of these developments, the driving force is provided by Pacific agency. 
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The changing geopolitics of the region since 2009 has created an enabling context 
to promote alternative diplomatic initiatives without relying on Australian or 
New Zealand funding. Chinese, Russian, Indonesian and United Arab Emirates 
funding is important for PIDF operations, for example. 
The driving force for the wider support for the new Pacific diplomacy lies 
outside these explanations. It lies in a shared perception of an increasing 
strategic necessity to develop effective diplomatic strategies to deal with key 
issues of concern to regional leaders around trade, fishing, climate change, and 
decolonisation. This has been coupled with a realisation that the PIF was not 
meeting this need. 
There were several reasons for this. One was the involvement of Australia and 
New Zealand in forum deliberations, making it hard to take strong positions 
on climate change or trade and decolonisation when their positions were 
antithetical. There has been a building resentment that the forum is no longer 
a place where the Pacific diplomatic voice can be developed and promoted, and 
that the regional diplomatic culture has reverted to the kind of hierarchical 
diplomatic culture that the forum was established to overcome. Rather than 
a diplomatic forum in which Australia and New Zealand were guests at the 
diplomatic table of the Pacific Island states, as originally conceived, the forum 
is now seen as one in which the interests of Australia and New Zealand prevail, 
to the detriment of island interests in engaging the global negotiations which 
matter to them. 
The most obvious case is climate diplomacy in relation to carbon emissions 
targets, where the interests of Australia and New Zealand could not be more 
divergent from that of the island states. Indeed, in many ways climate change 
has become the nuclear testing issue of the 21st century. It has brought an 
urgency and united front to island collaboration. Where the Pacific states might 
in the past have tolerated some frustration with the domination of the regional 
agenda in the PIF by Canberra and Wellington — to pursue the War on Terror 
or to promote a regional neoliberal economic order — this tolerance may have 
reached its limit on the climate change issue.
One can see the rising anger, among the atoll states in particular, on the lack 
of action by the PIF in representing a joint position on this question because 
of the restraining influence of Australia and New Zealand on regional positions 
on emissions targets. For the Pacific Island states it is simply not possible to 
pursue an AOSIS position on emissions targets through an organisation in which 
Australia and New Zealand are present and determined to water down any 
positions that might affect their interests. This concern has been accentuated 
by the Australian Government’s extreme position on the issue. Marshall Islands 
Foreign Minister Tony de Brum was reported in September 2014 as saying:
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he and the leaders of other Pacific island nations were bewildered by what he called 
‘backsliding’ on climate change by Australia, which the region had considered 
to be its ‘big brother down south’. Probably one of the most frustrating events 
of the past year for Pacific islanders is Australia’s strange behaviour when it 
comes to climate change … Island nations had watched with dismay not only 
the abolition of the carbon tax in Australia, but also the defunding of scientific 
advisory bodies … Pacific island nations no longer have time to debate climate 
change or even to engage in dialogue about how it might be mitigated — they 
need immediate action. Failure to act for us would mean disappearance under the 
sea by the turn of the century (O’Malley 2014).
A second reason is that the presence of Australia and New Zealand in the 
PIF creates a logistical problem for the Pacific Island states in seeking to use 
southern global coalitions — such as AOSIS and the G77 — to leverage their 
joint position on key issues such as climate change. With Australia and New 
Zealand being full members and the main financiers of the forum, the forum is 
not recognised as a southern grouping by these coalitions. This unnecessarily 
limits the bargaining power of Pacific states.
Thirdly, as we have seen, since the mid-1990s the forum had largely abandoned 
the field of joint diplomacy for a focus on regional integration. This emphasis 
culminated in the Pacific Plan of 2003 to 2013, which was a technocratic plan 
around an Australia–New Zealand agenda of pooling and integration either to 
secure the region in the War on Terror or to lower tariff barriers and harmonise 
laws in accordance with a neoliberal economic agenda. This was a far cry from 
the assertive Pacific voice of the 1980s dealing with the big issues confronting 
the region. Significantly ‘joint diplomacy’, or representing a Pacific voice, no 
longer appeared as part of the forum’s definition of regionalism and its mandate. 
A fourth explanation of a region-wide commitment to the new Pacific diplomatic 
network was the emergence of a more vocal Pacific leadership with a commitment 
to engage in regional debates more like the 1970s and 1980s. This has partly been 
due to Fiji’s commitment to overcome the isolation imposed by the forum, but 
just as important have been the efforts of Marshall Islands leaders and President 
Tong of Kiribati to give leadership in climate change diplomacy in the region, 
and even globally, and the political will of the O’Neill Government in Papua 
New Guinea to work with Fiji in promoting the MSG, and an independent 
Pacific ACP secretariat.
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Implications of the New Pacific Diplomacy
The new Pacific diplomacy represents an assertion of regional independence 
as well as a means for achieving more effective outcomes in regional and 
international forums. This has seen some marked successes: unprecedented 
financial returns from tuna access agreements as described by Transform Aqorau 
and Jope Tarai; reinscription of French Polynesia on the UN list of non-self-
governing territories (see Nic Maclellan’s chapter); the inclusion of ‘stand-alone’ 
sustainable development goals on oceans and climate change by the UN (as 
described by Fulori Manoa); and more coordinated advocacy on global climate 
policy by Pacific states (see George Carter’s chapter). Meanwhile, members of the 
MSG continue to take significant steps towards regional integration (described 
in chapters by Sovaia Marawa, Wesley Morgan, and Tess  Newton Cain) and 
the promotion of south–south cooperation. Pacific states have also successfully 
navigated what Dame Meg Taylor describes as ‘a crowded and complex geo-
political landscape’, in order to leverage recognition for their own development 
agenda (as evident, for example, in the broad support for the establishment of 
the PIDF).
These successes and achievements vindicate and validate the shifts that are 
underway in Pacific diplomacy, including the use of alternative, island-only 
groupings, and the forging of closer relationships with non-traditional partners. 
They also lend momentum to President Anote Tong’s call to ‘engage even more 
aggressively internationally’. Perhaps most significantly, given the current 
trends in Pacific regionalism, these successes can inspire greater political 
commitment to ‘act regionally’. Ultimately, it is not frameworks or plans that 
matter to the leaders and their people, it is the results of regional endeavours 
that count. 
The transformation of the regional architecture is central to the new Pacific 
diplomacy, but it remains an unfinished journey. As various chapters in this 
volume indicate, it is by no means obvious where this journey will end. 
Dame Meg Taylor refers to ‘a complex regional architecture where geopolitics 
and finance play an important part’. The influence of these factors will continue 
to challenge Pacific regionalism, whether or not Australia and New Zealand play 
a different role in the PIF in future, and whatever role the PIDF assumes in the 
regional system. Tensions over policy positions on issues such as decolonisation 
and climate change are also likely to deepen in the future. 
What the contributors to this volume all point to — from their various 
perspectives and positions — is the way the new Pacific diplomacy is creating 
opportunities and avenues for island countries to influence the regional order, 
in  line with their own interests and aspirations. This will perhaps have most 
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impact and resonance on future efforts to shape an approach to regional 
integration and diplomacy that will deliver fully on the expectations of the 
people of the Pacific.
Organisation of the Book
The book begins with an overview vision statement by President Anote Tong 
of Kiribati, which expresses many of the key ideas which motivate the new 
Pacific diplomacy. His plea for the Pacific to ‘chart its own course’ reflects the 
central importance of the promotion of regional self-determination at the centre 
of the new developments. A second theme with wider resonance is that the 
Pacific states should pursue this in unison. There is, he argues, a need for Pacific 
solidarity. Thirdly, he contends that Pacific leaders need to act from necessity and 
survival to confront new global forces threatening their way of life. They need 
to not only assert themselves ‘aggressively’ but to aspire to ‘global leadership’ 
in key diplomatic domains such as climate change, oceans management and 
sustainable development. To achieve this they need to change their mindset 
away from the view that small island states are necessarily dominated by 
developed countries and find confidence in the fact that they are large ocean 
states. He both recognises, and calls for, a paradigm shift in Pacific diplomacy. 
The importance of President Tong’s vision is reflected in the recognition given 
to them by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, when she argued that 
any review of regional architecture needed to take this sentiment into account. 
During her visit to Papua New Guinea in December 2014 she said, ‘it was time 
for Pacific leaders to chart their own course … I really think it’s time the Pacific 
leaders determine what they want for the 21st century and I’m hoping that 
Australia will be able to host that’ (Wroe 2014).
The first section of the book focuses on the recent developments in the regional 
diplomatic system. These institutional developments and their underlying 
principles are what have caught peoples’ imagination that something significant 
has been under way. Kaliopate Tavola’s chapter presents the case for a radical 
restructuring of the Pacific Islands Forum without Australia and New Zealand. 
His considered case for an all-island state forum provides the economic and 
political logic for the Fiji Government position that it will only return to forum 
membership if Australia and New Zealand are asked to leave. 
The New Pacific diplomacy was initially seen as in opposition to the Pacific 
Islands Forum system dominated by Australia and New Zealand. But as evident 
from Dame Meg Taylor’s chapter, the forum is also undergoing major change 
consistent with many of the principles of the new Pacific diplomacy. This is 
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recognised by Claire Slatter’s critical examination of the claims surrounding the 
new Pacific framework, which she argues do seem to treat seriously the earlier 
critique of the forum in such areas as inclusion of NGOs. Maureen Penjueli 
offers a more trenchant critique of both the forum and the PIDF (despite its 
claims of inclusion) based on the past difficulties of civil society to be heard in 
Pacific regionalism. 
Sandra Tarte then introduces the most prominent expression of the new Pacific 
diplomacy, the Pacific Islands Development Forum. As seen by many, this is 
potentially a competing organisation with the Pacific Islands Forum and is to be 
the heart of a Fiji-led alternative regional system. Fulori Manoa demonstrates 
that, while less well known, the dramatic rise of the Pacific Small Island 
Developing States (PSIDS) at the United Nations since 2009 has in many ways 
been the major success story of the new Pacific diplomacy. 
The second section focuses on Fiji’s key role in the new Pacific diplomacy 
showing its major role as a catalyst in key developments since 2009. Ambassador 
Mawi provides a government perspective emphasising the south–south aspect 
of this new regional foreign policy while Makereta Komai provides an analysis 
of the origins and implications of Fiji’s new policies since 2009. 
The third section deals with the geo-political context in which the new Pacific 
diplomacy emerged and developed. Michael O’Keefe argues that the changing 
geo-political context, including the rise of China and the entrance of new 
interests such as Russia and UAE, has provided an enabling environment for 
the new Pacific diplomacy but does not devalue ‘the issues, trends and agendas 
that have shaped the evolution of a new approach to diplomacy from within the 
region’. Nicola Baker explores the dominant managerial role of Australia and 
New Zealand in Pacific regionalism, which is seen by many to provide the major 
stimulus to the development of a reactive new Pacific diplomacy. She argues that 
it is a mistake to lump together these two influential neighbours as if they are a 
joint actor or to assume that New Zealand simply follows Australia’s lead. 
The fourth section focuses on developments in sub-regionalism and the 
question of how they articulate with the broader regional diplomatic system. 
Tess Newton Cain explains the nature of the renaissance of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group and highlights the issues provoked by its new prominence. 
Sovaia Marawa examines what is arguably the most impressive achievement in 
this recent renaissance — the negotiation of a Melanesia Free Trade Area — and 
why this was successful in contrast to the experience in the broader Pacific 
Islands region. Suzanne Lowe Gallen reviews the untold story of Micronesian 
diplomacy at the sub-regional level and how this complements Pacific regional 
diplomacy. 
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In the final three sections, the authors examine the key areas of contemporary 
Pacific diplomacy. Nicollette Goulding and George Carter introduce us to the 
complexity of Pacific approaches to climate diplomacy on the road to the 2015 
Paris conference; Transform Aqorau and Jope Tarai examine new developments 
in tuna diplomacy; Wesley Morgan explores the assertive Pacific diplomacy in 
relation to Europe and Australia and New Zealand on trade; and Nic Maclellan 
examines the recent record of Pacific diplomacy on pushing for decolonisation 
in the case of French Polynesia and West Papua. 
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‘Charting its Own Course’: 
A paradigm shift in 
Pacific diplomacy1
H .E . President Anote Tong
Our Pacific countries have come a long way as communal societies. Since the 
beginning of time, we began as very insular, traditional communities living 
together and sharing resources available to us from nature, until our recent 
history when we came into contact with the outside world through whalers, 
traders and missionaries, among others. This contact introduced our societies to 
the outside world, and there began our engagement in international relations, 
which has become so globalised and interdependent that we no longer can 
live in isolation. What happens in other parts of the world affect the lives of 
our communities. Climate change, world economic crises, food and fuel prices, 
conflicts and others are just some examples of the interdependent nature of the 
world we live in today. As we progress further into the 21st century we see the 
value of replicating communal systems at the regional and international levels 
as crucial to our advancement as a region and as a people.
1  Keynote Address by President of Kiribati at the Launch of the Pacific International Relations Forum of the 
School of Government, Development and International Affairs of the University of the South Pacific, Holiday 
Inn, Suva, 9 October 2012.
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I believe relationships, including international relations, are always about 
people. Yes, textbooks may define international relations as relations among 
states but what are states without people? International relations is therefore 
about managing relations among the peoples of our region and of our world. 
And, depending on how well we manage our relations, it is about living in 
harmony or otherwise with each other. It should be about helping each other. 
But we know very well from experience that that is not always the case. 
I have just come back from the 67th United Nations General Assembly, the 
premier venue and forum for international relations, where I had the opportunity 
to meet, engage and relate with fellow leaders from around the world and from 
our region. We were all there to share our challenges and to share our visions on 
how this could be a better world for all. 
But the question is: How effective is such a forum in dealing with global issues 
which require credible solutions? Do we really engage in dialogue with each 
other and do we really listen to each other’s stories? As nation states we gather 
in New York every year to tell our own individual stories, and to listen, and 
assess who will deliver the most provocative statement this time. The challenge 
is how to get the world to not only hear our stories but support our efforts in 
delivering on those stories — that is, in making this a better and more secure 
world for all.
I do not pretend to be able to answer these questions, but I shall be happy 
to share with you my own experiences at the different UN meetings as well 
as within the region itself and elsewhere. At the last general assembly, I was 
very happy to note a number of developments which indicated the increased 
engagement of our region in some significant groupings within the United 
Nations: the Republic of the Fiji Islands is Chair of G77 and China, a grouping 
which is an influential negotiating block within the United Nations system; 
the Republic of Nauru is Chair of the Alliance of Small Island States, another 
influential negotiating group within the United Nations system; and the 
Independent State of Samoa will be hosting the Global Small Island Developing 
States Conference in 2014 — all demonstrating that even small island states can 
be relevant in international affairs.
In 2011 and this year we also had high-level visits into our region from the 
UN Secretary General: to the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and then to the Pacific 
Islands Forum Meeting in Auckland. There were also visits from the European 
Union President, the Vice-Minister from the People’s Republic of China, the 
Foreign Minister from Russia, and more recently the US Secretary of State. 
All these visits clearly indicate interest on the part of these countries in engaging 
with our region. 
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This is a new experience for our region and, quite frankly, I for one have not 
been able to fully analyse the reason for this new level of engagement on the part 
of these countries, and the implications for our foreign relations as individual 
countries and as a region. I must, however, be honest in saying that I find these 
initiatives most welcome indeed and worthy of close scrutiny. It is nice to be 
relevant. 
But as we focus our attention on our relations beyond our region, we need also 
to look at how we relate with each other within our own region. There can be no 
doubt that there is greater strength in regional solidarity. This has been clearly 
demonstrated in many areas, including regional fisheries, trade negotiations, 
environmental management, climate change, and so on. But let me refer to the 
more recent initiative on ocean management — the Pacific Oceanscape. This was 
initiated in 2009 but is already gathering such strong momentum, reaching 
global proportions by the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
with the launch of the World Bank initiative on Global Partnerships for Oceans 
on the margins of that conference. 
Following the designation of marine protected areas (MPAs) by a number of 
Pacific countries, it was considered that, rather than embarking on fragmented 
management of these MPAs, it would be logical to link them up in order to 
coordinate and share experiences in their management — hence the Pacific 
Oceanscape. Since its formal endorsement by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2010, 
several countries have declared new and increasingly larger MPAs, including 
Cook Island, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Australia. Other Pacific Island 
countries are also exploring their options for doing the same. However, the 
point that I wish to make here is that even though we may be small island states, 
we are large ocean states, and with a great deal more relevance in international 
affairs than we realised. The Pacific Ocean under the jurisdiction of Pacific 
Island countries is a significant portion of the earth’s surface, and I believe it 
is important to keep reminding ourselves of this fact, especially in our foreign 
policy analysis.
The last issue on the international agenda that I wish to touch on is climate 
change. I have deliberately left it till last, because it is by far the most 
challenging issue in international relations, one which threatens the survival of 
a number of countries within our region and beyond, and indeed the planet as 
a whole. I have no desire to delve into the science except to say that every time 
new science comes up it is more alarming than the last one. The scenarios put 
forward guarantee that some countries will not have much of a future even if 
greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero. So that poses serious challenges 
for countries like Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, etc.
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I have been quoted as saying many things about adaptation measures in response 
to the impacts of climate change. I have, time and time again, expressed my deep 
disappointment at the apparent lack of care by the many countries which can 
do the most to do something about this global scourge. I have even questioned 
the effectiveness of our international governance system in dealing with what 
is unquestionably an issue of survival which can only be addressed at the 
international level. How can we, in all conscience, and with all the science 
available to us, continue to regard this issue as a matter of sovereign right? 
Until we as a global community can commit to addressing this greatest moral 
challenge, there can never be any credibility or sincerity in any of our other 
initiatives. 
Tonight’s launch is timely, for I believe the Pacific is now entering a new phase 
— a new paradigm shift where the Pacific needs to chart its own course and 
lead global thinking in crucial areas such as climate change, ocean governance, 
and sustainable development. For a long time, we have been branded as ‘small 
island developing states’, since we emerged into the global stage as independent 
and sovereign states. Our mindset and vision of ourselves and the world has 
been influenced by this doctrine. More often than not, we see a world where 
developed countries will continue to dominate global politics and economics, 
whether we have a say in it or not. How much longer must we continue to 
remain pacific? Our very survival is in question.
Therefore, the message I wish to leave with you excellencies, ladies and 
gentlemen, but most especially with our Pacific International Relations Forum, 
is that we have no choice but to engage even more aggressively internationally, 
because the key to our survival will depend on whether international action is 
taken on climate change or not. I also wish to add that our strength is in our 
solidarity. We can and must continue to work diligently together to influence 











This paper makes the case for a new regional diplomacy architecture centred on 
a reformed Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). It does so on the strength of two existing 
developments that are clearly pointing in this direction. The first is the new 
evolving Pacific diplomacy and its overwhelming demand to create a Pacific 
voice for the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) to best address the 
issues that genuinely matter to them. Such a voice will render legitimacy to the 
utterances of the PSIDS on global issues in the global arena; it will be conducive 
to creating and fostering genuine partnerships with development partners that 
have an interest in the Pacific; and it will ensure that PSIDS’ own interests 
are not compromised by the national, international and geopolitical interests 
of Australia and New Zealand. This voice is already being expressed in real 
1  Some of the ideas developed here were first developed in a series of seminar presentations: ‘What We 
Have Learned About the Factors that Shape the Regional Institutional Structure and How Might this Structure 
be Optimised for the Benefits of Pacific Island Countries’, What Can We Learn Symposium, 6–8 November 
2012; ‘PIDF and the Future of Regionalism’, School of Government, Development and International Affairs, 
the University of the South Pacific, 5 September 2013; and ‘Pacific Diplomacy and the Future Regional 
Architecture’, Workshop on the New Pacific Diplomacy, University of the South Pacific, 4–5 December 2014.
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developments in PSIDS at New York, and in the revitalisation of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG) and the creation of the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum (PIDF).2
The second discourse is associated with Fiji’s response to the invitation to return 
to the PIF after suspension: that as a condition of re-entry, Australia’s and New 
Zealand’s membership status in the forum should be reconsidered in the light 
of their development partner status, and the significance of other development 
partners in the region. This Fiji position is prominent and relevant in driving the 
need for a debate over a suitable architecture to meet future needs of the Pacific 
Island states. The Fiji case is a political imperative in the region. If it is not 
addressed with wisdom and foresight, the implications for Pacific regionalism 
— its unity, solidarity and utility — could be serious indeed. Regional PSIDS 
leaders have their work cut out. Australia and New Zealand in particular should 
be forward-looking.3 There is little to gain from trying to retain the status quo 
when it has proven not to be delivering the goods. There is everything to gain, 
however, by looking through a fresh lens to a reconfigured regional architecture 
that promises better outcomes for all concerned, even to the extent of losing 
membership in an existing forum that has become outdated.
These two developments point to the need for a dialogue about reconfiguring 
the regional political architecture, and in particular to the membership and 
governance of the PIF. In this chapter, I develop a rationale for undertaking 
such a reconfiguration based on an assessment of the achievements of Pacific 
regionalism since 1971. I argue that Pacific regionalism has been disappointing: 
it has under-delivered in many areas. The assessment points to the constraining 
nature of the regional architecture. The membership of Australia and New 
Zealand in the current regional architecture creates a dichotomy and an over-
diversity of membership that has not supported the optimisation of benefits 
from regional initiatives. This points to the need to move to a PIF without 
Australia and New Zealand, in order to bring about the optimisation of benefits 
that have long evaded the PSIDS. Increased benefits need to accrue to the PSIDS 
for Pacific regionalism to be worthwhile, useful, and meaningful, to bring about 
economic and social development to the PSIDS and to facilitate their integration 
into the global economy. 
2  These institutional developments are detailed in Tarte (2014).
3  Greg Fry has just released a paper, ‘Recapturing the Spirit of 1971: Towards a new regional political 
settlement in the Pacific’ (2015a) which is intended to inform the proposed meeting in Sydney. He raised five 
areas of discussion in the paper. His third point is directed at Australia and New Zealand: ‘recognising the 
need for Australia and New Zealand to return to a 1971 interpretation of equality and partnership within the 
PIF with possible consideration of a reintroduction of the island caucus system of the first PIF’. This chapter 
goes further, not only in recreating an island caucus, but formalising it into a forum which is formally and 
contractually linked to Australia and New Zealand.
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However, given the continued significance of Australia and New Zealand to the 
PSIDS, and given our shared regionality, this chapter argues that Australia and 
New Zealand should still attract a special place in the new regional architecture. 
Furthermore, the need to reflect on the role of other development partners 
vis-à-vis the new regional architecture is not only an acknowledgement of global 
reality, but also a firm statement of PSIDS’ own strategy in wanting to create 
its own Pacific vision in response to the increasing global focus on the region. 
The Rationale for an All-PSIDS Forum
New Pacific diplomacy, whatever field it is conducted in, inevitably points to 
the need for a PSIDS-only forum. Utterances from an all-PSIDS forum will be 
seen as more legitimate, and consequently increases the audience and adherents 
of the PSIDS globally. An all-PSIDS forum will protect the integrity, coherence 
and sustainability of its critical issues. This avoids the current situation where 
these issues can come under pressure from Australia and New Zealand, with 
their often contradictory views, risking compromise of these issues and/or 
lowered prioritisation. An all-PSIDS forum will be most conducive for the 
growing south–south partnerships and is likely to benefit maximally from such 
partnerships. Such a forum can also benefit appropriately from north–south 
partnerships, especially if it repositions itself strategically in the global arena, 
driven by transformative leadership and backed by committed interlocutors 
who can bring energy and dynamism into their work. The partnerships for 
cooperation, rather than for dominance, are essential for the PSIDS. 
An all-PSIDS forum is likely to effectively advance the evolving new Pacific 
diplomacy in all areas of significance to the PSIDS — climate change, 
environment, seabed mining, oceans and fisheries — and it may reclaim its 
place, which it seemed to have lost due to an increased focus on regional 
integration in recent times. An all-PSIDS forum will be a natural source of 
regional mandates for the PSIDS in the UN. This is critical, given the increasing 
impact of the PSIDS in the UN. The PSIDS group in the UN will play an 
important role in identifying and securing future partners and resources for 
the PSIDS, especially given the naturally high budgets that would be required 
to operate the new forum.
Regional Cooperation Lessons
Successful regionalism from the perspective of group (or club) membership is 
addressed in ‘Toward a New Pacific Regionalism’ (Asian Development Bank–
Commonwealth Secretariat 2005, p. xv). It promotes having to draw lessons 
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from the economic theory of clubs, and it draws two lessons: (i) a club must 
be self-sustaining; and, (ii) a club must provide a large pool of net benefits for 
each of its members. Understandably, the success or failure of a club depends 
on its benefits exceeding its costs. The Pacific Plan, which was developed to 
take the region ‘toward a new Pacific regionalism’, lost its way in the process. 
Political economy aspects — dominance of donors and development partners 
over the aspirations of the final beneficiaries, for instance — contributed to the 
malaise that drove the plan off course.
The existing regional architecture has under-delivered on regional cooperation. 
It is logical, therefore, to revisit the regional architecture for better delivery of 
critical regional issues. The need to increase benefits to members points to the 
need to reform the membership of PIF to bring about commonality, similarity of 
developmental status, interests, expectations, and aspirations. Such commonality 
will decrease the over-diversity of the group, especially the dichotomy of 
membership between the island states and their large, developed neighbours. 
This naturally leads to the reform to establish a PSIDS-only forum, without 
the participation of developed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Such a reform is logical, given similar regional 
groupings around the world and their respective membership composition 
—  for example, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 
and a host of African regional economic communities (RECs). The current PIF 
stands out due to its mixed membership. If such mixed membership were the 
modus operandi in RECs, what has prevented Australia and New Zealand from 
inviting the PSIDS to be parties to the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)? 
Reducing the costs of regional cooperation is problematic for PSIDS. In the 
first place, conducting regional cooperation in the Pacific is costly for a host 
of reasons, including long distances, high costs of travel, poor infrastructure, 
and diseconomies of isolation. There is still scope, however, for cost reduction 
through more effective and creative economies of scale, and creative application 
of IT in the conduct of meetings. Increased costs from diseconomies of isolation 
give rise to the prospect of a sub-regional approach within Pacific regionalism, 
with the aim of cost-effectiveness through more focused selectivity of issues of 
interests, economy and complementarity — a trend already evident, although 
each sub-region may need to be more strategic in terms of its operations and 
raison d’être. 
Costs subsidisation of regional cooperation in the region will abate with increased 
contributions from PSIDS members over time. Increased contributions are a 
factor of national and regional development, economic growth, and meaningful 
and productive integration into the global economy for the PSIDS. 
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Increased ownership of funding/costs of regional cooperation by the PSIDS will 
remove the price distortion currently experienced where Australia and New 
Zealand subsidise regional meetings, and where beneficiaries or participants of 
regional meetings are not the financiers but are usually incentivised to attend 
meetings, even if outcomes of the meetings are not immediately relevant. 
There is, however, a time lag before such ownership can be established. In the 
meantime, cost-subsidisation is a development cost for the region that needs 
to be met. This is best promoted in the context of PSIDS being treated as a 
‘special case’. The UN is united on this matter.4 As such, it can be envisaged that 
more flexibility, reduced conditionality and greater creativity in design will be 
factored into the determination of development funds for the PSIDS. 
In promoting the primacy of PSIDS interests in the context of Pacific regionalism, 
it is imperative therefore to reform Australia’s and New Zealand’s funding 
obligations. The reform does not necessarily entail having to sever the funding 
relationship. The funds are needed. What it entails, however, is the creation 
of a mechanism that allows Australia and New Zealand to be at arm’s length 
regarding the use of their own funds. This would logically have an impact on 
the configuration of Pacific regionalism and of the membership of PIF.5
Market Integration Lessons
The dichotomy of existing PIF membership, with the developed OECD members 
(Australia and New Zealand) at one end of the spectrum and the 14 small island 
developing states at the other end, has not encouraged joint efforts to optimise 
their economic integration. The preferential and non-reciprocal South Pacific 
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), for instance, 
would have been welcomed for its generous concessions; and the Fijian textile, 
clothing and footwear industry took full advantage of these concessions to grow 
the industry. However, the trade agreement failed to address the supply factors 
of the other PSIDS’ principal industries. 
4  See, for example, A/RES/66/288, Resolution 66/288, ‘The Future We Want’, adopted by the UNGA, 
27 July 2012, paragraphs 178–180 establish the special case for small island developing states. See also UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Resolution 68/1, adopted after a strong 
submission by Pacific leaders at the ESCAP Commission in 2012. See UN ESCAP (2012, p. 6).
5  Consideration of the treatment of Australia and New Zealand differently in the context of Pacific 
regionalism and as regards PIF’s membership is not a totally new subject. A number of regional commentators 
have given their sides of the story recently. See, for example, O’Keefe (2012), Grynberg (2012), and Tavola 
(2012). ‘Toward a New Pacific Regionalism’ (Asian Development Bank–Commonwealth Secretariat 2005, p. 80) 
had floated a similar sentiment in 2005. 
THE NEW PACIFIC DIPLOMACY
32
Fast forward to 2015, the reciprocal Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
(PACER) Plus negotiations are struggling to conclude. Two issues of development 
resources and labour mobility, critical to the PSIDS, are likely to scupper these 
negotiations, due to the inflexibility of Australia and New Zealand on these issues. 
An all-PSIDS forum will remove such dichotomy of membership. Members of the 
new PIF will have the same interests, in that they are all developing countries, 
notwithstanding their geographical diversity, and are all trying to integrate 
successfully into the global economy while trying to manage the overwhelming 
onslaught of globalisation. Market access and other concessions offered by 
developed economies will still be available and welcome under the proposed new 
regional architecture. However, their conduct will be guided by the provisions of 
the overarching agreement that will be negotiated in good faith. 
A major constraint to regional cooperation and the delivery of outcomes under 
market integration is the lack of national capacity. This remains a challenge 
notwithstanding the efforts that have been directed at human resources 
development. This problem will not disappear by reconfiguring relations with 
Australia and New Zealand. What can happen, however, is that a modality for 
resolving the problem could be found in the context of an all-PSIDS forum. It is 
envisaged that much benefit will come through deepened regional integration, 
but in an unconventional way — through regional integration on the basis 
of non-trade issues, for example, on capacity building, climate change, and 
environment. It is further envisaged that since the modality is unconventional, 
it may not be of interest to Australia and New Zealand. Developed countries 
like Australia and New Zealand would tend to see more gains and value in 
conventional regional integration, modelled on the European Union, for instance.
Regional Delivery of Services (Pooling)
Voluntary regionalism is a constraint to regional pooling of resources. The choice 
to shift away to involuntary regionalism (to introduce degrees of binding into 
collective decisions), is not going to come automatically to the new PIF, as 
suggested in this chapter. It is envisaged, however, that the new scenario created 
in having an all-PSIDS forum will be conducive to redressing the problem vis-
à-vis the current PIF. In the first place, the diversity of membership will be 
reduced. Commonality of interests will therefore tend to be a driving force 
in decision-making. Secondly, an all-PSIDS forum is likely to learn and adopt 
lessons from the sub-region that shares the same membership. This is especially 
so if, for example, a sub-region is to recommend binding decisions after it has 
been trialled in that sub-region. This is based on the precept that, once trialled 
in a smaller, more homogenous group, champions from that group can then 
advocate to the larger group. 
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Trialling binding of decisions at the sub-regional level can even be part of a 
larger exploratory intervention on the political economy of the group. It is 
postulated by a number of commentators of RECs that poor management of 
the political economy aspects of regionalism has contributed to the poor state 
of these RECs. For the new regional architecture, supported by a number of 
existing sub-regions, it is considered best strategy to trial issues of this nature 
in the smaller group before introduction into the larger group. In any case, 
studies on the political economy of Pacific regionalism are critical.
Conclusion on Lessons Drawn
If the lessons drawn are taken seriously and implemented effectively, we can 
anticipate improved results from Pacific regionalism in all its phases. To date, 
Pacific regionalism seems to be proceeding conventionally — linearly, though 
in its early stages. Pacific regionalism has to proceed in the collective interests 
of the PSIDS. Its approach and phases of development, however, will become 
evident under the new architecture. The prospect of an unconventional approach 
regarding regional integration on the basis of non-trade issues is flagged in this 
chapter. It is also relevant to underline that efforts at regional integration should 
not necessarily displace PSIDS’ collective efforts at diplomacy at the regional 
and global levels, especially diplomacy relating to global issues critical to PSIDS. 
Since 2002, PIF and PSIDS have devoted a lot of time and effort to negotiating 
trade agreements such as economic partnership agreements, the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), PICTA trade in services, and PACER Plus. 
This work is still continuing.
The Proposed Regional Architecture
The first step in establishing this new architecture is to declare an all-PSIDS 
forum without Australia and New Zealand. The designation of PSIDS is the 
preferred designation under the new architecture for the prospect of strategic 
linkage to the UN. The 14 PSIDS will immediately constitute the membership 
of the new PIF. The PIF Secretariat (PIFS) would continue as the secretariat of 
the new PIF but be subjected to reform in the near future. The question of PIFS 
being substituted by PIDF has been raised in some circles. This however is not 
being implied here. The recommended role of PIDF as a Council of Regional 
Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) agency, providing technical advice to the 
new PIF, is flagged below.
THE NEW PACIFIC DIPLOMACY
34
The second step is to recognise and acknowledge the existing sub-regional 
bodies as the constituent building blocks of the new PIF. These sub-regional 
bodies are the MSG, Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), Micronesian Chief 
Executives’ Summit (MCES), Pacific–African, Caribbean and Pacific (PACP), 
Smaller Island States (SIS), and PSIDS themselves: members of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). Sub-regions are to determine the issues that are 
best handled at that level and those that are best treated at the new PIF level. 
Criteria of allocation of these issues should be based on value-adding prospects, 
complementarity, relative efficiency and efficacy, and best trialling prospects 
of certain issues (binding commitment to decisions made, political economy, 
and cost benefit analysis of regional initiatives) in the interests of the larger 
collective. The new PIF should formalise its links to the PSIDS in the UN.
Thirdly, membership of the new PIF is to grow organically to incorporate all 23 
Pacific Island countries and territories that are currently members of the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC) — ‘organically’ being the operative word, implying care, 
vision, strategy, and utilitarianism. Membership is to also incorporate NGOs and 
eventually the private sector. This is an important point for Fiji, which has been 
particularly vocal on this matter. Modality of incorporation of their membership, 
however, can be informed and prescribed by the lessons from PIDF (an inclusive 
approach) and from MSG (described as Inter-Governmental Body (IGB) plus, 
given that its membership comprises governments and a political party). This 
can also be informed by future conversations on the merit and demerit of the 
concept of an IGB in the context of being inclusive in the name of sustainable 
development. Strategically, therefore, we should remain open to all prospects of 
representation and engagement, including preparatory parallel conferences of 
different constituencies leading to joint summits.
Fourthly, the establishment of the new PIF should also signal the start of 
essential reforms in the region. Given the duplication of issues amongst some of 
the CROP agencies, including PIFS, and the resultant inefficiency and inefficacy 
in implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these regional issues, there 
should be a follow-up study to the 2005 Regional Institutional Framework 
(RIF) study.6 This is particularly pertinent, since the recommendations of the 
2005 study were not fully implemented; some were subsequently misdirected. 
Politicisation of issues was partially to blame. This follow-up RIF could have an 
expanded terms of reference to address and rationalise the duplication of issues 
that exist in the region amongst the CROP agencies, with the aim of bringing 
6  See Hughes (2005).
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efficiency and efficacy in the delivery of services in the region; to review the 
duties and structure of the secretariat in the context of the new PIF; and to 
review the optimisation of benefits in all regional initiatives.
Fifthly, the prospect of exploring PIDF as a CROP agency should also be pursued. 
PIDF has special significance for Fiji, given its conception during the period of 
Fiji’s suspension from PIF. Its significance is also built around the inclusivity 
of its membership. It is imperative, therefore, that lessons drawn from this 
inclusive approach, especially the inclusivity applied, should inform future 
work on membership of the new PIF, as proposed above. The question of PIDF 
becoming the secretariat for the new PIF does not arise in this reconfiguration of 
the regional architecture. This chapter presents PIDF as a possible CROP agency. 
Its competence lies in the proliferation of green growth policies in the Pacific, 
and here it stands unchallenged as the sole purveyor of green growth technical 
advice to the new PIF.
Figure 3.1: Proposed inter-regional structure of new Pacific Islands Forum
Source: Author’s research.
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The New Pacific Islands Forum and Australia 
and New Zealand
Any regionalism project is costly. This is particularly true for Pacific regionalism, 
given the regional geography, the tyranny of distance, and the diseconomies 
of isolation. Even though the reform calls for a membership reconfiguration 
without Australia and New Zealand, it is still critical to retain their goodwill 
and generosity by way of a formally negotiated inter-regional agreement. 
This is only logical given, inter alia, our shared regionality and history with 
these two developed countries. The justification of continuing relations and 
partnerships with Australia and New Zealand goes beyond funding and financial 
considerations. What is being envisaged is a win-win situation for both parties of 
the existing PIF. Such an agreement will bind the two parties together in future. 
The provisions of the agreement will be negotiated in good faith and to focus 
on areas of need for both sides. The inter-regional agreement would not in any 
way undermine bilateral relations and could enhance bilateral commitments, 
by providing a focus on development and funding gaps that can be filled or on 
areas that can augment or supplement bilateral initiatives. For Fiji, coming out 
of suspension and sanctions, this bilateral scenario offers exciting prospects.
It is thus proposed that a special agreement be negotiated and established 
between the new PIF and Australia and New Zealand. Such an agreement would 
represent an overarching agreement between the two parties and could be 
modelled on the European Union–Africa Caribbean Pacific Cotonou Agreement. 
The overarching agreement would include political, economic and development 
aspects of the new relations. PACER and PACER Plus could be appropriately 
situated in the agreement. The labour mobility schemes could also be specifically 
reflected in the agreement. The prospect of an Inter-PIF–ANZCER agreement 
could also be pursued should it prove imperative for Australia and New Zealand 
particularly.
The New PIF and Other Development Partners
It is also logical, reasonable and strategic to negotiate and establish similar 
agreements with other development partners who seek genuine and forward-
looking partnerships with PSIDS. It is imperative for PSIDS therefore to identify 
the relative strengths of prospective development partners and seek, through 
negotiated treaty provisions, ways and means to take full advantage of these 
strengths in the resourcing of their development plans.
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The overarching agreement between the new PIF and Australia and New Zealand 
provides a possible template for use in negotiating agreements between the new 
PIF and other development partners. Agreements are to be negotiated with all 
current development partners as a starting point. New development partners 
can be added subsequently. For some partners — Japan, Korea, and the UN 
— new multilateral/plurilateral agreements can be formulated and built upon 
on the basis of ongoing unilateral programmes/conferences/summits. Others are 
to be selected on the basis of their respective benefits (for example, benefits 
that accrue from pooled services funded from development resources), and 
their strategic and geopolitical significance (south–south relations, strategic 
and innovative north–south relations). In all cases, the new PIF is to recognise 
the strength that each development partner offers and negotiate to take full 
advantage of that specific strength.
Conclusion
In his Devpolicy Blog, Professor Greg Fry provided four scenarios for the future 
configuration of regional architecture (Fry 2015b). His third scenario was that of 
doing nothing and maintaining the status quo. From his analysis of that scenario, 
he drew the following conclusions: (i) Fiji will not resume PIF membership; 
(ii) Fiji will continue promotion of PIDF, PSIDS and the MSG; (iii)  the region 
will see the entrenchment of two competing Pacific regional systems with 
overlapping membership; and, (iv) regional unity will be hampered and scarce 
human and financial resources will be spread thinly and inefficiently.
I agree with this assessment. To do nothing and simply maintain the status quo 
will drastically set Pacific regionalism backward and all forum island countries 
will be worse off. This is the logical conclusion from the analysis of past lessons 
developed here. Moreover, in Fiji’s absence from PIF, the region will also lack a 
maverick to prick our collective consciences on occasions when we lose sight of 
our regional diplomatic aspirations.
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The Future of the Pacific Islands 
Forum and the Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism1
Dame Meg Taylor
Thank you for the opportunity to speak on the future of the Pacific Islands 
Forum and the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. These are important 
topics to discuss at an important juncture in our region’s history. Allow me 
to acknowledge the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Rajesh Chandra, and his staff 
for the warm welcome and for extending the invitation to me. This is the first 
public lecture that I have been engaged with since taking up office and I am sure 
it will not be the last. Let me state for the record that I have been in office for five 
months, so I seek your understanding that anything delivered here comes from 
within that limited time span. 
Since taking up office, I have visited 10 countries and will visit the remaining 
six before the leaders meeting in September. It has been very useful for me to 
make face-to-face contact with the leaders, including key officials to whom the 
secretariat belongs. I also want to state that I have been given a term of three 
1  Address by Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Diplomacy Roundtable, School of 
Government, Development and International Affairs, Faculty of Business and Economics, the University of the 
South Pacific, 27 May 2015.
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years in which to successfully implement the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. 
Let me assure you that I will be working very hard with my staff at the secretariat 
to ensure that we deliver on the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. 
As a region, we face numerous shared challenges: managing our ocean and 
fisheries resources, our land-based natural resources, and trying to manage and 
mitigate the effects of climate change. Economic development remains elusive 
for the large part across the region, while dependence on development assistance 
remains high, and in some parts of our region it is necessary for the delivery of 
basic services.
There is unprecedented interest by a wide range of external actors in our region 
— some new, some old — and all have combined to present a crowded and 
complex geopolitical landscape. In addition, our regional architecture is more 
complex and varied than it once was. Part of this complexity arises from the 
way in which the regional architecture is governed and financed. Some regional 
institutions have members who are metropolitan countries and donor partners. 
Many regional institutions do work encouraged by or in response to their 
funding sources. These configurations present a complex regional architecture 
where geopolitics and finance play an important part. It is important that we, as 
individuals and citizens of the countries and territories of the Pacific, are aware 
of these complexities. 
Against this backdrop, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism presents an 
opportunity, both for the region and for the Pacific Islands Forum. For the region, 
it presents an opportunity to work towards the deeper form of regionalism 
that was always envisaged under the Pacific Plan, but was not delivered on; 
a regionalism that would acknowledge and recognise our shared challenges, 
draw on our many shared strengths, build the political will to act collectively, 
and devise and carry out effective, collective solutions to these challenges — 
whether through technical or political means. 
The Framework for Pacific Regionalism also signals or demands a number of 
shifts on the part of the Pacific Islands Forum. These include a greater political 
commitment to regionalism; a more inclusive Pacific Islands Forum; a forum 
that is open to robust and frank discussion about regionalism; and a secretariat 
to the Pacific Islands Forum that offers high-level policy advice to support and 
inform leaders’ discussions and decisions. 
I will begin this discussion by talking very broadly about the Framework for 
Pacific Regionalism and some of its key features. I will then say more about the 
shifts to the Pacific Islands Forum and its secretariat that the new framework 
signals. First, I will make a few introductory comments. 
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Introductory Comments
The first is a caveat: that it is important to recognise that regionalism must be 
about improving the lives of the people of the Pacific, and about fulfilling the 
goals and objectives set out in the framework. Regionalism cannot be pursued 
for its own sake. There must be some tangible benefit that it brings about. 
If regionalism is not doing this, then the strategy must be thoroughly evaluated.
It is worth pointing out that the debate and the discussion about regionalism 
and its benefit is ongoing. There is never a point where the value of regionalism 
is assumed. It is continually brought into question and challenged. Regionalism 
is by no means an assumed good. Regionalism is something that must be revised 
and revisited and made relevant and appropriate. Our role, and the role of 
those who work in regional institutions, is to ensure that regionalism remains 
relevant, and that it delivers tangible benefits to the people of the Pacific. 
The second is that the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, and regionalism more 
generally, is not intended as a replacement for national effort. We will always, 
first and foremost, think and act as citizens of our own Pacific Island countries, 
no matter the level of regional integration in the Pacific. There is no doubting 
the primary sense of identity that we derive from our nationalities, from our 
culture and custom. There is often a perception that regionalism will somehow 
displace nationalism or do away with national sovereignty or identity. This is 
not, by any means, assumed under the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, and 
it is also worth noting that the priorities that come about through the framework 
must complement national effort. Any encroachment on national sovereignty 
under the framework needs to be undertaken with the greatest caution.
Thirdly, in spite of these caveats, there is clearly a role for regionalism. I see 
our region as being one of great opportunity and promise. I said that we face 
numerous shared challenges, but that we also possess abundant natural and 
human resources. Our ability to deliver on our potential depends in large part 
on our ability to think and act collectively — not only at the political level, 
but also at the local level. Additionally, our collective voice at the global level on 
key issues to our region is of continuing importance to our collective well-being. 
Fourthly, I earlier made mention of the regional architecture. What I would say 
in respect to the range of actors in the regional space — whether at regional level 
or sub-regional level, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Polynesian 
Leaders Group and the Micronesian Leaders Summit, or whether they represent 
special interests as in the case of the parties to the Nauru Agreement — is that 
our goals and interests are fundamentally one and the same: we all want to 
improve the lives of the people of the Pacific and we all recognise that working 
collectively at some level can help to achieve that goal. 
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Finally, the role of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat amongst the range of 
regional institutions is clear. We have a mandate to carry out the wishes and the 
decisions of the leaders of the 16 independent forum countries of the Pacific. 
We also have a responsibility to provide leaders and officials with high quality 
policy advice in support of their work of making good regional public policy 
decisions. I am committed to ensuring that the forum secretariat delivers on 
these expectations, now and into the future. I also want to ensure that we have 
good working relationships with other regional and sub-regional institutions, 
to ensure that we are delivering effectively and efficiently on the regional agenda 
under the framework. 
The forum secretariat’s position in relation to Fiji is quite clear. Our position 
is to respect and support the decisions taken by forum leaders. We welcome 
the recent pronouncements by the Hon. Prime Minister of Fiji regarding 
their participation in all forum activities at the public service, technical and 
ministerial levels, and we look forward to advancing the work and development 
of the region together with Fiji. You would have noted in the media over the past 
week that Fiji’s Supervisor of Elections recently led a Forum Election Observer 
mission to Bougainville, providing important technical and logistical leadership 
to the elections observation there. This is indeed encouraging for the forum and 
its secretariat.
I also wish to remind us of successful examples of regional cooperation where 
shared commitments and values have led to some tangible benefits. Our very 
own regional University of the South Pacific is a case in point. This university 
is not only the place that produces our next generation of leaders and thinkers, 
but it is a very important hub for interactions between peoples from right across 
our large and diverse region.
The Framework for Pacific Regionalism 
You will recall that the eminent person, Sir Mekere Morauta, and his review 
team canvassed the opinions of over 700 people across the region and took 
in over 70 public submissions during the review of the Pacific Plan in 2013. 
It was a widely consultative process, and one which overwhelmingly called for 
an overhaul of the Pacific Plan. The review team noted that the plan was in 
many ways a highly productive regional strategy and that it was not delivering 
the kind of regionalism that was originally intended. There was little political 
buy-in from leaders, and the regional agenda was largely driven by officials 
and regional agencies. As a result, the number of so-called priorities produced 
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under the Pacific Plan was unworkable; in one year alone there had been up to 
37 priorities presented to leaders at their annual meeting. In short, regionalism 
had lost its politics under the Pacific Plan. 
One of the review team’s major recommendations was to replace the Pacific 
Plan with the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, which has now been in place 
since its endorsement in Palau by the Pacific Islands Forum leaders in July 2014. 
As a strategy for delivering on regionalism, the framework is a flexible one. It 
contains a vision, and a set of values and objectives, as well as a process for 
identifying the region’s public policy priorities. But it does not prescribe any 
specific priorities, as the Pacific Plan did. It does not set out a timetable for 
delivering on regionalism. It does not prescribe a particular form of regionalism 
for the Pacific to adopt or take up. This flexibility provides space — space for 
the region’s citizens to voice their concerns and raise initiatives for leaders; 
space for a more robust dialogue at leaders’ level about regionalism; and space 
for regionalism to progress at a pace that is appropriate and suited to the many 
stakeholders concerned. 
A set of tests for regional action is identified in the framework. These tests 
are central to assessing and selecting the regional initiatives that will be put 
forward for leaders’ consideration and discussion at their forum this year. 
These tests will help to ensure that initiatives have a regional character, which 
benefit people, and require political oversight. These tests will provide rigour to 
regional priorities. The specialist sub-committee on regionalism — with a make-
up of representatives from Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia, Australia and New 
Zealand, small islands states, civil society and the private sector, and with the 
secretary general as chair of the committee — is tasked with selecting a limited 
number of initiatives, submitted by citizens and organisations from within the 
region, for leaders to consider at their annual meeting later this year. 
Monitoring and reporting on the framework will be a priority. In recognising 
this, we will need to develop a set of indicators and measures to ensure that we 
are making effective progress, so as to ensure that these measures are aligned 
to the sustainable development goals. This reporting will not be confined to 
the regional initiatives that arise from the framework. Reporting will also be 
carried out on the framework itself to ensure that we monitor and report on the 
‘state of regionalism’, that is, to ascertain whether regionalism is effective and is 
delivering on the expected objectives.  
I wish to highlight four features of the framework.
THE NEW PACIFIC DIPLOMACY
44
An Emphasis on Focused Political Conversations 
Out of a recognition of the fact that regionalism had lost its politics under the 
Pacific Plan, the framework places an emphasis on creating the time and space 
for leaders to have open and robust discussions about regionalism — about what 
the regional agenda should be, about what forms of regionalism are appropriate, 
and about the pace at which regionalism should occur. The opportunity for 
leaders to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of regional approaches is 
fundamental to the success of the framework — without these conversations 
occurring at the political level, regionalism will not progress or deliver on 
expectations. 
Changes to the Regional Architecture 
The Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) structure, which 
is synonymous with Pacific regionalism, is not without its issues. The deeper 
form of regionalism called for by the framework requires a more coordinated 
approach and effective regional governance, including a set of financing 
arrangements, if it is to be effectively realised. At the core of this is analysis 
of how collective effort and action is best governed and incentivised. In short, 
we need to interrogate how the network of regional agencies can be better 
positioned to deliver on the framework, acknowledging that, at an institutional 
level, their specific mandates are clear. 
The secretariat has already started work in this area by reviewing the CROP 
working groups, to ensure that these groups are well positioned to deliver on the 
regional agenda under the framework. We will also shortly carry out a review 
of all meetings that require the attendance of officials, ministers and leaders, to 
ensure that these meetings are relevant and effective, and worth the time taken 
by participants to actually attend, and that there is policy cohesion between 
meetings and the work of regional organisations. Most importantly, we are also 
conducting a review of the governance and financing arrangements of CROP 
with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, to ensure that these arrangements 
are also positioned to deliver on regionalism under the framework. 
Greater Inclusiveness
The process for determining the region’s priorities under the framework calls 
for any and all members of the Pacific Islands Forum community to submit ideas 
and concepts around key issues for the region. This marks a fundamental shift 
away from previous practice, whereby priorities were largely determined by 
officials or regional agencies, with very little consultation of the broader public. 
From our consultations thus far, the opening up of this process has been largely 
welcomed by regional civil society and private sector stakeholders. 
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A Shift in the Development Paradigm 
The framework represents a major shift in the development paradigm. We 
are talking about a process whereby the region’s priorities — political, social, 
economic, and developmental — will, over time, be determined primarily 
by the Pacific Islands Forum leaders through an open public policy process. 
This is a change to current practice. Presently, it is an uphill battle for leaders 
to articulate and put forward their own collective agenda at the regional level, 
when there are so many actors and partners at the table. 
Future of the Pacific Islands Forum 
What does the framework mean for the future of the Pacific Islands Forum? 
I  suggest that it signals at least four important shifts for the Pacific Islands 
Forum.
Political Commitment to Regionalism by Leaders 
The Pacific Islands Forum leaders have mandated the implementation of the 
framework, now it is incumbent on them to drive it forward; our leaders need 
to make a political commitment to taking collective approaches to addressing 
common challenges. This requires collective political will to act regionally, 
recognising the inherent and natural tensions that exist between national and 
regional imperatives. Ongoing dialogue is important if we are to sustain this 
collective commitment to regionalism over the long term. 
A More Inclusive Pacific Islands Forum 
The framework sets out an open, inclusive public policy process — one that 
seeks the views of those beyond government and the usual set of stakeholders, 
in a meaningful and practical way. In particular, this process seeks the views of 
those who did not previously have access to regional priority-setting processes: 
civil society, the private sector, community groups, academia, and citizens, for 
example. This inclusive approach requires a shift on the part of the Pacific Islands 
Forum and its secretariat; it means incorporating the views of those outside the 
traditional set of stakeholders. There will be some challenges in the short term, 
and we will have our points of difference around issues, but the fundamental 
tenet here is that we work together and that we harness the strengths of those 
in civil society and in the private sector. 
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Inclusivity, however, cannot be limited to this process. It needs to be more 
than a buzzword. The forum secretariat must engage with civil society and the 
private sector more routinely in its work. We need to recognise the important 
role that civil society plays in the regional space. 
I have begun to reach out to a number of regional civil society and private sector 
organisations, some of whom are in the audience today. We have engaged formally 
and informally, and I am encouraged by our conversations and interactions. 
I also think that there is a role for academia in this new paradigm. The forum 
secretariat can do more to bridge the divide between policy and research. 
Sound policy is based in part on robust knowledge and analysis, and I am very 
interested in developing closer relationships with the University of the South 
Pacific and other universities and think tanks in the region in order to develop 
partnerships that support and enhance regional policy making. 
A More Effective Post-Forum Dialogue 
The framework calls for improved and more meaningful political discussions at 
the regional level. Some have expressed concerns that the post-forum dialogue is 
not the productive mechanism for political dialogue that it should be. There are 
issues with the format of the discussion, and many of our regional partners 
reduce the effectiveness of the post-forum dialogue by bringing bilateral issues 
to the discussion table. 
The process for priority-setting that the framework calls for needs to be 
accompanied by an improvement in the quality of our conversations about 
regionalism, and this includes those conversations with our post-forum dialogue 
partners. We are already conducting work in this space in consultation with our 
members, with our post-forum dialogue partners, and with the government of 
Papua New Guinea, who will host this year’s leaders forum. 
A Fit-For-Purpose Secretariat to the Pacific Islands Forum 
The Framework for Pacific Regionalism calls for some fundamental changes to 
the Pacific Islands Forum, and there is a need to ensure that the secretariat is 
fit for purpose in light of these changes. An external review commissioned by 
senior management has just been carried out in the secretariat, and in response 
to this review, a change process aligned to the implementation of the framework 
is now in place, to ensure that we have the right institutional set up within the 
secretariat to deliver on the framework over the short- and long-term future. 
The framework demands a number of important and fundamental changes for 
the secretariat, so it is important that we look at ourselves to see whether we are 
fit-for-purpose to deliver. 
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The secretariat will also have to position itself to provide responsive, high quality, 
and high-level policy advice to the leaders in support of their discussions and 
decisions on regional issues. This policy advice should not only be about issues, 
but also about the state of regionalism, and the extent to which regionalism is 
valued. Leaders’ decisions on regionalism will be enhanced and strengthened 
by quality policy advice. 
The forum secretariat also needs to find its optimal position in relation to other 
CROP agencies. The secretariat’s role is primarily political and policy-oriented, 
although it is the case that we currently implement projects and activities. 
The way in which we align ourselves and work with and support our fellow 
CROP agencies will be vital in delivering effectively on the regional agenda 
under the framework. 
Conclusion
In summary, the framework calls for a Pacific Islands Forum that is willing 
to embrace a deeper level of regionalism; that incorporates and harnesses all 
perspectives and opinions within the regional community; and that is willing to 
take a leadership role. It will lead to a strengthened Pacific Islands Forum — one 
that provides genuine regional leadership, that responds to the challenges of the 
region, and that embraces and practices the principles of inclusivity. I believe 
that it is important for the Pacific Islands Forum to continue to play a leadership 
role in the regional space, given it is the only political grouping comprising 
all 16 independent Pacific Islands countries. However, it is important that the 
Pacific Islands Forum make the kinds of shifts that the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism demands, to deliver fully on the expectations that the people of the 




The New Framework for 
Pacific Regionalism: Old kava 
in a new tanoa?
Claire Slatter
In October 2005, in Port Moresby, Pacific Island leaders adopted the Pacific Plan. 
Described as ‘the master strategy for strengthening regional cooperation and 
integration in the Pacific’, it was greeted with much criticism from academics, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and citizens’ groups in the region.1 
The outcome of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) set up by the Pacific Islands 
Forum in 2003, the Pacific Plan was first of all seen as the brainchild of New 
Zealand, particularly several senior civil servants from New Zealand including 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade personnel, who were part of the team 
supporting the EPG, were believed to have largely authored it. The plan was 
criticised for paying lip service to Pacific values and cultures, while primarily 
endorsing a neoliberal economic agenda that ran counter to Pacific peoples’ 
interests. Critics argued that it failed to address the needs of Pacific people, 
particularly the poor and marginalised, and was out of touch with the lived 
realities of Pacific Islanders (Coates 2006, p. 3).
1  Oxfam New Zealand’s Executive Director at the time, Barry Coates, cited the following criticisms of 
the Pacific Plan by civil society organisations, academics and community representatives: ‘a lack of genuine 
consultation, the lack of focus on the needs of those who suffer hardship and injustice, and insufficient 
connection to the reality of people’s lives’ (Coates 2006).
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The 2013 review of the Pacific Plan offered an opportunity to imagine a future 
desired by Pacific Island people, and to create an authentically Islander-centred 
development framework. Public submissions received by the review team, 
headed by former Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta, 
reportedly included 37 submissions from civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and/or leaders, out of a total of 65 submissions. Delivering the final report to 
Pacific leaders on 31 October 2013, Sir Mekere Morauta called for ‘a new level 
and quality of political debate, policy and cooperation at the regional level’. 
The report contained 36 recommendations to Pacific leaders, and a draft New 
Framework for Pacific Regionalism. The draft framework was widely circulated 
for feedback before a finalised version was adopted by Pacific leaders in Palau 
in July 2014. 
How new is the New Framework for Pacific Regionalism? How different is it 
from its earlier iteration? Does it reflect any of the concerns and ideas expressed 
in civil society submissions to the review team? Does the New Framework for 
Pacific Regionalism inspire confidence in Pacific leadership and ownership of 
our leaders’ vision? Or does it sorely disappoint by offering Pacific Island people 
more of the same? 
This chapter examines the New Framework for Pacific Regionalism and assesses 
the extent to which it reflects alternative views and visions of a Pacific future 
that have been gaining currency over the last two decades. The chapter begins 
by revisiting the strong criticism that emerged within the region almost ten 
years ago in response to the Pacific Plan, and situating the Pacific Plan within 
the broader programme of economic restructuring and trade liberalisation in the 
region of which it is an integral part. It then examines the extent to which the 
new Pacific framework responds to these criticisms. 
Revisiting Criticisms of the Pacific Plan
In her trenchant critique of the Pacific Plan, Elise Huffer (2006a) began by tracing 
its origin to the 2003 proposal by the then New Zealand Prime Minister Helen 
Clark, as Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, for a review of ‘the role, functions 
and Secretariat’ of the Pacific Islands Forum. As such, in Huffer’s view, the 
Pacific Plan was ‘intimately tied to the redefining of the Pacific Islands Forum’, 
a body which she criticised as representing ‘only heads of governments and 
states’, which did not ‘create space for wider discussion of important regional 
matters by citizens of Forum Islands Countries’, and whose secretariat was 
‘distant from the peoples of the region, as well as hierarchical and technocratic’ 
(Huffer 2006a, p. 159). 
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An EPG, led by Sir Julius Chan, former prime minister of Papua New Guinea, 
had been tasked with the job of reviewing the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and 
had produced a report titled ‘Pacific Cooperation: Views of the region’ (EPG 
2004). The report alludes to modernisation and globalisation as if they were 
autonomous forces that, despite ‘bringing wonders to our shores’, had ‘exposed 
the vulnerability of our small island states  …  threatened our family and 
community bonds and values, weakened our ability to live off the land and sea, 
and upset our harmony with the natural environment’. Apparently denying 
any agency on the part of states and governments in exposing island states to 
these threats, the report asserted a will to ‘stand strong to preserve our region, 
our heritage and the best aspects of our traditions, and enhance them for the 
benefit of future generations’. ‘The bottom line’, it revealingly declared, ‘is that 
future inter-country relationships will need to be closer and more mutually 
supportive if the region is to avoid decline and international marginalisation’ 
(emphasis added). What was really meant, in keeping with the predominant 
orientation of the regional economic and trade policy agenda, was the promotion 
of economic integration. The report’s inclusion of a proposal for a Pacific Plan, 
‘to create stronger and deeper links between the countries of the region’ made 
this purpose crystal clear. 
The rhetoric in the EPG report became the main focus of criticisms of the plan. 
Huffer, for instance, highlighted the EPG’s stress on the need for a ‘focus on 
people’ in the regional plan, noting particularly its pronouncement that ‘together 
we shall work to ensure that this is a region where people matter more than 
anything else, and where every person feels loved, needed and able to enjoy a 
free, responsible and worthwhile life’ (Huffer 2006b, p. 44). That the resulting 
Pacific Plan endorsed by the Pacific leaders in 2005 bore little resemblance to the 
EPG’s poignant reflections was explained by the fact that the Pacific Plan was 
drafted by a Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) supported taskforce which 
based its approach on a technocratic Asian Development Bank report, titled 
‘New Pacific Regionalism’, written by the one-time head of the forum secretariat’s 
trade division, economist Roman Grynberg. According to Huffer, the taskforce 
identified three ‘quite different concepts of regionalism — regional cooperation, 
regional provision of public goods and services, and regional integration’, and 
advocated shifting from regional cooperation to either of the other forms of 
regionalism on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis — ‘regional approaches to 
overcoming capacity limitations in service delivery at the national level, and 
increasing economic opportunities through market integration’ were expected 
to bring the highest gains (Huffer 2006b, p. 44). Huffer rightly perceived the 
Pacific Plan as setting:
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an agenda for new levels of regional integration whereby Pacific Island 
countries will gradually relinquish sovereignty over certain areas of governance, 
economic policy and security. As such it sets the framework for a new political 
and economic order, even though the latter may be introduced incrementally 
(Huffer 2006a, p. 158).
NGO criticisms of the Pacific Plan similarly highlighted the disjunction between 
the rhetoric in the EPG report, and the Pacific Plan. Following a regional NGO 
meeting in Port Moresby in October 2005, Greenpeace Oceans campaigner Lagi 
Toribau said that, despite considerable rhetoric about security, the Pacific Plan 
failed to address ‘true security for Pacific Island communities, such as health, 
food and real energy security’ (Hamed 2005). NGOs at that meeting also berated 
the Pacific Plan’s drafters for failing to consult Pacific people. They called for a 
two-year moratorium on the plan to enable ‘a more comprehensive and genuine 
consultation process’ to take place and ‘informed consent’ to be obtained from 
Pacific people (Pacific Magazine 2005). A subsequent meeting of Pacific NGOs in 
Nadi in October 2006, convened by Oxfam New Zealand, reiterated civil society 
criticisms of the Pacific Plan, and particularly of ‘planned trade deals’. Slatter 
and Underhill-Sem dubbed the Pacific Plan ‘a neoliberal framework for regional 
market integration’, noting its coherence with PIFS’ regional economic and trade 
liberalisation agenda, and its substitution of ‘political regionalism’ (organised 
resistance by Pacific Island states to powerful outside interests that pose threats 
to Pacific Islands interests) by the new regionalism of market integration (Slatter 
and Underhill-Sem 2009, p. 197). 
There was little doubt about which of the plan’s four pillars — sustainable 
development, economic growth, good governance, and regional security — 
lay at its core. Indeed, stripped of the rhetoric, the Pacific Plan was revealed as 
little more than a road map for regional market integration. Market integration 
or economic integration is ‘tradespeak’ for free trade. Amongst other things, 
the Grynberg report had proposed a broadened Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER), with investment, services and labour mobility 
added to free trade in goods, and a binding legal instrument involving trade, 
aid and governance commitments for forum island countries (FICs).2 These far-
reaching proposals for the proposed free trade agreement between Pacific Island 
states and Australia and New Zealand, which subsequently came to be called 
PACER Plus, were anticipated to meet considerable opposition from ‘the few 
losers’, who  the Grynberg report described as ‘often well-organised, vocal, 
and in a position to effectively oppose reforms’ (Asian Development Bank–
Commonwealth Secretariat 2005, p. 148). 
2  The Grynberg report proposed a binding agreement on good governance undertakings for Pacific 
Island states, in return for a renewable five- to 10-year aid and trade agreement (Asian Development Bank–
Commonwealth Secretariat 2005).
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Regional specialist Greg Fry aptly termed the exogenously conceived and 
neoliberal-inspired new Pacific regionalism ‘hegemonic regionalism’ (Fry 2004, 
p. 11). The hegemonic framing of regional priorities was not surprising as 
PIFS had been occupied for more than a decade in facilitating an externally 
driven, region-wide, economic restructuring and trade liberalisation agenda. 
The overweening role of New Zealand and Australia within the Pacific Islands 
Forum, which derived in large part from their almost total financing of the 
PIFS3 and effective control of key positions, had helped make it a conduit for 
regionally implementing donor-driven reforms.
Submissions to the Review Committee 
by Non‑State Actors
Although 37 NGOs and CSOs were reported to have made submissions to the 
Pacific Plan Review Team, 18 of these submissions were made by international 
NGOs, 17 by individuals, and four by private sector non-state actors (NSAs). 
Highlighted below are the submissions made by regionally-based NGOs and 
CSOs which critiqued the development model embraced by the Pacific Plan and 
offered an alternative development vision. Submissions from non-regionally 
based NSAs which shared this critique, and its alternative vision, are also 
mentioned. 
The Pacific Regional Non-Governmental Organisation (PRNGO) alliance, 
representing 13 regional NGOs ‘backed by strong networks across the Pacific’, 
confined its submission to concerns about the inadequacy of the PIFS Framework 
for Engagement with NSAs. It said some NGOs had limited access to regional 
meetings convened by PIFS and CROP (Council of Regional Organisations in 
the Pacific) agencies, but this was ‘based on personal relationships and remains 
this way because credible and sincere engagement with regional NGOs is not 
institutionalised’. It alleged that private sector NSAs were accorded ‘preferential 
treatment.’
The Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organisations (PIANGO), 
a regional coordinating body of umbrella NGOs in 21 Pacific countries, titled 
its submission, ‘The Pacific We Want: A new Pacific regional architecture’ 
and called for both ‘formal institutional recognition of CSOs as legitimate 
development actors’, and ‘a rethinking of development and reshaping of the 
Pacific we want’. PIANGO did not support a continuing focus on economic 
growth and regional integration in the Pacific Plan, saying there was now 
3  According to Greg Fry (2015), based on 2013 figures, Australia and New Zealand contribute 94 per cent 
of the PIF core and regular budget bill, while FICs contribute a mere 5 per cent.
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‘strong consensus that economic growth does not necessarily lead to improved 
human development and sustainability’, and that the Pacific Plan must deliver 
‘a transformative development agenda which is human development centred’ 
(Pacific Plan Review 2013a).
The Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) submitted that ‘the emphasis in 
the Pacific Plan’s economic pillar on neoliberal economics must be re-thought’ 
and framed with consideration of Pacific peoples’ right to economic self-
determination. It referred to ‘growing evidence of the negative impacts of 
the neo-liberal economic model promoted by the Pacific Plan on the lives 
and livelihoods of Pacific peoples’, and suggested that alternative models of 
development could be ‘derived from embedded traditional communal values 
such as stewardship, sharing, caring and reciprocity’. The challenge lay in 
‘having the courage to step forward on such a path and define regionalism on 
our own terms’ (Pacific Plan Review 2013a). 
A statement adopted by a meeting of Pacific Young Women Activists on Gender, 
Economic and Climate Justice, convened in September 2010, submitted to the 
review team, called for ‘development alternatives, policies and programmes that 
empower communities, families and individuals’. Another statement, from a 
meeting of Pacific feminists and activists in Nadi in February 2013, reminded 
Pacific states of their obligations and accountability ‘to translate gender equality 
and human rights commitments into law, policy and budget allocations, and to 
make these norms and standards the guiding principles for contemporary Pacific 
societies, to be reflected in … the Pacific Plan Review’ (Buadromo et al. 2013).
Two NSA submissions by organisations based outside of the Island Pacific 
shared the alternative visions of regionally based NGOs. Oxfam New Zealand 
said the Pacific Plan review ‘needs to be framed with the Pacific’s people at 
its core’, and future plans should ‘build on the Pacific’s strengths’ of ‘social 
cohesion and resilience, respect for tradition, vibrant cultures, equity and 
fairness and livelihood opportunities for all’. These foundations, it submitted, 
‘should not be sacrificed in ambitious plans for economic growth for the few, 
or economic infrastructure’. World Vision called for ‘sustainable management of 
natural resources including protection of biodiversity; security of land rights 
of communities and indigenous peoples, especially in the face of extractive 
industries and infrastructure projects; and ensuring lands and vital resources of 
communities are free from security risks’. 
A personal submission by Noelene Nabulivou, Development Alternatives with 
Women for a New Era (DAWN), proposed binding development safeguards for 
all peoples of the Pacific, and highlighted the incoherence in policy between 
setting up marine protected areas on the one hand, and working towards deep 
sea mining on the other.
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Several NSA submissions called for gender equality targets, including 
targets and indicators for combating gender-based violence. Pacific Women’s 
Parliamentary Partnership, in a submission signed by New Zealand MP Louisa 
Wall and Samoan Government Minister Fiame Mata’afa, called for indicators 
and measures for good governance at the judicial and local government levels. 
They proposed 30 per cent parliamentary representation for women in Pacific 
Island states and national progress reports on implementation of PIF’s Declaration 
on Gender Equality. 
Four submissions raised specific attention to the need to prioritise human 
rights protection in the revised Pacific Plan. Diverse Voices and Action for 
Equality (DIVA) called for the inclusion of two rights-based principles — 
non-discrimination and right to security of the person — with special attention 
to the rights of Pacific intersex and trans* people and lesbian, bisexual and trans 
women.
In summary, the NGO submissions highlighted partnership with NSAs, 
economic self-determination, people-centred (as opposed to economic growth-
centred) development, Pacific values, the need to safeguard land and other 
resources, gender equality, and protection of human rights for all people in 
Pacific Island states. 
The Pacific Plan Review Process
In response to the barrage of criticism, the Pacific Plan was flagged as a ‘living 
document’. In 2009 it underwent a review by an independent consultant, 
Makurita Baaro, following which the sustainable development pillar was 
broadened to include responding to climate change and improving livelihoods 
and well-being. Five themes and 37 priorities were adopted. The subsequent 
comprehensive review of the Pacific Plan, which resulted in its recasting as 
the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, began in December 2012, with the 
appointment of the review team led by Sir Mekere Morauta. 
In contrast to the top-down process of formulating and adopting the Pacific 
Plan, the Pacific Plan review process was widely consultative, participatory, and 
transparent. Given the harsh criticism of the Pacific Plan by NGOs, academics 
and other stakeholders, there was a clear intention to provide NSAs with the 
opportunity to contribute to revising the plan. From January to May 2013, 
the review team held country consultations and received public submissions. 
In all, the team made 18 country visits (including to New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia), consulted 700 stakeholders, and received almost 70 online 
submissions (65 of which were made available online with the consent of those 
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who submitted), and commissioned studies on some specific issues. A regional 
consultation workshop was convened in May 2013, together with a special 
session of the Pacific Plan Action Committee. Further consultations followed in 
June and July before the annual meeting of the Pacific Plan Action Committee 
in August considered review working papers. In October 2013, following the 
leaders meeting in Majuro the month before, the Final Pacific Plan Review 
Report, comprising 36 recommendations, was submitted. 
The full report was made publicly available in December 2013, following 
discussion by the Forum Officials Committee. At a special leaders retreat on the 
Pacific Plan Review in May 2014, the Pacific Plan was recast as the Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism.
Unpacking the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism
According to Sir Mekere Morauta, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism should 
be viewed ‘as a framework for advancing the political principle of regionalism 
through a robust, inclusive process of political dialogue, the expression of political 
values about regionalism and sovereignty, and the decisive implementation of 
key, game-changing, drivers of regional integration’ (cited in PIFS 2014).
Pacific Plan Adviser at the PIFS, Seini O’Connor, elaborated on the framework 
at a Pacific update meeting in Canberra, June 2014, confirming the clearly 
intended involvement of NSAs in the process of deciding regional priorities. 
The framework, she said, would:
support a tighter, more focused forum agenda, with space for just a few ‘big 
issues’ to be discussed by political leaders at their annual retreat. It will promote 
the development of large-scale initiatives that bring together development 
partners, regional agencies and non-state actors with plans of action, rather 
than just good ideas. It will complement effective sub-regionalism. And it will 
support recognition for leadership to be shown in other areas: for ministers to 
drive regional cooperation through decisive collective action, for officials to 
provide direction to their regional organisations when they sign off on annual 
work plans, and for the vast range of actors outside of government to be involved in 
proposing and deciding what the region should focus its efforts on (O’Connor 2014).
Essentially, the framework consists of a brief vision statement (of a ‘region of 
peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific 
people can lead free, healthy and productive lives’) and six values, which cover: 
1. the integrity of our vast ocean and island resources; 
2. the diversity and heritage of the Pacific and inclusivity; 
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3. good governance, democratic values, the rule of law, human rights, gender 
equality and just societies; 
4. peaceful, safe and stable communities and ensured full security and well-
being for Pacific peoples; 
5. full inclusivity, equity and equality for all people of the Pacific; and 
6. effective open and honest relationships and inclusive and ensuring 
partnerships based on mutual accountability and respect with [sic] each 
other, within sub-regions, within the region, and beyond. 
There are also four stated objectives, which elaborate concisely but more 
explicitly the objectives of the four original pillars of the Pacific Plan: sustainable 
development ‘combines economic, social and cultural development in ways 
that improve livelihoods and well-being and use the environment sustainably’; 
economic growth is ‘inclusive and equitable’; good governance is ‘strengthened 
governance, legal, financial and administrative systems’; and regional security is 
holistically defined in terms of ensuring ‘stable and safe human, environmental 
and political conditions for all’. 
The framework includes a matrix of six different ‘forms of regionalism’ or of 
regional collective action, which can be adopted by Pacific countries to support 
a regional initiative that has been proposed and adopted by Pacific Island 
countries (states or non-state actors) following a carefully elaborated process 
for priority setting. Prioritisation of a regional initiative and progress reports 
on its implementation will be evaluated against six criteria or tests for regional 
action, namely: 
1. a market test (the initiative should not involve a service which markets can 
provide well);
2. a sovereignty test (it should involve no loss of national sovereignty); 
3. a regionalism test (it should satisfy one of seven criteria — for example, 
establish a shared norm or standard, establish a common position on an issue, 
deliver a public good which is regional in scope, realise economies of scale); 
4. political oversight (it should require the leader’s attention and input); 
5. a risk and sustainability test (be based on a thorough risk and sustainability 
evaluation, a sound implementation plan, with funding and human resources 
capacity); and 
6. a duplication test (it should not be already in progress by another organisation 
or duplicate another initiative).
The framework proposes no specific regional projects, but sets up a process 
through which proposals for regional initiatives are received annually from 
Pacific states and NSAs and assessed by an independent sub-committee, with five 
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proposals selected for implementation each year. This essentially puts the onus 
on states and NSAs (private sector organisations or individuals, citizen groups, 
academics, development practitioners, etc.) to propose regional initiatives each 
year for selection by the committee. All proposals will be posted online for 
public information, although reasons behind the selection of the five initiatives 
will not be publicly disclosed.4 
Pacific Plan Review: Report to Pacific Leaders
Making an assessment of the framework requires examining the Pacific Plan 
Review Report, which explicitly advocated a particular model of regionalism. 
It said, ‘regionalism is in the first instance a political, not technical, process’, 
and that the overwhelming message from citizens across the region was that 
‘the right conversations are not being had about the region’s new vulnerabilities’, 
and ‘citizens’ voices are not being heard about what kind of Pacific is emerging 
in the absence of coherent, effective regional governance’ (Pacific Plan Review 
2013b, p. 54). The Pacific Plan ‘lacked ownership’ and there was ‘a lack of space 
in the Forum for the kind of political conversations’ needed (Pacific Plan Review 
2013b, p. 55). A ‘largely officials-led process, in which clarity over who are the 
principals in, and who are the agents of, regionalism has become confused’ had 
resulted in CROP agencies ‘prosecut[ing] their own [largely technical] agendas’. 
One observer was quoted as having said ‘we have created a superstructure of 
institutions and processes to prioritise, mandate and report on something that is 
ultimately not widely valued, and which does not effectively drive regionalism’. 
The review committee had concluded that ‘an overhaul of the processes, 
institutions and governance of the Plan’, was needed to progress regionalism. 
The kind of conversation the review committee thought was needed, however, 
was clearly rather different from the conversations amongst non-private sector 
NSAs. The review report made a number of recommendations, including that 
‘PIFS works with multilateral finance institutions’ to ‘offer PICs the opportunity 
to develop more highly prioritized growth strategies’, and that PIFS ‘investigates 
the merits of establishing a self-funding Secretariat to assist PICs with the 
development of seabed mining’.5 The report showed no evidence of having 
taken on board any of the concerns raised in the submissions from Pacific NGOs.
4  Interview with Pacific Regionalism Adviser at Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015. 
5  It also recommended PIFS work with multilateral finance institutions to ‘examine issues relating 
to reasonable standard of living’ and to ‘develop uniquely Pacific indicators of both poverty and progress’.
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In a section subtitled ‘Paths to Deeper Integration’, the report diagrammatically 
set out ‘the sort of path’ the review committee had in mind, showing progressive 
advance from regional cooperation (for example, strong external voice such 
as statement on climate change), to shared service delivery (for example, the 
University of the South Pacific or Secretariat of the Pacific Community technical 
assistance), to economic integration (for example, free trade agreement and 
labour mobility), to political integration (for example, shared supreme court), 
to political union (for example, European Union, Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States), to, ultimately, federation (for example, establishing a single 
political entity, such as united Germany) — ‘usually irreversible’ (Pacific Plan 
Review 2013b, p.  88). The given examples of regional integration towards 
federation reflect an unequivocal emphasis on economic integration features 
that are consistent with neoliberalism, namely free trade agreement, harmonised 
business regulation and business law, labour mobility, investment liberalisation, 
customs union, and common currency. Examples of political and administrative 
integration towards federation include shared supreme court, central government 
body to manage the region, shared defence force, transfers between countries, 
and supra-national law-making and taxation powers (Pacific Plan Review 2013, 
p. 90). It was acknowledged that it is ‘the prerogative of the people of the Pacific 
and their leaders’ to decide how far along this path the Pacific should go — and 
that leaders had only expressed an interest in discussing further integration, 
and had made no decision to follow this path (Pacific Plan Review 2013, p. 89). 
The emphasis on economic and deeper integration was very pronounced in the 
first draft of the new framework. It is substantially muted in the final framework, 
evidently in response to feedback on the first draft, not least from NSAs, and 
this was very likely motivated in part by a need to avoid being subjected, yet 
again, to major criticism. 
Implementing the Framework
The process of implementing the framework began with the establishment of 
the independent sub-committee to receive proposals, assess them against the 
six tests, and select the five for implementation. PIFS called for applications for 
the sub-committee in December, closing in February. A sub-committee of seven 
standing members was subsequently appointed by a troika comprising the 
present, incoming and last chairs of the PIF, and although it was not intended 
to be a representative body, its membership includes one from each of the three 
sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, one from a small island 
state, and one each from the private sector, civil society, and Australia and 
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New Zealand.6 Chaired by the Secretary General of PIFS, Dame Meg Taylor, the 
sub-committee has already met and considered gaps in their expertise and the 
weighting to be given to each of the six tests. An announcement and explanation 
of the process, together with a template for proposal submissions, was published 
in April, under the heading ‘Listening to the Pacific’, with 12 June 2015 set as 
the submissions deadline. Apart from providing the chair, the role of PIFS will 
be confined to receiving proposals and checking for completeness. 
How New is the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism?
The framework is very focused on processes — for priority setting, testing for 
regionalism, assessing progress reports, and ensuring that politically sensitive 
and major regional issues are the focus of leaders meeting agendas. Its open 
process and inclusivity has been conceived in recognition of some of the failures 
of the Pacific Plan.7 This distinctive new feature — openness to and inclusion 
of proposals from NSAs for priority attention by governments — seems to 
signify a radical shift from the previous state-centric model of regional agenda 
setting, and a changed role for PIFS, which has long been facilitating a donor-
driven regional agenda of economic reform and trade liberalisation. The new 
framework’s narrowing of priority issues to be given leaders’ attention each 
year to just five, and its vesting of decision-making to an independent sub-
committee, are also distinctively novel features. 
While it remains to be seen what proposals are endorsed as regional priorities, 
the framework does respond to concerns raised in NGO submissions in two 
ways: firstly, by incorporating into the framework values which resonate with 
those highlighted by NGO submissions; and secondly, by instituting an open 
and inclusive process in which NGO and government proposals are equally 
assessed and selected for implementation by an independent body.
It may be coincidental, but the new framework appears to concur with the 
submission by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), an international NGO that made a submission to the review 
team. IDEA commended the Pacific Plan review ream for seeking first the input 
of citizens and communities on the development process and political reform 
agenda, saying: ‘when the necessity for regional integration emerges from such 
input … it will then draw life and legitimacy in a way that is impossible from 
6  According to an NGO source, neither the NGO nor the private sector ‘representative’ on the subcommittee 
are known individuals, and are not known to be connected to established NGO or private sector networks. 
7  Interview with Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015.
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the more technical model that focuses primarily on leaders, executive arms of 
government and funding agencies … The revised Pacific Plan needs not only 
to address the substantive issues of development, but the process by which 
development priorities are identified and validated — and the process by 
which their legitimacy and relevance [are] retained and their implementation 
undertaken, its effectiveness overseen, and its shortcoming identified and 
addressed’ (Pacific Plan Review 2013a).
Through the open, inclusive and independent process of the new framework, 
PIFS is stepping back from a position of pushing policies, seeking instead 
broad ownership of the framework by Pacific Island people. Dame Meg Taylor’s 
‘listening tour’ of Pacific Island states — since taking up the job of secretary 
general she has been travelling to each of the FICs to ascertain for herself 
current thinking on regional priorities — is indicative of the importance of the 
framework to PIFS. Recent challenges to, and destabilisation of the established 
intergovernmental regional architecture (see Tarte 2014) have almost certainly 
impacted on the implementation of the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. 
Indeed, getting buy-in for the framework and making its inclusivity work may 
recover legitimacy for PIFS. On the positive side, the framework does open 
a window of opportunity for NGOs to submit proposals and make a case for 
priority to be given to some of their specific concerns by aligning proposed 
initiatives to the framework’s vision, values and objectives. 
Yet, by remaining silent on calls by NSAs for a fundamental shift in the 
development model being followed by Pacific Island states, the framework 
may function to simply divert attention from the main agenda of economic 
integration. While the values and objectives of the framework resonate with 
sentiments expressed in a number of NGO submissions, the over-emphasis on 
economic integration in the review committee’s report suggests that this is 
deeply embedded and will remain PIFS’ core aim and objective. PIFS maintains 
that, although economic and trade proposals may be submitted and selected, 
there is no bias in the framework towards economic integration.8
To conclude, on the face of it, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism appears 
to be serving up a more palatable kava mix than was offered in the Pacific Plan 
tanoa. But it is still too early as yet to be able to say whether the new processes 
of inclusivity will substantially change the focus of regional policy making 
and the development path along which Pacific Island states are being driven. 
The selection of initiatives may well include those proposed by concerned civil 
society actors and thereby address issues they raised in their submissions to the 
review team, however, it is not clear what the current vision of Pacific leaders 
8  Interview with Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015.
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is. More concerning, there seems to be a very evident disjunction between the 
elements of the finalised framework and the model outlined in the review team’s 
report. This raises questions about the meaning of selecting five initiatives for 
the leaders to give attention to each year, if the primary focus of PIFS remains 
unchanged. For NGOs, the jury is still out on the framework. 
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Civil Society and the Political 
Legitimacy of Regional Institutions: 
An NGO perspective
Maureen Penjueli
‘Citizens’ voices about the kind of Pacific that is emerging are not being heard 
in the absence of coherent, effective regional governance — Sir Mekere Morauta 
(Pacific Plan Review 2013).
Across the Pacific, the regional network of intergovernmental agencies is 
matched by networks of church, non-government and community organisations. 
The Malua Conference of Churches and Missions, held in Samoa in 1961, led to 
the founding of the region’s largest ecumenical body, the Pacific Conference of 
Churches (PCC), in 1966. For 25  years, the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre 
(PCRC) served as a regional hub for the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific 
(NFIP) movement. Today, networks such as the Pacific Islands Association of 
Non-Government Organisations (PIANGO), the Pacific Network on Globalisation 
(PANG), and the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) campaign on 
development, trade, oceans and climate change.
In many cases, civil society organisations (CSOs) have initiated or led regional 
debates on key concerns. The NFIP movement campaigned for a nuclear-free 
zone for years before governments adopted the Rarotonga Treaty, establishing the 
South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SPNWZ). Women’s organisations have 
led the regional debate on gender-based violence in the home, workplace and 
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community. Churches and women’s groups played crucial roles in peacebuilding 
during conflicts in New Caledonia, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands, well 
before regional peacekeeping interventions arrived.
For many years, governments and donors have announced that they value 
the role of CSOs in regional initiatives. But this commitment is not matched 
by concrete, ongoing and cost-effective mechanisms for engagement with the 
diverse range of organisations that are branded as ‘civil society’ or ‘non-state 
actors’. This chapter is based on the actual experiences of CSOs in their efforts to 
engage and participate in regional institutions — particularly the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) and Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) — for almost two decades. 
It highlights what lessons can be offered to the newest regional structure, the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), in terms of CSO inclusion. The paper 
uses real examples to show how the politics that keep CSOs out of regional 
institutions and constrain the openness of debates on key issues have been to 
the detriment of Pacific societies. It also highlights what CSO organisations offer 
Pacific regionalism.
The Significant Role of CSOs in Regionalism
It is continually stated (South Pacific Forum Secretariat 2000) that the island 
economies of the Pacific, because of their size and geographical position, have 
limited access to the skills, information and finance needed for successful 
global integration and economic growth. It is commonly argued that regional 
institutions and organisations are able to overcome such shortcomings by 
pooling human resources, and attracting and retaining highly skilled personnel. 
By operating regionally, economies of scale allow for sharing of technology and 
knowledge, and provide administrative savings. 
Regional cooperation can also give island countries a more persuasive voice 
on the world stage and help secure a more favourable external economic and 
political relationship, rather than be overwhelmed by large and powerful 
nations who can dictate the terms of such relationships. 
The role and importance of CSOs and their contributions to economic, social, 
cultural and political development have long been recognised at the global 
level. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, argues 
that CSOs:
1. provide basic services, such as primary education, health care, clean water 
and sanitation, facilitate participation of communities in local planning and 
budgeting purposes; 
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2. advocate for rights; and
3. provide special consideration for marginalised groups through the provision 
of counselling and support services. 
Historically, in the Pacific, social movements supported by CSOs have played 
a key role in the struggle for the right to self-determination and the pursuit 
of the region’s own development goals. In the Pacific regionalism of the 
1970s to the 1990s, there was often political solidarity between Pacific Island 
governments and CSOs, where external interests were evidently detrimental to 
the interests of the region. The greatest successes by Pacific Island countries 
at the international level have been in the pursuit of ‘collective diplomacy’,1 
where social movements and the state have worked alongside each other to hold 
overseas governments to account in order to achieve significant wins, such as 
the Law of the Sea Convention, the London Dumping Convention, and to help 
secure a nuclear-free Pacific and a ban on drift-net fishing.
Much of this success would not have happened had CSOs not provided support 
(or even led), and provided technical knowledge, outlined moral obligations, 
and utilised their networks, communication and advocacy skills. Perhaps most 
significantly, CSOs often gave regional institutions legitimacy by providing di-
rect links to social movements and their issues of concern. 
Lack of Formal Recognition and Inclusive 
Processes
Despite the obvious successes of collective diplomacy and the contribution 
of CSOs to that effort, it was not until 1995 that the PIF, the region’s premier 
political body, officially recognised this fact. Since 1995, PIF leaders have 
expressed a need to engage with CSOs, to widen the field of participation in 
regional and international matters, beyond the members of the forum donors 
and development partners known as dialogue partners. Yet despite the numerous 
declarations by leaders and recommendations by independent reviews of the 
regional body recognising the importance of CSOs, no effective mechanisms for 
CSO engagement have been developed.2 
1  In the description used by the University of the South Pacific academic Greg Fry (1994, pp. 70–71).
2  See IDEA (2014). The first substantive review of the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat in 2003 contained a 
landmark decision in which PIF leaders resolved to see how they could better interact with CSOs. In 2004, PIF 
leaders acknowledged the views of CSOs in a PIF communiqué. Leaders noted the importance of CSOs again 
six years later in 2009, and again in 2011 in the Waiheke Declaration.
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By Pacific Island Forum Secretariat’s own admission (see PIFS 2012) there is 
no protocol for dialogue between CSOs and the regional institutions that 
are members of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP). 
Although some regional institutions have higher levels of CSO engagement, PIF 
still lacks a formal policy for interaction and liaison with CSOs in the region. 
After intensive negotiations between CSOs and the PIFS, an accreditation policy 
was established. It is focused solely on regulating which CSOs would gain 
observer status at meetings hosted by the PIFS. In other words, it has focused 
on who can watch, not on who can participate. 
While CSOs face significant hurdles in obtaining the recognition needed 
to get a foot in the door — let alone a seat at the table — there has been an 
exponential increase in the number of new associate members, observers, and 
dialogue partners of the Pacific’s political club. This is a growing reflection of 
the changing geopolitical landscape of the region; powerful forces are at work 
in the Pacific, which is making the regional institutional political space highly 
contested. 
Today, PIF meetings are open to many observers, including foreign governments 
as far away as Cuba and Israel, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and UN agencies, 
as well as private sector organisations. Private sector organisations, including 
commercial banks, are enjoying access to forum leaders and in recent years have 
started to sponsor events at the leaders meetings. Development partners and 
observers now outnumber Pacific Island governments. 
Alarm Bells about Legitimacy of Regional 
Architecture
Our regional institutions exhibit a clear democratic deficit. Each year the list 
of observers grows, giving the PIF a sense of global legitimacy while failing 
to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of Oceania. A recent review of 
the PIFS found that even island governments generally feel alienated from the 
organisation and that there needs to be greater participation and ownership by 
members (PACNEWS 2015).
Over the last decade, alarm bells have been repeatedly rung by CSOs and many 
regional observers about regionalism, in particular the legitimacy of regional 
systems (both technical and political) and whether these spaces are democratic 
spaces. The 2013 review of the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional 
Cooperation and Integration, led by former Papua New Guinea Prime Minister 
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Sir Mekere Morauta, noted: ‘Citizens feel that the right conversations are not 
being had about the region’s new vulnerabilities — social, economic, political 
and environmental’ (Pacific Plan Review 2013).
Key questions posed by many experts are:
1. Who is Oceania for?
2. What does the community stand for; what are its values, practices and ideas?
3. Who should be regarded as belonging to the community, on what basis?
4. Who should speak for it and determine its practice?
National parliaments appear to have lost part of their power to scrutinise 
the positions taken by their ministers at the regional level, and there are no 
functional formal mechanisms to link the views of the people on political 
matters to the agenda of regional institutions such as the PIF. For too long, the 
public attitude has been one of ‘permissive consensus’, meaning that regional 
policies were taken for granted by the Pacific people as an accepted part of the 
political landscape. 
CSOs, as the alternative voice and the bridge between the broader public view, 
and regional institutions have for a long time been deliberately kept out by the 
lack of a formal mechanism for engagement with PIFS. 
Critical Moments in Regional Architecture 
and Diplomacy
The suspension of Fiji from the PIF after its fourth coup set in motion a series of 
events that challenged existing regional structures. The Fiji government, seizing 
the moment and the opportunity presented by a perception of an Australia-
centric PIFS, deliberately pursued an agenda of regional self-determination and 
set about reshaping regional diplomacy and architecture based on this principle. 
In doing so, CSOs were offered a platform on which they could revisit the 
question of the legitimacy of the regional architecture. At the sub-regional level, 
Fiji’s suspension from the various regional and international clubs only served 
to strengthen its resolve to work with Melanesian leaders in a ‘Pacific way’, 
without the participation of New Zealand and Australia. Fiji’s chairmanship of 
the MSG in 2011 was a turning point for Fiji and the MSG: it signalled that a 
determined MSG wanted to play a major role in setting the region’s development 
agenda without the formal involvement of their big brothers, Australia and 
New Zealand. 
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Australia and New Zealand are full members of the forum and are also the 
region’s major donors. The Fiji government’s intervention in regional debates 
has become a lightning rod for criticism from some regional leaders. But Fiji’s 
suspension from forum activities has allowed it to advance opinions that go 
outside the forum consensus. Fiji has persuasively argued that Australian and 
New Zealand foreign policy interests have dominated, at times contrary to the 
interest of Pacific Island countries, a sentiment that resonates with many Pacific 
Island governments. 
Indeed, we have seen an era of increased pressure from traditional allies, 
particularly Australia, to undertake extensive market driven economic and 
political initiatives in regional spaces that Pacific Island leaders have sometimes 
regarded as intrusive, disruptive, and even hostile (Wesley-Smith 2007). 
As a direct response, the Fiji government has participated in other international 
networks, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77 plus China 
grouping, using these platforms to debate south–south cooperation. Fiji also 
set up the PIDF, a move widely regarded as setting up a direct rival to the PIFS, 
premised on the argument that the Pacific needed a space in which Pacific Islands 
governments could meet to discuss issues of importance to Pacific Islanders 
without Australia and New Zealand. 
After a successful return to democracy with the September 2014 elections, 
Prime Minister Bainimarama argued that Australia and New Zealand should 
move from full members to dialogue partners of the PIF, presenting this as a 
condition to Fiji’s re-entry into the forum. While this debate has also opened 
up a much needed space to debate how to effectively include CSOs in regional 
institutions and place peoples’ issues at the centre of policy-making, it also 
opens up many dilemmas for CSO participation.
CSOs and the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum
The PIDF claims it will be an inclusive institution, particularly of CSOs. PIDF’s 
inclusion of CSOs is relatively new and the jury is still out; it remains to be seen 
whether this is merely lip service. CSOs are not just focused on the domination 
of Australia and New Zealand, but also on the collusion of powerful interests, 
including multilateral financial institutions such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and World Bank. The ADB and World Bank — as well as many 
other donors — have been pursuing a very specific neoliberal governance and 
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economic integration agenda in the region that in many ways is unchallenged, 
and yet is in direct conflict with the interests of Pacific peoples. CSOs seek to act 
as a counter-influence and alternative voice to these powerful interests. 
The litmus test for PIDF is whether it can counter the influence of external 
non-regional members, particularly China and Indonesia, who will also seek 
to influence the PIDF in ways that undermine a self-determination agenda for 
the Pacific. The involvement of Indonesia in Pacific regionalism demonstrates 
the complexities that can quickly come into play. Indonesia has grasped the 
significance of being intimately involved in regional power plays, whether 
through MSG, PIF, or PIDF. The growing public support in the Pacific for the 
West Papuan freedom movement has, no doubt, played a significant role in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy.
Given the ecumenical movement’s long-standing support for churches in West 
Papua, the PCC’s Secretary General has asked: ‘What agenda do Indonesia 
and other development partners bring to the PIDF; are they to replace the 
dominance that Australia and New Zealand have been accused of within the 
regional architecture centred in the Pacific Islands Forum?’3 
Indonesia’s intentions were exposed on 13 March 2015, when PNG Loop detailed 
Indonesia’s proposal for the five Melanesian provinces of Indonesia to become a 
full member of the MSG. This can only be regarded as a direct attempt to block 
the application for MSG membership by the United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua, supported by Vanuatu and New Caledonia’s Kanak and Socialist 
National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS)) independence movement.
We can only assume that Indonesia will not stop at the MSG; once it gains 
membership it would then apply, at the invitation of the Papua New Guinea 
government, for full membership to PIF and possibly PIDF. Politics makes for 
strange bed fellows, but the long-term implications of Indonesia being a full 
member of MSG, PIF, and PIDF need to be seriously considered against a right 
to self-determination push by Fiji and other Pacific Island nations. 
No People’s Voice in Regional Institutions
In political science, legitimacy is usually understood as the public’s popular 
acceptance and recognition of the authority of a governing regime (in this case 
regional institutions), where the authority exercises political power through 
3  As questioned by the Pacific Conference of Churches General Secretary Francois Pihaatae during the 
welcoming of the President of Indonesia to open the PIDF meeting in 2014.
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consent and mutual understanding, not coercion. Legitimacy assumes popular 
consent; but who gives consent and on behalf of whom is the consent given in 
these regional political spaces? 
Regional meetings, particularly those hosted by PIFS, are conducted behind 
closed doors and are increasingly subject to secret diplomacy, without a chance 
for the people whose lives will be deeply affected to have a direct say. This is 
particularly worrying when we consider that PIF covers matters that affect 
the ordinary person on the street. Australian and New Zealand interests are 
decidedly different from and, in some cases, contrary and even hostile to those 
of Pacific Island countries, regarding such issues as security, economics and 
trade, climate change, and decolonisation. Yet, increasingly, at the international 
level — particularly at the United Nations, the G20, and the World Trade 
Organization — Australia and New Zealand claim to ‘represent’ Pacific Island 
nation views by virtue of their membership in PIF. 
Given the growing tensions between members over the PIF’s ‘consensus’ policies 
on climate, trade and decolonisation, there is growing criticism over the lack of 
ownership of the forum, not just by countries but also by CSOs. In response 
to this challenge, PIFS initiated yet another program aiming to promote good 
governance in the Pacific by strengthening dialogue and engagement on policy 
development and implementation between the PIF and its secretariat and non-
state actors (NSAs). 
According to PIFS, there is an acceptance of the criticism of a lack of ‘people’s 
voice’ in regional policies: ‘There is no regional government or parliament for 
the Pacific. As a result, if NSAs wish to contribute to regional policies, they must 
go through the PIFS, whose membership comprises all the national governments 
in the region’ (see PIFS 2012). (Note the ‘if’ in this sentence, as though there 
were any doubt that CSOs wish to engage regional policy-making.)
The analysis states that member states of the PIF generally acknowledge that 
NSAs have strengths in:
• communicating with and engaging civil society; and 
• determining public sentiment concerning the current and potential impacts 
of policies and ongoing or planned government interventions. Governments 
also recognise they may lack these capacities themselves.
However, many governments perceive NSAs as activist groups that attempt to 
raise and exploit public sentiment on certain development issues, in order to 
promote opposition to government policies and strategies. Accordingly, despite 
some promising shifts towards greater openness, consultations with NSAs still 
tend to be limited in practice. The focus on CSOs’ roles in carrying government 
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policies to grassroots communities dismisses the fact that CSOs have long been 
engaging with regional policy issues, either to highlight emerging issues of 
interest, which governments may not necessarily be aware of, or to bring up 
issues that many governments would prefer to ignore (such as decolonisation 
issues in West Papua, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Guam, and Rapa Nui).
Governments too often regard CSOs as seeking to exploit public sentiments 
on certain development issues, which are contrary to government policies 
and strategies such as deep sea mining (DSM). But in the absence of a regional 
mechanism for accountability, it is the role of CSOs to hold governments to 
account.
While the PIFS would like to regard itself as the gatekeeper, controlling entry 
into regional policy-making, the PIFS’ delay in developing a formal mechanism 
for CSO engagement means that many CSOs have already climbed the fence and 
developed other sophisticated mechanisms for engaging in regional policy-
making. This includes participation in national government delegations and 
policy-making committees, much to the ire of some government leaders and 
some technocrats at the secretariat. 
In many cases, specific issues are allowed to dominate PIF’s policy on CSO 
engagement rather than letting policy dictate the terms of engagement. 
There are three immediate examples where our regional institutions — PIFS 
in particular — are being captured by specific interest groups, whether these 
are foreign governments, multilateral financial institutions or other technical 
agencies. 
1. Seabed Mining
In recent years, CROP agencies have been working to develop legal frameworks 
and policy documents to support DSM of strategic minerals in the vast 
exclusive economic zones of forum island countries (FICs). Through a project 
at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s (SPC) geoscience division (formerly 
SOPAC), funded by the European Union, the mining industry is already being 
given ‘legitimacy’ by regional institutions: the CROP debate is focused on how 
to facilitate seabed mining rather than asking whether it should be?
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NGOs around the region argue that the EU-SPC DSM project sets out a number 
of dubious and unfounded assertions about seabed mining.4 Working with 
lawyers, scientific organisations, customary landowners, and community 
groups, these groups argue that the current initiative contravenes numerous 
international legal norms, such as the precautionary principle and the right to 
free and prior informed consent. 
The Oceans Declaration signed by forum leaders in Palau in 2014 unfortunately 
supports the EU-SOPAC DSM project rationale. It has given political legitimacy to 
the industry to plunder the ocean floor of its wealth, by deliberately weakening 
any efforts to regulate an untried and untested industry. On this issue, CSOs 
have real grounds (scientific, economic, legal, social, cultural and moral) to 
challenge the policy interpretations of the PIF-mandated EU-SPC DSM project. 
CSOs who argue that the question of ‘how’ should only be discussed after the 
question of ‘if’ has first been debated are routinely excluded. Consultation is 
only sought on policies for seabed mining rather than questioning whether 
it should be allowed. The effect of this is that there has been no real debate 
on seabed mining, and dubious claims to legitimacy under the precautionary 
principle have, by and large, gone unchallenged.
2. Regional and Economic and Trade Integration
In 2009, the PANG released a report, titled ‘Speaking Truth to Power’, which 
documented the Australia’s and New Zealand’s use of power, aid, and at 
times coercion, to force the launch of the controversial Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus negotiations. The trade talks officially 
commenced after the Cairns Forum meeting in 2009, even though it was 
abundantly clear that most Pacific Island governments were reluctant to launch 
negotiations. PACER Plus was launched amidst a flurry of bullying and cheque 
book diplomacy. Australia and New Zealand are amongst the biggest aid donors 
to the region, and FICs are dependent on access to funding, limiting their ability 
to argue against an agreement that is in Australia’s and New Zealand’s interests. 
As negotiations gather steam for completion by December 2015, the implications 
are only just becoming clear. PACER Plus is far from being a balanced agreement. 
FICs are being pushed to make binding commitments, and the vast majority of 
concessions, in exchange for the status quo on labour mobility and possibly 
4  CSOs such as Act Now! PNG, Bismarck Ramu Group, Pacific Conference of Churches, Lutheran Church 
of Papua New Guinea (with a membership of over one million), and Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence 
Alliance, as well as feminist groups, student movements, and academics have called for a ban on seabed mining 
in the Pacific. 
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some extra aid money to assist with structural adjustment. The sad reality is 
that PACER Plus will constrain the ability of FIC governments to shape our 
development future.
Pacific CSOs have expressed their deepest concerns at the direction, content, 
pace and process for consultation of state negotiations toward the proposed 
regional free trade agreement. The PIFS has organised briefings for NSAs, 
but CSOs, social movements and community networks that are trying to shine 
a  light on negotiations from the outside are not able to attain even observer 
status. CSOs have therefore called for:
• the immediate suspension of the PACER Plus negotiations until there has 
been informed, comprehensive dialogue with civil society to ascertain 
whether there is a popular mandate for such negotiations;
• the immediate release of all negotiating texts to allow full, comprehensive 
and informed input from civil society; and
• following the release of the texts a properly funded social, cultural, 
environmental and human rights impact assessment be undertaken to 
determine the impacts of any proposed outcome (Pacific civil society 
organisations 2015).
None of the above requests should cause democratic and transparent institutions 
any concerns; after all, the agreement is supposed to be for our benefit.
3. Political Self‑Determination 
Surprisingly, in 2015 Oceania is home to some island nations and territories 
whose people are still fighting for the right to self-determination, notably West 
Papua, Kanaky, Bougainville, Tahiti, and Hawai’i. CSOs have a long history of 
actively supporting and being part of right to self-determination struggles. 
They have been central in some cases, long after Pacific Island governments 
changed their policy to ‘non-interference’ in sovereign matters. 
On the issue of West Papua and Tahiti, the Australian government has been 
largely mute in the face of atrocious human rights abuses, primarily because of 
their strong bilateral relationship with the Indonesian and French governments. 
Compare and contrast this stance with Australia’s reaction to Fiji’s last coup. 
As pointed out by Nic Maclellan (2002), ‘decolonisation might not look like a 
hot-button issue but after our (Australia’s) Security Council win we’ll have to 
start taking it seriously in the Pacific’.
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Politics of Inclusiveness
In all of these cases, PIFS seeks to justify its position by reference to its mandate 
from its member states. At the same time, it openly acknowledges in its own 
policy documents that there is no peoples’ voice in regional policies. CSOs such 
as PANG and the media have experienced first-hand the extent to which the 
forum secretariat will go to control access to their closed meetings. At the 2013 
forum trade ministers meeting in Samoa, even the small public spaces which 
CSOs and the media used to access trade officials and ministers were rapidly 
closed down by secretariat staff (Samoa Observer 2013). That the secretariat 
would even attempt to close down public spaces where officials and CSOs and 
media could meet speaks to the gatekeeper mentality of some technocrats. 
The continued exclusion of CSOs from regional engagement dismisses the 
technical knowledge (scientific, legal, environmental, social, and cultural), 
values, and extensive networks that CSOs can bring to the table. This expertise 
has been the basis of cooperation with governments from independence 
till today. The reason why it has taken PIFS this long to adequately address 
the issue of CSO engagement is because inclusiveness is, by its very nature, 
political. Governments instinctively do not want to work with what they call 
‘lobby and advocacy groups’ that do not toe the line. The emphasis in terms of 
engagement has been to regulate who, how, when and where CSOs can attend 
regional spaces. A lack of a formal mechanism for engagement leaves the power 
in the hands of technocrats to arbitrarily determine who can and cannot attend. 
This informal mechanism leaves not just CSOs, but also the wider community, at 
the mercy of technocrats. 
Regional institutions often seek to find one CSO network as their favoured 
interlocutor. This effort is self-defeating; ‘civil society’ across a region as vast as 
the Pacific is incredibly diverse, and it is difficult for one organisation to claim 
legitimacy. Instead, CROP agencies should recognise that the diversity of Pacific 
churches, NGOs and customary groups as a strength rather than a weakness. 
Regional institutions should provide a variety of mechanisms to engage with 
communities in a region noted for its geographic, cultural and political diversity.
More than this, the citizens of the Pacific want more than token, one-off 
consultations with their regional institutions. Surely, in the 21st century, CROP 
agencies should recognise that good development practice involves ongoing, 
interactive and well-resourced engagement with people affected by the 
policies adopted by governments and donors. Existing attitudes and practices 
do a disservice to the Pacific and its regional institutions. PIFS in particular 
is increasingly viewed by many as an organisation seeking to facilitate the 
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interest of those in power or those with money. CSOs argue that an organisation 
confident in its role and its mandate should welcome all views and seek ways to 
actively allow those views a space.
Regional CSOs demand a formal mechanism and an honest policy which is applied 
evenly and openly, regardless of the issue in question. The questions that the 
region faces are too important to be left in the hands of unelected technocrats, 
however well-intentioned they may be. PIDF has a unique opportunity to lead 
the way. Let us hope it has the courage and political leadership to engage all 
views even those that are contrary to PIDF’s position.
The time has come for an honest debate; are our leaders prepared to allow it?
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A New Pacific Regional 




A new regional body — the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) — 
was inaugurated at an international conference organised and hosted by the 
Fiji government 5–7 August 2013 and attended by around 300  delegates. 
The conference theme was ‘Leadership, Innovation and Partnership for Green/
Blue Pacific Economies’ and aimed to advance the vision of a ‘United, Distinctive 
and Sustainable Pacific Society’. The following report examines the processes 
and outcomes of this event and provides a preliminary analysis of its significance 
to Pacific regionalism, as well as to the development agenda of Pacific Island 
countries. It begins with an overview of the origins and background of the PIDF. 
1  Reprinted with permission. Originally published as Pacific Islands Brief No.4, Pacific Islands Development 
Program, Hawai’i, 2013.
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Background
The immediate antecedents to the PIDF lie in a 2012 Engaging with the Pacific 
(EWTP) leaders meeting, attended by leaders and representatives from Pacific 
Island states and territories. It was at this gathering that agreement was reached 
to convene the PIDF in 2013.
EWTP was a Fiji-led regional process that had evolved since 2010, in reaction 
to its suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum. The first EWTP meeting had 
occurred by default in 2010 in place of a cancelled summit of the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), at which the Fijian prime minister was due to assume 
chairmanship of the sub-regional body. The Fiji government’s intention was to 
turn the MSG meeting into a broader gathering, dubbed MSG Plus. This plan 
was scuttled at the last minute, reportedly due to Australian pressure on the 
outgoing MSG chair (the prime minister of Vanuatu) who cancelled the meeting 
on the grounds of a non-democratically elected leader being unsuitable to 
assume this position. 
The Natadola Communique issued at the end of the 2010 summit established 
the tone and focus for what would become the EWTP and later the PIDF. 
This emphasised the need for new modes of regionalism and new international 
partnerships, as well as new development approaches and new diplomatic 
strategies to support these. From the outset, it was made clear that the EWTP 
would emphasise Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) as the core 
membership. (This also included Timor-Leste and later Pacific non-self-governing 
territories.) Pacific regionalism would find its strength in shared interests and 
common concerns around sustainable development and by renewing ‘special 
cultural bonds’ and ‘regional kinships’. For Fiji, the underlying agenda was 
also to mobilise Pacific Island endorsement for the Bainimarama Government’s 
‘roadmap to democracy’. 
Despite being dismissed by some observers as a short-lived irrelevance 
(see Field 2010), the EWTP meeting attracted a large number of participants 
to its second conference in September 2011. There was also a broadening of its 
agenda to include self-determination (in this case for French Polynesia which 
attended for the first time). References to the ‘blue/green economy’ appeared 
for the first time, and the meeting endorsed the region’s preparations for the 
2012 Rio Plus 20 World Summit on Sustainable Development. It is significant 
that just prior to this EWTP meeting, the United Nations (UN) adopted a 
new nomenclature that recognised PSIDS as part of the Asia Group within 
the UN (renamed in brief the Asia Pacific Group). This underscored (and gave 
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impetus to) Fiji’s determination to assert the PSIDS membership as the primary 
basis for regional solidarity and cooperation, which would be carried forward 
to the global level through the EWTP process. 
The momentum continued with the third EWTP leaders meeting in Nadi in 
2012, which now also included New Caledonia. As mentioned earlier, this 
meeting resolved to convene the PIDF, alongside the next EWTP leaders meeting. 
The proposed PIDF aimed to bring together leaders from key sectors in order 
to advance ‘green economic policies’. The concept of green economy — which 
had been evolving over several years and was given prominence at the 2012 
Rio Plus  20 World Summit — emphasised partnerships among governments, 
civil society, communities and the private sector. Three organisations that 
made presentations to the 2012 EWTP meeting around this theme were United 
Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and Pacific Islands 
Private Sector Organisation (PIPSO). All three organisations would become part 
of the steering committee formed by the Fiji government to conceptualise and 
plan the formation of the PIDF. 
Planning the PIDF
Although initially conceived as a parallel event to the EWTP meeting, within 
a few months the Fiji government had approved the PIDF as a successor 
arrangement to the EWTP process. Based on a secretariat established within 
the Fiji government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
work began to more fully articulate the role and purpose of the PIDF and to 
promote this to the region (governments, civil society, CROP (Council of Regional 
Organisations in the Pacific) agencies, private sector). 
In promoting the PIDF, Fiji government officials maintained that there was a 
need for the Pacific to ‘get our act together in the region if we want to make an 
effective contribution to the (UN’s) Asia Pacific Group’. The PIDF would not 
have any political or security role, but would be ‘totally focused on the Green 
Economy and sustainable development’. Moreover it would represent and 
comprise ‘only Pacific people and values’.2 
The inaugural PIDF summit was scheduled for early August 2013 and planning 
was undertaken by a committee comprising the Fiji government (mainly the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but including other departments), PIPSO, UNESCAP, 
IUCN, and the Solomon Islands High Commission in Suva. 
2  These comments were made to a briefing of the University of the South Pacific staff in March 2013.
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Participation/Timing/Funding
During the planning process it was envisaged that participating countries would 
all be Pacific Island countries and territories (including Timor-Leste). Observers 
would include existing regional organisations, UN agencies, private sector and 
NGO umbrella groups, academic institutions, and ‘development partners’. The 
latter was intended to encompass as many countries as possible, both current 
and potential partner states. Other interested organisations and individuals 
were also welcome to request observer status.
From the outset there was some ambivalence about the inclusion of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS)). It is perhaps not 
surprising that the PIFS was the only key regional CROP agency not represented 
at the PIDF inaugural summit. Whether or not they were invited remains subject 
to some dispute. But it is also significant that the PIDF summit occurred in the 
same week as the meeting at the forum secretariat of the Pacific Plan Action 
Committee (PPAC) and, following from that, the Forum Officials Committee. 
In what could be seen as a parallel — if not competing — process, the PPAC 
(which comprised members of the PIF) was meeting to receive the report of 
the team that had been tasked with reviewing the Pacific Plan and drawing up 
a more relevant framework for regionalism and regional integration. 
In the lead-up to the August PIDF it was not clear how many countries invited 
as observers would, in fact, attend. It was apparent that some countries were 
hesitant to accept their invitations, at least until they knew who else would 
be attending. The hesitancy on the part of some established regional partners 
(such as Japan and the United States) pointed to a reluctance to give endorsement 
to the PIDF and thereby undermine the Pacific Islands Forum as the key 
political body through which they engaged with the region. In the end they 
all attended — about 30 countries from Europe, Africa, Latin America, North 
America, Asia, and the Pacific. Those ‘partners’ with diplomatic missions in Fiji 
were represented by their resident ambassadors. Those without missions sent 
diplomats from neighbouring missions in Australia or New Zealand, or special 
envoys. This included special envoys of the governments of Russia and China, 
who each made statements to the summit pledging their respective government’s 
support for the PSIDS and the PIDF. 
Perhaps of most importance was the attendance of Pacific Island countries. 
Of the invitees who accepted, five sent heads of government, heads of state, or 
deputies (Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, and Federated States of 
Micronesia). The rest sent ministers and diplomatic representatives. There were 
four members of the Pacific Islands Forum who were conspicuous by their 
absence: Cook Islands, Samoa, Niue, and Palau. Two of these (Samoa and Palau) 
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are members of the UN PSIDS group, and Samoa will host next year’s Global 
Summit of Small Islands Developing States. None of these countries had 
previously participated in the EWTP meetings (Palau apparently still does not 
have diplomatic relations with Fiji). Of the four, Samoa was the only government 
to openly criticise the meeting (see Radio Australia 2013).
The absence of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) prime minister also became an 
object of some speculation. It was suggested that the PNG prime minister had 
been offended by remarks made by the Fiji prime minister and foreign minister 
criticising Australia’s policy of resettling asylum seekers in PNG (as a deterrent 
to the flow of boat people heading for Australia) and had subsequently decided 
against attending. However, the PIDF meeting coincided with Papua New Guinea 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill’s official visit to New Zealand, presumably planned 
well ahead. Moreover, the PNG prime minister did not feature on earlier drafts 
of the conference program. It was the PNG minister for national planning who 
was on the program and who chaired one of the sessions.
In terms of funding, a press statement released in advance of the meeting by 
the Fiji government revealed that the governments of Kuwait, China, and the 
United Arab Emirates had provided financial support (totalling US$689,000), 
along with a number of ‘local business houses’. 
Procedures/Presentations
The format of the PIDF conference combined an unconventional mix of 
diplomatic protocol and creative informality. This owed much to the make-up 
of the participants: from state leaders and politicians to academics, business 
leaders, diplomats and civil society representatives. There was less room 
for formal interventions and more for personal or individual reflections and 
responses. The bulk of the program comprised plenary sessions addressing the 
conference theme — leadership, innovation and partnerships — however, half 
a day was set aside for parallel sessions based on key economic sectors or policy 
areas (seven in all). Each of the parallel sessions had designated facilitators 
(from government, CROP agencies, private sector and civil society) and each 
was tasked with coming up with a short list of policy recommendations and 
actions that would make a difference in advancing the blue/green economy. 
These recommendations are contained in the conference outcomes documents 
(PIDF 2013).
Both the plenary sessions (including keynotes and panels) and the parallel 
sessions aimed to highlight ‘best practices’ from across the region and beyond 
in the area of blue/green economy — initiatives by governments, private sector 
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and NGOs of inclusive and environmentally sustainable development, at the 
grassroots, national and regional levels. There was some disagreement and 
confusion voiced regarding the precise meanings of blue and green economy. 
For the Kiribati president, one simply referred to the marine zone and the 
other to the terrestrial zone, and the extent to which these were developed 
in an environmentally sustainable and inclusive manner. However, it was 
recognised by the conference that there was a need for further clarification, 
and representatives from the University of the South Pacific offered to provide 
a paper on this.
Throughout the presentations and discussions, a number of things stood out. 
There was an emphasis on infusing the PIDF with a ‘distinctive Pacific voice’ 
— evident by the opening audiovisual presentation of the South Pacific creed. 
Speakers, especially national leaders, repeated the call for a ‘new development 
paradigm’, based around a ‘distinctive Pacific model of green growth in blue 
economies’. There were frequent references to the need to ‘step outside the box’ 
and to reject ‘business as usual’. On the whole there was a view that PSIDS 
needed to take greater ownership over the development process and, in the 
words of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, to be ‘agents of our own change’. 
A presentation by Fijian entrepreneur Colin Philp on sustainable shipping 
(using  wind/sail power) as an innovation towards achieving the blue/green 
economy appeared to resonate strongly with conference participants, by 
highlighting the potential role for traditional knowledge and technologies. 
This  provoked a somewhat passionate response from Marshall Islands 
government minister Tony de Brum:
For too long we have accepted down as normal; we have accepted small as 
normal; we have accepted prescriptions of our development partners as normal 
— that we must do what we are told to do, not what we want to do. I came 
to this meeting in the hope that the PIDF will make up for that deficiency 
in our development; where solutions to our development problems can be 
reached quickly without multitudes of expensive consultants. The world needs 
alternative energy technology. This is something that can fit into the agenda 
of this meeting. We  need to do something new about climate change. It is 
frustrating to Pacific Island countries that hardly anything has been done in that 
area. This organisation can take the lead in that and stop the rhetoric. PIDF must 
be outcome driven.
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The Way Forward
In the final session, which addressed future institutional and governance 
arrangements for the PIDF, the way forward was mapped out by Fiji’s 
permanent secretary for foreign affairs. In what had been touted as a surprise 
announcement by the Fijian prime minister (but which probably surprised few) 
it was revealed that leaders had agreed to establish a PIDF secretariat, based in 
Fiji, but no longer within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was later reported 
that the governments of Russia, China and Kuwait had offered to contribute to 
the costs of the secretariat, which would operate out of Fiji government quarters 
in Suva. The secretariat staff would be drawn from the PIDF member countries, 
on secondment/attachment from government, civil society and the private 
sector. A working group, also representative of these various sectors, would 
be established to develop the longer term institutional framework ahead of the 
next PIDF meeting (which the Fijian prime minister promised would be held in 
2014, at a place and time yet to be decided).
It was also announced that the work program of the PIDF secretariat would be 
developed inter-sessionally and circulated to PIDF countries for endorsement. 
One of the priorities was to agree on language and indicators for the ‘ten big 
things’ necessary to achieve blue/green Pacific economies. In response to this 
roadmap, country representatives made a number of comments and suggestions, 
including the need for further consideration of the financial implications of the 
PIDF, the need for clearer terms of reference guiding participation of various 
stakeholders, and revisiting the name of the organisation. (Kiribati suggested 
‘Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Forum’, but there appeared to be little 
support for this.)
The conference was closed formally by the Fijian prime minister who used the 
occasion to again assert the distinctive Pacific voice and identity of the PIDF, 
that this was an initiative ‘by Pacific Islanders, for Pacific Islanders’. According 
to Prime Minister Bainimarama, the PIDF was a genuine expression of the Pacific 
way of consultation and consensus and would be the antithesis of expensive, 
top-down bureaucracy. It would operate, instead, according to the principle of 
‘less is more’, where the goal would be to ‘live within our means’. 
Assessment
Although described on a number of occasions by Prime Minister Bainimarama 
as a development forum, not a political forum, there can be no denying the 
political significance of the PIDF. Moreover, while questions and uncertainties 
surround its future structure, processes and outputs, there seems little doubt 
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that the PIDF has sufficient support — both within the region and beyond 
— to carry it forward. The PIDF could not have occurred without the Fiji 
government’s leadership, but it resonates with broader regional concerns and 
trends. While a direct outcome of Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands 
Forum, the PIDF is a ‘product’ of the new fluidity in the international relations 
of the Pacific region, evident by the large number of states attending the PIDF 
conference that normally have no presence at other Pacific regional forums. 
It is also an expression of the disaffection and disillusion among Pacific Island 
countries with the prevailing regional order and the development outcomes it 
has delivered (or failed to deliver). 
The outcomes document underscores a widely held view that new approaches 
are needed to meet the challenges posed by climate change as well as to address 
other social and economic problems. This is reflected in the declared need to 
assert a Pacific model of ‘green growth’. How this translates into policy at the 
local and national levels remains to be seen, but the PIDF was an attempt to 
showcase what was possible (both through the conference presentations and on 
the sidelines with the Pacific Green Growth Expo). In this context, the PIDF may 
well become the driver of the green growth development agenda in the Pacific.
The PIDF may also become the principal interlocutor for Pacific Island states at 
the UN, based on its claim to represent the Pacific sub-region of the UN’s Asia 
Pacific Group (minus Samoa and Palau). This will involve formalising links with 
relevant groups and agencies, including the successor to the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (the High Level Forum on Sustainable Development). 
In this role, there is obvious overlap with the work of the PIFS and it is not clear 
how this will be resolved, especially in the lead-up to the 2014 Global Conference 
on Small Islands Developing States, scheduled to take place in Samoa. 
The PIDF reflects a new dynamism that has characterised Pacific regionalism over 
the past few years, and that has challenged the established donor-dominated 
CROP system. Within this more fluid environment, Pacific states have sought 
to take control of regional processes and agendas (whether fisheries, trade, or 
security) through promoting alternative regional frameworks and alliances. 
PIDF is the latest and perhaps boldest of these initiatives. Not only is it 
formalising a new regional grouping of Pacific states and territories (PSIDS), it is 
also breaking convention by incorporating non-state actors (the private sector 
and civil society) as full partners. 
While eschewing convention (including the bureaucratic formalities associated 
with existing regional bodies) the PIDF will undoubtedly encounter challenges 
(the week-long delay in releasing the conference outcome documents is perhaps 
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a precursor of those). But, as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community Director 
General put it, the PIDF marks ‘an important historical journey’ and it remains 
very much a work in progress. 
Postscript
Since the inaugural summit, attention has focused on formalising the PIDF’s 
institutional and governance structures. This has meant confronting difficult 
questions about membership and participation in the quest to include Pacific 
Island states, non-self-governing territories, civil society, and the private 
sector. It has also meant finding a funding model and formula that would 
reflect and reinforce the principles of the organisation. The PIDF Governing 
Council convened for the first time in 2014, ahead of the second summit. 
This group, which is chaired by Fiji’s prime minister, comprises heads of 
member governments, the PIPSO and the Pacific Islands Association of Non-
Government Organisations. A key challenge facing the governing council has 
been to formalise a legal agreement establishing the PIDF, which would enable 
the PIDF to participate in its own right at international conferences. A process 
which included public and regional consultations led to the formulation of the 
PIDF charter by the People of the Pacific, to be formally launched at the third 
PIDF summit in Suva in September 2015. Within this charter is provision for 
a regional development fund. Institutionalisation has also taken place through 
the establishment of a secretariat headquarters (which opened in Suva in May 
2014), led by an interim secretary general. Applications opened for a permanent 
secretary general (who could not be a citizen of Fiji), and this appointment was 
also due to be announced at the third PIDF summit. 
As indicated at the outset, the PIDF has become a platform for showcasing 
new regional partnerships. At the second PIDF, the chief guest was Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, using his first state visit to the region 
to pledge support for the green growth agenda and announcing assistance to 
support capacity-building programs for Pacific Island states. Russia and China 
have also continued to be strong backers of the PIDF, with China providing a 
financial contribution towards setting up the PIDF secretariat. The chief guest 
to the 2015 Summit was Thailand’s Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, 
with the Commonwealth Secretary General Kamalesh Sharma also attending. 
Apart from facilitating new economic partnerships, the PIDF is emerging as an 
important forum for mobilising diplomatic support on crucial global agendas, 
primarily around climate negotiations and sustainable development. The 2015 
PIDF summit thus aimed to formulate ‘key messages’ from the people of the 
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Pacific for the UN Climate Change Conference scheduled for Paris later in the 
year. In keeping with the ‘inclusivity’ principle, attendance at the third PIDF 
summit was ‘open and free’.
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The New Pacific Diplomacy 
at the United Nations: 
The rise of the PSIDS1
Fulori Manoa
Since 2009 there has been a marked elevation in the profile of the Pacific Island 
countries at the United Nations (UN). Nauru’s much publicised chairmanship 
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Fiji’s successful chairmanship 
of the G77 plus China in 2013, and Samoa’s hosting of the Third International 
Conference of Small Island Developing States are the more telling signs of this 
rise in prominence. In addition, Pacific Island countries are now making it 
onto important UN committees and taking up leadership roles. Much of this 
new recognition at the UN can be attributed to the Pacific Island countries 
organising and working together as Pacific Small Island Developing States 
(PSIDS). This paper seeks to briefly tell the story of the PSIDS, who they are, 
why they organise the way they do, and outline some of the successes that they 
have achieved. 
1  In June/July of 2014, I was privileged to be able to interview eight Pacific Island Ambassadors to the 
United Nations, 12 Pacific diplomats, and two advisers. I was able to speak to officials from 11 out of the 12 
Pacific Island missions. I am exceedingly grateful to the ambassadors, diplomats and advisers for their time 
and help in sharing with me the story of the Pacific Small Island Developing States at the United Nations.
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The PSIDS comprises 14 Pacific Island countries: Cook Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. When discussing 
the PSIDS in the context of the UN, the Cook Islands and Niue are not included, 
as they are not UN members; however, their names appear on official PSIDS 
stationery, their flags are included in the logo, and they are able to be part of 
group statements. For the purpose of this paper, PSIDS refers to the PSIDS who 
are members of the UN — the UN PSIDS.
When the idea of forming a PSIDS grouping first materialised, it was envisioned 
as a collective of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) countries minus Australia and 
New Zealand. It initially grew out of a need to raise funds for projects around 
climate change adaptation and mitigation, renewable energy and pollution, but 
the structure proved successful and it has been consolidated over the past five 
years to the point where it has become arguably the most important part of the 
way in which Pacific Island countries engage at the UN.
The PSIDS is a New York–based, United Nations–specific grouping. This is 
highlighted by the case of Kiribati. Kiribati joined the UN in 1999, but it was 
not until September of 2013 that it established a mission in New York. A survey 
of PSIDS statements to a variety of different forums clearly shows that before the 
establishment of the Kiribati Permanent Mission, only rarely would Kiribati be 
included in a PSIDS statement. It was only after September 2013 that it became 
a ‘regular’ on the list of countries included in the PSIDS statements.
The PSIDS is founded on consensus; members circulate, make joint statements, 
and agree on which issues to pursue together. Although they have common 
interests and are recognised as a cohesive grouping, lobbied by other countries, 
they are not a voting bloc and pursue their national interests individually. 
From the Forum Group to the PSIDS
According to Powles (2002, p. 72), writing more than a decade ago, the Pacific 
states at that time were organised into a Pacific Group which met once a month, 
made joint statements, and cooperated closely. The Pacific Group comprised 
members of the PIF that were also members of the UN. In  other words, the 
Pacific Group comprised Pacific Island countries and Australia and New 
Zealand. The forum group ambassadors continue to meet, and they do release 
joint statements from time to time. However, today, the PSIDS is the primary 
vehicle for advocacy at the UN among Pacific Island countries. A long-serving 
ambassador put it this way: ‘the Forum group still meets but not as regularly as 
it used to and it does not deliver as many joint statements as it used to. PSIDS, 
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as a group, are making more statements’ (personal communication 10 July 2014). 
The PSIDS ambassadors officially meet once a month, or more often if necessity 
dictates — if there are important ongoing negotiations, for example. They are 
also in regular electronic contact.
PSIDS meetings do not only take place at the ambassadorial level, which is an 
improvement on the meeting model that exists in the forum group. The PSIDS 
has also incorporated a working group, made up of staff from all the missions. 
A task of this working group is to examine the current issues at the UN, 
draft the PSIDS positions and make recommendations to the ambassadors for 
their approval.
Why the Shift from PIF to PSIDS?
There are a number of reasons why PSIDS gained impetus and superseded the 
PIF as the main body for Pacific Island country organising at the UN, including: 
differing interests with Australia and New Zealand, necessity, logic, and Fiji’s 
suspension from the PIF. 
Differing Interests
Powles (2002, p. 71) highlights the marginalisation experienced by the Pacific 
countries as a reason for their finding other avenues to make themselves heard. 
At that time, that meant organising through the forum group, however, it would 
seem that the Pacific Island countries and their issues were marginalised within 
the forum group. Joining their voices to those of Australia and New Zealand 
undoubtedly made their voices louder but, in practice, this actually muzzled 
them on issues where their interests diverged from those of their metropolitan 
forum colleagues. This was a point that most of the ambassadors and diplomats 
agreed upon. There was the general feeling that, since Australia and New Zealand 
were donor countries, they dealt with issues in different ways to the rest of the 
members of the forum group. Some were even of the view that Australia and 
New Zealand were using the forum group to promote their own interests, and 
that these interests clashed with the rest of the forum group on important issues 
such as climate change. For Pacific Island countries, sustainable development 
and climate change are the most important issues at the UN. To be marginalised 
within your own grouping on these issues would be grounds to find another 
avenue by which to make your voice heard. As one diplomat said:
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PSIDS issues were never at the centre, the agenda was dictated by those that 
held the purse strings. If the issues were at all addressed, they were addressed 
sub-standardly. Within the region, the same actors and institutions are still at 
play, so why not form a different entity in New York at the UN to address the real 
challenges of the PSIDS (personal communication 2014).
Necessity
The average Pacific Island mission to the UN has three diplomats, including 
the ambassador, as compared to 33 diplomats at the Australian mission, 
and 14 diplomats at the New Zealand Mission. These numbers may seem ample 
for a Pacific high commission or embassy in another country, but for the 
sheer volume of work at the UN, these numbers can be woefully inadequate. 
Apart from the work of running the mission, which can range from consular 
and legal work to administration and finances, diplomats also have to deal with 
the plethora of issues and meetings that take place every day.
The United Nations General Assembly has six main committees and meetings 
for these committees run simultaneously. With the average of three staff per 
mission (in many cases less) it would be impossible for one PSIDS mission to 
cover all these meetings, or even all the relevant meetings. Every ambassador 
and diplomat spoke about the enormity of the work load and the importance of 
being strategic and working together. PSIDS ambassadors and other diplomats 
rely upon one another to cover meetings that they cannot attend and, in doing 
so, safeguard each other’s interests. Not only do they share notes, there is 
genuine warmth within the grouping, and it is not unusual to have diplomatic 
staff from one mission calling another mission to ask for help with meeting 
timetables and venues or procedure.
Over the years, not much has changed in terms of manpower for the Pacific 
Island country missions. But recently a lot more has been achieved. Much of 
this can be ascribed to the collective work that is taking place amongst the 
PSIDS missions in New York. 
Powles (2002, pp. 74–75) also talked about regional group membership as 
a ‘daunting challenge’ for the Pacific Forum Group at the United Nations, due to 
New Zealand and Australia being members of the Western European and Others 
group, and the Pacific Islands being members of the Asian group. At that time, 
Australia and New Zealand were pushing to bring the region together in its 
own UN-recognised grouping, to boost the status and influence of the region. 
Since then, however, the UN has reconfigured that particular status quo so that 
the Pacific Islands countries are part of the PSIDS group within the renamed 
Asia Pacific group (Tarte 2013, p. 2). It is through these groups that much of 
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the work at the UN is done — voting, for example. It makes more sense for the 
Pacific Island countries to work together to raise their profile and push their 
interests within their own grouping. 
Fiji’s Suspension from the Pacific Island Forum
A few ambassadors place Fiji’s suspension from the PIF in 2009 as central to the 
formation of, or the impetus given to the PSIDS. It was felt that Fiji’s suspension 
lead to the reconfigured grouping as it became a necessity to ensure that Fiji 
was not left out after its suspension from the PIF. PSIDS was the space in which 
other Pacific Island countries could continue to engage with Fiji and thus the 
importance of the PSIDS grouping grew. The PSIDS grouping was subsequently 
found to be a ‘comfort zone’ for the Pacific Island countries, as they shared 
similar interests. Once they started meeting and engaging as PSIDS, recognition 
of the PSIDS as a separate entity from the PIF followed. 
At the time Fiji was suspended from the PIF, PSIDS was already in existence and 
there were joint statements and actions already taking place. However, after 
Fiji’s suspension PSIDS members began to act more in concert. This is measured 
by the amount of PSIDS statements that have been made and the achievements 
of the PSIDS at the United Nations. This gives support to the argument that Fiji’s 
suspension from the forum was a catalyst to the PSIDS’ subsequent rise at the 
UN. In this case, Fiji’s departure from democracy can be said to have actually 
been a positive factor for the PSIDS in the pursuit of their goals at the UN and 
other global forums.
Has Organising as the PSIDS Yielded Success? How has 
it done this?
Success is a relative term, and it means different things in different situations. 
In order to get a truer picture of PSIDS’ success at the UN, it is necessary to 
first examine what success means for the PSIDS and for individual PSIDS 
representatives to the UN. The underpinning definition of success for the 
ambassadors and diplomats was to have the ability to effect positive change for 
the people back in their home countries, through their work and advocacy at 
the UN. There also existed the notion of success as recognition, that is, being 
able to draw and maintain attention at the international forum despite myriad 
competing demands and differences. Taking into account these two main criteria 
— being able to effect change, and being recognised — it would not be amiss to 
say that the PSIDS have met with considerable success at the UN. This success 
has not come without serious effort; there were a series of strategic actions that 
the PSIDS undertook to achieve the success they are enjoying now.
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In 2010, the PSIDS representatives met and decided on a plan of action to raise 
their profiles at the UN. The first course of action was to change the name of 
the Asian Group2 to the Asia-Pacific Group. This was important to the PSIDS 
because they believed that how they were perceived carried a great deal of 
weight and to be able to achieve their ends they needed the recognition that 
a name change would bring. They were told that it would be impossible, but 
14 months later they were able to achieve the name change. Officially, the group 
is now called the Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States 
(Radio New Zealand 2011), however, the shortened form, the Asia-Pacific group, 
is in more frequent use. Achieving this level of acknowledgement made it easier 
and more plausible for the Pacific Island countries to put forth the PSIDS as the 
proper grouping to address the issues of the Pacific Island countries. This links 
directly to the change in focus from the PIF group to the PSIDS.
The PSIDS then started to assert themselves, insisting that the PSIDS and not 
the forum was the right grouping to address the issues that related to Pacific 
Island nations. The recognition of their group implied in the name change of 
the voting bloc was reflected in the PSIDS taking up the rotating monthly chair 
of the Asia-Pacific group when it was their turn. This laid the foundation for 
the next push, which entailed strategically tackling the candidature charts for 
elections within the UN. Changing the name of the Asian Group to the Asia-
Pacific Group and becoming more involved in the running of that group was 
integral to the success of the PSIDS venture into the candidature charts, because 
the selection of candidates for elections is done through the regional grouping. 
The PSIDS coordinate amongst themselves and decide who should take up the 
seats that they find relevant to their advocacy.
A look at the Asia-Pacific Group’s candidature charts for September of 2014 
revealed PSIDS countries in key positions directly relevant to their development 
issues. Fiji sits on the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
(UNCITRAL) and the Governing Council of United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). It also sits on the Executive Board of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 
and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and is currently 
chairing the bureau of the executive board. Fiji and Tonga are members of the 
Council of the International Seabed Authority. Papua New Guinea currently sits 
on the Executive Board of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). Solomon Islands currently sits on the Executive Board of 
United Nations Women and the Bureau of that executive board. Samoa currently 
2  The Asian Group is one of the regional groupings at the United Nations, the others being the African 
Group, Eastern European Group, Latin American and Caribbean Group, and the Western European and Other 
Groups.
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has an expert in the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Some of these 
PSIDS are serving the last leg of their tenure of these seats, but in some cases 
other PSIDS have been lined up to receive seats on the same boards, so that 
PSIDS interests are looked after. For example, Fiji’s term on the Executive Board 
of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS ends in 2015 but the PSIDS have endorsed Samoa to 
take up a seat on that board once Fiji’s term is up. 
Also significant is the position of Vice President of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). At every UNGA, 21 vice presidents are elected and among 
their tasks is to sit on the general committee that scrutinises the provisional 
agenda at the start of the UNGA session (UNGA 2014). Since 2011 (66th session), 
the PSIDS have had one of their number as Vice President of the UNGA, with 
Kiribati currently a vice president (69th session), and Fiji taking over for the 
70th session. While PSIDS countries have had vice presidency of the UNGA 
before (starting with Fiji in 1973: 28th session), never has there been this level 
of sustained representation and, consequently, recognition. 
With recognition comes more leverage, and this has been the case with the PSIDS 
and their advocacy. Examples of this success in recent years include the passing 
of the first climate change resolution, French Polynesia’s reinscription onto the 
list of non-self-governing territories and achieving stand-alone Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) on oceans and climate change. These examples are 
discussed below.
On 3 June 2009, the UNGA unanimously adopted a resolution titled ‘Climate 
Change and its possible security implications’. A few longer-serving diplomats 
flagged this as an important early achievement for the PSIDS, as they had to 
campaign hard for a long time to see it come through. This was recognised 
by Australia’s representative at the time, who said, after the resolution was 
adopted, that it demonstrated regard for some of the smaller states in the 
international arena and that ‘those states deserved congratulations for their 
dignified participation in the long negotiations’. If United States government 
cables revealed by WikiLeaks are anything to go by, it would seem that the 
PSIDS did make an impact. One document clearly outlines that the United States 
had intended that the option of negotiating the resolution was only to be used 
as a ‘fall back’.3 The resolution is not as strong as it could be, but the fact that it 
was adopted and the PSIDS were able to force the hand of the United States to 
adopt the fall-back position can be seen as a victory.
The second illustration of success illustrates the prominence of the Pacific 
Island countries at the United Nations. On 17 May 2013, French Polynesia 
was reinscribed onto the UN list of non-self-governing territories by a UNGA 
3  See wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE82276_a.html.
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resolution  that was  sponsored by Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu with 
support from Vanuatu, Samoa, and Timor-Leste (Maclellan 2013). The Pacific 
Islands (acting as the forum) have had prior success getting a territory on the 
list. In 1978, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Western Samoa 
(now  Samoa) launched a collective attack on France’s continuing colonial 
presence in the South Pacific at the UNGA. For the next ten years, New 
Caledonia was a main topic at forum meetings (Fry 1994, p. 167). Between 1980 
and 1986, there was a split in the forum on what to do about New Caledonia, as 
some countries wanted to play it safe with France and not embarrass a world 
power (Fry 1994, p. 167). However a centre-right change in government in that 
metropolitan country put the island leaders, along with Australia and New 
Zealand, on the same team. Vanuatu requested and gained the Non-Aligned 
Movement’s support at the UN and the resolution for reinscription was passed, 
89 votes to 24 (Fry 1994, p. 168). It is important to note here that the Pacific 
Island countries had to get Australia and New Zealand on side before they were 
able to achieve their ends.
By stark contrast, with the reinscription of French Polynesia, Australia was not 
supportive of the action (Maclellan 2013). Thus collective Pacific action did not 
come through the forum. At the forum meeting in August 2012, the call for 
reinscription was not endorsed, but one month later at the UN, leaders from 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu made the call for decolonisation 
at the UN and the following year in February the ambassadors for Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu, and Nauru formally lodged a draft resolution at the UN which 
was adopted, despite strong French opposition (Maclellan 2013). 
Aside from the success of helping French Polynesia work toward 
self-determination, for the PSIDS this represented a success in achieving 
autonomy from Australia and New Zealand. A long-time diplomat at the UN 
said that in the past (when the Pacific Islands Forum was still the main Pacific 
Island grouping), when the Pacific Islands wanted something, they would ask 
Australia and New Zealand for help, and they relied heavily on them in this way. 
Now, however, they meet up as PSIDS and discuss their issues and the things 
that they want to advocate before they inform Australia and New Zealand, 
and they do not depend solely on their support.
What may be the PSIDS’s most important success in advocacy to date is 
the negotiation of climate change and oceans as stand-alone sustainable 
development goals. These goals will feed into the post-2015 development 
agenda. Virtually every ambassador and diplomat interviewed spoke at length 
about the importance of having these goals included and a few also talked about 
the renewable energy goal. There were other issues that were also important, 
but oceans and climate change needed to be championed in order for them to 
be included. There were 30 seats in the open working group for the sustainable 
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development goals, seven of which were allocated to the Asia–Pacific Group. 
The PSIDS were represented by a troika of Nauru, Palau, and Papua New Guinea, 
who shared a seat (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform 2014). PSIDS 
diplomats who were involved in the negotiation of the sustainable development 
goals talked about the difficulty involved in trying to negotiate comprehensive 
stand-alone goals for oceans and climate change. However, on 12 August 2014, 
the report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable 
Development Goals was submitted to the UNGA, Amongst the 17 goals were 
‘Take urgent action to combat Climate Change and its effects’ and ‘Conserve 
and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development’ (UNGA  2014). It is recognised that the Pacific countries were 
very active in their SDGs campaign. In his address to the Pacific Islands Forum 
(the PSIDS is not an official grouping while the PIF is recognised) leaders on 
26 September in New York, the UN Secretary General commended them on their 
advocacy of the stand-alone goal on oceans.
It has been over 40 years since the first Pacific Island country joined the UN; now 
the Pacific Islands have reached a stage where they are able to assert themselves 
and influence decisions in this global forum. In 2004, Pacific Island ambassadors 
were feeling very marginalised at the UN and they felt that their issues were not 
getting the attention they deserved (McNamara 2009). Ten years later, Pacific 
Island ambassadors and other diplomats are a lot more positive about their role 
at the UN. They have made great gains at the world body. Much of this can be 
attributed to the new Pacific diplomacy at the UN — working together and 
working innovatively. Pacific collective diplomacy is arguably strongest at the 
UN in New York, and this is fostered by shared interests, the need to work 
together, distance from the region, and proximity to each other in New York. 
The PSIDS model of cooperation is testament to the fact that ‘smallness’ and 
a lack of resources does not have to translate into helplessness. The Pacific Islands, 
acting together as PSIDS, have met with success at the UN, but according to one 
long-serving Pacific ambassador, ‘success is a journey’, and continued success 
will depend on whether or not advocacy can be continued at this level (personal 
communication 2014). This is the challenge for the PSIDS.
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Fiji’s Emerging Brand of Pacific 
Diplomacy: A Fiji government 
perspective
Litia Mawi
In a variety of ways, Fiji’s regional presence in the Pacific has gradually yet 
progressively evolved since it gained independence from Great Britain in 1970. 
However, it is during this past decade —  since the launch of the national 
initiative to ‘Build a Better Fiji for All’, through the People’s Charter for Change, 
Peace and Progress (PCCPP) in 2007 — that Fiji’s mark of true independence as 
a sovereign nation has intensified. The charter set in motion a national mindset 
that a common and equal citizenry is the only foundation upon which a modern, 
democratic Fiji can be sustainably developed. Vigorously but steadily nurtured, 
that ideal image will blossom into a Fiji that showcases the richness of its many 
cultures, traditions and histories.
Such a national mindset has, over this past decade, inevitably enhanced Fiji’s 
global integration and engagement in international relations, through an 
asserted posture of self-determination that cautiously respects the sovereignty 
of others by being ‘a friend to all and enemy to none’ in the entire global family 
of nations. In retrospect, Fiji’s post-2006 diplomatic isolation by traditional 
allies was the needed impetus for it to explore and maximise new opportunities, 
such as the ‘look and engage north’ policy, and to broker new partnerships 
beyond familiar spheres of interest. 
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It is among Fiji’s silent aspirations that this bold and unwavering stance will 
make some imprint on the ambitions of the smaller Pacific Island developing 
states and territories and their relationship with Pacific development partners, 
to whom they are implicitly subordinated through colonial ties and obligatory 
mindsets. 
During this blossoming period, Fiji’s most notable presence at a sub-regional 
level was through the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). During Fiji’s 
chairmanship of the MSG, over the two years 2012–2013, culminating in the 
25th silver jubilee celebration, it promoted the principles of self-determination 
and economic growth with equity. It also promoted inclusivity by encouraging 
the recognition of associate member states.
At a global level, Fiji’s contribution to global peace and security has been 
active since 1978 in the United Nations peacekeeping activities (now evolved 
into peace-building) in various versions of international unrest. Such active 
participation has showcased to the world a breed of Fijian soldiering and 
policing renowned for lending their professional attitude and personality to the 
task of building bridges across human divides in adaptive ways. 
Also at a global level, Fiji’s chairmanship in 2013 of the Group of 77 plus China, 
the largest voting bloc in the United Nations, motivated Fiji to lead by example 
in advocating south–south cooperation (SSC) in the Pacific, by becoming a 
development partner to smaller Pacific neighbours thereby demonstrating 
to the international community Fiji’s distinctive brand of responsible global 
citizenship.
What have been some of the major highlights in the last six years? Following 
Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2009, Fiji has capitalised 
on the subsequent detachment from traditional friends to venture onto new turf 
through a ‘look and engage north’ policy; strengthening ties with Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS); and new accreditations to the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and 
other international networks, where there are no political conditionalities, but 
where there are shared values in the sovereign equality of states and mutual 
respect for domestic jurisdiction within such states. 
Engaging with the Pacific
At a regional level, following Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum in 
2009, Fiji committed itself to remaining productively engaged with the Pacific 
by hosting three Engaging with the Pacific (EWTP) meetings in 2010–2012. 
It was at the third EWTP in 2012 that the Pacific leaders in attendance made 
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a decision to establish the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF). As stated 
by Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama when he opened the inaugural PIDF 
summit in 2013:
… the 2012 EWTP Communiqué endorsed the convening of the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum for the purpose of engaging leaders from key sectors in 
implementing green economic policies in the Pacific Small Islands Developing 
States (or PSIDS). 
Why do we need a new body, a new framework of cooperation? Because the 
existing regional structure for the past four decades — the Pacific Islands Forum 
— is for governments only and has also come to be dominated only by a few. 
In too many instances, it no longer genuinely represents our interests and needs.
We want to stand up as Pacific islanders and with one voice send a clear message 
to the world at large; that Pacific-SIDS are vulnerable and face unique sustainable 
development challenges. 
Since the very first EWTP meeting in 2010, Fiji has established MOUs with 
seven Pacific Small Islands Developing States (PSIDS): Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon 
Islands, Nauru, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
and Vanuatu. These MOUs highlight the replicability of development experiences 
amongst PSIDS, and the need to move away from the archaic notion of aid to 
one of partnership and collective self-reliance. Any specificities for individual 
PSIDS are facilitated under separate Memorandum of Agreements, such as for 
the Fiji Volunteer Scheme and other emerging modes of technical assistance 
that capitalise on human resources capacity building. The ‘perfect fit’ of Fiji’s 
skills and technologies with the needs of these PSIDS arises from the lower costs 
and greater appropriateness of skills and expertise available in Fiji compared to 
neighbouring locations. For example, a capacity building program for PSIDS 
officials would be far more cost effective conducted in Suva or Nadi than in 
Tokyo, Sydney or Auckland.
These specifically tailored Fiji–PSIDS Development Cooperation MOUs 
(and MOAs) are focused on nine areas of development cooperation:
• bilateral trade and investment;
• education, youth and human resources development;
• labour mobility;
• immigration;
• commerce, retail and taxation;
• fisheries cooperation;
• air and sea transportation;
• health and pharmaceuticals; and
• climate change, environment, security and energy.
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These Fiji–PSIDS south–south partnerships fall neatly within the global 
framework for Small Island Developing States (SIDS)-specific cooperation under 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Nauru is the current AOSIS chair 
through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations (PRUN). The AOSIS 
representatives are the AOSIS PRUNs, including the PSIDS PRUNs based in New 
York. The global framework for SIDS cooperation also reflects the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs): 2000–2015, the Barbados Plan of Action (1994), the 
Mauritius Strategy (2004) and the S.A.M.O.A. Pathway (2014). In due course, 
they will also reflect the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) — post-2015 
development agenda.
Within these south–south frameworks, the recurring global themes for SIDS-
specific cooperation include response and resilience to natural disasters, climate 
change adaptation, sustainable development, maritime resources (fisheries and 
deep sea mining), investment and public–private partnerships, people-to-
people exchanges, capacity building, the MDGs acceleration framework to 
2015, and the emerging SDGs — post-2015 sustainable development agenda.
South–South Cooperation
SSC is used to describe the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge 
between developing countries, and is universally promoted as an essential 
cross-cutting mechanism designed to deliver capacity building and technology 
support activities in developing countries and regions of the south. SSC can also 
complement north–south cooperation to enhance technical, financial, scientific 
and technological exchanges and innovations for development.
SSC received considerable attention as a philosophy for development during the 
1960s and 1970s, when developing countries, coming out from under the yoke 
of colonisation, were struggling with poverty and underdevelopment. A lack of 
financial and technological resources and western apathy forced them to look to 
collective self-reliance as an engine of growth. The most significant platform for 
SSC is G77 plus China which was originally formed by 77 countries in 1964, and 
which now has 134 developing countries of the ‘south’. SSC suffered a setback 
during the late 1980s and the 1990s, however, as a large number of developing 
countries faced financial crisis against the backdrop of declining resource flows.
The launch of the MDGs in early 2000 has given a new impetus to SSC. SSC is 
today a vital component of the international development fabric as the G77 plus 
China members increasingly recognise that solutions to many of the development 
challenges they face are better addressed through partnerships between and 
amongst themselves. We can only hope that, in the same manner that the MDGs 
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provided an impetus for SSC to be invigorated post-2000, it should pick up 
pace again at the upcoming launch of the SDGs at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in September 2015.
As implied briefly above, the binding characteristics of SSC between Fiji and 
PSIDS include the replicability of development experiences amongst PSIDS — 
partnership and solidarity for development, rather than development assistance/
aid. The appropriateness of Fiji’s skills and technologies arises from a number of 
reasons including:
(i) a backdrop of similar factor endowments — for example, labour abundance 
and relative capital scarcity;
(ii) solutions are more labour intensive rather than automated technology; 
(iii) a similar state of basic infrastructure — for example, telecommunication 
technologies not requiring air conditioning, etc.;
(iv) expertise is attuned to similar geo-climatic tropical conditions — for 
example, the proficiency required for food preservation in tropical settings; 
(v) technologies and expertise are scaled down to size of markets in smaller 
PSIDS rather than the mass production skills in industrialised countries; 
and
(vi) technologies and expertise available are cost effective, having been adapted 
in view of low income consumers in PSIDS.
Over this past decade of such developments, Fiji now views the Pacific as 
distinctly different from the world’s understanding of PSIDS. Fiji now asserts 
the position that all PSIDS are sovereign nations whose views and preferences 
should not be overwritten by any external lenses that are not willing to align to 
Pacific aspirations and self-determined priorities, and that the time has come for 
a distinctive and united PSIDS voice.
It is only with this view and end in mind that Fiji — or any other Pacific 
development partner for that matter — will be able to genuinely contribute 
to development initiatives and aspirations through targeted development 
cooperation that is customised to the felt and expressed needs of her 
neighbouring PSIDS.
Fiji is exploring newer modes of partnership where existing development 
partners of PSIDS become the triangular/trilateral partner to initial bilateral 
partnerships between Fiji and the smaller PSIDS. Triangular cooperation, at a 
very general level, involves two or more developing countries in collaboration 
with a third party, typically a developed country government or organisation, 
contributing to the exchanges with its own know-how and resources. Fiji’s 
search for triangular development partners in the Pacific setting is particularly 
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in the areas of human resources and institutional capacity building in the 
agriculture, fisheries and tourism sectors — these being the three sectors in any 
PSIDS that are capable of producing tradeable, exportable commodities — as 
well as the enabling sectors of transport (both sea and air) and energy. There is 
also the emerging sector of deep sea minerals, which is seen by Fiji as an area of 
potential collaboration with developed triangular partners.
The Way Forward: Strengthening the PIDF
So what is the way forward for Fiji’s Pacific diplomacy? Following successful 
democratic elections in 2014, Fiji has an opportunity to further strengthen its 
‘hub of the Pacific’ role in developing SSC through the PIDF. Inaugurated in 
August 2013, PIDF is the first platform in the Pacific focusing specifically on 
green economies and sustainable development in the series of Rio+20 Global 
Agenda on Sustainable Development. Fiji views the PIDF as the only forum that 
will truly represent the voice of the PSIDS on the sustainable development issue 
as the global community prepares for the implementation of the SDGs.
The inclusion of the private sector and civil society in the PIDF not only 
guarantees explicit commitment and civic ownership to green economic growth 
in PSIDS but also launches a new era of regional cooperation through genuine 
partnership and dialogue between governments, civil society groups, and the 
business community. These crucial groups had hitherto been excluded from 
PSIDS regional decision-making processes. 
A strengthened PIDF will also validate Fiji’s hub role in the Pacific and her 
relations with the smaller PSIDS, provided that all sincere development partners, 
irrespective of the length and depth of their association with individual PSIDS 
in whatever capacity, acknowledge their role as partners by aligning to the 
ownership by PSIDS of their development goals and ideals. 
Fiji remains encouraged by the fact that, in addition to PIDF, there is promising 
potential for PSIDS triangular partners within existing Pacific regional 
frameworks, including the traditional Pacific partners of Australia, Japan, 
France, New Zealand, the USA, and the European Union; the MSG; the Council 
of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP); the Pacific Islands Private 
Sector Organisation (PIPSO); the Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government 
Organisations (PIANGO); the UNDP Regional Program for Asia and the Pacific 
2014–2017 (which is new, since Asia–Pacific became an official grouping at 
the UN in 2012); the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 
the Pacific, 2013–2017; the Korea–Pacific Forum; and, last but not least, Japan 
through the Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting (PALM) dialogue. The state visits 
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to Fiji in 2014 by the presidents of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China, 
and the prime minister of India — which also included roundtable dialogues 
with Pacific leaders — are clear indicators that Indonesia, China and India 
would be willing triangular partners to any SSC between PSIDS.
The undeniable challenge for the Pacific, like any other SSC, is financing. 
Like all challenges, however, it is also the greatest opportunity for exploring 
triangular cooperation with the above-mentioned Pacific development partners. 
It is also an opportunity to explore more innovative financing strategies that 
emphasise ownership by communities as resource owners if there are to be 
more sustainable social governance structures. For the immediate future, the 
apparent challenge is the need to shift the PSIDS mindset away from a focus 
on vulnerability into more positive and alternative visions for the Pacific in 
approaches to development, governance, environmental sustainability, security, 
and social cohesion which would ensure inclusiveness and self-sufficiency 
amongst all our PSIDS communities.
Fiji’s Role as Pacific Hub
Understandably of course, there are lenses and perspectives that question Fiji’s 
role and label as the Pacific hub in political, economic and sociocultural solidarity. 
Fiji sees the Pacific — not just the South Pacific — as an integrated region that 
is driven by the shared value of ‘collective self-reliance as an engine of growth’, 
and where Fiji has the primary role of being the hub through its geographic 
location and its more developed state, relative to most other PSIDS. Evidence 
and reassurance to validate this hub role include Fiji’s successful venture into 
relatively unknown spheres over the past decade and in its strengthening of the 
economic, political and sociocultural ties that have progressively weaned Fiji off 
total dependence on traditional partners in a refreshed foreign and trade policy 
direction. Fiji can develop the capacities of smaller PSIDS who wish to take this 
sovereignty route. 
Other evidence of reassurance and validation include Fiji’s election as president 
of the 2014 UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS executive board following its chairmanship 
of G77 plus China in 2013. Founded, as mentioned above, in 1964 by an original 
group of 77 countries, G77 plus China membership has since increased to 132 
over the years, and during Fiji’s chairmanship, it admitted Kiribati as the 133rd 
member nation at the UNGA in September 2013. Not only is the G77 plus China 
the main voice of the global south on economic and social issues in the UN 
system, it has boosted the bargaining strength of the south in championing the 
primary interests of the developing world.
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As Fiji asserts her hub of the Pacific role through SSC with smaller PSIDS, it 
is essential that the core principles of the Paris Declaration for Development 
Effectiveness are consciously upheld: ownership by PSIDS of their priorities, 
alignment by Fiji to such priorities, harmonisation by Fiji with other development 
partners (including triangular partners), managing for results in both outcomes 
and impacts, and mutual accountability. Triangular partners, on the other hand, 
should be convinced to no longer ask PSIDS the question, ‘what can we do for 
you?’, but rather, ‘what can we do to add value to what it is that you are already 
doing to help yourselves and each other?’. 
With the advent of the post-2015 sustainable development goals as the broadest 
framework for global partnerships — be they south–south, north–south, or 
triangular — it has to be universally accepted by all players that these much 
anticipated sustainable development goals can validly build upon regional 
and national agendas on the one hand, yet on the other be the common 
denominators and underlying bases for ultimate accountability in responsible 
global citizenship. Amidst all this cross pollination in global integration and 
international cooperation, there always will be some duplication and overlap, 
as humanity zooms in on areas that matter most. Instead of seeing such 
developments as rivalry and competition, the challenge would be in converting 
them into complementarities for win-win solutions for all Pacific people. 
Inclusion of the Pacific People
At the heart of Fiji’s new regional diplomacy is the notion of ‘Pacific people’, 
embracing an inclusivity not previously acknowledged or practised in Pacific 
regionalism. Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama succinctly explained this 
notion of ‘Pacific people’ and its importance for future SSC in the Pacific in 
his remarks at the inauguration of the PIDF in August 2013. Let me conclude 
by reproducing his explanation of this central concept in Fiji’s new regional 
diplomacy in full: 
Until now, ladies and gentlemen, sovereign governments have largely determined 
how the Pacific will respond to its many challenges. The small island territories, 
dependencies and protectorates haven’t had a direct say. And neither have civil 
society groups and businesses. The people most affected by government decisions 
— the grassroots and their representatives — have largely been excluded 
from the decision-making process. Not any longer. The PIDF recognizes that 
governments do not have all the answers. We cannot merely prescribe solutions 
to the challenges we face in keeping the Pacific ‘green’ and ‘blue’.
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We need to listen more to our people and the common sense towards problem-
solving that comes with grassroots participation. We need to listen more to our 
business communities, whose investment generates the jobs we need to raise 
living standards and improve the lives of our people.
So for the first time, we are bringing all these stakeholders together to discuss 
common solutions to our common problems in a practical and holistic way. 
And we will take those ideas and contribute them to the global debate in other 
forums — including the United Nations — the Pacific speaking with one voice 
based on the consensus we reach here.
The world recognises the underlying importance of this approach. In June 
2012, governments and civil society groups gathered in Rio De Janeiro for the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. It concluded that Small 
Island Developing States have a special status in the debate about sustainable 
development because of their unique vulnerability. And it said that sustainable 
development ‘can only be achieved with a broad alliance of people, governments, 
civil society and the private sector, all working together to secure the future for 
present and the following generations’.
So Fiji’s vision is for sovereign governments, territories and dependencies, civil 
society groups and the business community, forming a grand coalition to protect 
our environment; to make sure that development is sustainable; to make sure that 
the common good comes before sectional interests; and that we leave the Pacific 
to our children and grandchildren in a better state than when we inherited it.
It is unfortunate that certain Pacific countries are not with us. They have chosen 
to regard the PIDF as a political event rather than grasp its true purpose — which 
is to address the very real threat that our people face and could be catastrophic if 
we don’t act in a collaborative and unselfish manner. As leaders, we must always 




Fiji’s Foreign Policy and the 
New Pacific Diplomacy
Makereta Komai
Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth in 
May and September 2009 respectively was a major turning point in its relations 
with the international community. These two dramatic events sparked a change 
in Fiji’s foreign policy, which has continued until today. Initially, these policies 
were formulated to circumvent what were seen as an Australia/New Zealand-led 
policy to isolate Fiji, and to counter the negative image and fallout created by 
the suspensions. Some radical thinking was put into the policy to ignite Fiji’s 
standing in the international community in line with the government’s 2006 
Charter for Change. Pillar 11 of the charter requires Fiji to enlarge its foreign 
relations, extending beyond traditional allies to countries that respect Fiji’s 
sovereignty and understand the needs and challenges the country was going 
through. 
It is argued that this ‘new diplomacy’ has constituted a major departure from 
past Fiji foreign policies. This chapter demonstrates the sense in which there has 
been a fundamental change in the principles and practice of Fiji’s foreign policy 
and what implications this has for Fiji’s place in the region and the world. 
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Fiji’s New Foreign Policies
Pacific Engagement and Leadership
Fiji’s foreign policies prior to 2009 were closely aligned with its bilateral relations 
with Australia, New Zealand and the Commonwealth, because of its history as a 
colony of Great Britain. A substantial part of Fiji’s trade and economic relations 
are linked to Australia and New Zealand, and the European Union. However, the 
suspension of Fiji from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth in May 
and September of 2009 saw a major shift in Fiji’s foreign policies. Recognising 
the importance of regional mechanisms in global geopolitics, the first of the 
five strategies applied by Fiji was to maintain its presence and leadership in 
the Pacific region, despite its removal from the premier political body, the 
Pacific Islands Forum. For Fiji, the next best option was to enlist support from 
within the powerful sub-regional group, the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG), for political reforms put in place by the Bainimarama Government to 
return the country to democratic rule. The endorsement of the MSG was key 
to reclaiming some regional legitimacy within the Pacific and proving to the 
world that Fiji was not a pariah state (Nayasi 2013). However, in July 2010, 
Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Edward Natapei cancelled the biennial meeting 
of MSG leaders because he felt that ‘the group should only be chaired by an 
elected leader and not someone who came to power in a military coup’ (Kilman 
2010). He refused to hand over chairmanship of the group to Commodore 
Bainimarama. Despite the cancellation, Fiji convened its own Engaging with 
the Pacific (EWTP) meeting to replace the MSG leaders meeting, which was 
deferred to another date (Balawa 2013). Vanuatu’s refusal to hand over the MSG 
chair to Fiji caused a division among the leaders of Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu. Former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea Sir Michael 
Somare was instrumental in drawing up a compromise to show support for 
Fiji. Sir Michael stepped in to broker the thaw in relations between Fiji and 
Vanuatu, and suggested Solomon Islands as a neutral venue for the handover of 
chairmanship of MSG and for leaders to reconcile amongst themselves. He was 
the only MSG leader that stood by Fiji, asking other Pacific leaders to allow Fiji 
to deal with its own political situation. This support is reflected in his speech 
at the 25th anniversary of the MSG in Noumea on 20 June. He said Fiji needed 
the understanding of the MSG and recognised that the ‘Melanesian values of 
dialogue and patience have the greatest potential to bring about the change we 
want in Fiji’. Bainimarama ensured that Fiji was present at the Honiara meeting, 
because the chairmanship of the MSG was key to Fiji asserting its presence 
and leadership within the region (Balawa 2013). A reconciliation ceremony was 
held in Honiara, hosted by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Danny Philip on 15 
December, where Solomon Islands handed over the MSG leadership to Fiji. 
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‘Look North’ Policy
The second new foreign policy strategy was ‘finding better partners beyond 
Australia and New Zealand’. As defined by Esala Nayasi, Director of Fiji’s 
Political and Treaties Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘these are 
partners who, despite the country’s political situation, respected Fiji as equal 
and understood the policies put in place by the government to take the country 
back to democratic rule’ (Nayasi 2013). This position was spelt out clearly by 
Fiji Foreign Affairs Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola in a speech to the Australia 
Fiji Business Council meeting in Brisbane in July 2013, when he said that 
‘Fiji no longer looks to Australia and New Zealand but to the world’ (Kubuabola 
2013). He said that, since 2009, Fiji had taken a ‘different path’ and forged new 
relationships with countries that understood and didn’t judge the political 
reforms the country was going through:
Jolted from our complacency by the doors that were slammed in our faces, we 
looked north — to the great powers of Asia, especially China, India and Indonesia 
and more recently to Russia. We looked south to the vast array of nations, big 
and small, that make up the developing world and we currently chair the G77, 
the biggest voting bloc at the United Nations. And we looked to our Melanesian 
neighbours, to forge closer ties with them and use our collective strength to 
make our voices heard in global forums and secure better trading deals for us all 
(Kubuabola 2013). 
What Ratu Inoke expounded to the Australia Fiji Business Forum was in line 
with the Fijian government’s strategy to enhance and deepen its ‘Look North’ 
policy. Key to this strategy was the deepening of bilateral ties with China, as 
reiterated by Commodore Bainimarama in his 2013 state visit to Beijing. Since 
2009, Commodore Bainimarama has assured the Chinese administration that Fiji 
will make China a key part of its ‘Look North’ policy (Xiaokun 2009). Political 
and economic support from China has enabled Fiji’s economy to stabilise and the 
country to make political progress with its roadmap to democratic reform and 
elections (Balawa 2013). Instead of giving Fiji a cold shoulder, China developed 
closer engagement with Fiji, stepping in to fill the gaps left by Australia and 
New Zealand. China’s position is in line with its foreign policy, which respects 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the affairs of other 
states, and peaceful coexistence. In May 2009, prior to Fiji’s suspension from the 
Pacific Islands Forum, Commodore Bainimarama said: ‘The Chinese authorities 
are very sympathetic and understand what’s happening here — the fact that 
we need to do things in our own way.’ He was the first Pacific Island leader to 
meet with the new Chinese President Xi Jinping, two months after he assumed 
office. The deepening partnership and cooperation between the two nations 
has raised eyebrows in Australia and New Zealand because Australia has always 
regarded Fiji and the rest of the Pacific as its own backyard. While Fiji was 
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deepening relations with China, it also deepened ties with Indonesia and South 
Korea, setting up diplomatic missions in these two countries in April 2011 and 
July 2012 respectively.
‘Friends to All’
Expanding relations meant that Fiji had to look at establishing diplomatic ties 
with as many countries as possible — countries that understood Fiji’s political 
situation and did not interfere with its domestic affairs (Nayasi 2013). Prior to 
2009, Fiji had established diplomatic relations with 70  countries. The new 
strategy required beefing up Fiji’s friends globally. Nayasi stated that:
We looked at our own database and realised that we have signed diplomatic 
relations with only 70 countries. We saw this was something that we needed to 
change — first of all that we must be friends with everyone. We had to look at 
our comparative advantage — what we can offer rather than just depending on 
two countries (Australia and New Zealand).
From 2009–2013, Fiji added 63 more nations to its list of countries with diplomatic 
relations. According to Nayasi (2013), ‘Cabinet has now given the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the go-ahead to sign diplomatic relations with the rest of the 
member countries of the United Nations’. Given Fiji’s limited human resource 
capacity to set up diplomatic missions in all capitals of countries with diplomatic 
relations, cabinet agreed to set up diplomatic missions in all key regions of the 
United Nations (UN) — South Africa (Africa), Brazil (Latin America and the 
Caribbean), the United Arab Emirates (Middle East), and Indonesia as a key and 
influential nation in Southeast Asia and founding member of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (Southeast Asia). During this process, Fiji even courted 
controversial friends such as Iran, North Korea, and Egypt. Nayasi said: ‘As far 
as we are concerned, it is about respect and treating each other equally.’ 
At the multilateral level, Fiji actively participated in regional and international 
organisations, including the UN. According to Nayasi (2013):
Since we were out of the Pacific Islands Forum, our only opportunity was to 
revamp our participation at sub-regional and regional organisations like the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the Engaging 
With The Pacific, which is now known as the Pacific Islands Development Forum. 
In 2011, Fiji chaired the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s Governing 
Council, the Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations 
(CRGA) and the MSG, two key positions that lifted Fiji out of the ‘political and 
diplomatic doldrums’ it found itself in after 2006 and assured its leadership 
and influence in the Pacific. As assessed by Nayasi (2013), ‘You can clearly see 
the hands of Fiji in these groups — we have become an influential member at 
the regional level’. At the UN in New York, Fiji continued to work within the 
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193-member group, securing new friends. The new strategy allows the foreign 
affairs office in Suva to explore benefits from being a member of an international 
organisation. 
Fiji has actively remained engaged in the area of peacekeeping since it joined 
the world body. Peacekeeping is a key pillar in Fiji’s foreign policies; since 1978, 
Fiji has derived considerable foreign revenue through remittances from soldiers 
on peacekeeping duties, which have provided employment to thousands of men 
and women. To date, UN peacekeeping has contributed over FJ$200 million in 
revenue per annum, earning more than traditional sectors such as sugar and 
garment manufacturing. Another key aspect of Fiji’s peacekeeping commitment 
is its strategic interests in global politics. As a result of its commitments in 
Sinai, Iraq, and the Golan Heights, Fiji is well regarded by super powers such 
as the United States. At the 68th UN General Assembly in 2013, Bainimarama 
assured world leaders that Fiji recognises the risks involved in peacekeeping, 
but that it was more than ready to provide 501 troops to Syria to shore up the 
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Peacekeeping is a source of great 
pride for Fiji, because it allows Fiji to make a meaningful contribution to global 
peace (Bainimarama 2013). For the Fiji government, ‘The high standard achieved 
by Fijian personnel in UN peacekeeping has been a focus of national pride 
and has earned Fiji considerable distinction in the international community’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 2009). 
An attempt by Australia in 2010 to shut Fiji out of UN peacekeeping duties 
was foiled even before it was tabled to the security council because of a 
possibility of two of the five permanent members withdrawing support for the 
resolution against Fiji’s UN peacekeeping participation (Balawa 2013). During 
its term as chair of G77, Fiji was actively involved in a move within the group 
to introduce reforms within UN peacekeeping operations. In May 2014, Fiji and 




From Fiji’s perspective, the new foreign policies achieved more than they set 
out to do. From being an international outcast in 2009, Fiji defied all the odds 
to emerge as chair of the powerful G77 plus China lobby group within the UN. 
This achievement came about in 2012 when Fiji was elected ahead of Bangladesh 
to lead the 133-member group, securing more than 50  per  cent of the votes 
in the first round of votes (Nayasi 2013). Fiji and Bangladesh were the two 
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candidates from the Asia region. Nayasi revealed that Bangladesh opted for a 
second round of voting, but later withdrew when it realised that it would be 
near impossible to surpass support for the Pacific nation. A compromise was 
reached and Bangladesh agreed to withdraw from the race if Fiji supported its 
bid to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Nayasi said 
chairing the G77 plus China for 2013 was the pinnacle of Fiji’s achievements 
because it became the first Pacific Small Island Developing State (PSIDS) to lead 
an august lobby group of more than 130 countries at the UN. 
An analysis of Fiji’s G77 election by Catherine Wilson argued: ‘Fiji’s election will 
give the country’s leadership a chance to reach out to the rest of the region by 
way of consultation in order to make sure a regional voice can be heard in the 
international stage.’ She added that the ‘Pacific will have a rare opportunity to 
represent itself on the global stage’ (Wilson 2012). In 2012, Fiji Foreign Affairs 
Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola said that Fiji’s election was a ‘demonstration 
of the confidence of the international community in Fiji to preside over the 
132 member organisation in its endeavour to advance matters that are of great 
importance to all developing countries’ (Wilson 2012). Celebrating Fiji Day in 
New York on 10 October 2014, Fiji’s Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, Ambassador Peter Thomson, said that 2013 was a significant year 
because it marked the first time a small island nation from the Pacific held the 
chairmanship of the Group of 77 plus China, the largest intergovernmental 
group in the UN. Ambassador Thompson explained:
Highlights so far for Fiji’s Chairmanship have been its leadership leading up 
to and during the Special Event to follow up efforts towards achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the inaugural meeting of the High 
Level Political Forum. These were very significant events for UN Member states 
as they deliberate on setting the global post-2015 Development Agenda. In both 
events, Prime Minister Bainimarama was the lead speaker, as the Chair for the 
Group of 77 and China, signifying the critical importance of the Group’s part in 
preparing for the post-2015 Development Agenda (Thompson 2013).
Not only was Fiji prominent in global affairs through its chairmanship of the 
G77 plus China group, the island nation was responsible for initiating discussion 
on behalf of PSIDS in New York to change the name of its regional grouping at 
the UN. Nayasi revealed the idea was borne out of discussion between him and 
Ambassador Thompson at the Fiji mission. The rationale behind the proposed 
name change was to give the Pacific the recognition it deserved as a member of 
the Asia Group. PSIDS represent a fifth of the membership of the Asia Group 
at the United Nations. However, its numbers are not reflected in the name of 
the group (Nayasi 2013). The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) tried for 
the inclusion of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to be a special category 
within the UN but this didn’t succeed, said Nayasi. The AOSIS push was limited 
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to climate change negotiations. According to Nayasi (2013), ‘Fiji felt that all 
the issues we bring through to the UN have always been seen as a climate 
change and sustainable development issue. Often when it goes to the security 
council, it is sidelined because it lacks the politics it deserves.’ Climate change 
and sustainable development have their own processes within the UN system. 
Pacific positions in these processes are represented by PSIDS, AOSIS, and G77. 
However, the important political manoeuvrings that moves the UN to make 
decisions happen at the regional grouping — where the Pacific is grouped with 
Asia. Nayasi reveals: 
For the Pacific to elect the President of UN General Assembly, appoint judges for 
the International Criminal Court or any other UN elections, these decisions are 
allocated or divided into regional groupings. The Africa and the Asia Group are 
the largest groupings at the UN with 54 members each (Nayasi 2013).
In 2010, Fiji realised that if the Pacific was to have some influence over how 
decisions are made at the multilateral level, it must do so within its own group, 
the Asia Group. The idea was conceived to lobby for its inclusion in the name 
of the group. Fiji prepared a concept paper which it circulated to all 54 member 
countries of the Asia Group, including PSIDS in New York. Discussions and 
negotiations took a year (2009–2010) to develop the concept before it was 
presented to the group. Nayasi revealed:
We went bilaterally and basically convinced all the members except China and 
India. The concerns by these two countries was to do with if we are calling it the 
Asia–Pacific Group, it would mean that Australia and New Zealand will be part of 
the group because this is the demarcation in the UNESCAP regions. We had our 
discussion and we suggested two things — to call it the Asia and Pacific Small 
Island Developing States and do away with Asia-Pacific region (Nayasi 2013). 
This was the compromise, and China and India agreed that the registered name 
of the group with the UN will be Asia-Pacific Islands Developing States but in 
terms of the everyday UN parlance, the group will be known as the Asia–Pacific 
group. ‘For us to get that recognition means that the Pacific will now get a fair 
share of representation in the Asia Group’ (Nayasi 2013). In September 2010, 
the Asia-Pacific group was formally endorsed unanimously by all members 
before the secretary general was officially notified. A Pacific diplomat based in 
New York told me that the name change was historical for the UN: ‘There has 
never been any name change within any of the UN’s regional grouping since 
the regions were divided in 1965. For the Pacific, especially Fiji to achieve 
this significant milestone is testament to Fiji’s leading voice in New York on 
behalf of PSIDS.’ Even though Fiji and the Pacific created history, Nayasi was 
disappointed with the support from the Pacific SIDS group: ‘They thought that 
Fiji will not succeed. They were watching us and only came to support our 
effort at the very end and we were all credited for the outcome.’ Fiji was the 
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first PSIDS to join the Asia Group in the early 1970s. With PSIDS reflected in 
the group name, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
now have a prominent voice within the Asia Group. 
Another boost to Fiji’s global standing came in early 2012 when Brazil and India 
supported Commodore Bainimarama to lead the International Sugar Council 
(ISC) for a year. The council is the peak body for the world’s largest sugar 
producers, representing 86 countries. Speaking after his election in London, 
Bainimarama said: 
The election is yet another international vote of confidence in Fiji and the 
Government’s reform program. Our chairmanship of the ISC comes on top of 
the extraordinary honour of chairing the G77 and China, recently chairing the 
EU–ACP trade negotiations, and re-joining the Pacific ACP. Fiji’s standing in the 
world has never been higher (Bainimarama 2012).
Regional Leadership
The establishment of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) was a 
significant milestone for Fiji’s new foreign policy in 2009. PIDF was formed as 
a result of a resolution from the EWTP initiative driven by Fiji in 2010 after 
it was suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum meetings. The new regional 
body champions the implementation of the Rio+20 sustainable development 
agenda, SIDS development agenda under the Barbados Plan of Action and the 
Mauritius Strategy for Implementation, and the post-2015 development agenda. 
‘PIDF’s choice to champion green growth will guarantee its relevance’ (Tavola 
2013). The inaugural meeting of the PIDF was convened by Fiji in August 2013, 
attended by more than 20 Pacific Island countries and territories, as well as 
donors and development partners. Their attendance indicates support for Fiji’s 
leadership of an alternative regional grouping to the Pacific Islands Forum. In 
an interview with Islands Business magazine in October this year, respected 
Fijian diplomat Kaliopate Tavola said the agenda of the PIDF was ‘refreshing’ 
because it responded to the growing frustrations of Fiji and other Pacific Islands 
towards Australia and New Zealand. Much of that unhappiness came from 
undue influence on the affairs of Pacific Island countries by Australia and New 
Zealand (Tavola 2013). Australia and New Zealand are not part of the PIDF, but 
were invited as observers to the inaugural meeting in Nadi. 
At the sub-regional level, Fiji was able to convince all the leaders in Melanesia, 
except for Vanuatu, that it could lead the organisation for two years, despite 
the fact that it was not a democracy. In 2011 Commodore Bainimarama took 
over the helm of leadership from Vanuatu, although Vanuatu Prime Minister 
Edward Natapei had earlier refused to hand over the chairmanship. Under 
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his chairmanship, the MSG ‘grew from strength to strength’. In his handover 
speech given on 19 June 2013 in Noumea, Bainimarama said, ‘We are turning 
over the chairmanship of an organisation that has grown stronger, that has 
carved out a firmer regional and international presence, which has a clearer 
vision and roadmap for the future’. Some of the achievements of the MSG 
during Fiji’s two-year chairmanship included commitment to a single market 
and economic union to allow for free movement of goods, services, labour 
and capital; implementation of the MSG Trade Agreement with the ongoing 
removal of tariffs for trade between MSG; the MSG Skills Movement Scheme; 
regional cooperation and collaboration between law enforcement agencies to 
tackle transnational crimes; department of peacekeeping operations to assist an 
MSG peacekeeping unit for peacekeeping missions; and the Melanesian Green 
Climate Fund to finance regional environmental initiatives. An eminent person 
group led by Kaliopate Tavola also carried out a review of the MSG to mark 
25 years of its existence. The review sought to chart a new way forward for the 
sub-regional organisation.
Conclusion
The new diplomacy was a significant and radical departure from Fiji’s traditional 
foreign policy. The decision to build new relations with every nation willing to 
become friends with Fiji saw some controversial nations courted, much to the 
disappointment of traditional allies. Some of the milestones achieved along the 
way were not part of the short-term objectives set out in 2009 but have become 
much broader, with benefits not only to Fiji but other Pacific Island countries. 
Fiji has now realised that the policy changes in 2009 triggered a rhetorical 
response that has paved the way for fundamental foreign policy change. It is 
now clear that these policies have survived the 2014 return to democracy and 
the re-establishment of relations with traditional partners. 
The experiences of 2009 to date have taught Fiji many hard lessons about 
diplomacy and international relations. As an independent sovereign nation, Fiji 
has learnt not to rely too much on its traditional partners, Australia and New 
Zealand, but to expand its relations to any country that respects its sovereignty 
and does not interfere with its domestic affairs. Fiji found out that many countries 
were ready and willing to engage with Fiji despite the political challenges it was 
going through. As a result, Fiji put in place a comprehensive foreign policy to 
respond to the diverse responses from the international community. The new 
foreign policies formulated after 2009 allowed Fiji to reclaim its position as an 
influential PSIDS engaging constructively with the international community 
both at regional and global level. 
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The Strategic Context of the 
New Pacific Diplomacy
Michael O’Keefe
The new Pacific diplomacy is being shaped by politics played out in distant 
capitals. This chapter provides the strategic context for discussions of the new 
Pacific diplomacy by reflecting on the global competition that is influencing 
regional and national dynamics. It does not seek to devalue the issues, trends 
and agendas that have shaped the evolution of a new approach to diplomacy 
from within the region. Rather, it seeks to provide the missing piece of the 
puzzle with an overview of international trends that have also been integral to 
shaping the new Pacific diplomacy.
It highlights four broad trends. The first broad contextual trend is the 
geopolitical contest sparked by the rise of China, and to a lesser extent, Russia’s 
renewed interest in the Pacific. The second is the increasing disquiet within the 
Pacific over the costs and benefits of regionalism. The third is Fiji’s increasingly 
confident foreign policy and diplomatic strategy. The fourth is the impact of the 
first three trends on the traditional place of metropolitan powers in the region. 
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The Geopolitical Contest Sparked by the Rise 
of China and Renewed Interest of Russia
There has been a revival of global geopolitical analysis since the end of the 
Cold War (Brzezinski 1997). There is little doubt that global geopolitical 
competition is having a profound impact on Pacific affairs, but most analysis 
is not focused on the Pacific. The decline in military competition between the 
ex-imperial great powers and Cold War opponents at the end of last century 
should not be overestimated. Dramatic strategic change appeared to herald a 
new era, but as the 21st century has unfolded, old habits have resurfaced and 
have become more obvious, and new players have joined the game. The growing 
assertiveness of revisionist powers is the most notable trend that impacts on the 
Pacific. Revisionist powers are those that challenge the international order and 
the hegemon (the US). This international challenge focuses on China and Russia, 
although the former has much more experience and capacity to take this contest 
to the Pacific.
If taken to its logical conclusion, the challenge would ultimately see the 
Washington Consensus undermined and replaced by a hitherto undefined 
Beijing Consensus (WHO 2013; McKinnon 2010). However, the revisionism in 
this challenge may be more apparent than real. It may be more a geopolitical 
challenge to US dominance than an existential threat to the international system 
as we know it (Mead 2014). 
This new geopolitics also explains the interest of the Pacific’s other ‘new 
friends’ — so-called by some Pacific leaders because they don’t have the long-
term relationships of the metropolitan powers who dominated the region for 
so long. The most notable of the ‘new friends’ — Indonesia, India, Israel, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Turkey — are simply trying to increase their relative 
power and influence in the existing system (and in the Pacific). While the arrival 
of these new friends is symptomatic of increasing geopolitical competition and 
buttresses the new Pacific diplomacy, for the purposes of brevity, this chapter 
focuses on China and Russia as examples of states bringing their international 
geopolitical competition with the United States to the Pacific. This focus is 
justified by the strategic potential of the challenge from these powers whilst 
other new friends are not in the same geopolitical league.
The nature of global competition is the subject of much discussion and debate, 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter to address in full. The relevant point 
here is that it provides the lens through which strategy and diplomacy in the 
Pacific is viewed. This is why there is much debate over whether China is, 
in fact, challenging the US and its metropolitan power proxies in the Pacific 
(O’Keefe 2014; Lanteigne 2012; Hansen 2008; Yang 2011; Sen 2015).
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China’s rapid economic development has certainly shaped foreign and economic 
affairs, but a more recent trend is that it is becoming more strategically 
assertive. In recent years, this has included expanding its global reach through 
‘harmonious diplomacy’ (Wang 2007; Crocombe 2007, pp. 249–67). The newly 
announced ‘strategic partnership’ with Pacific Island countries also fits this 
strategy (Xinhuanet 2014). 
More recently, the renewal of Russia’s global ambitions has added impetus to 
geopolitics. There is some debate over whether Russian power is expanding 
or declining (Ikenberry 2014), but either way Russia has been increasingly 
interested in exercising influence in the Pacific and has used a similar, yet much 
more modest, approach to China. This could be because it is a cost effective 
way of influencing many states and their votes in international forums and/or 
opening a new front in the larger geopolitical contest with the United States. 
There are some signs that Russia is more interested in strategic competition 
involving military aid than China. For instance, Russia concluded a defence 
cooperation agreement with Fiji in February 2013 and has provided assistance 
to Fijian peacekeepers in the Golan Heights (ABC News 2013; China.org.cn 
2013). This is palpably different from the largely economic focus of China’s 
approach; it reflects the Soviet/Russian historical approach to ‘influence aid’ and 
the historical response of metropolitan powers to activities, such as the Soviet’s 
negotiating fishing agreements in the 1980s. It may be limited in scope, but this 
aid is significant for Fijian peacekeeping operations, which have become a key 
foreign policy priority. The fact that aid was sought from a rival to the US and 
metropolitan powers that were Fiji’s traditional defence partners is geopolitically 
significant.
Needless to say, any militarisation of competition has the potential to expand 
the scope of geopolitical competition in ways that would impact on other 
actors, most notably the US, but also the metropolitan powers and China. It is 
noteworthy from this nascent trend that, in the Pacific at least, geopolitical 
competition is triangular (between the US, Russia, and China). This contrasts 
the bilateral competition — between the US and Russia, or the US and China 
— that characterises other diplomatic contests. In fact, it may be that China’s 
growing influence is an additional element that has drawn Russia into the 
Pacific. This potential triangular element provides greater emphasis on Russia’s 
diplomatic activities well beyond their material involvement in Pacific security, 
aid or trade.
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The (Incomplete) Promise of Regionalism
There has also been a growing perception that Pacific regionalism has not 
delivered. Pacific Island countries have viewed regionalism as a method of 
aggregating, increasing and sharing aid and development assistance. Regionalism 
was also seen as a buffer and brake on the interests of external powers and on 
the dominance of powerful Pacific states. 
In contrast, from a critical vantage, regionalism has been shallow, uneven, 
incomplete and unfinished. It has imposed high costs, both in financial terms 
and in terms of eroded sovereignty, and has delivered small benefits relative to 
the costs. The financial sustainability of these activities has also been criticised.
The way that metropolitan powers have influenced development policies has 
also been questioned. The liberal development agenda has been viewed as too 
closely representing development orthodoxies developed elsewhere, or too 
closely tied to the interests of development partners — see, for instance, the 
commitments in the Waiheke Declaration on Sustainable Economic Development 
(PIF 2011; UNODA n.d). 
Pacific government criticisms of the influence of new friends are not as 
pronounced as criticisms of the dominance of old friends, but criticisms are being 
aired in popular media. It may be that any beneficial role of new friends acting 
as an alternative to the metropolitan powers will also play itself out, especially 
if the funds dry up, preferential loans are called in, or greater conditionality is 
introduced. 
In the security realm, agendas and agreements have focused on the orthodox 
security concerns of the metropolitan powers. The way that metropolitan 
powers have characterised the Pacific, from failed states to ‘doomsday scenarios’ 
(AusAID 2006), has also been criticised, while there is a perception that the issue 
of most concern to the Pacific — climate change — has not been addressed. 
This gives rise to statements, such as the Majuro Declaration, that place climate 
change at centre stage (PIF 2013).
The capacity and sustainability of many states to survive and prosper without 
external support has also been questioned (Reilly 2003, p. 66). Here,  the 
Pacific that is largely aid-independent and can engage internationally and 
shape outcomes to support its preferences is clearly contrasted with the aid-
dependent Pacific that lacks the capacity to act too far outside the interests of its 
influential development partners and/or donors. Larger and more economically 
and strategically important (to outside powers) Pacific Island countries such 
as Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands have received the lion’s share of 
development assistance, with smaller island nations receiving far less in gross 
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terms. For all but a few states, development assistance has made up such a 
large proportion of government revenues as to guide and potentially distort 
priorities and programs. In contrast to aid-dependent Pacific Island countries, 
Fiji received far less external support as a per cent of GDP and has been able to 
shape the aid it has received to focus closely on national priorities. So the impact 
of external trends (whether development or geopolitical) and players (whether 
traditional or new sources of support) is also important to understanding the 
context behind the new Pacific diplomacy.
The intersection of liberal development agendas with national interests is not 
a new problem, but is more pronounced when new players with new rules of 
engagement enter the arena. Similarly, overpromising and under-delivering is 
not new. The regular pattern of critical self-review and reform practiced by 
large regional intergovernmental organisations has often been seen as ‘new 
wine in old bottles’, but this is more pronounced when there are other new 
players and new possibilities in relation to multilateralism in the region and 
beyond (Pacific Islands Development Forum, United Nations Pacific Small Island 
Developing States, Group of 77, etc.) (O’Keefe 2013). 
The sense that there is one region is under significant strain. We may be 
witnessing the Pacific diplomatic identity collapsing into a hybrid of overlapping 
identities: the Pacific legacy, sub-regional blocs, and national interests. The ties 
that bind the region together are increasingly being questioned and may be 
unravelling. Again, this is not a new argument. Crocombe argued that ‘the 
one region policy set by the former colonial powers is being increasingly 
marginalized or subordinated’, and that there were overlapping regions based 
on the Pacific Islands Forum, Pacific Community, colonial history, and culture 
(Crocombe 2006, pp. 197–98, 203; Hawksley and Wolfers 2011). How important 
these issues and trends are depends on the outlook and geopolitical power of 
the state in question. What this chapter is arguing is that connections beyond 
the region are becoming increasingly important in how Pacific Island countries 
define themselves. Fiji has led the way in this regard.
The outcome has been an impetus for the development of a new Pacific diplomacy 
and the search for a new regional political settlement that would more closely 
reflect the interests of Pacific Island countries (Fry 2015). It may be that the ties 
that bind the region have been under sustained pressure for so long that they 
have stretched beyond their original scope. If so, then it is a mixture of the 
division between a state’s external motives for engaging with the region and 
the internal motives for Pacific Island countries to engage with outsiders that 
has led to the idea of the ‘Pacific’ unravelling. In an era of increased geopolitical 
competition, we are right to question ‘what is the Pacific Way?’.
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Fiji’s Growing Diplomatic Independence 
and Confidence
Fiji’s place in the new Pacific diplomacy is covered elsewhere in this volume; 
it is the geopolitical dimension that is discussed here. The key elements of 
Fiji’s influence could be referred to as Fiji’s rise as a ‘normal’ state. In terms 
of international relations, this means that Fiji has gained the capacity and 
willingness to act at the international level to support its interests and shape 
global affairs. This capacity refers to economic, military and diplomatic capacity. 
Both capacity and willingness are important, and they are activated through 
leadership and creativity.
Fiji’s ‘Look North’ policy began in the early 2000s as an effort to look beyond 
traditional relationships and traditional patterns of behaviour (such as in the 
Pacific Small Island Developing States grouping in the United Nations system, 
the Group of 77, and the Pacific Islands Development Forum). This was largely 
driven from the top. Successive prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs 
and international cooperation have developed and expanded this approach 
to a policy that today appears akin to ‘look north and west’, but not south. 
The  elements of this policy focus on the choice of diplomatic partners and 
modes of cooperation.
From the perspective of diplomatic partners, the focus has shifted to powers 
beyond the region. As noted earlier, relations with China have grown closer 
and new relationships with countries such as Russia, Indonesia and India have 
grown (O’Keefe 2014). More surprising was the growth in relations with Middle 
Eastern countries, which was unprecedented for both regions. Fiji’s network 
of embassies expanded and the energy and dynamism of the consular corps 
ensured that the new relationships bore fruit. Fiji also led the way in developing 
new modes of cooperation that looked beyond existing forms of regionalism. 
The growing confidence that came from this independence fed directly into the 
new Pacific diplomacy and into Fiji’s position as one of the few Pacific Island 
countries that could be viewed as shaping the regional diplomatic environment 
to suit its preferences. An enabling factor in Fiji’s diplomatic strategy was the 
sanctions regime imposed by Australia after the 2006 coup, or more accurately, 
the longevity and inflexibility of the sanctions and their ineffectiveness at 
achieving their stated goals. An unintended consequence for Australia was 
Fiji firming its position and looking elsewhere for new friends and new modes 
of multilateral cooperation. Australia may have been distracted along with its 
‘great and powerful friend’, the US, by the long war on terror, but the outcome 
of maintaining the rigid sanctions regime was that Fiji moved on.
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Australia’s diplomatic overreach in persisting with sanctions was clear from 
Fiji’s unwillingness to compromise. Fiji continued this policy post-sanctions 
and has slowly clarified its position. For instance, Australia’s high commissioner 
took up her position in December 2014, having been announced two years 
earlier, while Fiji selected its high commissioner in April 2015. The proposed 
summit to consider the suitability of the regional architecture in the light 
of Fiji’s concerns about the role of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific 
Islands Forum, scheduled for February 2015, was abruptly cancelled without 
explanation. A  subsequent foreign ministers meeting, focused on regional 
disaster management, met in Sydney in July. This allowed the Fijian foreign 
minister to meet with his Australian and regional counterparts but did not 
resolve the tensions over Fiji’s position on regional governance.
On regionalism, the Fiji government has made repeated statements against 
involvement in the Pacific Islands Forum as currently conceived, while slowly 
increasing participation. In May the prime minister clarified this in a presentation 
to the Pacific Islands Development Forum when he noted: 
We will continue to participate in all forum activities at the public service, 
technical and ministerial levels … As head of government, I will not participate 
in any forum leader’s meeting until the issue of the undue influence of Australia 
and New Zealand and our divergence of views is addressed (ABC News 2015). 
While Australia remains by far the dominant development partner across the 
region, for Fiji it has been overtaken by China. Over the last decade China has 
provided over US$330 million while Australia provided US$252 million (Brant 
2015). This was during the sanctions period in which aid was quarantined, but 
it did not grow in the way that Australia’s aid program to other Pacific Island 
countries did. It will be interesting to see how the aid budget compares now 
that re-engagement with Fiji is firmly on the agenda.
Fiji’s relationship with Australia neatly captures the sense that a new Pacific 
diplomacy is being formulated. However, it also highlights the additional 
geopolitical lens through which we need to view regional diplomacy. 
Fiji developed a clear understanding of its national interests in the diplomatic 
realm and implemented a policy to achieve its ends, independent of other Pacific 
Island countries (especially Pacific Island countries that supported Australia and 
New Zealand during the long sanctions conflict). This has major implications for 
the future of regionalism.
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Metropolitan Powers with Pacific Interests
Another important context for understanding the influence of geopolitics on the 
new Pacific diplomacy is the role of metropolitan powers, specifically Australia 
and New Zealand (ANZ). New Zealand’s role is covered elsewhere in this volume, 
so the focus here is on Australia. 
During the Pacific colonial period the ANZ metropolitan powers were either 
colonies themselves, or were aligned or allied with the United Kingdom. They 
were colonies of choice who never left their coloniser’s orbit, and this strategic 
culture has transferred to the present close alliance with the United States. 
As such, ANZ could nominally be viewed as agents/proxies of great powers in 
the region (Fry 2006, pp. 204–15). This was especially the case when contentious 
security issues arose involving geopolitical issues — from the South Pacific 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SPNWFZ), to maintaining the regional status quo, 
to recent allegations of spying for the ‘Five Eyes’. This in turn fed into criticisms 
of their undue influence over regionalism.
Australia has also been more active and more sensitive to geopolitical conflict 
in its backyard. Australia has its own strategic and development interests in 
the region, but where security is concerned Australia also acts as a proxy for 
the US. The US is concerned about geopolitical developments, but while the 
trends noted above solidified it was distracted by the war on terror and military 
entanglements in the Middle East. Australia was also distracted, but periodically 
returned to being concerned with regional affairs. However, geopolitical 
interests never overtook other national interests and the sanctions regime 
against Fiji was maintained. The subsequent regional division over sanctions 
clouded and shaped regional relations throughout this time. The increased 
Chinese interest posed a challenge to Australia’s development strategy that the 
dictates of proximity would not allow it to retreat from, which made regional 
diplomacy even more complex.
China continues its pattern of ‘influence aid’ which developed during the 
height of competition with Taiwan over gaining and maintaining diplomatic 
recognition by Pacific Island countries. This competition is fading into history 
with the tacit compromise for each to keep its existing/traditional diplomatic 
partners (Dobell 2007). However, this ‘truce’ could potentially change if, in 
expanding its influence, China targets Taiwan’s traditional partners (Lai 2007). 
The point for the current situation is that China’s pattern of interaction was 
tried and tested and is presently being expanded. Chinese aid to the Pacific has 
dramatically increased over the last decade, to the point where China has most 
probably overtaken Japan as the third largest donor, after Australia and the US 
(Brant 2015). Some caution is warranted, however, when viewing these figures. 
133
11 . THE STRATEGIC CONTExT OF THE NEW PACIFIC DIPLOMACY
There is little transparency in Chinese reporting of aid, making it difficult to 
measure accurately. In addition, aid from the US and France is largely focused 
on their Pacific dependencies so they do not have the same impact on the 
broader region. If this type of aid is discounted, China is probably about to 
displace Japan as the second largest donor, with Australia still remaining by far 
the largest donor —possibly at a factor of six to one (Brant 2015).
China’s influence aid is a key avenue of geopolitical competition in the region. 
The approach of the new donors can be contrasted with the development partner 
approach of metropolitan powers (including Japan). For instance, preferential 
loans, untied aid and budget support do not fit neatly with the good governance 
and capacity-building agenda promoted by metropolitan powers — epitomised 
by the Paris Declaration on AID Effectiveness (OECD 2008). China describes 
itself as a friend that does not judge the values of its partners (Xinhuanet 2014), 
which relates to democracy and sustainable development. At this level, China 
and Russia could be seen as revisionist powers insofar as the liberal values of the 
Washington Consensus are concerned (Mead 2014).
Australia’s focus on development assistance was complicated by its historical 
ties and increasingly complex aid diplomacy (Hawksley 2009). There was also 
tension between geopolitical interests — its own and a reflection of its allies — 
and the liberal objectives of promoting democracy and sustainable development 
(Firth 2013). China’s increasing interest in the region was viewed in Canberra 
as strategic competition and competition for its largely liberal development 
assistance strategy, while the US saw China as a strategic rival in the South 
Pacific through its proxy, Australia. But as a metropolitan power, Australia has 
direct, enduring interests in the region, while the US is far more focused on 
its territories and the Western Pacific. These tensions in relation to differing 
strategic priorities remain unresolved. 
Conclusion
China and Russia’s growing assertiveness has implications for the global 
hegemonic state, the United States, and its interests in the Pacific. It is also having 
an impact on other external powers with long histories of regional engagement 
in the South Pacific, not least of which are the traditional metropolitan powers 
— Australia and New Zealand. The geopolitical interests of both groups in the 
Pacific makes the maintenance of relations with new friends and old friends 
potentially destabilising. 
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Despite the potential for diplomatic manoeuvring, this increased external 
interest also poses opportunities and challenges for Pacific states. How they 
are placed to manage the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities is 
largely based on their capacity to engage with regional and global diplomacy 
and their importance to new friends and old friends.
This multilayered competition will play out for some years to come, so it is worth 
building it into our considerations of the enabling and disenabling influence of 
geopolitics on the new Pacific diplomacy. 
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New Zealand and Australia 
in Pacific Regionalism
Nicola Baker
Much of the current debate about the future of the Pacific regional architecture 
revolves around the appropriate level of engagement for Australia and New 
Zealand. Because they are both developed country members of the most 
prominent regional forum, whose presence has created some problems for their 
developing country counterparts, and who have contributed to the formation 
of other regional and sub-regional groupings, it is understandable that they are 
now being discussed as a single unit. They are in the same awkward position 
of being major aid donors to the other members of the Pacific Islands Forum, 
of  having the resources and capacity to dominate regional meetings, and of 
being a hindrance to the forum’s credibility and utility as a vehicle for south–
south cooperation. 
But is it otherwise useful to refer to ‘Australia and New Zealand’ as if they were 
umbilical twins, as analysts of regional international relations have long tended 
to do? Or to assume that Australia always leads and New Zealand follows, as this 
invariable ordering suggests? Is it simply a matter of contrasting approaches, 
as inferred by the common allusions to their playing ‘bad cop’ and ‘good cop’, 
or could it be that they have different interests in, and perspectives on, Pacific 
regionalism?
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This chapter discusses New Zealand’s role in the regionalism of the independent 
Pacific from the 1960s until the early 21st century. It finds that New Zealand has 
long had a unique sense of identification with the region, and that its interest 
and activity in regional matters has been enduring and intense, and that it 
has — usually but not always — been sensitive to Pacific Island concerns and 
desires. This has been based on its own calculations of what the region requires 
and it has tried to persuade other powers with an interest, including Australia, 
to behave in ways that accord with those calculations.
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of New Zealand’s engagement in the 
regionalism of the independent Pacific is that it has had a longer history of 
interest and activism than Australia. Forging ahead with the decolonisation of 
its territories, concerned about French nuclear testing, and impatient with the 
‘pottering’ of the Australian initiated South Pacific Commission, New Zealand’s 
Department of External Affairs (DEA) had by the mid-1960s begun rethinking 
the merits of the existing regional framework.1 In 1961, Deputy Secretary Frank 
Corner had suggested that a revitalisation of the South Pacific Commission 
might suffice, but by 1967 he and his colleagues had begun considering the 
option of a completely new forum, to be composed of independent island states. 
They told their metropolitan counterparts (excluding France) in that year’s 
four-power talks on the future of the Pacific that this forum ‘should ideally be 
a grouping of indigenous governments’, with Western Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji 
possibly forming the founding group. New Zealand warned that ‘although there 
would be a need for metropolitan guidance, it would be best for the guidance 
to be inconspicuous’.2 
The Australian delegation thought this idea a good one, but with national 
attention focused on Southeast Asia, and with changes in government, ministers 
and department heads, it appears to have slipped from the institutional memory. 
Australia did not begin giving serious consideration to the formation of a new 
regional organisation until April 1970, when Albert Henry, Premier of the Cook 
Islands, mentioned the idea on a visit to Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
officials in Canberra. Australia wrongly took Henry’s suggestions for change 
in the existing regional architecture to be tentative, and began thinking about 
ways in which Australia might encourage the establishment of a new regional 
grouping (Doran 2004). As DFA refined its thinking and its proposal wended 
its laborious way up to cabinet, officials grew increasingly suspicious that 
1  New Zealand had been the only metropolitan power with territories in the South Pacific to vote in favour 
of the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
had granted Samoa independence in 1962, and was working towards a change of status for the Cook Islands. 
2  UK Public Records Office, FCO 32/343, ‘Pacific Island Talks’: Commonwealth Office notes on four-power 
talks in Washington, April 1967. Cited in Lal (2006). 
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‘New  Zealand thinking (and perhaps action) may be further advanced than 
ours’.3 New Zealand would admit only that ‘the idea for a forum had germinated 
slowly during the last two years’.4
New Zealand’s early interest in the formation of a new regional organisation 
was driven in part by a realisation by the DEA that the country’s foreign policy 
needed a focus that made more sense domestically and internationally. It was 
already imbued by a commitment to liberal internationalism, a commitment that 
has maintained almost uninterrupted bipartisan agreement to this day. But it had 
no geographic centre and was subject to the shifting interests of its allies and 
partners, on whom New Zealand then relied for an ultimate security guarantee 
and trade. The DEA official most concerned about this was Frank Corner, who 
had in 1951 voiced his unease in a letter about the negotiations on the formation 
of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) to his 
departmental secretary:
My mind still finds it difficult to reconcile the arrangements we are making — 
An agreement for the Pacific, but commitment in reality in an area of the M[iddle] 
E[east] where we have no representation and no intelligence of our own; its all 
so untidy and I feel we are losing control of our own fate … I have the feeling 
that we [are] getting into a curious colonial status (cited in McGibbon 1999, 
pp. 78–79).
Corner went public with his proposed solution ten years later, giving a passionate 
speech arguing that the South Pacific should become New Zealand’s primary 
area of foreign policy interest and activity. He began by recalling Prime Minister 
Richard Seddon’s 19th-century attempt to bring into being a Pacific federation, 
claiming that in doing so he had displayed ‘a solid knowledge of New Zealand’s 
interests and a sound feeling for New Zealand’s geographical position’. He went 
on to call for a return to a focus on the South Pacific, arguing that, ‘if we do 
not accept the implications of our geographic and historical situation and of the 
dual racial origin of our people, our foreign policy can not be fully realistic, 
consistent or effective’.5 
All of Corner’s arguments were cited and amplified by Professor Kenneth 
Cumberland in a public lecture delivered later in 1961 (and attended by 
the future Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Mara). He criticised the South Pacific 
3  National Archives of Australia, A1838, 277/1/1/PART 1, A. J. Eastman, Memo to Secretary Department 
of External Affairs, ‘Political Forum in the South Pacific’, 23 November 1970.
4  UK Public Records Office, FCO 32/795/083, ‘Political Forum in the Pacific’, Letter to Pacific Dependent 
Territories Department from British High Commission, Wellington, 31 May 1971.
5  Archives New Zealand, R22848844, folio 101, F. H. Corner, ‘New Zealand and the South Pacific’, Speech 
at the Convention of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1961.
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Commission and its avoidance of ‘crucial political, social and economic matters’ 
and emphasised New Zealand’s particular claim to a leading place in regional 
affairs by differentiating it from Australia: 
Asia may be Australia’s ‘Near North’. The Pacific Ocean is ours. The interests 
of Australia and New Zealand are by no means identical. Our environment is 
the ‘surrounding Pacific’. In the ‘surrounding Pacific’ New Zealand clearly has 
a unique role to play (Cumberland 1962, p. 391).
In 1971, DEA officials helped island leaders persuade Prime Minister Keith 
Holyoake to host the first meeting of what would become the South Pacific 
Forum. In 1972, Frank Corner was promoted to Secretary of External Affairs 
(and the Prime Minister’s Department) and he and the like-minded Norman 
Kirk, who replaced Holyoake in the same year, were able to make a concerted 
push to marry the different strands of what Corner saw as New Zealand’s unique 
foreign policy identity: its place in the Pacific, its liberal internationalism, and 
its commitment to global disarmament. New Zealand began openly assuming 
its ‘unique role’ in regional affairs, proposing and gaining island support for 
the establishment of the forum secretariat, the forum declaration on the Law 
of the Sea, and the first attempt at a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
(Doran 2004, p. 18; WikiLeaks 1976).
These early initiatives were not popular with Australia, with the exception of 
the forum declaration on the Law of the Sea. Australia did not take any sustained 
interest in the affairs of the forum in these years, rousing itself only to oppose 
New Zealand’s push for a regional nuclear-free zone when the United States 
made its concerns known to Gough Whitlam.
The election of the Hawke Labor Government in 1983 ushered in the first 
period of Australian activism in Pacific regionalism since 1944. Bob Hawke 
proposed a modified nuclear weapons–free zone and pushed for a regional ban 
on drift-net fishing. His successor, Paul Keating, maintained this high profile on 
environmental issues and it was he and his Minister for Pacific Island Affairs, 
Gordon Bilney, who insisted that improved economic governance become 
a regional objective.6 
During this period, New Zealand was prepared to work with Australia on 
initiatives that it supported, such as the ban on drift-net fishing and the revival 
of the nuclear-free zone concept. But it did not always cooperate or even consult. 
New Zealand was not initially enthusiastic about the Australian government’s 
6  Greg Fry has produced the best analyses of Australia’s role in Pacific regionalism over the years. 
See  Fry  (1997) for a detailed explanation and critique of the Keating Government’s focus on regional 
economic governance.
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attempts to push island countries towards economic reform and did not keep 
Australia fully informed of its Bougainville conflict resolution initiatives 
(Brown 1997).
It was the Bougainville crisis that really gave birth to the notion of New Zealand 
playing ‘good cop’ to Australia’s ‘bad cop’ in the region. Australia was unable 
to play a mediation role because of its open support for the Papua New Guinea 
government’s position and its indirect support of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force’s campaign against the rebels. As the neutral regional power, 
New Zealand was much more acceptable to the Bougainvilleans as a facilitator 
of peace negotiations and as leader of the first truce monitoring team. But the 
characterisation of New Zealand as ‘good cop’ in the Bougainville crisis implies 
a strategy agreed with the ‘bad cop’, and this was not the case as Australia’s 
complaints about lack of consultation demonstrate. 
The Bougainville experience did reveal something important about New 
Zealand’s attitude towards cooperation with Australia and that is the significance 
of economic considerations, both bilateral and regional. With deepening 
integration into the larger Australian economy being a key New Zealand 
objective since the 1970s, its governments have increasingly recognised that 
there are ‘straight commercial grounds’ for getting their ‘thinking clear on all 
issues that might affect the trans-Tasman relationship’.7 The consequences of 
its unilateral diplomacy on Bougainville drove home the regional importance 
of cooperation with Australia. New Zealand was unable to fund or man a long-
term peace monitoring presence and had to turn these duties over to a better-
resourced Australia. Since then, New Zealand has adopted a more consultative 
approach in recognition of the fact that it needs both Australia’s financial support 
for regional initiatives and its contributions to regional assistance missions.
Australia’s interest in the region waned again after the 1996 elections. The new 
Liberal Party government of John Howard was not much interested in what 
was happening in the region or in the South Pacific Forum, which he rarely 
attended. Until 2003, his government’s regional interests did not extend much 
beyond ensuring that forum communiqués on matters such as climate change 
did not conflict with Australia’s national interests. It was left to the New Zealand 
governments of Bolger, Shipley, and Clark and their island counterparts to push 
ahead on coordination of law enforcement and on environmental and economic 
matters. Hawke’s Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, by then on the opposition 
benches, was furious at Australia ceding its ‘intellectual leadership’ in the 
region (Beazley 1997). 
7  Jim Bolger quoted in Press Release: Parliament Building, Wellington New Zealand, 17 February 1997: 
transcript of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Parliament of Australia. 
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That ‘intellectual leadership’ passed to New Zealand’s Helen Clark when she 
became prime minister in 1999, but she would make sure that the relationship 
with Australia was consultative. By 2000, more of the island states were having 
economic and political difficulties and the New Zealand government had come 
around to the Australian view that improved governance was a regional necessity. 
Despite the vast difference between their ideological outlooks, Clark and Howard 
were able to form a respectful, even friendly, working partnership on a range 
of regional issues. In a major departure from tradition, both leaders refrained 
from criticising each other openly, and in conversations with his major ally, 
the United States, Howard noted that the two governments were working well 
together in the region, attributing minor differences to the fact that the New 
Zealanders were ‘soft Saxons, with a disposition to the centre-left and with 
fewer resources’ (WikiLeaks 2006).
When ‘minor differences’ did occur, Clark was sometimes able to prevail, 
sometimes not. It was New Zealand who put the ‘cooperative’ into the Howard 
Government’s regional doctrine of ‘cooperative intervention’, announced by 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in June 2003. When Australia suddenly 
decided that it was in its interests to abandon its policy of non-intervention in 
the Solomon Islands crisis in May 2003, it initially planned to undertake the 
operation unilaterally. This approach was in keeping with Howard’s own realist 
foreign policy preferences and with those of his American counterpart at the 
time, President G. W. Bush. Helen Clark, who was an even more passionate 
liberal internationalist than most New Zealand political leaders, and chair of the 
Pacific Islands Forum at the time, negotiated hard with Howard and persuaded 
him that the intervention should have ‘the approval of the Pacific Islands Forum 
and the involvement of as many island states as possible — not to mention the 
invitation of the host country’ (Young 2006).
She was not so successful in trying to persuade Howard to emulate New Zealand’s 
approach on Bougainville and take a more ‘softly-softly’ approach, with 
unarmed soldiers or police leading the intervention. Nor was she successful in 
persuading him that the Solomon Islands government should be closely engaged 
in the subsequent state strengthening process (Adams 2012).
Transforming the planned ‘Australia/Solomon Islands bilateral initiative’ 
(Trevett 2008) into the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) was not Helen Clark’s first or last significant regional initiative. 
The Pacific Islands Forum Biketawa Declaration, under whose auspices she 
insisted RAMSI be undertaken, had itself been conceived and promoted by her 
government. In August 2000, following the ousting of elected governments in 
Fiji and Solomon Islands, New Zealand had organised the first meeting of Pacific 
Islands Forum foreign ministers. At that meeting, hosted by the Samoan Prime 
Minister in Apia, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Phil Goff, had put forward 
143
12 . NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA IN PACIFIC REGIONALISM
a proposal that the forum build on its previous declarations on regional security 
and develop procedures and processes for dealing with similar situations. 
The  Australian foreign minister did not contribute at all to the ensuing 
discussion (McCraw 2005, p. 220; Tavola 2014).
Helen Clark also initiated the Pacific Plan and the Eminent Persons Group 
review of the forum during her stint as chair from 2003–2004 (Grynberg 2013). 
Afterwards she continued to be active in regional affairs, acting as a valued 
broker between disagreeing member states, negotiating the continuation of 
RAMSI in 2006 and instigating a review of its performance, and then in 2008 
hammering out agreement that Fiji should be suspended from the forum in the 
event that it did not meet a 2009 deadline for democratic elections. According to 
Samoa’s then prime minister, Clark’s negotiation skills were formidable and she 
could be relied on to find ‘the right word to reflect the areas where compromise 
can be reached. She has that talent’ (Trevett 2008).
Australia’s 2003 about-turn on direct assistance to the Solomon Islands had 
marked a new phase of regional assertiveness by Canberra, which included 
bilateral capacity-building initiatives with Nauru and Papua New Guinea, and 
attempts to strengthen regionalism and enhance Australia’s capacity to influence 
its direction. This new assertiveness had not been welcomed with unalloyed 
joy in Wellington, partly because some of the Howard Government’s proposals 
such as ‘pooled regional governance’ would have cut across New Zealand’s 
national interests, and partly because its approach was seen as inappropriately 
interventionist. Much of Helen Clark’s regional diplomacy in the years after 
2003 can be seen as an attempt by New Zealand to moderate Howard’s new 
regional concerns and ambitions. 
Unfortunately, New Zealand officials did not have the same tact or skill when 
it came to trade negotiations with the region, sorely testing relations with the 
forum secretariat and with island leaders. When the secretariat responded to 
forum declarations on trade liberalisation and the looming prospect of free 
trade negotiations with the European Union by putting forward plans for an 
islands-only free trade agreement at the end of the 1990s, New Zealand was 
initially unconcerned. But it did not take long before it was aligning itself with 
its furious trans-Tasman neighbour to demand inclusion and subject forum 
and regional trade officials to scorn and intimidation. One of the New Zealand 
academics contracted to draft alternative proposals for the Australia and New 
Zealand governments complained: ‘The whole experience was stressful and 
demoralising for me, let alone for the Pacific Islands negotiators. There were 
times that I felt ashamed to be a New Zealander; I was just pleased that I was not 
an Australian’ (cited in Kelsey 2004, p. 16).
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As with most matters Pacific, the New Zealand and Australian positions 
were not identical and in the end the agreed compromise, the PICTA–PACER 
Agreement (Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement–Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations), was closer to that taken by New Zealand. And when 
negotiations for PACER Plus got under way, New Zealand proved more willing to 
provide the island countries with some compensation in the form of temporary 
access visas for a limited number of unskilled workers. But the seasonal workers 
scheme was not incorporated into PACER Plus and island leaders were only 
too aware that it could be terminated at any time. Both the negotiations and 
the outcome of the whole regional free trade process tarnished New Zealand’s 
reputation for being more diplomatic and sympathetic towards their island 
counterparts than Australia. 
This was not the first time that New Zealand had upset its island counterparts. 
Its  honeymoon years with the forum’s island members had ended abruptly 
with the election victory of the National Party in 1975. Prime Minister Robert 
Muldoon was unarguably the most realist post-war prime minister that New 
Zealand has had, with an abrasive and inflexible character to boot. Although he 
attended all the forum meetings and enjoyed doing so, he was less committed 
to maintaining a cordial relationship with the island governments than his 
predecessors — or his successors. His first priority was maintaining good 
relations with the United States and France, and it was this that caused the first 
real friction between forum island members and Australia and New Zealand. 
As soon as he became prime minister, Muldoon had brought the first South 
Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone campaign to a halt, now siding with its 
long-time Australian government opponents and arguing down island leaders, 
most notably Ratu Mara, who wanted to continue the process of gaining 
it international acceptance (Templeton 2006, pp. 301–5). During his term, 
Australia and New Zealand also made an unpopular attempt to gain the United 
States membership in the proposed Forum Fisheries Agency. 
New Zealand’s dispute with the United States in the mid-1980s and its departure 
from the ANZUS alliance over nuclear ship access had also been unpopular with 
a number of the forum’s island members, in particular with Ratu Mara, who 
had by then become more sympathetic to the United States, having been feted 
at the White House by President Reagan. Few in the region would have noticed 
that efforts to restore relations between New Zealand and the United States had 
begun almost immediately on both sides of the Pacific or will have appreciated 
the extent to which New Zealand has since sought to engage the Americans in 
regional affairs. 
Relations between the United States and New Zealand had thawed considerably 
by 2003, when Helen Clark openly criticised the Bush administration’s invasion 
of Iraq as a breach of international law. Even this proved only a temporary 
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irritant, with New Zealand keen enough to secure a free trade agreement that it 
was willing to demonstrate a strong commitment to the War on Terror in other 
areas, namely Afghanistan and the South Pacific, albeit in the name of liberal 
internationalism. 
New Zealand sought to strengthen American interest in the relationship by 
engaging it more closely in regional affairs. It persuaded the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretary General, Greg Urwin, to schedule a special session for 
United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Christopher Hill, after the 2006 forum meeting in Nadi, and it was Hill who 
suggested to Howard that Helen Clark take charge of negotiations with the 
Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, over his demand 
that RAMSI be terminated (WikiLeaks 2006). Foreign Minister Winston Peters, 
who had established a very cordial relationship with the US Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, even persuaded her to visit the region and meet Pacific Island 
leaders, which she did in 2009. New Zealand’s efforts to sell itself as having a 
unique understanding of, and role in, the island Pacific met with such success in 
Washington that President Bush spoke of relying on ‘New Zealand’s leadership, 
with US help, to help solve the problems — and Australian help as well’.
Australia had by this time been compelled to take a less assertive role in regional 
affairs, partly for diplomatic reasons and partly for practical ones. On the 
diplomatic front, the Howard Government had managed to alienate Melanesian 
leaders with the aggressive cross-border pursuit of the Solomon Islands 
attorney general, and on the practical front, Australia’s focus had swung back 
to its priority area of security interest, Southeast Asia. Although the Australian 
and New Zealand governments had by now instituted six-monthly meetings to 
discuss regional matters, New Zealand was left to push forward on strengthening 
Pacific regionalism and to provide much of the counterterrorism training and 
support activity in the region (WikiLeaks 2006).
By the time that Helen Clark had been replaced as prime minister by the National 
Party’s John Key and the new Obama administration began instituting its ‘pivot 
to Asia’, New Zealand had made itself sufficiently useful to the United States 
that it was possible to engage in open cooperation on regional and international 
matters. The new Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visited New Zealand in 
2012 and went on to the Pacific Island Forum meeting in the Cook Islands, the 
first in her position to do so.
The Key Government has engaged in close practical regional cooperation with 
the United States (and China), changed its regional aid priorities, and adopted 
a more informal but less tactful approach to its dealings with island leaders, 
but has retained an interest in strengthening the existing regional architecture. 
It initiated a review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in 2012 and provided 
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support to the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), formed in 2011 as a response 
to the activism of the Melanesian Spearhead Group. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade hosted meetings of the PLG in its Auckland offices in 2013 and 
then flew them all to the forum meeting in Majuro with John Key. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade again played host to the PLG in 2015.
China’s increasing presence in the island Pacific and Fiji’s establishment of the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum as a region-wide but island-only organisation 
have both been of concern to New Zealand — as they have to Australia. 
They were undoubtedly factors in the hasty restoration of ties with Fiji after its 
2014 elections. When Fiji then insisted that the price of its return to the Pacific 
Islands Forum was the relegation of Australia and New Zealand to the status of 
development partners, New Zealand was quick to send ministers and officials to 
remind their island counterparts of Australia and New Zealand’s contributions 
to their economies. Prime Minister Key was even less diplomatic in his public 
pronouncements than his Australian counterpart. What, he asked, would the 
forum do without Australian and New Zealand funding? ‘Where would they 
get the money to do anything? And the answer is nowhere. None of them have 
that’ (Radio New Zealand 2015). 
New Zealand’s public response to Bainimarama’s demands, its position on 
free trade, and its support for improved governance in the island countries 
have given many observers the impression that when it comes to regional 
matters, ‘you probably couldn’t slide a pandanus leaf between Canberra and 
Wellington’ (Honnor 2003). And it has been assumed that it is Australia that 
has called the tune, because of its size and its more insistent and assertive 
approach. But  impressions can be misleading, as this brief examination has 
demonstrated. New Zealand has rarely completely agreed with Australia on 
regional issues and has often either provided the intellectual leadership or been 
successful in influencing policy in Canberra. This should come as no surprise. 
New Zealand’s identification with the fortunes of the island Pacific predates the 
latter’s emergence as a region of independent states, while Australia has no such 
intense or durable interest. Small powers with limited resources such as New 
Zealand have an added incentive to think creatively about the pursuit of their 
national interests.
It is often claimed by New Zealanders that while Australia works on the 
region, New Zealand works in it. But in recent decades, both have given the 
appearance of responding to the island countries’ economic and political 
difficulties by pushing for greater regional activism and integration. Assuming 
this kind of managerial role in the region and adopting a public posture of 
complete solidarity with Australia entails costs as well as benefits for New 
Zealand. New Zealand should not forget that good relations with Pacific Island 
governments are fundamental to the successful implementation of its efforts to 
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improve regional prosperity, stability, and resilience, and to its foreign policy 
identity and international credentials. Its leaders and officials once had the 
imagination, creativity and tact to work with Pacific Island governments on a 
form of regionalism that suited everyone. It would be great pity if New Zealand 
were to squander the considerable regional and international capital amassed 
during those years by appearing more interested in defending its own interests 
and ideas than in listening to and engaging with the rest of its Pacific Island 
family.
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The Renaissance of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group
Tess Newton Cain
Although the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) has been in existence for 
more than 25 years, it is only recently that it has come to prominence within 
the sub-region and more widely. The recent renaissance of the MSG would 
appear to represent a blend of two things. First is the maturing diplomacy of 
the Melanesian states, both in terms of the increased number of relationships 
formed within the sub-region and the evidence of increased sophistication of 
those engagements, particularly in relation to trade and economic integration. 
Secondly, the recent prominence of this grouping is indicative of a perceived 
failure of pan-regional diplomacy, including (but not limited to) the isolation of 
Fiji in the 2006–2014 period. 
This chapter presents the evolution and work of the MSG within a wider 
consideration of the significance of sub-regional groupings in the Pacific. It then 
considers what diplomatic opportunities and challenges may face the MSG with 
reference to the impacts of internal diplomacy on the ability of the group to act 
cohesively within the region and on the wider international stage.
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The Background to the Recent Renaissance 
of the MSG
The MSG is a prominent example of a sub-regional grouping among what looks 
to be an increasing number of such initiatives. There are, broadly speaking, 
two  subsets of sub-regional groups: those that are based on geographical 
proximity and/or cultural affinity, and those that are based on the pooling of 
resources to address service delivery or other policy issues.
There are three sub-regional groups that align broadly with the most widely 
accepted cultural demarcations in the region as a whole. The memberships of 
these groups comprise sovereign and non-sovereign entities. While this indicates 
a degree of diplomatic innovation, it can present challenges in terms of engaging 
in wider arenas, whether at the regional or global levels.
The Micronesian Chief Executives Summit (MCES) was convened for the first time 
in 2003. It brings together the political leadership of the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas, the Territory of Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia 
(Yap, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Chuuk), the Republic of Marshall Islands, and the 
Republic of Palau (ROP). The most significant achievement of this group to date 
is the establishment of the ‘Micronesia Challenge’, which has environmental 
issues and the management of natural resources as its primary areas of focus.
The Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) was established largely in response to 
the growing presence of the MSG. It comprises the leaders of eight states and 
territories: American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Tokelau. To date, it has been the least active of these 
groupings, with its focus being more on establishing and maintaining cultural 
ties than on economic or political endeavours. However, ahead of its most recent 
gathering in Auckland in 2015, it was announced that the group would be 
focusing on the enforcement of fisheries management (Radio New Zealand 2015).
The MSG is generally acknowledged to be the most established and dynamic of 
this set of sub-regional groupings. The MSG was established in 1988 and obtained 
recognition as an international organisation in 2007. Its current membership is 
the sovereign states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
plus the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (Kanak and Socialist 
National Liberation Front (FLNKS)), a pro-independence movement from New 
Caledonia. The FLNKS has chaired the MSG since June of 2013 and will hand 
over chairing responsibility to the government of Solomon Islands during 2015. 
It has a secretariat located in Port Vila, Vanuatu and, in recent years, has been 
increasingly active both politically and economically.
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Pooled service delivery at the pan-regional level is fraught with challenges 
of varying types and there are some indications that they are easier to overcome 
by operating sub-regionally (Dornan and Newton Cain 2014). This form of 
sub-regional activity does not necessarily have to be formulated by reference to 
geographic proximity or cultural affinity. The most significant grouping of this 
type is (currently) the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA). Its members 
are particularly concerned with management of fisheries in order to maximise 
economic return and promote sustainability and appear to have been more 
successful (at least on the former issue) than the larger Forum Fisheries Agency 
(ADB 2014).
It is not surprising that a grouping with the longevity of the MSG has undergone 
numerous changes in its lifetime. There have been changes to the membership, 
to the activities it has undertaken, and to its relative importance, whether 
to its members or within the wider region. Here, I will examine some of the 
milestones that have shaped the MSG as it exists today and which provide the 
context for the increase in prominence of the group that has been witnessed 
since the mid-2000s. 
In 1986, the MSG convened for the first time ahead of the meeting of the 
South Pacific Forum. This was followed in 1988 by the adoption of the Agreed 
Principles for Cooperation by the leaders of Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, and  Vanuatu. This took place in Port Vila, which has remained the 
home of the MSG since then. In 1989, the group’s membership increased to 
include the FLNKS. The MSG adopted what became the precursor to the MSG 
Trade Agreement (MSGTA) and in 1996 Fiji became the most recent member 
of the group.
The current renaissance of the MSG commenced in 2007 when the membership 
signed the Agreement Establishing the Melanesian Spearhead Group (the MSG 
constitution) and deposited it with the United Nations in order to secure 
recognition as a sub-regional organisation. In 2008, the MSG’s secretariat building 
(funded by the government of the People’s Republic of China) was opened in 
Port Vila. The contemplation of further economic integration was heralded in 
2012 when the leaders of the MSG countries signed an agreement for the Skilled 
Movement Scheme. In 2013, the MSG celebrated its silver anniversary. Also in 
this year, an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) undertook a strategic review of the 
MSG and its secretariat to inform the group’s strategy and vision for the next 
25 years. It was captured in the 2038 ‘Prosperity for All’ Plan.
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How has the MSG’s Underpinning Philosophy 
Contributed to this Renaissance?
An underpinning and enduring tenet of the grouping is the commitment to 
independence for all peoples of Melanesia. This was articulated in the Agreed 
Principles for Cooperation in 1988 and further restated in the constitution in 
2007. This in turn reflected the more radical activist stance of the Melanesian 
states in relation to continuing decolonisation issues, which set them apart from 
the more conservative members of the South Pacific Forum, such as Fiji and 
the Polynesian countries (MacQueen 1989). Until relatively recently, the focus 
in this regard was on independence for the Kanak people of New Caledonia. 
The MSG’s accommodation of the FLNKS, a political movement whose purpose 
is to change the sociopolitical status of New Caledonia, is a defining feature 
of the MSG. The MSG has responsibility for oversight of the implementation 
of the Noumea Accords and in 2012 established a dedicated unit within its 
secretariat focused on progressing Kanak self-determination. The secretariat has 
also facilitated study visits to Timor-Leste for young Kanak professionals who 
will be expected to take the lead in state-building if and when New Caledonia 
becomes an independent country (Forau and Newton Cain 2013).
In 2013, the MSG commitment to independence for all Melanesian people was 
again highlighted when, at the leaders’ summit in Noumea, the West Papua 
National Council for Liberation submitted an application for membership of the 
group. The process of that application (which has yet to be resolved) provides 
a telling insight into the complexity of relationships within the MSG and the 
significance of outside influences on their decision-making.
The issue of self-determination for West Papua is considered in more detail 
elsewhere in this volume. The issue of the membership application by the United 
Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) has yet to be resolved by the 
MSG. The MSG leaders will consider this application at their 2015 summit in 
Solomon Islands. The fact that the application is under consideration at all is 
an indicator of the ability of this group to embrace issues that have proved 
too diplomatically sensitive or complex for other regional organisations, most 
notably the Pacific Islands Forum. However, the vexed nature of this issue and 
the varying relationships between Indonesia and members of the MSG make 
it an issue that has the potential to severely test the strength of the diplomatic 
bonds between MSG states. For Webb-Gannon and Elmslie (2014), ‘the MSG has 
reached a turning point and must decide whether it values West Papuan human 
rights over the potential economic benefits of increasing political engagement 
with Indonesia’.
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The centrality of Melanesian culture, including tenets of reconciliation and the 
maintenance of cohesion, was demonstrated by the MSG in how it negotiated 
the difficult issue of Fiji chairing the group in 2010. Although this issue caused 
a significant degree of internal division and meant that the MSG was at odds with 
the Pacific Islands Forum, which had suspended Fiji, the MSG leaders managed 
to work through their differences and reach an accommodation. The period of 
Fiji’s chairing of the MSG (2010–2013) was one of significant activity. However, 
it would be simplistic to say that the MSG’s renaissance is wholly attributable to 
the influence of Fiji. As we have already seen, this resurgence commenced prior 
to 2010 and it is certainly the case that, since 2013, the MSG has continued to be 
both active and prominent despite a reduction in engagement by Fiji’s political 
leadership. This is largely explained by the increased participation of Papua 
New Guinea in sub-regional and regional politics and diplomacy, under the 
leadership of Peter O’Neill (Hayward-Jones and Newton Cain 2014).
What has the MSG Achieved?
Perhaps the most significant thing the MSG has achieved is a measure of 
longevity. It celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2013 and has maintained 
its presence despite a number of challenges arising from internal tensions. 
Examples include the strained relationship between Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands during the Bougainville crisis, and friction in 2010 around the 
controversial decision to allow Fiji to chair the group, even though it was (at that 
time) under a military dictatorship.
The MSG is the only one of the three sub-regional groups identified previously 
that has a dedicated secretariat housed in its own building and staffed by a team 
drawn from its members. Several of the secretariat staff (including the current 
director-general, Peter Forau) have experience of working at the pan-regional 
level, especially within the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS). So it is not 
surprising that some of the sub-regional ‘architecture’ that the secretariat has 
built resembles the structures and processes that the PIFS uses. So, for example, 
the MSG secretariat’s work plan for 2015 was reviewed by a senior officials 
meeting and then endorsed by the foreign ministers meeting. There is also a 
conference of police commissioners with the potential for similar conferences 
for chief justices and ombudsmen from within the sub-region.
The MSGTA was signed by Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in 
1993, with Fiji acceding to it in 1997. Work on eliminating tariffs on movement 
of goods between the countries has progressed over time. The agreement and 
its value to all member countries have recently been reviewed and MSGTA3 is 
expected to be launched during 2015. In 2012, the group’s leaders also signed 
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the Skilled Movement Scheme, which is intended to facilitate the free movement 
of skilled workers between member countries, subject to an upper limit of 
400 per country. To date, there has been very little take up of this, especially by 
the private sector (Voigt-Graf 2015) and there is expected to be more work done 
on promoting this scheme during 2015.
Based on the success, albeit limited, of the MSGTA, the group is now exploring 
opportunities for closer economic integration, which may include initiatives 
such as a customs union and a single currency, both of which have already 
been considered by officials and political leaders. The group is also looking to 
explore opportunities for pooled service delivery, including bulk procurement 
of pharmaceuticals and fuel, and increased and improved shipping services 
between member countries. All of these initiatives are still at the research stage 
and one of the characteristics of the approach taken by the MSG is to work 
closely with the private sector where this is appropriate and more cost-effective 
(Dornan and Newton Cain 2014).
Recently, the MSG secretariat has shared its experience with another of the 
sub-regional groupings by assisting in the establishment of the Micronesian 
Trade Centre and the development of a treaty to create the Micronesian Trade 
and Economic Community (PINA 2014).
What Does the Future Hold for the MSG?
Looking ahead, it appears that there are both opportunities and challenges 
for the MSG.
In the immediate to short term, the issue of most significance is the ULMWP’s 
application for membership. Not only does this issue bring into play individual 
members’ bilateral diplomatic relationships with Indonesia, it also has the 
potential to be a point of conflict within the group. If the apparent change of 
position on the part of Papua New Guinea is sustained, this will mark a point 
of departure from previous dealings where the O’Neill Government and the 
leadership of Fiji have sought to restrain smaller members’ agitation for West 
Papuan self-determination.
The issue of ULMWP membership points to a related question of how much 
bigger the MSG is likely to become. Following the pathway established by the 
Noumea Accords, the French territory of New Caledonia is scheduled to hold a 
referendum on the transfer of remaining sovereign powers from Paris between 
now and 2018. In the event that New Caledonia becomes an independent 
country, it is expected that it will apply to join the MSG. This will not change 
the number of members, but it will change the nature of the composition and 
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will have an impact on funding arrangements for the group, as FLNKS currently 
does not contribute to costs associated with the secretariat or meetings. Also in 
play is the 2015–2020 window in which the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
will hold a referendum on whether it remains part of Papua New Guinea or 
secedes. If Bougainville were to become independent (and assuming that it 
does not choose to become part of Solomon Islands), it is reasonable to expect 
that it would join the MSG, which would increase the overall membership. It is 
possible, but not very likely, that the MSG would invite other Pacific Island 
countries, especially the smaller island states, to become members. The MSG 
has already made it clear that it sees itself having an important role to play in 
assisting small island states with solving key development challenges, such as 
improving transport, but it is not necessary for those countries to be members 
of the group to be able to benefit from accumulated expertise or new ventures 
that may be undertaken. If Timor-Leste were to seek to establish closer links 
with the Pacific Island region, it is possible that the MSG would be its preferred 
form for doing so. It already has a strong connection with the group, having held 
observer status since 2011, and the government of Timor-Leste also contributes 
by way of funding one of the secretariat’s positions.
The MSG is expected to play an important role in the ongoing development 
of Pacific regionalism, including (but not limited to) the rolling out of the 
Framework for Pacific Regionalism, which resulted from the 2013 review of the 
Pacific Plan (Pacific Plan Review 2013). The rhetoric put forward at the regional 
level, most notably by the new Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, is that there is much to be learned from the activities of sub-regional 
groups, with the work of the MSG at the forefront of that learning (Newton Cain 
and Taylor 2015). How this rhetoric is applied in practice remains to be seen, 
but Dame Meg Taylor took the opportunity to visit the MSG secretariat during 
a recent visit to Port Vila. This is an indication of a refreshed approach from 
the PIFS, based on recognition of the economic and political significance of 
the Melanesian sub-region. What appears certain is that the desire for more 
and better synergy between sub-regional and regional mechanisms forms an 
important part of what the MSG envisages for itself as encapsulated in its 2038 
‘Prosperity for All’ Plan which arose from the strategic review undertaken 
in 2013:
Apart from taking full advantage to develop optimally its own economies, the 
MSG’s plan proposes to collaborate and form solidarity with other sub-regional 
groupings in the Pacific, with the CROP agencies and also to reach out to other 
PSIDS (Pacific small island developing states) by way of joint development 
initiatives, e.g. in climate change and fisheries, and to also share with fellow 
PSIDS burdened with scarcity of resources, the surpluses of its development and 
economic growth (Tavola 2015).
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Until very recently, the MSG has been very open to approaches from numerous 
entities, including individual governments, sub-regional and regional 
organisations, think tanks, and universities. At the leaders’ summit in Honiara 
in mid-2015, the group will adopt the Prosperity for All plan. It is expected 
that future relationship-building activity on the part of the group, as facilitated 
by its secretariat, will be more selective and strategic. This could well have 
significant diplomatic implications, particularly in relation to the granting of 
observer status. There was a certain amount of internal tension created when 
Indonesia was granted observer status, and this vexed relationship continues to 
cause discord (Webb-Gannon and Elmslie 2014). A recurrent issue of interest is 
what relationship Australia could or should have with the MSG. At the time that 
the secretariat was established, Australian diplomats came to the conclusion that, 
as Australia was not a member of the MSG, there was no benefit in providing 
financial support for the undertaking. To date, Australia has not established 
any formal relationship with the MSG, and has not requested observer status. 
Given the Australian government’s position regarding the Bainimarama regime 
prior to the change of government in Canberra in 2013 and the 2014 Fiji elections, 
this is not surprising. However, it would seem sensible for Australia to establish 
some relationship with the MSG, given its membership includes countries that 
are of great economic, strategic and political significance to Canberra. There are 
indications from within the secretariat that the MSG would be interested in 
establishing a trade agreement with Australia.
The issue of funding will be an ongoing challenge for the MSG. The group has 
benefitted from the support of numerous donors including the government of the 
People’s Republic of China and the European Union. However, ensuring that the 
member governments pay their share of ongoing costs, which are calculated by 
reference to relative population size, is a perennial challenge. Very recently, the 
group announced the creation of ‘Melanesian Solutions’, which is a consulting 
operation whose income will fund overheads and operational costs including 
those associated with maintenance of the secretariat.
Reference has already been made to the fact that numerous members of the 
secretariat (including the current director-general) have a pedigree that includes 
working at the pan-regional level, most notably within the PIFS. Critics of the 
MSG point to the apparent replication of PIFS mechanisms and methodologies. 
A real risk to the credibility of the MSG, therefore, is that it follows the PIFS and 
becomes too secretariat-centric. To maintain credibility, it needs to proactively 
maintain its focus on delivering real outcomes that benefit the populations of its 
member countries.
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Conclusion
The commencement of the recent renaissance of the MSG predated the change 
of chairing arrangements in 2010 which saw the then interim prime minister 
of Fiji use this mechanism as a key plank in his assertive development of new 
diplomatic and political relationships as a reaction to his country’s suspension 
from the Pacific Islands Forum. Some may have expected that MSG activity 
would wane once Fiji relinquished the chair of the group in 2013. This has proved 
not to be the case, partly because of the increased, and increasing, prominence 
of Papua New Guinea as a sub-regional and regional leader. The  momentum 
around membership of West Papua has also maintained a focus on the MSG’s 
ability and willingness to be diplomatically innovative.
The diplomatic importance of the MSG is likely to increase and alongside it there 
will be internal and external challenges. The group has already demonstrated a 
certain degree of resilience in relation to previously arisen challenges and it is 
to be expected that this will provide a bedrock of strength and experience to 
overcome future obstacles.
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Negotiating the Melanesia 
Free Trade Area
Sovaia Marawa1
Melanesia is gaining prominence as a powerful political and economic sub-region 
in the Pacific. The initial members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) first 
signed the MSG Trade Agreement (MSGTA) in 1993 as the instrument to promote 
trade and regional integration in Melanesia. The MSGTA has been reviewed twice 
by its members to strengthen and improve its implementation, and in January 
2013 a significant milestone was reached with the opening up of the largest 
regional market in the Pacific. 
This chapter explores the significance of the MSG Free Trade Area (MSG-FTA) 
and how it has reached new heights, despite the experiences of trade wars 
on biscuits, kava, and beef. It also explains how it departs from the initial 
MSGTA and the reasons why it has been more successful than similar regional 
integration initiatives, such as the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
(PICTA). It then examines the three key factors contributing to the success of 
the MSG-FTA: the political will and leadership of MSG leaders to set a bold 
vision for closer economic integration, measures taken by members to make the 
1  I would like to acknowledge Mrs Mere Falemaka, Pacific Islands Forum Ambassador to Geneva, for her 
editorial advice on this chapter. This is based on my research as a postgraduate student in the diplomacy 
program at the University of the South Pacific and should not be taken as the representing the official view of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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MSG more relevant and improve the implementation of the MSGTA, and the 
prominent role played by Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in increasing trade 
and investment relations within Melanesia.
Significance of the MSG-FTA
In 2013, the MSG-FTA became operational, with its members now according 
reciprocal tariff treatment for originating or value-added products traded 
within the sub-region.2 Under the free trade area, Fiji does not have any 
sensitive products on its negative list; products qualify for tariff preference 
subject to fulfilling the Rules of Origin (ROO) criteria. PNG removed duties 
from the 400 products in its negative list, with the exception of three products: 
canned tuna mackerel, cane sugar, and salt. Although Solomon Islands deferred 
its tariff reduction commitments following the ethnic conflict in 2004, at least 
80 per cent of its tariffs are to be reduced to zero by 2015. It is expected that all 
MSG parties will trade fully duty free amongst themselves by 2017.
This is a significant achievement for the MSG, which had its humble beginnings 
in 1981, when the founding members came together to pursue common political 
and economic goals that would benefit their peoples. In 1993, the first MSGTA 
was signed by PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as founding members of 
the MSG. A ‘positive list approach’ was taken with three products that the 
countries successfully exported to each other at the time: canned tuna (PNG), 
beef (Vanuatu), and tea (Solomon Islands). The objective of the MSGTA was to 
promote intra-MSG trade and strengthen economic cooperation. Fiji’s desire to 
ratify the MSGTA in 1997 boosted the MSG to become a ‘formidable entity’ in 
the Pacific (Jayaraman 2012). Over the years, members gradually implemented 
reforms to reduce tariffs, accompanied by supportive economic policies to 
facilitate the implementation of the MSGTA. The first review of the MSGTA 
resulted in the expansion of the initial product list to more than 180 products 
through a positive list approach. 
The MSG’s attempts to establish a free trade area in Melanesia have faced stormy 
waters during the 20-odd years of the agreement. In the mid-1990s, the basic 
tenets of the MSGTA were put to the test as trade relations between Fiji and 
Vanuatu became strained following the infamous trade wars on biscuits and 
kava. Vanuatu placed a one-year ban on biscuits imported from Fiji, which cost 
the FMF Biscuit Co. Ltd more than FJ$2 million as containers were held up at the 
ports and entry declined into Vanuatu (ABC Radio 2012b). Vanuatu unilaterally 
2  Products originating from MSG countries —  namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu —  were 
eligible for tariff preferences under the MSGTA, subject to meeting the rules of origin.
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applied the trade ban as it perceived the imported biscuits from Fiji to be 
undercutting its local biscuit industry. The trade ban measure contravened the 
basic principles of encouraging free trade within Melanesia. Through diplomatic 
channels, the Fijian government requested bilateral consultations with Vanuatu 
within 14  days to resolve the dispute. Vanuatu later revised its position by 
licensing importers to import only two tonnes of biscuits and imposed an 
additional 50 per cent import duties. However, Vanuatu’s actions did not satisfy 
the Fijian government, who retaliated by imposing a ban on imports of Vanuatu 
kava. Vanuatu’s kava exports to Fiji sustain the livelihood of many Ni-Vanuatu 
farmers who rely solely on income earned from this million dollar industry. The 
ban was finally removed by Vanuatu in 2005. Following the biscuit and kava 
dispute, PNG threatened to impose more than double import duties on Foods 
Pacific Ltd’s canned beef in retaliation for the Fijian government refusal to allow 
Ox & Palm beef into Fiji. Fiji had claimed that, due to quarantine concerns, PNG 
could only use beef imported from Australia and New Zealand, and substantially 
transformed in order to qualify for tariff preferences under the MSGTA. This 
policy did not please PNG, since it had a thriving beef industry. Following 
concerns raised by the PNG government, biosecurity officials in Fiji visited PNG 
to inspect the canning facilities to ensure it met Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) standards. 
The Formation of the MSG‑FTA
Considering the long history of efforts made to establish free trade agreements 
in the broader Pacific Islands region, the success of the MSG-FTA is significant. 
The proposal to explore regional economic integration and a free trade area 
was mooted from 1971 since the establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF).3 The PIF lacked the political will to consider the concept as the means 
to bring economic growth and prosperity in the region (Herr 1994). But, more 
importantly, the economics of trading amongst the scattered islands, and the 
fact that most countries produced similar goods, presented huge challenges. 
Even more challenging were the necessary economic reforms to achieve this 
objective. Regional integration was not developed further as the PIF continued 
to pursue regional sector initiatives such as the University of the South Pacific 
(USP) and the Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA). 
3  The Pacific Islands Forum was initially called the South Pacific Forum.
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In the early 1980s, the forum island countries (FICs)4 recognised the need 
to secure export markets for their agriculture and fisheries resource-based 
products and secured the first non-reciprocal trade agreement, called the South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). 
SPARTECA provided FICs duty and quota free non-reciprocal market access 
to Australia and New Zealand. The FICs soon realised the SPARTECA rules of 
origin were too restrictive for the private sector, this was particularly true for 
manufactured products such as Fiji garments. The exports of wholly obtained 
primary produce to Australia and New Zealand were increasing, although strict 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements were applied. Although SPARTECA 
was beneficial for Fiji, it made it difficult for the businesses and industries in the 
FICs to meet the ROO. The non-reciprocal preferences accorded to FICs products 
through SPARTECA would automatically become redundant once the Australian 
government had reduced duties to zero, in line with their commitments under 
other regional trade agreements, such as the APEC goal of eliminating tariffs 
imposed by developed members by 2010. To date, the average Australian 
customs tariff hovers around 17 per cent. Due to these glaring realities, the FICs 
proceeded to develop more favourable ROO that would benefit their exporters 
and generate economic returns to their ailing economies. 
The considerable lack of political consensus to reach new agreement within the 
multilateral trading system also led to countries pursuing regional integration 
initiatives. The FICs also faced pressure to enter into reciprocal trade agreements 
due to the looming deadline for the expiry of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) waiver. The waiver, obtained in 2002, allowed the European Union 
(EU) to extend its non-reciprocal trading scheme to the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Lomé II Convention, which facilitated 
Fiji’s sugar and tuna exports to Europe. In 2001, the EU secured an extension 
of the five-year WTO waiver on its Lomé preferences to allow it to negotiate 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, which included 
the 14 FICs. Since the EPA would be the first agreement between the FICs 
and a developed partner, the agreement would be required to comply with 
the stricter reciprocal WTO rules on regional economic integration. The FICs 
agreed to negotiate a free trade agreement amongst themselves under PICTA as 
a stepping stone to integration with the EU through the EPA and with other 
major partners in the future. This would also facilitate their gradual integration 
into the global economy and the multilateral trading system, thereby opening 
up their markets to competition with the rest of the world. The Pacific Islands 
expansion of trading links among the FICs would bring economic and social 
4  The FICs comprise 14 islands in the Pacific: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu 
and Vanuatu. The FICs group does not include Australia and New Zealand.
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benefits, and improve the living standards of all peoples. The FICs recognised 
the desirability of a clearly established and secure framework of rules for trade 
under conditions of fair competition in the Pacific region.
In its efforts to create regional integration of Pacific Island markets, the PIF leaders 
endorsed the PICTA. PICTA was seen as the vehicle to strengthen and enhance 
intra-regional trade between the FICs by eliminating trade-distorting tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade through progressive and gradual phases in order to 
achieve a single regional market (PIFS 2012). This regional economic integration 
strategy was part of the forum leaders Pacific Plan; it was implemented by the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.5 It took two years for the FICs to negotiate a 
PICTA trade in goods agreement. Although negotiations on the PICTA trade in 
goods agreement entered into force in 2003, the FICs faced significant challenges 
which contributed to the slow, ineffective and unsuccessful implementation of 
the agreement. Scollay indicated that many of the FICs lacked the capacity to 
undertake reforms and address inconsistencies in the PICTA and MSG schedule 
of commitments. Further to this, some FICs do not use automated systems for 
customs clearance, and some have yet to implement the harmonised system for 
classification for trade in goods (Scollay 2008). Even though 11 FICs ratified the 
PICTA, there were further complications, as only seven of the 11 FICs announced 
their readiness to trade (PIFS 2009). 
In 2003, the FICs started negotiations on a WTO-compatible EPA to meet 
the looming deadline for the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in December 
2006. Since the negotiations were carried out with a developed country, this 
presented an opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to pursue negotiations 
for a free trade agreement with the FICs. Australia and New Zealand had 
strongly argued that they should not be disadvantaged by any trade agreement 
that the Pacific would negotiate with any other developed country. Noonan 
stated that the EPA negotiations with the EU were linked to negotiations of the 
Pacific Area for Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus in 2008 (Noonan 2011), 
which occurred in anticipation of the negotiations on the Interim EPA, which 
PNG and Fiji eventually signed and ratified in 2007 and 2009 respectively, to 
protect market access for its products such as canned fish, sugar and garments. 
PNG’s commitments under the Interim EPA also triggered the removal of duties 
on majority of the products listed on their negative list under the MSGTA, 
with the exception of salt, sugar, and canned mackerel. The change in PNG’s 
commitments in the MSG provided an opportunity for exporters to freely trade 
within the sub-region. 
5  The Pacific Plan is a high-level framework designed to strengthen regional cooperation and integration 
in the Pacific. The framework was endorsed by forum leaders in 2005.
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The conclusion of the PICTA negotiations gave the impetus for the MSG 
countries to review the MSGTA to ensure that the PICTA did not overtake MSG 
preferences and render the MSGTA irrelevant for its members. A review of the 
MSGTA was undertaken in 2005 which committed members to reduce tariffs 
to duty free on a longer positive list of goods within eight years. A new ROO, 
based on change in tariff heading method, which was much simpler, replaced 
the value-added ROO in the previous agreement. The review was critical to 
further promote trade and ensure that the MSG-FTA was proceeding ahead of 
the other free trade agreements to maintain its relevance. 
The significance of the MSG-FTA is also indicated by the fact that although it 
initially focused on goods, there was also scope for members to create a regional 
market for trade in services, investment, and labour mobility. In  2012, 
milestones  were achieved with the MSG Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on Skilled Movement Scheme (SMS) which facilitated the movement of 
semiskilled personnel within the identified category of skills. Under the SMS, 
people with specialised skills — such as trained teachers, nurses, engineers, 
pilots, and doctors — are able to move freely to meet skills shortages within 
the MSG-FTA. The negotiations of the MSG MOU on SMS also had a profound 
impact for the MSG, since it only took two years to negotiate, compared to the 
seven years that it took the FICs in negotiating the PICTA Trade in Services 
(TIS) agreement. The PICTA TIS is yet to enter into force as only four out of the 
14 FICs have ratified the agreement (PIFS 2014).
Political Will and Leadership
One of the critical factors contributing to the achievement of a MSG-FTA is the 
vision, political will and determination of the founding and current leaders to 
establish and advance economic integration in Melanesia. This was not easy, as 
most Melanesian economies faced significant challenges to creating sustainable 
economic growth. With increasing calls for globalisation, the MSG had foreseen 
the profound impact of regional integration on its members’ ability to export 
their products and services in a competitive global environment. Since the region 
has an abundant supply of natural resources and a population of more than 
seven million people, there is huge potential for a larger sub-regional market 
to generate economic activities that would contribute towards employment 
creation, economic growth and the development of local industries. 
Although MSG countries began to gradually liberalise their markets, the 
economies were highly protective with significant trade and investment barriers 
that discourage private sector development. The MSG sometimes had its own 
internal political differences but these were usually resolved the traditional 
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‘Melanesian way’. In 2010, Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Edward Natapei refused 
to hand over the chairmanship of the MSG to Fiji’s Prime Minister Commodore 
Josaia Bainimarama on the grounds that this would undermine the MSG’s 
democratic ideals. Some claims were made that Australia had instigated the move 
with the promise of aid to Vanuatu. But the chairmanship issue was resolved 
in the traditional Melanesian way, a first for the leaders, at a special meeting 
hosted by the Solomon Islands Prime Minister Danny Philip. The traditional 
reconciliation ceremony stamped its mark as an alternative avenue for resolving 
disputes within the MSG and its engagement within the wider Pacific.
In 2011, Bainimarama assumed chairmanship of the leaders’ summit in Suva 
which set a bold vision to achieve future closer economic regional integration 
towards either a common market or customs union. The vision was to be achieved 
through a broadening of the MSGTA beyond goods to advance trade in services, 
investment and labour mobility. It also supported the MSG’s plan to proceed at a 
faster pace than the rest of the FICs, given their aim to strengthen private sector 
development, attract investment, and create economic opportunities to grow 
and strengthen their economies. With the MSG members also participating 
in several other regional trade negotiations, it was realised that preferences 
accorded within the scope of the MSGTA would erode faster and become 
ineffective if these regional free trade negotiations superseded the MSG. 
As chair of the MSG, Bainimarama also took advantage of this opportunity to 
share his views on the vision to ensure that the MSG would remain relevant. 
He  was a keen advocate of greater regional cooperation in Melanesia and 
believed that competition would create business opportunities, and generate 
economic growth and a prosperous Pacific. Fiji’s position as the hub of the 
Pacific would also support and strengthen the overall vision to achieve regional 
integration in Melanesia. Bainimarama not only raised the profile of the MSG 
by advocating issues pertinent to its people, but also enabled the institution 
to achieve a number of key milestones. The chairmanship was then handed 
over to Victor Tutugoro of the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS)) in New Caledonia, who 
was expected to carry on the vision of the leaders.6
6  Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS)) 
is an organisation representing the interests of indigenous people in New Caledonia. Although FLNKS is a 
political member of the MSG, it is not yet signatory to the MSGTA.
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Making MSG More Relevant 
One of the many reasons attributed to the successful achievement of a MSG-FTA 
was its members’ collective resolve to ensure that the MSGTA remains relevant 
in the midst of trade negotiations currently taking place in the Pacific. As part of 
efforts to improve the implementation of the MSGTA, Vellutini and Puech were 
commissioned by the MSG secretariat in 2010 to assess the implementation of the 
MSGTA and develop a roadmap for the creation of a common market for services 
and labour within a two to three year period. Vellutini and Puech found that, 
although the value of intra-MSG trade was small (around 3 per cent) compared 
to their trade with the rest of the world, intra-MSG trade was increasing and 
had enormous potential to increase in future, due the size of the large market 
of almost eight million people (Vellutini and Puech 2010). The study also found 
that PNG had become the largest exporter and importer in the region, surpassing 
Fiji. This result is not surprising considering the unprecedented growth of the 
PNG economy over the last eight years and its population size of almost seven 
million people. 
One of the challenges in making the MSGTA relevant lies in addressing 
inconsistencies in implementation at the national level. Vellutini and Puech’s 
study found that PNG and Vanuatu reneged on their commitments by maintaining 
high tariff barriers and failed to progressively reduce duties on products in their 
negative lists. Members were required to reduce duties immediately on products 
within eight years of the coming into force of the revised MSGTA. The general 
inconsistencies in the application of the tariff levels, the ROOs, and quarantine 
procedures sent out negative signals and caused a lot of uncertainty for the 
private sector. The findings of the report were addressed by senior trade and 
economic officials, who also considered a proposal to review the MSGTA legal 
text and architecture. Although PNG had been highly protective of its industries, 
a strategic shift in policy direction took place in 2011, when PNG granted duty 
free and quota free preferences to the EU under the Interim EPA. PNG was 
required under the ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ provisions in the MSGTA 
to automatically extend the same preferences to other MSG members.7 Parties to 
the MSGTA that enter into free trade agreements with other non-MSG members 
are required to extend the same tariff treatment to each other, resulting in the 
benefits flowing to other MSG members. With these developments, PNG duties 
were removed from more than 400 items listed in its negative list, except for 
sugar, salt, and canned mackerel. The MSG-FTA thus became operational from 
7  The Interim EPA provides for duty-free, quota-free market access into the EU for all exports originating 
from Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea signed the Interim EPA in July 2009, and Fiji in December 
2009. European parliament approved the agreement in January 2011 and Papua New Guinea ratified it in 
May 2011. Fiji started to implement the Interim EPA at the end of July 2014. 
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1 January 2013 when at least three members (Fiji, PNG, and Vanuatu) effectively 
began to trade duty free. The other products exempted from zero rates under 
the MSGTA were alcohol, oil and fuels, tobacco, and cane sugar. 
Another major driving factor that contributed to making MSG more relevant 
is attributed to the establishment of the MSG secretariat. A workable regional 
integration initiative is highly dependent on the existence of its own effective 
secretariat. In the early days, the work programs for the relevant committees, 
such as the trade and economic officials, were driven by members that assumed 
the chairmanship of the MSG. But the lack of capacities at the national level to 
facilitate and monitor the implementation of the MSGTA quite often hindered 
members’ initiative and drive to develop work programs. In 2009, the MSG 
secretariat was established to facilitate the implementation of the MSGTA, 
identify new areas of cooperation with development partners, and provide 
policy and technical advice to its members on general matters relating to the 
MSG (Pacific Institute of Public Policy 2008). There were generous donations 
of financial assistance and aid in kind received from development partners to 
support the work program of the secretariat. The Chinese-funded secretariat 
building is located in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
Increasing Fiji–PNG Trade and Investment 
Relations
Another major contributing factor to the achievement of the MSG-FTA is 
the fact that both Fiji and PNG share and identify with a common vision of 
closer economic integration as a means of creating economic opportunities for 
their people. Recently, there have been continuous efforts made to strengthen 
commercial relations between these two largest economies in the Pacific. PNG 
has implemented policy changes to trade duty free on goods originating from 
other MSG countries in its efforts to share much of its income gained from its 
growth with the Pacific. This has led to PNG prioritising its obligations to pursue 
the MSGTA over other regional integration initiatives, such as the PACER Plus 
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand (Islands Business 2013). Fiji, on 
the other hand, recognises PACER Plus as a means to deepen regional integration 
with Australia and New Zealand. Fiji joined the PACER Plus negotiations in 
November 2014, following its successful elections held in 2004.8
8  Fiji withdrew from the PACER Plus negotiations due to the Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ decision 
to suspend Fiji on 2 May 2009. 
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Historically, Fiji and PNG have enjoyed close and friendly relations ever since 
the arrival of Fiji’s first missionaries in PNG in 1875. Political relations were only 
established some 100 years later and have since strengthened, with Fiji joining 
the MSG in 1997. As the largest economies, in the Pacific, Fiji and PNG have 
the potential to strengthen trade and economic cooperation in the Pacific. PNG, 
the fastest growing economy in the Pacific, was projected to have grown by 
around 8 per cent in 2012 and with a population of almost seven million people, 
there are increasing opportunities for job creation and investments (IMF 2013). 
PNG is experiencing an unprecedented economic boom driven largely by the 
construction of the US$19  billion liquefied natural gas project coupled with 
strong performance in domestic demand in the construction, transport and 
finance sectors. PNG has a small manufacturing sector that predominantly 
produces beer, soap, concrete products, fruit juices, plywood, and paint, 
but this is growing and diversifying.
Historically, the PNG government had been highly protective of its domestic 
industries, as is demonstrated by the high tariff rates it levied under the MSGTA. 
Under the able leadership of Prime Minister O’Neill, the PNG government fast-
tracked reforms necessary to support the development of the private sector, 
creating employment, and promoting trade and investment opportunities. 
Prime Minister O’Neill shared a common vision of a unified Pacific with free 
movement of goods and people, but it was to be supported by strong national 
policies to drive economic development (Islands Business 2012). In supporting 
regional integration, O’Neill believed there were merits in working together 
to take advantage of the opportunities that would be mutually beneficial to 
the Pacific in resolving common issues such as climate change, food security, 
education, health, and potential investments. Prime Minister O’Neill stated that 
while PNG is experiencing an economic boom, it lacked the capacity to generate 
new economic activities to facilitate trade (ABC Radio 2012a). The free movement 
of goods and labour within the Pacific would provide opportunities in sectors 
of the economy where PNG lacks qualified and skilled workers, such as tourism 
and manufacturing. 
The boom in the economy has also driven PNG investor interest in exploring 
other markets and entering into joint venture projects that would generate 
viable economic returns. In 2012, Prime Minister O’Neill led a strong private 
sector delegation on an investment promotion mission to Fiji. The mission 
coincided with the official unveiling of the Pearl South Pacific Resort and the 
Championship Golf Course in Pacific Harbour, following their acquisitions by 
PNG companies, and included visits to the PNG-owned Bank South Pacific, and 
the Grand Pacific Hotel (which is a joint venture project with Fiji). The PNG 
Mineral Resources Development Cooperation and Petroleum Resources had 
invested US$32 million in Pearl South Pacific at Pacific Harbour. PNG’s National 
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Superannuation Fund and Lamana Development Ltd had invested in the Grand 
Pacific Hotel in Suva. Prime Minister O’Neill believed that in strengthening 
trade and investment ties between Fiji and PNG, the private sector could directly 
benefit from the huge opportunities that could flow into other MSG countries 
and the wider Pacific region. 
O’Neill affirmed that, while Fiji was going through some challenging times, he 
was encouraged by the developments taking place in the country. The PNG 
government offered at least 50 million kina to assist Fiji prepare for the 2014 
national elections and return to genuine parliamentary democracy. PNG’s 
support for Fiji was further demonstrated in 2012 when O’Neill offered to 
host the special Pacific ACP Leaders Meeting in Port Moresby to resolve Fiji’s 
concerns about its participation at all levels of the Pacific ACP forums. The PNG 
government also offered to host and fund an interim Pacific ACP secretariat. 
Fiji, as the hub of the Pacific, and with its large manufacturing base, connectivity 
to the Pacific and strong infrastructure, views itself as an equal partner to 
explore trade and investment relations with other members, with the hope of 
improving the lives of every Melanesian. Fiji has a favourable trade balance 
with PNG, and as a competitive supplier, this trend is expected to grow in 
the future. Foreign direct investments also play a significant role in economic 
development, and already there has been a fairly good exchange of businesses 
operating in both countries. Some Fijian companies have invested in PNG in the 
areas of manufacturing, construction, hotels and restaurants. Fijian companies 
already operating in PNG include Punjas (PNG) Ltd, Foods Pacific Ltd, Datec 
(PNG) Ltd, and Hardware Haus Ltd. The growing PNG economy augurs well 
for Fiji’s manufacturing business, and encourages more cargo, thus enhancing 
business for the shipping lines. There is also considerable scope to encourage 
investments within Melanesia, which has already materialised through cross 
border movements of MSG business ventures such as PNG’s Bank South Pacific 
and Vanuatu’s Bred Bank. 
In his quest to strengthen trade and investment relations with PNG and take 
advantage of the available opportunities, Fijian Prime Minister Bainimarama led 
a 70-member government and private sector delegation on his inaugural state 
visit to Port Moresby in 2013. The objective of the mission was to promote 
Fijian products and services, explore trade and investment opportunities, and 
discuss the common vision of PNG and Fiji leading the MSG into economic 
union. As a result of the trade and investment mission, several Fijian companies 
secured orders and entered into business agreements with PNG suppliers and 
distributors, and two companies have registered with the PNG Investment 
Promotion Authority to set up businesses in PNG. Prime Minister Bainimarama 
also announced plans to appoint a trade commissioner to PNG, who will be 
responsible for promoting trade and investment, and boosting networking 
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relationships with Fiji and PNG companies and other major stakeholders. 
A budget of FJ$890,000 has been allocated in 2015 to facilitate the setting up 
of Fiji’s Trade Commission Office in PNG. The prime ministers announced that 
both countries will no longer require visas to facilitate the travel of citizens and 
business people. Further work will need to be undertaken by the respective 
government agencies, through a Fiji–PNG Investment Working Group, to discuss 
opportunities and enable government to explore ways to address bottlenecks 
that prevent trade and investment activities. The first Fiji and PNG senior 
officials meeting was convened in Suva in February 2015 to discuss plans and 
future engagements, with the view to strengthen existing relations between 
both countries. The increase in cooperation and collaboration between Fiji and 
PNG clearly indicates that opportunities for trade and investment can be tapped 
and harnessed to create mutual benefits for the countries and, in turn, stronger 
growth for the MSG region.
Conclusion
Since its humble beginnings in 1983, the MSG has made leaps and bounds, 
particularly with the creation of the free trade area from 1 January 2013. 
The MSG-FTA allows qualifying products to trade freely between Fiji, PNG, 
and Vanuatu. Solomon Islands has also progressively taken steps to remove tariff 
barriers and to trade freely with other members in 2017.9 The creation of the 
free trade area bears testament to the political will, determination and collective 
efforts of the MSG leaders to make the MSG more relevant in the midst of 
increasing pressures to negotiate more free trade agreements within the Pacific. 
The MSG also places utmost importance on achieving its broad goals to provide 
economic opportunities and achieve sustainable economic growth. 
To improve the implementation of the MSGTA, tariff barriers were reduced 
and inconsistencies addressed, which generated new trade and investment 
opportunities within Melanesia. The growing trade and investment relationship 
between Fiji and PNG clearly demonstrates the improvements in strengthening 
of business to business contacts that are mutually beneficial to both parties. 
The conclusion of the MSG Skills Movement Scheme will add to the success of 
the MSGTA. A new MSGTA that consolidates goods investment — and expands 
it into services investment — and labour mobility is currently under negotiation 
by members, making it (once concluded) the most progressive in the Pacific.
9  Solomon Islands have removed duties levied on 80 per cent of its products from 2013, with the remaining 
products to be duty free by 2017.
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Shifts in Pacific diplomacy, governance and development priorities are changing 
the context of Pacific regionalism. In these shifts, Melanesian countries are 
represented by the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and Polynesian 
countries have formed their own sub-regional response via the Polynesian 
Leaders Group (PLG). But what of the Micronesian sub-region? Little is known 
of the North Pacific’s sub-regional experience, let alone its history, cultural 
context and governance structures. This chapter will highlight some of those 
experiences by pointing out the similarities and differences between the two 
main Micronesian sub-regional entities: the Micronesian Presidents Summit 
(MPS) and the Micronesian Chief Executives Summit (MCES), as well as some of 
the failures and successes of Micronesian sub-regionalism. 
There are several prevailing misconceptions, and perhaps misrepresentations, 
of the north Oceanic sub-region. It is perhaps a misnomer  to use the term 
‘North Pacific’ when referring to Micronesia because Kiribati and Nauru are 
geographically south — the equator being the obvious divider. The terminology 
may sometimes also be complicated by geographic references in the United 
States  — the ‘North Pacific’ or ‘Pacific Northwest’ refer to the US states of 
Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia. It is sometimes important to 
make this distinction because of the close Micronesian affiliations with the 
US. The confusion may not be so much of an issue in the South Pacific, where 
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the US  North Pacific probably is hardly ever, if at all,  a topic of discussion 
or reference. It is undoubtedly more geographically and politically correct 
to refer to the sub-region as ‘Northern and Central Oceania’ or simply the 
‘Central Pacific.’ Another identifying term that is used for the three northern 
Micronesian sovereign states is the ‘Freely Associated States’ (FAS), which is an 
entirely neo-colonial term in the sense that its primary reference is to the sub-
region’s relationship with the US. Another term commonly used in Micronesia 
for the three sovereign FAS is ‘US-affiliated states’, while the extension ‘and 
territories’ refers to the inclusion of the US territories of Guam and the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), as well as one non-
Micronesian US territory — American Samoa — which is in Polynesia. Neither 
of these geopolitical identifiers includes the two Micronesian states south of the 
equator — Kiribati and Nauru — which are not US-affiliated and have more 
ties to Australia and other British Commonwealth countries, as former colonies 
of Great Britain. The focus of this chapter is the northern Pacific or northern 
Micronesia, terms that will be used interchangeably and are meant to describe 
Micronesian states north of the equator, more specifically, the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the 
Republic of Palau, but also the US territories of Guam and the CNMI.
There are two main sub-regional bodies in northern Oceania. The MPS is an 
annual meeting among the three sovereign countries — FSM, RMI, and Palau. 
The MCES is a similar body, but also includes Guam and the CNMI, as well 
as the four states of the FSM (Pohnpei, Chuuk, Kosrae, and Yap). The issues 
discussed at each conference are often very similar, sometimes even the same, 
but their approaches are entirely different, given that one entity comprises 
sovereign states, while the other also includes non-sovereign states. 
Political Background of Micronesia
Micronesia is made up of over 2,000  islands, with a land area of 
2,700  square  kilometres and an ocean area of 7.4  million square kilometres. 
Historically, there are four main island groups: the Gilberts and Nauru; the 
Carolines (which comprises Palau, Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae); the 
Marianas (comprising Guam and CNMI); and the Marshall Islands. This chapter 
mostly discusses the latter three, or those that make up what is often referred 
to as the northern Pacific, as discussed above: the three sovereign states of 
the RMI, FSM and Palau and two territories under the US — Guam and the 
CNMI. As a side note, one of the three independent states, the FSM, is made 
up of five separate governments (the four state governments and the national 
government); this is why there are often references to more governments than 
there are countries. 
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Northern Micronesia was colonised by Spain, Germany and Japan, before falling 
under United Nations (UN) trusteeship, administered by the US. This mandate 
was called the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), which was initially 
under control of the US Navy, before being handed over to the US Department 
of the Interior in the early 1950s. 
Overview of Government Structures
In the mid-1970s, efforts toward sovereignty finally made headway and a political 
futures committee was commissioned. The committee produced several political 
options from which the islands could choose, this is how the sub-region ended 
up with a variety of government structures. Guam opted to remain a US territory; 
CNMI opted for commonwealth status (which holds an entirely different meaning 
here than is referred to in the British/Australian system); the four states of Yap, 
Chuuk, Kosrae,1 and Pohnpei became the FSM2 and opted for a federation in free 
association with the US, as did RMI. Palau was the last TTPI district to become 
independent in 1994, also opting for free association. 
The referenda of the 1970s laid out the governments that exist today in 
northern Micronesia. The three sovereign FAS, in keeping with the terminology 
introduced earlier, are all constitutional democracies in free association with the 
US. However, in terms of government structures, this is where the similarities 
end. The FSM has a highly decentralised national government with four states, 
each with its own separate government, and a unicameral congress from which 
the president and vice president are elected. The RMI operates as a mixed 
parliamentary–presidential government, with the president elected by the 
Nitijela (parliament). The Republic of Palau (ROP) has a bicameral congress 
called the Olbiil Era Kelulau with the president and vice president elected by 
popular vote. 
Challenges
The challenges the sub-region faces are similar to challenges faced in other parts 
of the Pacific and other small island developing states: climate change, food 
security, high transportation costs, unreliable shipping services, geographical 
limitations, limited resources, and high emigration rates. There are other 
1  Kosrae was initially an outer island of Pohnpei, but became a state when the FSM was formed. 
2  While constitutions were adopted in 1979, US administration formally ended in RMI and FSM in 1986 
with the signing of the Compacts of Free Association. The UNSC formally ended their trusteeship status in 
1990, the same year they both became UN members. 
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challenges that are more unique to certain Micronesian islands, such as an 
air service monopoly (in the FSM), and uncertainties regarding the future of 
economic provisions under Compacts of Free Association with the US. 
Micronesian Sub‑Regionalism
As a response to the many challenges faced by the sub-region, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation through sub-regional bodies has increased in the past 
two decades, particularly since the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was around 
this time that significant changes in Pacific regionalism were also taking shape, 
signalling broader inclusivity. In 1997, the South Pacific Commission changed 
its name to the Secretariat of the Pacific Community to better reflect its wider 
Pacific membership (SPC 2011). Following suit, discussions at the 29th South 
Pacific Forum (SPF) hosted by the FSM in 1998 included the issue of changing 
the name of the forum to be more inclusive of northern Pacific members. 
The name was formally changed to the Pacific Islands Forum at the 2000 Annual 
Forum Meeting, hosted by Kiribati (PIFS 2015). In early 2000, the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community (SPC) welcomed its first Micronesian head, Chamorro 
Lourdes T. Pangelinan (SPC 2011). Pangelinan served six years as SPC’s head, 
leaving behind other legacies — being the first female head of SPC and with the 
opening of a North Pacific Regional Office in Pohnpei, FSM, in January 2006, the 
same month she left the organisation. The South Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme also appointed a Micronesian, H.E. Asterio Takesy, to serve as its 
executive director in late 2002. Takesy served two consecutive three-year terms, 
from 2003 until 2009. 
Despite these attempts at greater representation from the northern Pacific, and 
the changes in Pacific regionalism to incorporate Micronesia more explicitly in 
South Pacific regionalism, more often than not northern Micronesia has been 
sidelined in Pacific regional issues, owing largely to geographical distance 
(and  related transportation limitations), but mostly due to historical and 
political dissimilarities as a result of being colonised by the US (compared to 
the South Pacific’s affiliations with European colonisers). Up until very recently, 
while the South Pacific may sometimes go to great lengths to include them, 
northern Micronesian participation in Pacific regional matters has largely been 
characterised by a sense of detachment.
The relegation of Micronesia may sometimes be self-perpetuated, as in the case 
of the FSM Department of Foreign Affairs receiving executive instructions from 
President Emanuel Mori in 2007 to close down its embassy in Suva. While the 
FSM embassy closure never materialised, it suggested that the newly appointed 
FSM president was dismissing Pacific relationships as inconsequential to his 
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country’s priorities. This could not have been farther from the truth, particularly 
when it comes to issues such as climate change, which the FSM leadership would 
have quickly come to realise had it not been for other leaders in the northern 
Pacific pushing the issues through already established sub-regional entities — 
the MPS and the MCES.3 
Micronesian Presidents’ Summit
In May 2001, leaders from the three northern Pacific sovereign countries, 
Leo  A.  Falcam from the FSM, Tommy Remengesau Jr from the Republic 
of Palau,  and Kessai Note from the Republic of the Marshall Islands, met in 
Pohnpei  to discuss issues of ‘working together to improve communication 
and planning on areas of common interest to their nations and to the region’ 
(FSM Information Services 2001). The meeting was called by President Falcam as 
a way of forging a common ground to establish closer ties, and to communicate 
on national and regional issues of mutual concern and importance to the three 
nations (FSM Information Services 2001). Of particular urgency at the time were 
issues of maritime surveillance and opportunities for information technology 
upgrades, but also high on the list of priority issues was the matter of US 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol (FSM Information Services 2001). These and 
other issues discussed at the first meeting laid a foundation for future meetings. 
At a second presidential meeting in 2002, recognising the fact that each of the 
three nations was becoming more involved in regional and international forums, 
it was agreed to begin negotiating with one another to establish an official North 
Pacific regional alliance. This official alliance would provide a single voice 
on appropriate sub-regional and broader Pacific regional issues. One of the 
stated aims of the forum was to collaborate on issues related to US association. 
The FSM and RMI at the time were renegotiating their respective Compacts of 
Free Association with the US, and Palau had a vested interest in monitoring the 
outcomes as a precedent for their future renegotiations. The MPS has been an 
annual, sometimes biannual, meeting since then, and the acronym MPS now 
more generally refers to the political entity, rather than to the meeting itself. 
In the early days of MPS, invitations had also been extended to Nauru and 
Kiribati, and in 2009 a formal joint invitation was extended in the form of a 
resolution that made a statement of ‘Micronesian Solidarity’ (MPS 2009). 
The three northern Micronesian presidents acknowledged the significance 
3  There is also an FSM-only sub-regional entity called the FSM State and National Leadership Conference 
(SNLC), comprised of the FSM president and vice president, four FSM state governors and heads of legislatures 
— speakers from Pohnpei, Kosrae, Yap and Chuuk, plus the President of the Chuuk State Senate. 
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of consolidating Micronesian support in order to strengthen their position in 
broader Pacific regional settings, in international settings, and with development 
partners (MPS 2009). To date, however, Kiribati and Nauru have not joined MPS 
and are not likely to join anytime soon. The reasons for this are the same as 
those underlying northern Micronesia’s sense of detachment from the rest of the 
Pacific — their different colonial history and difference in primary development 
partners, combined with geographical distance compounded by transportation 
limitations, which create differences in priorities during discussion. 
High-priority regional and sub-regional issues have generally dominated the 
MPS agenda. Those issues may be, but are not necessarily always, centred on 
relations with the US. The respective foreign affairs office in each of the nations4 
is typically charged with servicing the meetings — scheduling, drafting and 
compiling the agenda, background and briefing documents, taking of minutes, 
and finalising outcome documents — with the host nation customarily tasked 
with on-the-ground planning and logistical arrangements. Many of the issues 
seem to be permanently ingrained in the agenda (for example, immigration, 
climate change, and security). Others may emerge as needed for some type of 
action, then die out either over time or once completed to the satisfaction of the 
leaders. Examples of short-lived action items at the MPS include the FSM’s bid to 
host the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (‘Tuna Commission’), 
extension of the University of the South Pacific campus in the RMI, and US 
appropriation-related items such as prior service, US postal services, and other 
issues that may or may not be referred from the other sub-regional body, MCES. 
Micronesia Chief Executives’ Summit
In 2003, the chief executives of four western Micronesia island governments 
(the Republic of Palau, the US Territory of Guam, CNMI, and the State of Yap 
within the FSM) formed a unified sub-regional multilateral body for cooperative 
governance known as the Western Micronesia Chief Executives’ Summit 
(WMCES). Similar to the MPS, this summit was created in order to initiate 
and advance sub-regional issues among leaders in western Micronesia, the key 
difference being that the WMCES membership includes non-sovereign states 
(Guam and the CNMI). While the meeting itself was the product of separate 
informal bilateral discussions between Palau’s President Tommy Remengesau Jr 
and then Governors Felix P. Camacho of Guam, Benigno R. Fitial of the CNMI, 
and Robert Ruecho of Yap, it was Governor Camacho who pushed for the entity’s 
creation after Palau, the FSM and RMI refused access to the MPS for non-
sovereign entities. However, the credit for convening the first meeting belongs 
4  FSM Department of Foreign Affairs, RMI Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Palau Ministry of State. 
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to President Remengesau, who, in true Micronesian brotherly solidarity, invited 
Governors Camacho and Fitial as leaders of non-sovereign entities to Palau to 
meet separately on the margins of the third MPS. Robert Ruecho, the Governor 
of Yap (another non-sovereign entity), was also invited at the last minute. So 
within less than two years after the MPS was created, the separate WMCES 
was initiated, both as a response to the MPS rejection of non-sovereign state 
membership and based on several key attributes shared by the four entities: 
geographical proximity in western Micronesia (hence the name of the sub-
regional body), cultural affiliations, and historical connections that date back 
to pre-foreign contact days. Since the first meeting was called by President 
Remengesau in 2003, the WMCES has typically met twice a year. As with the 
first meeting, held in Palau in 2003, WMCES meetings have usually been held in 
tandem with the MPS to minimise logistical problems and scheduling conflicts, 
and to save on costs. 
In March 2007, CNMI hosted the seventh WMCES summit in Saipan. 
Then Governor Benigno Fitial summed up the sentiments of chief executives 
with regard to the importance of the meetings: 
This summit is successful because it facilitates information sharing on so many 
levels: from the chief executive level to the staff level and from the public sector 
to the private sector and vice versa. We have vertical and lateral information 
exchanges, within each government as well as between the governments and the 
private business sectors  …  by working together as sub-regional governments 
and by partnering up with private industry, we put ourselves in a far better 
position to collectively address these regional challenges (Donato 2007). 
That particular summit would have been newly elected Yap Governor Sebastian 
Anefal’s first meeting. However, his background as FSM Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs probably influenced his decision to seek endorsement from the 
FSM national government prior to sitting in on a WMCES meeting. Ensuing 
discussions between Governor Anefal and President Mori in early 2007 solidified 
the FSM’s subsequent move to join the WMCES, further paving the way for 
other FSM states to become members. 
In 2007, after two presidencies and four years of formal and informal invitations, 
the FSM national government, through then President Emanuel Mori, joined 
the WMCES. At the next meeting in Palau in 2008, RMI, Kosrae, and Pohnpei 
also joined, and the ‘Western’ portion of the name was dropped, becoming 
the MCES. The subsequent meeting in Pohnpei, co-hosted by FSM President 
Emanuel Mori and Pohnpei Governor John Ehsa, seated Chuuk’s then Governor 
Johnson Elimo as the final member. 
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There have been informal, and rather unconvincing, discussions of further 
extending membership to American Samoa. While American Samoa would 
culturally be better suited to join the PLG, the territory’s close affiliation with 
the US makes membership in the MCES more enticing, given the US relations–
dominated agenda, but more so, because of their non-sovereign status similar to 
that of fellow US territories, Guam and the CNMI. 
The issues discussed at the MCES, while similar to the MPS, are approached 
quite differently given that the entity comprises sovereign and non-sovereign 
states. For example, it would be pointless to hold in-depth trade discussions at 
the MCES (as the US controls areas such as customs and immigration for Guam). 
Similarly, it is not unknown for Guam and CNMI to bring along a Washington-
based US fisheries official to an MCES meeting. This would be regarded as a 
diplomatic blunder, not to mention highly discourteous, to any of the three 
sovereign Micronesian entities were it to occur in an MPS meeting. 
There are currently nine committees within the MCES, each with its own 
structure, oversight and management: Regional Workforce Development Council, 
Micronesia Regional Invasive Species Council, Micronesia Challenge, Renewable 
Energy Committee, Pacific Island Regional Recycling Initiative Committee, 
Regional Transportation Committee, Regional Tourism Council, Regional Health 
Committee, and Communications Committee. Some committees are funded by 
governments themselves, while others partner with NGOs or bilateral donors, 
depending on the issue. The committees meet outside of the MCES, typically 
prior to the final preparatory or pre-summit meetings, to finalise what is to 
be put before chief executives at the plenary. Full-length presentations are 
requested during pre-summit meetings and are further filtered for plenary 
meetings. The high-priority issues highlight accomplishments, challenges and 
recommendations. Unlike the MPS, the MCES has a more structured secretariat, 
the Center for Micronesian Sustainable Futures. 
Sub‑Regional Achievements
There are several success stories of activities that would not have been 
possible without the Micronesian sub-regional dimension either forefronting 
or advancing  the issues. While these are examples of Micronesian solidarity 
on issues of great importance to the region, not all stories are as successful. 
In  fact, despite the terms that established the sub-regional bodies to better 
align members, it is not uncommon for differences within the sub-region to 
sometimes surface, as in the case of RMI offering open immigration and customs, 
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while the FSM and Republic of Palau have consistently and contentiously 
failed to reciprocate. Some examples of sub-regional successes and failures are 
outlined below. 
Climate Change
The issue that stands out for Micronesia is that of climate change. The significance 
of this critical issue is reverberated at every opportunity, in virtually every 
leadership statement. Just as important as the issue of climate change, and in 
many cases more important, is the face or voice that represents it. 
Palau’s President H. E. Tommy Remengesau Jr has long been a strong advocate 
for the environment. He has won numerous environmental awards, and was 
featured as one of Time magazine’s Heroes of the Environment for his Micronesia 
Challenge initiative (Shuster 2009). He was also the co-winner of the 2014 
Laureate Policy Leadership award. After serving the constitutional limit of two 
consecutive terms in office, Remengesau shifted to parliament after winning a 
seat in the 2008 Palau general election. This meant he could no longer be the 
face of conservation efforts in Micronesia, which was considered a setback by 
the environmental community. Environmentalists and conservationists in the 
sub-region clamoured to find a voice that could take over, ending up with FSM’s 
then President Manny Mori, who had just under a year as chief executive under 
his belt. 
In 2008, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), a worldwide environmental non-
government organisation with a chapter in the FSM, tried to get President 
Mori more interested in environmental issues by inviting him to head an FSM 
delegation to a convention on biological diversity in Rome.5 President Mori gave 
a resounding speech at the Convention on Biological Diversity. However, if there 
was any success associated with the trip, it ended there. As a staunch Catholic, 
Mori made it a priority to visit the Pope while in Rome, which immensely 
detracted from the primary purpose of the trip, much to the dismay of his 
TNC trip sponsors. While many of his subsequent speeches included issues 
of climate change and its importance in the sub-region, President Mori never 
quite captured the essence of the matter in a way that conveyed its fundamental 
significance. Suffice to say, environmentalists soon found that it would not be 
easy to live up to Remengesau’s legacy, let alone simply have someone else pick 
up where he left off. 
5  Convention on Biological Diversity Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Workshop on Protected 
Areas. 
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In November 2012, Tommy Remengesau Jr again won the Palau presidential 
election, sparking renewed fervour in the Micronesian environmental 
community and re-igniting the flame that had gradually dimmed since his 
temporary departure from the political limelight: ‘Palau may be small, but 
with President Remengesau at the helm, it has a big voice’ (UNEP 2015). Barely 
a year after the Liberal–National Coalition took power in Australia, with Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott announcing that climate change was not a priority for 
the country (Phillips 2014), Remengesau sent waves of encouragement around 
the Pacific with his Oceans Declaration during Palau’s hosting of the 45th Pacific 
Islands Forum. The Oceans Declaration calls on the international community 
to commit to genuine partnerships to protect and manage the region’s marine 
resources sustainably for future generations, culminating in the advocacy of 
a stand-alone Oceans Sustainable Development Goal. The declaration did not 
originate in the sub-regional bodies, however, Palau has gone on record in 
the MPS promoting the initiative and seeking full support from its northern 
Micronesian neighbours (MPS 2014). 
The Micronesia Challenge
Micronesian leaders have jointly committed to the Micronesia Challenge, 
an initiative to effectively conserve at least 30 per cent of the near-shore and 
20  per  cent of terrestrial resources across Micronesia by 2020. Leaders have 
agreed to further advocate and promote the Micronesia Challenge at regional and 
international meetings, and the need to review the various work programmes 
(national and regional), for implementation with a view to integrate and 
streamline functions. 
Every conservation activity in Micronesia’s five jurisdictions is now linked 
to the Micronesia Challenge, including national plans, government strategic 
action plans and NGO plans. The Micronesia Challenge has also spawned several 
other regional environmentally related challenges around the world, such the 
Caribbean Challenge Initiative and the Coral Triangle Challenge. 
Micronesian Conservation Trust
The environment and conservation fields have garnered worldwide financial 
support for adaptation and mitigation efforts. The Micronesian sub-region 
has established a financial mechanism for the Micronesian Challenge and 
other conservation efforts. The Micronesian Conservation Trust (MCT) is 
headquartered in Pohnpei, capital of the FSM, with an objective to build an 
endowment to provide sustainable financial support for conservation and natural 
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resource management across Micronesia. MCT was chosen by the UN Office of 
Project Services to host the Micronesia Global Environment Facility and Pacific 
Environment Fund Small Grants Programme. In April 2015, MCT became the 
first national implementing entity accredited by the Adaptation Fund, allowing 
it to now apply for projects up to US$1 million to support climate adaptation 
work in Micronesia. 
Rock Island Airlines
There had been talk of Palau establishing a sub-regional airline for several years 
and in September 2002 that dream finally became a reality. Start-up costs were 
estimated at US$5  million, contributed by both private and public donors, 
including the FSM (US$1 million from Yap, US$500,000 from the FSM national 
government) and Japan (US$1 million). Operations started in August 2004 under 
an Air New Zealand air operators’ certificate, with experienced pilots from 
Australia and New Zealand, and a leased 128-seat Boeing 737–33A airplane from 
a Swedish company. Lease costs for the aircraft were extremely low, since the 
company was established soon after 9/11 and the SARS epidemic. 
Nevertheless, operations were suspended in December 2004, after only four 
months, due to high costs and under-performing sales. The under-performing 
sales were very discouraging because most air travellers in the region preferred 
to travel with the sub-region’s then principal airline, Continental, on account of 
receiving frequent flyer benefits. 
If anything beneficial resulted from the Rock Island Air debacle, it was that 
it realised some untapped potential and prompted Continental (now United 
Airlines) and other airlines to increase services to Palau. As of 2013, Palau was 
seeing over 40 flights a week from United and other airline carriers, which has 
contributed significantly to tourism in the country. 
Sub‑Regional Opportunities
In spite of the many challenges for the sub-region, there are also many 
opportunities. From trade and diplomatic representation to international 
and regional programme access, the prospects for further Micronesian sub-
regionalism are immeasurable. To harness this immense potential, however, 
will require leadership towards a common identity for the sub-region. 
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During the seventh MPS in 2007, leaders directed ministers and staff to look 
into the possibilities of establishing a Micronesian trading bloc. After several 
years of negotiations, the Micronesian Trade Committee Treaty was signed in 
September 2014 in Samoa on the margins of the Small Island Developing States 
Conference. While the treaty signing was hailed as a big step forward, there is 
still a long way to go in terms of creating a Micronesian Trade and Economic 
Community (MTEC). The treaty allows for the committee to openly and actively 
pursue financial and other resources in order to further pursue steps toward the 
MTEC. The following steps have been proposed: phase one — setting the rules, 
institutions and infrastructure for preferential trade and investment; phase two 
— towards free trade and investment; phase three — harmonisation of trade 
and investment policies towards a customs union; phase four — realisation of 
a common market leading to an economic union. 
There are also opportunities that have been formally or informally raised, 
such as Micronesian joint diplomatic representation in Europe (as a result 
of increasing European Union presence in the region) and tapping into the 
potential of high numbers of retiring Micronesian US military service members. 
Other possible opportunities that are more focused on the South Pacific include 
membership in the new Pacific Islands Development Forum and the long 
established University of the South Pacific. There is also a joint Micronesian 
effort to gain improved access to international and regional programmes, such 
as the United Nations Development Programme Pacific Centre, Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, Secretariat of the Pacific Community,6 other CROP Agencies, 
and the Development Cooperation Scheme between Fiji and the Pacific Island 
countries, in which only RMI, Nauru and Kiribati have thus far participated 
since its inception in 2013. 
It can be said that personalities in northern Micronesian sub-regionalism are 
just as important as the issues themselves. One critical sub-regional opportunity 
that is currently unfolding is that of the new FSM leadership. The FSM 
congress has recently installed President Peter Christian, former chair of the 
FSM’s compact renegotiation team and a career politician known for his no-
nonsense attitude with US policy-makers. In 2011, Senator Christian introduced 
a resolution in the 17th FSM congress to prematurely terminate the Amended 
Compact of Free Association with the US. FSM Congress Resolution Number 
17–61 submitted, among many other allegations, that the US had abused its 
power under the Amended Compact with the FSM and made decisions that 
are contrary to the interests of the country. At a time when all three northern 
Micronesian nations are fighting an uphill battle of prioritising development 
interests both independently and under their respective Compacts of Free 
6  Despite FSM’s hosting of a regional SPC office in Pohnpei.
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Association, a categorical yet guarded cynicism is an indispensable quality to 
have in current leaders. President Christian, a veteran statesmen, may be just 
the right person needed to bring those long overdue qualities to the forefront of 
the sub-regional agenda. 
Conclusion
Sub-regionalism has established a secure foundation in northern Micronesia. 
However, two questions remain to be answered: who is sub-regionalism for, 
and what characterises Micronesian identity? Perhaps a coordinated response 
can answer both questions and, given the many opportunities that exist, these 
questions will be answered sooner than one may think. In the meantime, while 
regional experience, knowledge and information-sharing are the wind needed 
in the sails of Micronesian sub-regionalism, leaders of the FSM, RMI, and 
Palau, as well as Guam and the CNMI, must recognise that the ‘Micronesian 
Way’ of looking north is coming to an end. It is time to look south, where true 
solidarity rests with fellow Pacific Islands. 
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Marshalling a Pacific Response 
to Climate Change
Nicollette Goulding
This chapter seeks to address the question: ‘Are Pacific states marshalling a 
collective and cohesive Pacific response to climate change?’ In doing so, it will 
examine how the expansion of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) to include more interest areas, actors and alliances, 
has had an impact on Pacific cohesion. Firstly, it will examine how the splitting 
and subsequent division of Pacific states into various issue areas has led them 
to engage in new affiliations known as climate clubs, alternative forums and 
alliances; secondly, it will assess the efforts of regional institutions in facilitating 
a more coordinated Pacific response to climate change at the international level.
Fragmentation in the Climate Change Regime 
and Pacific Cohesion
The shift in the global climate change regime from policy-making to actual 
implementation of actions has resulted in the creation of new areas which are 
causing a ‘spreading out’ of interests of Pacific states. From the establishment of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the agenda of the UNFCCC has shifted from one of 
policy formation to that of implementation (Shibuya 2004), and as such there is 
an emerging trend for the establishment of state clubs whose members are drawn 
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together by commonalities. Engberg-Pedersen (2011) argues that sector-based 
groupings are more conducive to reaching agreements, as the number of actors 
is reduced and the issue areas more focused. This shift towards implementation 
has also seen a shift in the influence of traditional institutions, such as the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (Shibuya 2004) as countries begin to 
focus on the implementation of actions to best suit their national needs. 
Faced with conflicting national priorities, Pacific states are increasingly choosing 
to speak and make individual submissions and interventions within the UNFCCC 
negotiation process. This trend is shown in Figure 16.1 for the period, 2006–
2011, with Fiji, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu choosing to make separate submissions outside of their AOSIS 
coalition. This shift in the actions of Pacific nations coincides with the shift in 
the UNFCCC process from discussions and negotiations to implementation and 
actions — a more ‘sectoral approach’ to dealing with climate change issues. 
This clearly shows that the shift in the UNFCCC process affects the movement or 

































Figure 16.1: Count of AOSIS and AOSIS members submissions, 
2006–2011
Source: Author’s research.
Coalitions are formed on the basis of mutual interest and compromise, however, 
when individual members can no longer see their interests adequately 
reflected in the common position, they may choose to leave the coalition 
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(Betzold et al. 2011) or seek other coalitions to fill the gaps and better address 
their needs. As  processes in the UNFCCC shift towards implementation and 
a sector-based approach, Pacific cohesion is becoming tested as PICs become 
increasingly more active in areas that appeal to their own national agenda as 
opposed to a common regional agenda. Despite being established as the core 
institution for climate change, the UNFCCC has increasingly been deemed 
a mechanism for goal setting and not implementation. This has led to the 
proliferation of sector-based clubs (Widerberg and Stenson 2013), which leads 
to further fragmentation. This fragmentation has had a rippling effect, causing 
fragmentation to Pacific cohesion, and creating uncertainty and panic as PICs 
look to the horizon for new partnerships as the deadline to an agreement to 
succeed the Kyoto Protocol looms nearer in 2015. 
A particularly contentious subject on which PICs have not reached consensus 
is the mechanism of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) an incentive that provides payment for actions that prevent the 
loss and destruction of forested areas. AOSIS and Pacific solidarity on this issue 
was first tested in the mid-1990s, when the negotiating bloc of JUSCANZ (Japan, 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), led by New Zealand and 
Australia, attempted to obtain the support of Melanesian States (Fiji, PNG, 
Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands) on the issues of land use, land use change and 
forestry (Barnett and Campbell 2010). Although this would have had benefits 
for the Melanesian states, they instead chose to maintain their solidarity on 
this occasion with their fellow PICs and the AOSIS coalition (Barnett and 
Campbell 2010). This stance could be attributed to the ‘Pacific Way’ — a term 
that was coined by Fiji’s first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, which is 
synonymous with consensus, and usually refers to shared ideas about solidarity 
and reciprocity, and the fostering and maintenance of kinship networks.
However, with growing recognition and interest in REDD+ within the UNFCCC 
process, the interest of PICs who can benefit from this mechanism has also 
increased. Only the large volcanic islands with vast forest cover — PNG, 
Solomon Islands, and Fiji — stand to gain, as opposed to low lying atolls, such 
as Kiribati, Tuvalu and RMI, who have no forest cover and therefore nothing to 
gain from this initiative (Boydell 2008). The Melanesian countries’ decision to 
sign up to the REDD+ Partnership is a step that goes against the grain of Pacific 
solidarity and the ‘Pacific Way’, where consensus is usually the order of the 
day. Tuvalu and PNG have been the most vocal, locking horns over this issue. 
This was quite visible at UNFCCC COP (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, the 
annual global conference to negotiate climate change policy and targets) in 
Copenhagen in 2009, where tensions over REDD+ led to PNG breaking ranks 
with AOSIS (Ryan 2010). Both Fiji and Tuvalu have invested a great deal of time 
and resources on this issue, making 18 and 16 interventions respectively on the 
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topic of REDD+ between 2007 and 2009 (see Figure 16.2). Given the long list 
of issues on the agenda at UNFCCC conferences, and taking into account PICs’ 
limited resources and capacity, even when pooled together, it is particularly 
interesting to note that certain countries are investing much of their limited 
resources and capacities on issues such as REDD+ where there are contrasting 
views between certain Pacific states. This points to the fact that the coalition of 
AOSIS cannot be used as a vehicle to drive this issue and, as a result, some states 
are opting to pursue the issue individually or with a select few in the group that 
have similar vested interests. Given the capacity constraints, these resources 
could be better used in lobbying for other substantive shared issues, such as 
adaptation, mitigation, and climate financing. 
Figure 16.2: Topics of interventions by AOSIS countries between 
2007–2009
Source: Betzold et al. (2011).
Growing dissatisfaction with the sub-optimal progress in the overall UNFCCC 
negotiations has seen a swing towards the forming of new alliances (both formal 
and informal). Several Pacific Island states have joined climate change forums 
that run parallel to the established UNFCCC process. Described as the ‘thousand 
flowers blooming’ (Maybe et al. 2013), the increase in the numbers and 
types of climate clubs has created paths for states to pursue their interests 
(see Figure 16.3). A majority of these clubs’ objectives work in tandem with 
the objectives of the UNFCCC (Bailer 2012), and thereby provide a means for 
Pacific Island states to caucus strategically in order to better serve their national 
interests. Overall, these clubs fill the governance gaps and allow like-minded 
states to garner support and use available opportunities to advocate their 
national climate change needs. As Bo Kjellen, former chief UNFCCC negotiator 
for Sweden, said regarding such clubs: ‘Only when national conditions are 
favourable for an agreement, can an international agreement be met’ (Eritsland 
2013). Some of the Pacific Island states are actively forming new alliances and 
engaging in forums such as Cartagena Dialogue, Global Bio-Energy Partnership, 
Coalition of Forested Nations, REDD+ Partnership, Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Partnership, and the MRV and International Partnership. 
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Figure 16.3: A near-comprehensive illustration of the many climate clubs, 
groupings and actors in the climate change regime, described as the 
‘thousand flowers blooming’
Source: Maybe et al. (2013).
With the growing frustration over the deadlock in UNFCCC negotiations on 
mitigation targets, countries are increasingly finding alternative forums 
through which they can articulate their priorities with other like-minded states. 
The Climate Vulnerable Forum, initiated in 2009, is such a forum, consisting of a 
partnership of states that are considered the most vulnerable to climate change 
impacts. The members of this forum are not only vulnerable states, but also 
developed nations from Africa, Asia, the Americas and PICs — Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu. When Kiribati hosted the forum in 2010, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
and the Marshall Islands also participated. 
The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action — described as a progressive 
dialogue for furthering the climate change debate — is another new alliance that 
has developed as an alternative forum. The forum, which consists of developing 
and developed states from across the traditional negotiating alliances, allows 
members to openly express and discuss their national interests in a safe space 
(Maybe et al. 2013). Seizing the opportunity to move beyond the deadlock in the 
UNFCCC, Samoa and Marshall Islands are the lone Pacific countries participating 
in the dialogue. Though this dialogue group does not negotiate together within 
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the UNFCCC, they do develop a joint position. (Maybe et al. 2011). Motivation to 
join such an alternative alliance is best articulated by Marshall Islands Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Tony de Brum, who said: ‘We don’t restrict our climate change 
efforts to the UNFCCC, and we think that’s good practice because you never 
know what might happen’ (Tong 2013). As national interests and uncertainty 
become the dominant narratives of the climate change discussions, Pacific states 
are increasingly having to engage in these new forums and clubs as individuals or 
smaller subsets, limiting their links with each other, as is shown in Figure 16.4.
Figure 16.4: The alliances, climate clubs and outside forums in which 
PICs participate
Source: Author’s research.
Apart from participating in these informal spaces, Pacific states are also trying 
to engage in debates on climate change outside of the UNFCCC, and in certain 
cases this has led to greater cohesion. According to Keohane and Victor (2011), 
because of diversity and uncertainty in the problems of climate change, states 
have difficulty in seeing linkages between different alliances and areas within the 
UNFCCC process. Within the United Nations, PIC cohesion has been revitalised 
by the creation of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) grouping 
which caucuses over issues pertaining to sustainable development and climate 
change (Tarte 2014). As a result of this grouping, the united voice has been 
more audible in COP events in Cancun, Durban and Doha. It is also the case 
that since the formation of this grouping there has been better coordination 
between the various traditional alliances to which each of these PICs are party. 
Given the important roles that PICs are playing in major alliances, such as Fiji 
role as chair of the G77 plus China, Nauru as the chair of AOSIS, and Tuvalu 
playing a significant role within the Least Developed Country (LDC) grouping, 
it would appear that PICs are increasingly working cohesively and finding 
common ground within these alliances. However, the very fact that coordination 
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resulted outside of the UNFCCC suggests that Pacific states find it difficult to 
come together within the UNFCCC. As RMI Foreign Affairs Minister Tony de 
Brum stated: ‘Small Pacific states sometimes find other avenues much easier to 
engage with, because of the practical and psychological barriers to accessing the 
United Nations talks’ (ABC News 2014).
In the pursuit of achieving their individual country agendas, PICs are forging 
new alliances and their active participation in these climate clubs, aside from 
affecting Pacific cohesion, could have other serious implications. One  such 
implication is that of ‘forum shopping’. As defined by Eritsland (2012), 
forum shopping is ‘the strategic selection of favourable venues from a menu 
of alternative  governance arrangements, but also withdrawal from old and 
creation of new arrangements’. As these forums and alliances are relatively 
new, they rarely contain established rules of conduct. This could lead to 
uneven power dynamics, resulting in larger states negatively influencing and 
unfairly dominating priorities and diluting the focus interest of the smaller 
states. This  was  evident, for example, when Australia pulled out of the 
Cartagena Dialogue in 2013 as a change in government resulted in a change in 
its climate policy.
These new developments could also endanger the central role that the UNFCCC 
plays in establishing a legally binding agreement that includes all developed 
and developing nations, as countries may choose to continue working within 
alternative groups that better suit their interests. This may lead to less ambitious 
emission targets than would have otherwise been achieved had the UNFCCC 
remained the central forum for debate. There is a need to not only draw links 
between these new extensions, but to recognise the increasing role that these 
structures may have in furthering or detracting from the main debate. Amongst 
other possible solutions, this may involve states reporting developments in 
these forums to the UNFCCC. However, with all states, particularly small Pacific 
states, already overwhelmed with reporting to the UNFCCC on existing issues, 
this process may need a regional solution.
Coordinating a Pacific Response
As the PSIDS make attempts to bridge their relations at the international level, 
regional efforts to feed into this process are equally important for Pacific cohesion 
on the climate change agenda. As stated by President Anote Tong (2012): ‘As we 
focus our attention on our relations beyond our region, we need also to look at 
how we relate with each other within our region. There can be no doubt that 
there is greater strength in regional solidarity.’ Since the introduction of the 
climate change issue to the Pacific region at the Pacific Forum leaders meeting 
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held in Rarotonga in 1991, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) was charged with 
regional coordination of efforts to help PICs to find solutions to combat and cope 
with the negative effects of climate change. Under the theme ‘Environmental 
Issues’, and in later years under ‘Climate Change’, this has been an agenda item 
in the annual leaders’ communiqué. 
In 2005, at the Pacific Islands Forum in PNG, the Pacific leaders agreed 
on developing the Pacific Plan as a framework for strengthening regional 
cooperation and integration. The Pacific Plan has since undergone a major review 
and been replaced by the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. The framework 
is intended to support focused political conversations and settlements that 
address key strategic issues, including shared sovereignty, pooling of resources, 
and delegation of decision-making. Rather than providing a list of regional 
priorities, it seeks to set out a robust process through which regional priorities 
will be identified and implemented.
The annual leaders’ communiqué is essentially a to-do list for the region to 
implement. The communiqué drives the actions, and the vehicles for the 
implementation of these actions are the Council of Regional Organisations in the 
Pacific (CROP) organisations, which have their own governing councils, and the 
Pacific Islands states themselves, through their national plans and strategies. 
Since 2010, these actions have largely focused on strengthening access to, 
and management of, climate change financial resources for member countries. 
The emphasis has been on accessing international climate change financing and 
facilitating improved management of these resources at the national level. 
The issue of climate change has gained deep and wide traction within Pacific 
societies. National governments, non-state actors, regional and inter-regional 
bodies, schools, and businesses have ramped up the rhetoric for advocacy. 
The rhetoric has touched the hearts of the leaders and this is reflected in their 
adoption of the Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership on 5 September 
2013. In a concise and focused way, the declaration captures the Pacific’s 
political commitment to be a region of climate leaders and to spark a ‘new wave 
of climate leadership’ that can deliver a safe climate future for all. In this 
declaration, Pacific leaders (with the exception of Fiji, which was suspended 
from the forum in 2009 and has not yet rejoined, despite it meeting the criteria 
for doing so) are committed to take on the role of climate leaders for Pacific 
Island Forum states in a bid to set targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, as has been seen in previous forum communiqués, there 
can sometimes be a disconnect in the messages coming from the forum leaders at 
a regional level and their actions at the international level. For example, in the 
lead up to the development of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Pacific lobbied at 
an international level for targets to reduce emissions. However, in the same year, 
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the Pacific Islands Forum leaders statement was toned down to non-committal 
language — ‘recognition of climate change impacts’ — and urged participants 
to be forthcoming on emissions targets. 
The watering down of the communiqué text on climate change points to the 
immense influence that Australia and New Zealand have on forum outcomes, 
diluting the Pacific’s message on climate change. Regional efforts on climate have 
been greatly hampered by Australia’s insensitivity to Pacific concerns. At the 
2009 Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting, the following comments were made 
by Seni Nabou, a leading Fijian advocate for climate change: 
The Forum Communiqué comes as a slap in the face for the Pacific leaders who 
went into the PIF calling for 45 per cent cuts in greenhouse pollution by 2020. 
Today they leave agreeing to 50  per  cent cuts by 2050. They went in with a 
strong position that global warming needs to be kept below 1.5 degrees, and 
finished up agreeing to 2 degrees (Rowell 2009). 
This occurred because of the leaders buckling to pressure by Australia. 
Speaking at the RMI’s mission in New York in September 2014, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Tony de Brum said that he and leaders of other PICs were bewildered 
by ‘backsliding’ on climate change by Australia, whom the region considers as 
a ‘big brother down south’. This was a response to the Abbott Government’s 
abolition of the carbon tax, and defunding of scientific and advisory bodies 
for climate change research. Minister de Brum said that PICs felt abandoned 
in light of this back-pedalling, especially after they had all come together and 
supported Australia’s successful bid for a seat on the Security Council.
The process detailed below shows that the forum leaders’ communiqué 
reflects the regional climate change position that was arrived at after extensive 
discussions. The Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat holds 
the permanent chair of CROP, as mandated by leaders in 1995 and reaffirmed 
in 2004. The CROP executives meeting, which is attended by the CEOs and 
heads of CROP organisations, occurs annually, biannually, or when the need 
arises to discuss pertinent regional issues — climate change is one such issue. 
The outcomes from these meetings are gathered with the outcomes of other 
regional ministerial meetings, councils, committees and working groups and are 
consolidated at the Forum Officials Committee meeting (the governing council 
of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, which is made up of representatives 
from member governments who are tasked with oversight of the secretariat’s 
activities) where recommendations on climate change matters are submitted as 
an agenda item for consideration by the leaders. A climate change position or 
directions on further climate policy development, implementation or reporting 
could form part of the leaders’ communiqué which reports on the decisions at 
the leaders retreat. However, with growing criticism rising over the interference 
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of Australia and New Zealand, it is questionable whether the PIF will still be 
regarded as a forum representing the interests of the Pacific on the climate 
change issue.
While the PIF is the pre-eminent authority in coordinating the climate change 
issue, the Secretariat of the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme 
(SPREP) is mandated to take the lead on environmental issues. Established as 
an independent intergovernmental organisation in 1992, SPREP is the Pacific’s 
central agency responsible for regional climate change policy, programmes 
and projects. SPREP’s role in coordinating a Pacific response to climate 
change is broad-ranging. Apart from providing assistance to its 20 member 
states, including representation at international meetings and coordinating 
the Pacific Climate Change Roundtable (PCCR), it also serves as a conduit for 
disbursement of  climate change funding to PICs, disseminates information 
on climate change, and implements climate change projects in the region 
(Barnett and Campbell 2010). 
There is however, some criticism of SPREP’s preoccupation with implementing 
adaptation actions in the region at the expense of creating Pacific cohesion 
in global negotiations (Barnett and Campbell 2010). The need for the Pacific 
to work together towards common goals within AOSIS in COP processes is 
fundamental, as is overcoming limited capacity and skills to effectively negotiate 
against developed nations. This is a point stressed by the Director General of 
SPREP, David Sheppard, at the SPREP preparatory meeting in the lead up to the 
COP in Durban. In reality, SPREP’s role extends only as far as the provision of 
advisory services and limited capacity development for UNFCCC negotiations, 
and responding to the needs of countries on a request basis. It does not extend 
to aiding Pacific states to find a joint negotiation position. 
Being an issue of regional concern, climate change seems to find its way onto the 
agendas of most regional and sub-regional forums. For example, as diplomacy 
between Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) member states intensifies, so too 
have discussions of climate change, to the point that, in 2012, the MSG met to 
develop its own position on global climate change negotiations (Tarte 2014). 
This was done in part to acknowledge that they needed to hash out differences 
that could cause divisions between them. This points to an alternative important 
step towards building a coherent and cohesive Pacific position to the UNFCCC. 
MSG actions may have shown the way a broader Pacific might arrive at a unified 
stance on climate change — by thrashing out sub-regional differences and 
ultimately coming to an amicable decision.
The Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) has been touted as the institution 
that will further enhance the development of cohesion in Pacific joint positions 
on issues regarding sustainable development and climate change. The notable 
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absence of Australia and New Zealand from PIDF is said to better encourage the 
traditional ‘Pacific Way’ of consultation and discussion (Tarte 2014). With its 
agenda focusing on areas such as green growth, its impact may primarily be 
on implementation within the region. Its inclusiveness of governments, civil 
society, CROP agencies, development partners, and the private sector provides 
the potential for Pacific states to enhance linkages between themselves.
As the climate change issue evolves, understanding the implications of 
overlapping alliances will be central if Pacific states want to continue the 
momentum from PSIDS efforts. This may require further engagement with non-
governmental and civil society groups, and the networks that they can provide. 
For example, Tuvalu’s links with the organisation 350.org demonstrates how 
engagement with such organisations can bring positive attention to a country’s 
cause. Such affiliations can allow for the formation of partnerships that could 
allow Pacific states to better engage with each other at various levels and in 
different forms — such as youth groups, private sector, NGOs, etc.
Conclusion
‘Consultation and consensus’ (Tarte 2014) is the epitome of the ‘Pacific Way’ of 
diplomacy. When threatened by the impacts of climate change, Pacific states 
responded in a similar way to previous times of crisis — they banded together 
and formed alliances with similarly vulnerable states in order to increase their 
ability to appeal to global states’ sense of morality against the common challenge 
of ‘climate change’. 
Climate change is not a single problem, but rather a plethora of intertwined 
challenges with unique ‘attributes, administrative challenges and distinctive 
political constituencies’ mingled with a host of diverse interests from various 
states and non-state actors (Keohane and Victor 2011). 
Perhaps the bottom line for tackling the climate change problem is aptly 
described by Tony de Brum: ‘Climate Diplomacy is most effective when you are 
able to speak to someone else about his or her political and national interests.’ 
(de Brum 2014). Such effectiveness however may come at the cost of Pacific 
cohesion. With the impact of climate change beginning to batter their island 
homes, it is not surprising that Pacific states should want to take advantage of 
every possible opportunity, even if it means doing so without their traditional 
Pacific allies. 
The climate change debate, however, is not limited to the UNFCCC. When PICs 
are not contesting the debate within the UNFCCC, they are finding themselves on 
the frontline of other battles in informal and formal spaces outside the UNFCCC. 
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Stalemates within the UNFCCC, such as occurred with the highly controversial 
Copenhagen Accord, are becoming too common an occurrence. Dissatisfaction 
with the UNFCCC process is leading states to pull away or join parallel forums. 
These new arenas are becoming potentially better alternatives for furthering the 
climate change debate in a manner which is less divisive, more open to actors’ 
self-interests, and progressive enough to allow for experimentation in alternative 
solutions (Fuhr et al. 2011). Desperate for a globally binding agreement by 2015, 
PICs are engaging in these alternative forums and forging new alliances to help 
build momentum toward this goal. 
Enhanced Pacific coordination in forums such as PSIDS in the UN underscores 
the inability of Pacific states to achieve the same within the UNFCCC via AOSIS. 
Regional efforts to improve Pacific coordination within the UNFCCC process 
appear to be limited by several factors. The interference of New Zealand and 
Australia, and the focus on capacity development and regional implementation 
actions in the PIF and SPREP, prevent adequate opportunities to coordinate 
a Pacific response to climate change. However, with recent leadership and 
initiative shown by the MSG in attempting to discuss differences between 
themselves, and the development of the PIDF, there are indicators that there is 
some recognition of the need to develop a better coordinated Pacific response. 
It is glaringly apparent, however, that at present there is no means to develop 
a Pacific position in climate change negotiations leading up to Paris 2015. 
Climate change vulnerability is high on the agenda of all Pacific states. It cannot, 
however, be ignored that the complexity and fragmentation of the UNFCCC is 
having obvious implications for PIC cohesion as PICs break out into various 
clubs in a desperate attempt to tackle different aspects of the climate change 
issue. With the growing literature on the impact of UNFCCC fragmentation 
pointing out that this may lead to more effective climate change actions, 
including better avenues for achieving long term emissions reduction, the 
question that needs to be answered is: ‘Is Pacific cohesion really necessary to 
achieve a global commitment to climate change action that addresses Pacific 
interests and priorities?’ 
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Establishing a Pacific Voice in 
the Climate Change Negotiations
George Carter
When asked about the greatest challenge to global climate change negotiations 
at the United Nations Third Small Islands Developing States Conference in 
2014, the leaders of three Pacific Island states expressed similar sentiments. 
Enele Sopoaga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, said that ‘Pacific negotiators need 
to be in sync at the UNFCCC’; Tony de Brum, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Marshall Islands, asserted that ‘there has been a failure of traditional diplomacy 
at the UN  …  we need a new brand of diplomacy  …  one voice diplomacy’; 
and President Anote Tong of Kiribati argued ‘we need to establish alliances 
that are non-traditional, that serve our best interest’. These responses echo 
the frustration of Pacific leaders at the state of current negotiations as they 
prepare for the Conference of the Parties (COPs) in Paris, 2015. The COPs 2015 
is especially significant as it attempts to produce a new global climate change 
action agreement for post-2020. 
For almost 25  years, the global climate change regime has been an arena of 
complex and multifaceted diplomacy involving seemingly endless negotiations 
on a wide range of issues with a plethora of actors (state, civil society and private 
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businesses).1 The climate regime is based on the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which commits its 196 state parties to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Despite the various negotiation impasses, the constant contact of negotiators 
has allowed for innovative forms of climate diplomacy. An important aspect 
of climate diplomacy, and a complementary bargaining tool to a state’s climate 
policy position, are the political groupings or interstate coalitions to which 
they belong. As reflected in the above responses, Pacific leaders are increasingly 
placing a strong emphasis on Pacific coalitions or political groupings as a means 
to accentuate a Pacific voice in the climate change regime at the global level.
This chapter explores the work of Pacific Island states in establishing a Pacific 
voice at global climate change negotiations. It seeks to draw out several trends 
in the academic literature relevant to Pacific states’ participation in the UNFCCC, 
through interstate coalitions. For the student of Pacific diplomatic studies and 
international relations, the general literature is disappointing in its lack of 
attention to the Pacific Islands experience. To paraphrase Carsten Holbraad, 
the Pacific Islands have always been objects of international relations theory 
building, and never the subjects of analysis (Holbraad 1971, p. 78). In piecing 
together the trends and behaviour of Pacific state participation through 
coalitions, a student of diplomatic studies finds not only the employment of 
innovative tools of diplomacy, but also exciting avenues of future empirical 
research. 
There are many coalitions with which the 14 Pacific Island states that are party 
to the convention are associated.2 While it is the prerogative of a state to be 
associated with any grouping, this raises two important questions. Firstly, 
why is it important for Pacific states to join coalitions? Secondly, what is the 
advantage gained from joining multiple coalitions in the regime? This paper will 
address these questions in three parts. The first part of this paper will outline 
why coalition blocs are an integral part of the climate change regime. The second 
part will provide an overview of the various blocs with which Pacific states 
are associated. Finally, the paper will focus on the benefits of joining multiple 
coalition blocs for Pacific Island states. 
1  On average, over 7,000 country delegates and 4,000 media representatives attend the COPs. In smaller 
negotiations during the year there are on average 2,000 participants. These figures do not include the various 
UN agencies staff. Over 1,500 observer organisations have been registered for accreditation in the negotiations.
2  The 14 Pacific Islands states that are party to the UNFCCC are: Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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Coalition Diplomacy in the Climate 
Change Regime
Coalition Diplomacy Literature
The study of coalitions has high theoretical and practical significance for the 
discipline of international relations. Its theoretical contributions have critical 
impact on the stability (or otherwise) of the international system (Narlikar 2003, 
p. 1 2). There already exists a vast amount of scholarship devoted to analysing 
the implications of multipolar versus bipolar alliance structures and coalitions 
of the willing, of war and peace.3 More importantly, the policy significance 
of interstate coalitions lies in the fact that they provide opportunities for 
member countries. As Christophe DuPont argues, there are two core functions 
of coalitions. Firstly, coalitions function as a means for maximising bargaining 
power for its members (Dupont 1996, p. 49). Secondly, coalitions function as a 
means for managing complexity of processes and issues within a regime where 
a common platform that incorporates the minimal demands of each coalition 
member is easier to handle and negotiate than the sum of individual items 
(Dupont 1996, p. 49). These two core functions are especially important for 
small countries with limited negotiation resources and political clout in climate 
negotiations, such as Pacific Island countries.
Although considered to be a significant part of the UNFCCC regime, coalitions 
are relatively understudied. Coalitions are mentioned briefly in the neoliberal 
regime literature by academic negotiators such as a Yamin and Depledge (2004) 
and Depledge (2005). Within the burgeoning area of global environmental 
politics, the focus of research has mainly been on individual state bargaining, 
asymmetrical power relations of states (polluters), and non-Annex I states 
(Bailer  2012), especially theorising conditions for a global climate change 
agreement. At best, the limited literature available compares the strategies of 
climate coalitions with those in the areas of trade, the international criminal 
court (Wallbott and Deitelhoff 2012), or coalitions of epistemic communities 
and non-government organisations (NGOs) (Gough and Shackley 2001). Recent 
studies on the issue of climate justice (Audet 2013) and the emergence of 
post-Kyoto coalition blocs (Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2014) emphasise a complex 
landscape of political coalitions within the regime. 
Only a handful of studies highlight the work of Pacific state participation in 
coalitions of the UNFCCC, but these studies are primarily focused on the broader 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Ashe et al. (1999), Chasek (2005) and 
Betzold (2010), for example, have analysed the influence of AOSIS, especially 
3  See the work in alliance and coalition theories by Waltz (1979), Walt (1987), Morgenthau (2003), 
Snyder (1997), and Sheehan (1996). 
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regarding agenda setting in the early days of the regime. A more recent paper 
by Betzold, which highlights intra-bloc diplomacy, finds that although AOSIS 
continues to function as a group, incidents of internal disagreements have 
prompted a questioning of its cohesiveness (Betzold et al. 2012). While this body 
of work on AOSIS is useful in producing some insights into the work of Pacific 
Island states in negotiations, it does not fully uncover the internal politics of 
the group. Most importantly for our purposes here, the perspectives of Pacific 
negotiators are hidden by the strong leadership voice of Caribbean countries. 
Coalitions in UNFCCC
Coalitions are an integral part of the climate change regime, as it would be 
logistically impossible to conduct negotiations among the 196 individual 
country delegations. The existence of coalitions, some of which speak with a 
common voice, helps to streamline the negotiation process and transaction costs 
(Gupta 2000, p. 34). Their very presence leads to a dual structure in the climate 
change regime: issues are negotiated at the coalition level first, before common 
positions are presented in a COPs and Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) meeting. These 
coalitions inadvertently become clearinghouses or filters for key positions and 
rallying support for major submissions. 
Despite the prominence accorded to the work of the coalitions by the parties 
themselves, there are no hard and fast rules or formal processes for establishing 
a negotiation coalition. States may simply decide to do so, and then usually 
notify the COPs bureau, SBs, or secretariat of their actions (Gupta 2000, p. 35). 
Without a registry of blocs, the precarious ad hoc nature of these arrangements 
makes the tracking of coalitions difficult. The well-known coalitions document 
their existence through plenary statements, submissions, media releases and 
engagement in public debate. Those coalitions that are not well documented, on 
the other hand, are often involved in secret side-door or back-room negotiations. 
Although such coalitions are widely known and can be useful, they can also be 
detrimental, as evidenced by the Copenhagen COP 15, where secret dealings 
changed and derailed negotiations.4
Coalition blocs are intrinsic to the climate change regime, with UNFCCC article 
3 dividing the 195 Parties into two major camps: Annex I countries (developed 
countries) and non-Annex I countries (developing countries). In recognising 
that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels 
of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years 
of industrial activity, the protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations 
under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (UNFCCC n.d.). 
This north–south divide, also referred to as ‘the firewall’, becomes the basis 
upon which political groupings are formed.
4  See the work on new political groupings in UNFCCC since Copenhagen 2009 in Blaxekjær and Nielsen (2004).
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Pacific States in UNFCCC Coalitions
There are 21 coalition blocs that have actively participated in the climate change 
regime. The membership of states within these blocs is varied. Some blocs comprise 
only Annex I countries or non-Annex I countries, while others include both. Of the 
21 coalition blocs, there are six blocs associated with one or more Pacific parties. 
As climate change negotiations progress with little action improving the situation 
for Pacific states, Pacific leaders are responding by creating new Pacific blocs in 
an attempt to create a united Pacific voice in the hope of affecting real change in 
global climate change negotiations. This section will provide a brief outline of the 
six traditional coalition blocs of which Pacific states are currently members before 
discussing the emergence of new Pacific blocs. 
Table 17.1: Coalition Blocs in UNFCCC Negotiations
Annex I non-Annex I Both Annex I and non-Annex I
Economies In 
Transition (EIG)








Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 
America (ALBA)
Durban Alliance (DA)
Central American Integration System (SICA)
Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova (CACAM)
Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN)
League of Arab States (LAS)
Least Developed Countries (LDC)
G77 and China (G77)
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)
Brazil, China, South Africa, India (BASIC)
Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)
Mountains Landlocked Developing Countries 
(MLDC)
Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)
Association of Independent Latin American and 
Caribbean Countries (AILAC)
Note: The coalitions which some or all of the 14 Pacific states are involved with appear as underlined.
Source: The list is attributed to research by Blaxekjær and Nielsen (2004) which focuses on coalitions 
that arose after COPs Copenhagen 2009. 
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G77 and China
Founded in 1964, in the context of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
G77 and China has been active since the early days of the convention. Of 
the 134 members in the group, 10 are from the Pacific: Fiji, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
The membership dynamics of the group are diverse, ranging from vulnerable 
small island states, least developing countries, and oil exporting countries, to 
large and middle income nations, each with differing interests on climate change 
issues. Despite this, the G77 remains the most important and powerful coalition. 
The group develops common positions on substantive issues by consensus: 
if there is no consensus, there is no position. The chair of the group is the first 
to take the floor in the main negotiations and presents the common positions. 
The role of chair rotates annually and although it is a highly respected position, 
not all countries feel able or willing to take it on due to the economic and 
institutional resources required, the difficulty of bringing members to a common 
position, and the fact that the G77 chair may have to stand against some powerful 
countries, which could trigger wider political repercussions (Gupta 2000, p. 36). 
While countries such as Papua New Guinea and Samoa chaired G77 subsidiary 
bodies, the landmark year for Pacific leadership in the group came in the form 
of Fiji’s chairmanship of the whole G77 in 2013.
Least Developed Countries
The Least Developed Countries (LDC) bloc was formed in 1971 as an offshoot 
from a UN categorisation of countries. Of the 48 countries in this group, only 
Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Vanuatu are from the Pacific. (Samoa left 
the group following its LDC graduation in 2014).
The bloc has become increasingly active in the climate change process, often 
working to defend its particular interests — with regard to vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate change, for example (UNFCCC n.d.). The bloc works together 
at the intergovernmental negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change with two aims. The first is to demand that wealthier nations 
act in accordance with their responsibility for creating the problem and their 
capability for addressing it. The second aim is to play a leadership role in 
global efforts to prevent dangerous climate change (Least Developing Countries 
Group n.d.).
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Alliance of Small Island States
Established in 1990, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has and continues 
to be the premier bloc in the formal negotiations with close resonance to Pacific 
Island needs. It comprises 44 small island states and low-lying coastal states 
that are highly vulnerable to climate change. All 14 Pacific Island countries are 
part of the coalition, with American Samoa and Guam having observer status. 
Although the diverse membership of AOSIS derives from the Pacific, Caribbean 
and Indian Oceans, they are united by the common immediate threat posed to 
their survival by climate change.
The bloc proved instrumental in shaping the regime when it prepared the 
original draft of the Kyoto Protocol, advocating for 20 per cent cuts in carbon 
dioxide emissions from 1990 levels by 2005. Famously quoted as the ‘moral 
conscience’ of the negotiations, the ad hoc lobby group gives voice to the Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) on environmental matters and climate change 
threats. The bloc is the main focal point for many Pacific negotiators in terms 
of technical resource and capacity support. Its ambassadors in New York meet 
periodically throughout the year to be apprised on positions, but key discussions 
occur in the weeks prior to and during the negotiations. One of the most notable 
contributions of the bloc has been successful lobbying for SIDS as special case 
in the Rio Summit of 1992 that led to the establishment of the SIDS conferences.
Coalition of Rainforest Nations
The Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) was founded in 2004 and brings 
together tropical rainforest developing countries to collaboratively reconcile 
forest stewardship with economic development. Of the 41 members, Fiji, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea are drawn from the Pacific.
The coalition operates as a forum to facilitate consensus among participating 
countries on issues related to the domestic and international frameworks 
for rainforest management, biodiversity conservation, and climate stability. 
The work of the bloc has been instrumental in the establishment of the Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) program, which 
was vigorously negotiated as the Bali Action Plan. The success of the REDD 
program owes much to the tactical plea of Papua New Guinea Prime Minister 
Michael Somare and Papua New Guinea Special Envoy Kevin Conrad in the Bali 
COPs of 2007. The breakthrough moment when Kevin Conrad called out to the 
United States, ‘If you’re not willing to lead, then get out of the way’, has been 
described as ‘the mice that roared’ incident (von videoarchitekt 2007).
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Climate Vulnerable Forum
The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), founded a month before COPs Copenhagen 
in 2009, is an international partnership of countries highly vulnerable to a 
warming planet. The forum is premised on the idea of a south–south cooperation 
platform for participating governments to act together to deal with global 
climate change (Climate Vulnerable Forum n.d.). Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
are within its 20-member country grouping. 
The forum of highly vulnerable developing countries argues that they are 
already experiencing the negative effects of climate change. In 2010, Kiribati 
was the chair of the CVF and hosted the Tarawa Climate Change Conference, 
which was instrumental in bringing together Pacific states and their major 
development partners to sign the Ambo Declaration. The 12 signatories to 
this declaration were Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, the Republic of the 
Maldives, Cuba, Brazil, Fiji, Japan, China, the Marshall Islands, New Zealand 
and Australia (Packard 2010).
Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action
Established in 2010, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (Cartagena 
Dialogue) was formed after the breakdown of the Copenhagen COPs, recognising 
the need to rebuild trust between developed and developing countries. The 
group continues to meet outside formal UNFCCC negotiations. While its members 
claim that it is not a political bloc, the dialogue provides a platform for delegates 
from developed and developing countries to have frank discussion to better 
understand each other’s positions and find areas of possible middle ground. 
This fluid membership is useful, as developing countries apparently find it 
difficult to be too closely associated with developed countries in negotiations 
due to formal group memberships and a sense of loyalty to G77 (Blaxekjær and 
Nielsen 2014, p. 4). Of the countries involved in the dialogue, only Samoa and 
Marshall Islands have been actively involved. The 2014 Cartagena Dialogue was 
held in Marshall Islands and focused on opportunities to break the international 
deadlock and find common position for a 2015 binding agreement (Islands 
Business 2014).
The Emergence of ‘Pacific’ Coalitions
In the past five years, there have been new developments in the political 
landscape of coalition blocs in relation to the Pacific Island countries. While the 
six groups described above appear to remain cohesive and functioning, new 
groupings have emerged due to intra-bloc disagreements. As one lead negotiator 
states, the traditional blocs ‘have not been sufficient in addressing our Pacific 
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needs … the particular issues of coral islands nations are drowned amongst the 
bigger tropical rainforest, harbour and oil-producing nations’ (Pacific negotiator 
2014). These groupings exist on the fringes of the six traditional blocs, and strive 
to provide a more powerful voice for the Pacific in negotiations. The two new 
Pacific climate change blocs are Pacific SIDS and the Coalition of Atoll Nations.
Pacific SIDS
The advent of the Pacific SIDS (PSIDS) group in the climate regime is arguably 
a natural progression. PSIDS is a consortium of ambassadors of the 12 Pacific 
embassies based in New York, whose work encompasses the major thematic 
areas of the UN. The group was once the Pacific Islands Forum contact group in 
New York, however, in a show of solidarity towards Fiji, it continued its work 
with less Australian and New Zealand influence. Since 2007, PSIDS has grown 
organically to be the main Pacific grouping whose work encompasses the major 
thematic areas of the UN. While it is not clear when the group officially became 
involved in the climate debate, the first submission by the group to a Subsidiary 
Body meeting came in 2009 (just before Copenhagen). Since then, the PSIDS 
has been a clearing house for key joint positions of the Pacific states for AOSIS 
and subsequently for G77. According to one negotiator, there is an increasing 
feeling amongst Pacific leaders that PSIDS should become more vocal as a bloc 
in the regime (Pacific negotiator 2014). 
Coalition of Atoll Nations on the issue of Climate Change
In July 2014, a new grouping was formed by ‘front-line states’ out of further 
frustration with the results of negotiations. The Coalition of Atoll Nations on 
the issue of Climate Change (CANCC) was the initiative of President Anote 
Tong. It comprises four atoll nations: Kiribati, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, and the 
Maldives from the Indian Ocean. Their positions revolve around the rhetoric 
of atoll nations being in the frontline of the impacts of climate change and 
who consider themselves as the early warning system for the rest of the world. 
As one negotiator argued: ‘Time after time, coral atoll nations have supported 
the work of the blocs, [but] because of our small populations (and bureaucratic 
incapacities) we are continually left out of climate financing initiatives and have 
to be content with only small pilot projects’ (Pacific negotiator 2014). The group 
remains committed to pushing legally binding agreements and ambitious targets 
at the global level, and for easier access to resources for the ‘smallest of small 
island nations’. The ultimate goal of the group is for UN special recognition in 
the convention for coral atoll nations (as in the case of AOSIS pursuing SIDS as 
a special case).
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Benefits from Coalition Diplomacy
The continued involvement of Pacific states in various coalition blocs and the 
growth of new groupings is testament to growing Pacific agency within the 
regime. Notwithstanding the work of individual country delegations, association 
with the blocs has not only empowered their positions, but has developed 
their diplomatic finesse. The many diplomacy lessons and benefits that can be 
derived include access to a wide network of negotiators, development in climate 
leadership, and engagement in climate public diplomacy. 
Negotiators Network/Service
Through associations with these groupings in a year-long calendar of 
negotiations, it is only natural that a network of negotiators is established. 
The typical Pacific negotiator is no longer someone from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Coalitions are able to bring together a plethora of interested and needed 
actors from country delegations (including prime ministers, ambassadors, 
ministries of foreign affairs, environment and other national agency officials), 
scientists, regional organisation officials (such as Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, and 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat), environmental NGOS, international lawyers 
(such as the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development), 
academics, and media. As a result, Pacific delegates are able to talk ‘climate 
speak’ fluently in the big negotiations (Betzold 2010, p. 141).
This constant contact of members can easily be mistaken for a global foreign 
service of negotiators. Armed with countless emails of text drafts and issue 
papers, they travel from the Pacific Islands to Bonn (for the SBs) and then to some 
metropolitan city (for the COPs), while their base remains at the UN headquarters 
in New York. The daily dialogue, bargaining, and instructions on procedural 
matters are delivered from ambassadors in New York. It is now common practice 
for each country to have at least one or two permanent negotiators (other than 
the ambassador) focused on climate change. Institutional knowledge is key, and 
rotation of personnel is thus not only a step back for a country, but also for 
coalitions. 
To enhance the capacity of country and lead coalition negotiators, the groups 
have funded private firms that specialise in multilateral negotiations. The G77, 
LDC, CfRN and AOSIS groupings have all facilitated research, assembled advisory 
capacity, undertaken policy development, coordinated economic and technical 
regulatory frameworks, and overseen implementation. While the annual work 
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of negotiators may be entrenched in what Chasek and Rajamani (2003, p. 257) 
call ‘text diplomacy’, they are unconsciously creating both a diplomatic culture 
and a network of Pacific negotiators.
Climate (Diplomatic) Leadership
A defining theme that resonates through the blocs is the attention to climate 
leadership. The concept of climate leadership evokes a call to immediate action 
to address the complex issues surrounding climate change by charting a course 
through global agreement. To paraphrase a top UNFCCC official, climate change 
is a challenge for all peoples and generations, and it calls on leaders to lead by 
example and leave a legacy for future generations (Figueres 2014). 
While the concept has been a fundamental message in the rhetoric of Pacific 
leaders since the convention was established, their participation in the blocs 
has enabled them to influence global consciousness. Pacific statesmen and 
ambassadors have been chairs of various blocs — such as Vanuatu’s Robert 
van Lierop, Samoa’s Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga, Nauru’s 
Marlene Moses (for AOSIS), Papua New Guinea’s Michael Somare, Kevin Conrad 
and Robert Aisi for the CfRN, and most recently Fiji’s Ratu Inoke Kubuabola 
and Peter Thomson for the G77 Plus China. Although individual chairs have 
brought a unique style of leadership to the coalitions, it is undeniable that the 
increased participation of Pacific leaders in the coveted role of chair has instilled 
in the groupings, and the regime as a whole, more attention to the vulnerability 
of the Pacific Island states.
In line with recent developments of Pacific-only negotiating blocs, there has 
been a flurry of shuttle diplomacy within the region. With the impending 
demand for a new agreement in Paris in 2015, Pacific leaders have sought to 
increase regional and global awareness by lobbying in, and through, multiple 
arenas. Pacific leaders had no hesitation in raising climate change as a key issue in 
dialogues with President Francois Hollande of France, Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi of India, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, during their visits to the Pacific 
in 2014. At the UN Third SIDS 2014 meeting, Pacific leaders made sure that 
they negotiated to have the issue enshrined in the S.A.M.O.A Pathway outcome 
document (UN 2014), and urged the 4,500 participating representatives — from 
government, business, NGO, and epistemic organisations — to contribute to 
a legally binding agreement in Paris. 
The Marshall Islands hosted the Cartagena Dialogue in 2014 and the PIF leaders 
summit in 2013, both important forums that brought leaders, negotiators and 
scientists to witness the impact of climate change first hand in the ‘frontline 
states’. ‘It was my first time on an atoll’, stated Swedish Climate Change 
Ambassador, Anna Lindstedt. ‘It was an eye-opener. It’s not until you see it 
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for yourself that you understand the situation (of islands)’ (Johnson 2014). 
The Majuro Declaration of Climate Leadership, the first document of its type, 
which attempts to encourage Pacific forum leaders and post-dialogue partners to 
list specific commitments on greenhouse gas emissions, was a key document in 
both the Forum Leaders Summit and the Cartagena meeting. Called the ‘Pacific 
gift’ to the world by Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Tony de Brum, the 
declaration is a draft of the Pacific region’s commitments that is intended to 
be a platform for an upward spiral of action to urgently address reduction of 
greenhouse gases.
Climate Public Diplomacy
Beyond the lobbying in multilateral meetings, dialogues, and, in some cases, in 
airport and hotel lounges, the coalitions have acknowledged the need to reach 
out to citizens. With the advent of new information technology allowing mass 
communication, many individuals and interested groups have become more 
connected than ever to the progress of the negotiations. Rather than relying on 
traditional media to communicate their messages, the blocs have utilised public 
diplomacy tools to better inform a global audience. 
E-diplomacy tools have allowed Pacific parties to become more innovative in 
their diplomacy. The six main blocs each have comprehensive and lively websites 
that publicise current news, meetings, partnership information, podcasts, and 
negotiating positions on particular issues. They hold a wealth of information, 
with archival documents from speeches, position papers, and country reports. 
Social media, through Facebook, YouTube and Twitter accounts, has facilitated 
dialogue with a global audience. The Twitter accounts of Marlene Moses 
(the Nauruan ambassador and former chair of AOSIS), Tony De Brum, the LDC 
chair, and G77 chair have a combined following in excess of 15,000. The tools of 
e-diplomacy have also been used to support the civil society climate activism of 
such organisations as 350.org, Pacific 350, and Peoples Climate March (Visenten 
2014). And who can forget Kathy Jetnil-Kijine, the Marshallese poet who 
brought world leaders to tears at the UN Climate Summit, who now has more 
than 500,000 views on YouTube?
A further development in the role of e-diplomacy is the use of contracted 
professional negotiation and public relation firms. Experts in public relations 
have trained coalition members, and some have been placed as short-term 
contracted spokespersons, to ensure coalition members are able to communicate 
effectively to the global media. Public relations firms have ensured that various 
coalition key positions are communicated in both traditional and social media 
forms in a timely and effective manner. A notable firm within the negotiator 
circles is the Independent Diplomat, used by the Republic of Marshall Islands, 
AOSIS, and the Cartagena Group. This group of independent former diplomats, 
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international lawyers, and international relations experts has been associated 
with the blocs since 2009, providing diplomatic support, advice and technical 
assistance on the ‘legal form’ for the post-2012 climate regime, including the 
future of the Kyoto Protocol.
Conclusion
Despite the importance of coalitions in climate change negotiations, there 
remains a lacuna in the literature on coalition-building and coalition diplomacy 
in the regime more broadly. More importantly, there is little empirical research 
on the diplomacy of Pacific states in these coalitions and the regime, despite their 
being among the states that are the most vulnerable, sensitive, and susceptible 
to the effects of climate change. While this chapter is purely conceptual in 
highlighting the literature and trends of Pacific state participation in UNFCCC 
coalitions thus far, it emphasises the potential, and the need, for students 
of diplomatic studies to research the phenomenon. One such area for future 
empirical work is exploring the intra-coalition politics of Pacific states and their 
coalition allies. 
It is undeniable that the global political landscape of coalition blocs is complex, 
adding to an already complex climate change regime. The two decade-long 
regime has evolved and become more complex, with more actors and issues. 
In respect of the diplomacy of interstate coalitions, this chapter argues that, as 
climate change negotiations have evolved and processes matured, so too have 
the diplomatic capabilities of Pacific states. 
According to Dupont, coalition blocs function to allow states to manage the 
complex regime and to maximise their power. They function as a clearinghouse 
for common positions with parties with similar economic development 
concerns, and provide a space for dialogue with developed countries, and, 
more importantly, to highlight small islands development needs. By joining 
coalitions, Pacific states have become better equipped to navigate the regime, 
giving them a louder voice to affirm their vulnerabilities, and build resilience to 
climate change. The coalitions have empowered Pacific states and their leaders 
in their diplomatic finesse by providing access to a wide network of negotiators, 
the capability to employ climate leadership, and the utility of public diplomacy 
tools to inform their citizens and a wider global audience on climate issues. 
However, frustrations remain, and the increasing rhetoric has been that the 
regime and blocs have not delivered on Pacific-specific and coral atoll nation 
needs. This in turn has motivated Pacific leaders to create new vehicles, such 
as the PSIDS, to bring a united Pacific voice to the fore in climate change 
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negotiations. The emergence of Pacific blocs can therefore be seen as a natural 
progression in the global dialogue on climate change, as Pacific states develop 
their capacity and capability as agents of change. The participation of Pacific 
states in wider coalitions, and the formation of their own, is striking evidence 
of the new Pacific diplomacy, driven in this case by the urgency of the issue in 
the Pacific Islands — where it is one of survival — and by the wide divergence 
between the climate change positions of the forum island states and those of 
Australia and New Zealand. Although the emergence of the PSIDS and CANCC 
is at the fringes of UNFCCC attempts to address these concerns, only time will 
tell if these blocs become a force to be reckoned with in climate negotiations.
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This chapter examines how tuna has shaped regional politics and influenced 
the relationship between the Pacific Island states and two of the world’s largest 
trading blocs, the United States and the European Union (EU). This relationship 
has come under stress in recent years because of the development of 
arrangements such as the purse seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS),1 the emergence 
of regional alliances such as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) grouping 
of countries, and because of the strong desire of the Pacific Island states to 
control their tuna fisheries and maximise their share of the economic benefits 
flowing from the exploitation of their tuna resources.
The geopolitical underpinnings of the region’s tuna management provide an 
interesting backdrop to this analysis. All of the world’s major trading states are 
involved in this fishery — Japan, Korea, the United States, the EU, and China. 
Japan has the longest presence in the region’s tuna fishery. More recently, 
China  has become a major force in the longline fishery. The region’s tuna 
1  The VDS is a management measure that sets a limit on the number of days purse seine vessels are allowed 
to fish in the waters of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) group of countries and Tokelau. The days 
are allocated to each party, who then charge fishing companies/vessels for each day they fish.
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resources have become a key focal point for the prosecution of the strategic 
geopolitical interests of these powers. Access to the region’s tuna resources 
allows them a physical presence over a large geographic area of the Pacific, 
from which they can pursue their strategic interests. The analysis presented 
here, however, focuses on fisheries relations between the Pacific Island states, 
the United States and the EU. 
This chapter argues that there is a multiplicity of strategic interests that 
underlie the management of the region’s tuna resources. These are often inimical 
to the interests of the Pacific Island states who want secured rights to their 
tuna resources. However, it is often assumed that this leads to the Pacific Island 
states having a shared interest, and that a regional framework fits the strategic 
and political aspirations of individual states. This is not necessarily the case. 
It is argued that the regional configuration and architecture has changed, and 
that Pacific Island states have a diverse range of strategic interests that are not 
often amenable to a common approach to their relations with external fishing 
interests.
These differences are manifested not only in Pacific Island states’ relations 
with external fishing states but also their relations with each other. They also 
explain the difficulties in accommodating the interests of Pacific Island states 
in current negotiations to extend the Treaty on Fisheries with the United 
States and conclude a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 
with the EU. The conclusion is drawn that regional fisheries interests are not 
homogenous; these interests are not necessarily shared, and these differences 
have informed the evolution of a new Pacific regional tuna architecture that has 
impacted on the shaping of the relations between the Pacific Island states, the 
United States, and the EU.
The Heterogeneous Tuna Fishery: Skipjack, 
albacore, yellowfin, and bigeye
In order to appreciate the impulses that inform the evolution of fisheries 
management arrangements in the region, it is necessary to understand the 
structure and dynamics of the region’s tuna fishery. 
Tuna is a highly migratory resource. It is found in the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) of all the Pacific Island states. However, the abundance and distribution 
of the different tuna species is not shared equally amongst the Pacific Islands. 
The major species of tuna are skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), albacore (Thunnus 
alalunga), yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), and bigeye tuna (Thunnus obsesus). 
The distribution and abundance of these four species have helped shape the 
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cooperative arrangements that have been developed over the past 30  years. 
Skipjack, for instance, is found mainly in the equatorial waters of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Tokelau. These countries are colloquially 
known as the Nauru Group. They have used their common interest in skipjack, 
which is targeted by purse seiners, to establish their own regional arrangements. 
Albacore tuna tend to be caught further south in subtropical and temperate 
waters. This fishery is confined to the waters of countries such as the Cook 
Islands, French Polynesia, Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, New 
Zealand, and Niue. There is also a sizable albacore fishery in Solomon Islands, 
PNG, Tuvalu and the Southern Gilberts, who are members of the Nauru Group. 
The countries where albacore dominates their fishery have formed the Tokelau 
Arrangement — a coalition to advocate limits for albacore fishing and to 
maximise economic returns from albacore tuna. There is cross membership 
within these different groups by countries such as Tuvalu and Solomon Islands, 
who are members of both the Nauru Group and the Tokelau Arrangement, 
reflecting the different fisheries in their waters. Albacore tuna also provides 
the backdrop for another species aligned coalition, the Te Vaka Moana Group, 
which consists of Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Tokelau, Cook Islands, New Zealand, 
and Tokelau. This is a New Zealand inspired and funded Polynesian group 
formed around shared interests in albacore tuna; but it is also motivated by a 
shared desire among these countries to cushion the growing influence of the 
Nauru Group. That leaves bigeye and yellowfin tuna, which is a bycatch in the 
skipjack fisheries within the Nauru Group of countries, and to a lesser extent in 
the albacore fishery in the southern Pacific Islands countries, but which is also 
a core target species in the tropical longline fishery which occurs mainly in the 
high seas areas, often adjacent to the EEZs of the Nauru Group 
There is also the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Fisheries Committee. 
This is not a species-focused group, but is aligned around the common trade 
interests of the Melanesia countries of PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and 
the Kanak Independence Movement of New Caledonia. In the main, the MSG 
have explored issues in which they can maximise their involvement in the value 
chain in the various fisheries, including coastal fisheries. This transcends both 
the longline and purse seine fishery. These sub-regional coalitions and alliances 
have been built around a variety of factors, including the geographic range of 
different stocks, the fishery that targets these stocks, and cultural ethnicity 
(in the case of Te Vaka Moana and MSG Fisheries Committee). The effectiveness 
and success of these various groups have varied. While the MSG represents the 
largest demographic group in the region, its fisheries committee is yet to make 
any impact, perhaps reflecting the fact that alliances are better drawn around 
fishing interests. Similarly, the Te Vaka Moana’s influence has been minimal. 
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Some of these alliances are based around policy coordination, advice generation, 
and a forum whereby allocations are set. The efficacy and effectiveness of 
these alliances are dependent on their architecture. Unlike the skipjack Nauru 
Group–affiliated arrangements, the other alliances do not have legally binding 
decision-making regimes, and to some extent this has influenced their efficacy 
in shaping regional tuna politics, in particular, the extent to which they can 
leverage influence.
It is instructive to note that these alliances work within two overarching 
political frameworks, namely the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 
and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). The FFA 
is a coalition embodying all the Pacific Island states but its core functions are 
to coordinate policy advice and provide technical support to the Pacific Island 
countries. It does not manage tuna. The WCPFC is a body initiated by Pacific 
Island Forum leaders to bring compatible governance into high seas areas 
through the establishment of conservation and management measures for tuna 
inside and outside the EEZ, although EEZ measures are applied and adopted by 
the Pacific Island countries pursuant to their sovereign rights. Its membership 
includes the FFA member countries and the major fishing states: France, the 
EU, China, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, Canada, and the 
United States. It is probably best described as a coalition of the unwilling, as it 
provides a forum whereby stakeholders unwillingly cooperate with one another. 
Both organisations provide an effective forum for discussions. 
There are serious limits to the effectiveness of the WCPFC. While it has been 
successful in adopting conservation measures for seabirds and sharks, it has 
been less successful in adopting effective measures for bigeye tuna, which is 
currently subject to overfishing. This is attributable to different interests in the 
organisation which make it difficult to arrive at mutually acceptable outcomes. 
The tuna measures adopted by the WCFC have evolved from PNA initiatives, 
underscoring the role that sub-regional arrangements play in ensuring the 
WCPFC discharges its obligations.
The vacuum that has been created by the WCPFC’s failure to provide an 
effective forum for management of the target tuna species is being filled by 
PNA countries. The influence of the powerful PNA bloc hinges on the leverage 
that it is able to apply through access to member country EEZs. This may be 
explained in part by the catch statistics illustrated in Figure 18.1, which shows 
the catches of four key species. In 2013, 2.62  million metric tonnes (mt) of 
tuna was caught in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Of this, 
the purse seine catch accounted for 1.9 million mt, of which skipjack tuna was 
1.8 million mt, bigeye tuna 150,000 mt, yellowfin 524,000 mt, and albacore tuna 
143,000 mt. About 68 per cent of the skipjack catch is taken from the waters 
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of the PNA waters. This is important, because the proportion and size of the 
skipjack tuna that is taken from the PNA gives them influence, which they have 
been able to leverage against fishing states and the other Pacific Island countries.
Figure 18.1: Total tuna catch WCPO
Source: SPC, Noumea, 2015.
Figure 18.2 illustrates the proportion of catch by gear type. As discussed 
above, some of the alliances formed in the region are related primarily to the 
predominance of gear. Catch by gear is thus dominated by purse seine vessels, 
which are the largest fishery in terms of value and volume of catch, followed by 
longline, pole and line, and others, such as trolling and handlines. It should be 
noted that this data also includes Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Figure 18.2: Total tuna catch by gear
Source: SPC, Noumea, 2015.
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The differences that have emerged in regional tuna diplomacy since the 1976 
forum declaration on the Law of the Sea are a function of a variation in commercial 
interests, and do not necessarily reflect a lack of desire for common action. In the 
mid-to-late 1970s, when the Pacific Island states were gaining independence, 
they had a collective and shared interest in the EEZ regime, as extended 
maritime jurisdiction intertwined with the idea of self-determination. In the 
1980s, when the US fleet fished illegally in the region, the Pacific Island states 
had a common cause: to control US vessels, and support the US in preventing 
the region’s exposure to overtures from the Soviet Union. Thus the Treaty on 
Fisheries was negotiated. With time, changes in dynamics, the development of 
fisheries, and more clearly defined fishing rights, the interests of Pacific Island 
states have diverged and become more narrowly aligned along economic goals 
based on the different fisheries that occur in their EEZs.
References to a common interest in the tuna fishery by the Pacific Islands states 
are not entirely accurate. It is argued that those who advocate a common approach 
to the management of tuna in the Pacific Islands region misunderstand the 
dynamics at play and the different arrangements that underpin the management 
of the different stocks. Nowhere are these differences more pronounced than 
in the negotiations of two regional instruments, the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with the EU and the negotiations to extend the Treaty on 
Fisheries with the United States. 
The Treaty on Fisheries between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States 
and the United States
Differences over the form and shape of the 1987 treaty have emerged in recent 
years because of its rigid structure, subsidisation from the US government, the 
failure of US vessels/industry to pay commercial rates for access, and the difficulty 
of shaping an arrangement that meets all of the stakeholders’ interests. These 
differences have caused friction between the PNA and non-PNA members within 
the FFA, and between the Pacific Island states and the US government. The treaty 
was designed to address a major problem with the US position in the 1970s. 
During the negotiations of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, the US did not accept that highly migratory fish stocks such as tuna could fall 
within the sovereign rights of coastal states. They argued that tuna stocks could 
only be managed internationally. They enforced this interpretation of the law of 
the sea through Magnuson Act embargoes, which they applied to any state that 
arrested US vessels for tuna fishing illegally in their EEZ. Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands were at the receiving end of US sanctions, which caused friction 
between the US and the Pacific Island states in the 1980s.
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In order to resolve this issue, the Treaty on Fisheries was concluded in 1987, 
giving US vessels the right to roam freely throughout the Pacific Islands region 
and catch tuna in return for a fee. Initially, the licences were valid for a period 
of five years. The second and third licensing terms were for 10 years, locking 
in access at a fixed price for 10-year periods. While this provided the US with a 
stable environment for their vessels to operate in the region, it did not give the 
Pacific Island states much flexibility. Tensions began to arise when the PNA VDS 
became fully operational and US fleets were not being subjected to the VDS. 
These tensions were also exacerbated by the way in which the treaty constrained 
the ability of the Pacific Island states to amend their national laws. The treaty 
prohibited the Pacific Island states from adopting national measures if these 
were in conflict with the treaty. There were various tensions at play. There was 
tension between the Pacific Island states and the US because of the Pacific Island 
states’ lack of flexibility to apply national laws in their EEZs without US consent 
if the matter fell within the purview of the treaty. There was tension between 
the Pacific Island states, with the PNA wanting to see the treaty come under the 
VDS. The PNA also wanted US industry to pay commercial market rates for their 
fishing days. The non-PNA countries supported the status quo, as they received 
a proportion of the share of the treaty funds — which the US government paid 
for access for its flagged vessels — and did not want to see their share reduced. 
These issues emerged because the VDS had seen an increase in the value of 
access from other fleets, but there have not been enough funds from the treaty 
to ensure that US industry paid a premium for their multiple zone days. This 
became a source of tension between the PNA and non-PNA countries. These 
tensions largely reflected the different disparate interest groups discussed 
above. The treaty is essentially a purse seine arrangement targeting skipjack 
tuna. Almost all of the efforts of the US fleet occurred in PNA waters, where US 
industry were in effect paying just ten per cent of the regional benchmark for 
regional, as opposed to bilateral, access.
The Treaty on Fisheries, once a symbol of regional cooperative success, has 
become politically divisive, impacting on relations between the US and the 
Pacific Island states, the PNA and non-PNA members, and within the PNA group 
itself. The rigid form and shape of the treaty has made it incompatible with a 
market-based instrument such as VDS, especially where parties are compelled 
to contribute days to allow US vessels to operate in the region. Although the 
treaty’s design was suitable at the time of its signing in 1987, it has begun to 
impact on the effectiveness and efficacy of the VDS. It was inevitable that there 
would be a conflict between stakeholders because of the different interests 
at stake. These difficulties have been somewhat ameliorated as a result of the 
willingness of parties to set aside their differences. Whether they have been 
fully resolved remains to be seen. By June 2013, the treaty had been assimilated 
under the  VDS, but under arrangements in which the PNA were compelled 
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to allocate days to the treaty, rather than voluntarily contribute days based 
on the value of those days. This is a matter of ongoing negotiations with the 
United States, and is the cause of some friction amongst the Pacific Island states. 
The PNA have also been interested in reshaping the treaty to deal directly with 
the US tuna industry, but have been frustrated because the treaty does not allow 
for access to be individually negotiated as commercial arrangements between 
the Pacific Island states and US boat owners.
The Treaty on Fisheries has defined the relations between the US and the Pacific 
Island states, as underscored by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her letter 
to Pacific Island leaders in November 2011: 
Over the past quarter century, the treaty has been the cornerstone of the economic 
and political relationship between our countries. In particular, the treaty has: 
• Provided a foundation for active cooperation for the conservation and 
management of the region’s valuable fisheries resources and related issues, 
including cooperation on fisheries monitoring, surveillance, and enforcement; 
• Supported a vital economic and commercial relationship involving the 
US fishing industry; 
• and provided economic benefits to the Pacific Island parties of approximately 
$450 million over the past 25 years.
The importance of this relationship and the framework that the treaty provides 
for it is not lost on the PNA members and the rest of the Pacific Island states. 
The weight which they give to this broad political and economic relationship, 
however, varies. PNA members view fisheries access as commercial arrangements 
and therefore delink the aid component of the treaty, which is contributed by 
the US State Department as economic assistance and is the subject of a separate 
agreement between the US and the FFA, known as the Economic Assistance 
Agreement. PNA members view US aid and its political and strategic ramifications 
as being separate from the commercial access that US vessels enjoy in their EEZs. 
However, it is clear that there will have to be more flexible arrangements for the 
US industry if there is to be an ongoing relationship between the Pacific Island 
states and the United States. This will have to be defined around the principles 
articulated by the PNA members at their meeting with the United States in 
March 2014. These include: 
• PNA and Tokelau recognise the regional and political importance of the 
treaty and will thus continue to cooperate among themselves in the provision 
of access for US vessels, which is conditional on meeting the needs of their 
domestic fleets and maximising benefits from fishing in their waters.
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• There is a range of interests, needs and opportunities among Pacific Island 
states which must be recognised in any future arrangements for the provision 
of access for US vessels, including, as appropriate, through bilateral and sub-
regional arrangements.
• The value and competition for access to waters where the VDS applies is 
continuing to increase. Fees for US vessels will need to meet the market 
conditions for vessel days in these increasing competitive processes. US vessel 
owners may have to bid for days. 
• Participation in the provision of access for US vessels must be on a voluntary 
basis, and no party should be pressured to provide access.
The non-PNA members have not agreed to these principles. They have disagreed 
on the contribution of fishing days to the treaty and the distribution formulae 
for funds received from the treaty. Even within the PNA, there have been 
disagreements over the distribution formulae for days that are to be contributed 
to the treaty. There have been disagreements between the United States and 
the Pacific Island states over the structure of the treaty. Getting a regional 
arrangement to fit neatly within the different interests at play has not been easy. 
Pacific Island states, the PNA in particular, want greater flexibility. This is simply 
to reflect the range of interests, needs and opportunities among the Pacific Island 
states. While there are a range of regional and sub-regional interests, the general 
approach of the Pacific Island states to management of the purse seine fishery is 
a rights-based approach. These approaches only work when the rights holders 
are able to use or discharge their rights in an unrestricted way according to 
their circumstances. As such, their interests, pushed by the PNA, are to provide 
access opportunities to US vessels in a greater range of forms than in the past.
The Economic Partnership Agreement 
with the EU
The negotiation of the CEPA with the EU has brought out differences within 
the region, which have had implications for the negotiation of a regional trade 
agreement between the Pacific Island states and the European Union. Developing 
a regional comprehensive trade arrangement that reflects all the interests of the 
Pacific Island states has been difficult, especially negotiating an instrument as a 
single region. While the imbalance in the trade interests between countries such 
as PNG and Fiji on the one hand, and Niue, Tuvalu, and Kiribati on the other, 
are obvious, it is the difference in fisheries interests between the PNA, non-
PNA, and the EU that have impacted most on negotiations, reflecting the central 
role of fisheries in the external and internal relations of the Pacific Island states.
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The CEPA purports to establish a trade agreement between the EU and the Pacific 
Island states in place of the development arrangement known as the Cotonou 
Agreement. This supersedes the better known Lomé Convention. Negotiation of 
the new trading arrangements commenced in September 2002 and CEPAs were 
supposed to enter into force by 1 January 2008. Negotiating as a single region 
ignores the differences that divide the Pacific Island states. The differences in 
the fishing and trading interests of the Pacific Island states culminated in a 2007 
split by PNG and Fiji, when they initialled the Interim EPA to avoid disruption to 
market access for their canned tuna and sugar. The Interim EPA was negotiated 
by the Pacific–African, Caribbean and Pacific (PACP) group but the other Pacific 
Island states did not initial the Interim EPA on the grounds that it did not 
address their development needs, insisting instead that all Pacific Island states 
continue to negotiate a development-friendly CEPA that included tuna. 
After the initialling of the Interim EPA, the Pacific Island states and the EU 
decided to explore opportunities to further develop an agreement leading 
towards a comprehensive free trade agreement that would contain provisions 
for investments, services, and intellectual properties.
Differences over the fisheries component of the EPA reflect the different interests 
of the PNA and the non-PNA countries, and processing and non-processing 
countries. PNG had secured global sourcing for HS 1604 and HS 1605 fisheries 
products — cooked and processed products which were of particular interest to 
the PNA members — in the Interim EPA. However, during CEPA negotiations, 
some of the Pacific Island states expressed interest in the export of fish pieces in 
their natural state (HS 0304-0305) and demanded global sourcing opportunities 
for fresh fish products. In return for this access, the EU expressed interest in 
re-securing guaranteed access of five per cent of the total fishing effort under 
the management of the Pacific Island states. Just what five per cent meant and 
where it might be processed has never been explained, but no investment has 
been proposed on account of these proposals.
After the Interim EPA was initialled and ratified, the EU Spanish fishing 
interests started lobbying against the global sourcing given to PNG and Fiji in 
the Interim EPA. This resulted in the EU parliament setting up a committee on 
fisheries to evaluate and research the negotiations and preferences offered to 
the EU under various trade agreements. Reports given to the EU parliament, 
such as the 2013 Fraga Report, were blatantly misinformed and misguided, and 
intended to portray a negative slant on the management of the tuna fisheries by 
the PNA member countries. 
233
18 . HOW TUNA IS SHAPING REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
The non-PNA members wanted the PNA members to sacrifice their fisheries 
development and management interests in return for a trade agreement with 
the EU at any cost. The EU further demanded oversight of PNA governance 
and endorsement of rejected EU proposals at WCPFC level. Additionally, the EU 
demanded the reopening of the global sourcing provisions of the Interim EPA.
The PNA were concerned about sacrificing fishing opportunities for surface 
fisheries in exchange for global access for fresh fisheries — products that 
studies have suggested may only provide seasonal opportunity at best and are 
not accessible because only three PACP countries currently have EU recognised 
competent authorities, which, even if fully domestic, would be eligible under 
rules of origin without global sourcing. The PNA members were concerned 
about the EU’s approach to tuna fisheries in the region not only because of their 
poor track record of conservation in other oceans, but they were now seen to be 
using the CEPA negotiations to manage the region’s tuna resources.
The differences between those that want access to the EU market at any costs 
and those, such as the PNA, who do not want to sacrifice market access by 
acceding some of their tuna management and conservation rights to the EU, 
have exacerbated the complexity of negotiations. Arguably, this merely reflects 
different national interests that belie the various fisheries that exist within the 
region. During the negotiations, the EU have openly challenged the Pacific 
Island state-inspired regional fishery partnership agreements and sovereign 
rights to manage their EEZs, in favour of a wider accord, ‘where any fisheries 
agreement between the EU and Pacific States shall be concluded taking into 
account the conservation and management measures of the WCPFC’. In other 
words, the EU wants to decide how the Pacific Island states should manage 
their fisheries resources. The PNA viewed the EU as being divisive and cutting 
a wedge amongst PNA, and between the PNA and the rest of the Pacific Island 
states. In its Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) with Kiribati, the EU 
actively sought to undermine the regional management measures advocated by 
the Pacific Island states, including abuse of the VDS and pursuing a negative 
conservation agenda of anti-selective fishing against mesh size increases, pro-
Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs), and opposition to closed areas.2 
The introduction of the PNA purse seine VDS represents a global threat to the 
EU’s FPAs. The changing structure of fishing access arrangements, with the 
VDS creating a seller’s market, represents a threat to the EU FPAs. The average 
2  The mesh size restrictions relate to the size of mesh in the purse seine nets. The minimum mesh size is 
intended to ensure that smaller size fish are able to escape after being caught in the nets. FADs are floating 
objectives that tend to attract other species. Vessels target these because it is easier for them. The problem 
is that there is a higher proportion of juvenile bigeye tuna, which is already overfished, caught with FADs. 
The EU have opposed closures of high seas areas in the eastern Pacific areas where the proportion of their 
catch of bigeye tuna is about 18 per cent, whereas bigeye tuna bycatch on other areas is about 5 per cent.
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returns from the VDS have been about US$400  per metric tonnes on catch, 
which is generally above the EU FPAs. Arguably, the boot is no longer on the 
foot of the EU as a competitive market for access arrangements. Support for 
the VDS has meant that the EU has been put on the back foot, consequently it 
has had to resort to other tactics, such as using the CEPAs to enforce its global 
domination. Throughout the negotiations of the CEPA, the EU has been seeking 
to increase its control of the tuna fisheries in the Pacific by putting pressure on 
the Pacific Island states to allow it to have a say in the way they manage their 
tuna resources.
Obtaining a regional consensus on this has not been easy. The PNA members 
believe that the benefits generated from access to the European fresh fish 
product market are insignificant compared to other markets, and will probably 
fail to materialise because of the high cost of trade. The price for this small 
gain in accepting EU fishing access to the Pacific would be the sustainability 
of the tuna resource and loss of higher rentals, which can be achieved through 
agreements with friendlier fishing and trading partners.
The difficulties with achieving consensus on these issues reflects the different 
fisheries that exist in the region, together with the varying levels of development 
and interests. What is clear is that if the heavy handed approach of the EU 
extends to all sectors under a CEPA, the Pacific Island states could have less 
independence than a French territory in the region.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the emergence of regional arrangements aligned along 
different tuna stocks, the fishery that targets them, and the influence that these 
arrangements have had on two key regional negotiations: the renegotiations 
of the Treaty on Fisheries with the United States and the CEPA with the EU. 
Some  commentators have derided the emergence of sub-regional groups. 
However, in the context of fisheries, sub-regional groups such as the PNA have 
had a major influence on regional tuna negotiations and fulfilment of national 
development goals. Since most of the fishing takes place in their waters, they 
can dictate the terms and conditions under which access is negotiated. Having 
a single region arrangement is useful for some purposes, but not for others. 
It is clear though that single region arrangements are normally determined by 
the lowest common denominator. This is known as the Niue factor. In single 
region arrangements where decisions must be made by consensus, a small 
country such as Niue — with no US fishing in its waters and no trade with 
the EU — can prevent the best outcomes because their interests also have to be 
taken into account. The increase in treaty funds from the Treaty on Fisheries — 
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from US$18 million to US$21 million — was delayed for some years because 
Niue wanted an increase in shares apportioned as project development funds. 
Conversely, the increase in treaty payments — from US$21 million in 2012, to 
US$63 million in 2013, and US$90 million in 2015 — was driven by the PNA 
and demonstrates the power of the VDS. It is doubtful that this would have been 
possible through a single region approach because of the Niue factor. Similarly, 
if the PNA members were not opposed to global sourcing for fresh fish in return 
for allowing the European Union a say in how their fisheries are managed, the 
region would have a trade arrangement in which only the EU could have a direct 
say in what Pacific Island states do in their own waters.
The complexity of the dynamics in fisheries and the relationships between the 
Pacific Island states and their external partners is creating new challenges to the 
way these issues are addressed. The diplomacy of the past, the ‘Pacific Way’, 
and doing things by consensus is not going to work because of the complexities 
of the issues that the Pacific Island states now confront. These challenges 
raise questions about the efficacy of existing regional architectures, the role 
of nation states, and the need to explore models of integration that can best 
deliver outcomes for the various fisheries. The PNA arrangements, in which 
measures are legally binding and where a common currency is shared amongst 
VDS membership, might be a model that could be considered by other Pacific 





The New Pacific Diplomacy and 
the South Pacific Tuna Treaty
Jope Tarai
The shift to a new Pacific diplomacy, where the Pacific’s agenda is no longer 
externally driven, but is to an extent led from within the Pacific, can be seen in 
the case of the negotiation of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty.1 To demonstrate this 
shift, this chapter will highlight the factors shaping the inception of the treaty, 
and those influencing the current negotiations. These include the regional 
agenda, the Pacific’s leveraging capability, and the influence and roles of the 
regional institutions. It will highlight the role of the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) at the time the initial treaty was signed in 1987, and the role of the islands-
only Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) in the contemporary era. This will 
demonstrate how the new Pacific diplomacy has been instrumental in elevating 
the Pacific’s negotiating position.
1  The South Pacific Tuna Treaty is officially known as the Treaty on Fisheries between Governments 
of certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America.
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Negotiating the Original South Pacific 
Tuna Treaty
The South Pacific Tuna Treaty was signed in 1987 and came into force in June 1988 
(Chang 2007). The treaty is a multilateral agreement that brings together a 
total of 16 Pacific countries with the United States of America.2 It  allows for 
a maximum of 50 purse seine vessels to be licensed. Initially, it had guaranteed 
a total of US$12 million per year, for a total of five years, spanning an initial 
period of 1988–1993 (Glebbeek 1990). This payment combined a majority of 
US government funding with a smaller portion paid by industry. Of the agreed 
financial package of US$60 million over the first five-year period, 85 per cent was 
allocated to countries according to catch volume within the various Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) of participating countries. The remaining 15 per cent 
was apportioned equally among all parties, irrespective of catch, in the form of 
project aid and technical assistance. 
Figure 19.1: The South Pacific Tuna Treaty
Source: Author’s research.
The original settlement of the treaty had not been without controversy. In the 
early 1980s, this was mainly attributed to the conflicting interpretations of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3 of 1982 (Maw 1983; 
Lugar 2004; Kengalu 1988). The US refused to recognise coastal state claims 
to tuna stocks as highly migratory species within their EEZs (Malone  1983). 
This led to the Pacific’s so-called ‘Tuna Wars’, which saw a number of US vessels 
confiscated by Pacific states, leading to retaliatory US trade embargoes, including 
the infamous Jeanette Diana and Danica debacles (Kengalu 1988; Gubon 1987).4
2  The 16 countries include: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu.
3  The coastal states took Article 61 and Article 64 of the UNCLOS to claim jurisdiction over highly migratory 
species (tuna), while the US disregarded this claim, which fuelled much of the contentious interpretation 
between the two sides.
4  The Solomon Islands government seized the US vessel Jeanette Diana in June 1984 after it was caught 
illegally fishing within the Solomon Island’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The US fishing vessel Danica was 
confiscated by the government of Papua New Guinea in February 1982 for illegally fishing within PNG’s EEZ.
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Despite these tensions and differences, when the treaty was concluded, the 
Pacific was able to secure significant financial returns, through access fees, and a 
degree of recognition of ownership over migratory species within its EEZs. The 
treaty was outstanding at the time because it was able to accrue a 10 per cent 
rate of return compared to the 3 per cent average for bilateral access agreements, 
while providing the FFA comprehensive effort and catch data (Tarte 1998).
The difference in the interpretation of the UNCLOS, and the Pacific’s push for 
the US to recognise their claim to highly migratory species within their EEZs, 
was the main agenda for the Pacific at this time. Pacific Island states, like other 
coastal states, were adamant in their claim over highly migratory resources. 
Ultimately, this claim would allow the Pacific states to derive financial returns 
from access fees and benefits through cooperative engagements with distant 
water fishing nations (Gubon 1987).
However, it is instructive to note that this agenda was externally motivated, 
rather than internally initiated. The agenda was more a response to the US 
policy of non-recognition, which indicated that the modus operandi of Pacific 
diplomacy at the time was more reactive to external influences. It developed 
as an attempt to mediate the uncompromising position of the US. While the 
UNCLOS did provide a basis for the assertion of jurisdictional claim for the 
Pacific, it was in essence an external leverage. 
The looming presence of the Soviet Union, at least in the mind of western powers, 
provided an additional leverage for the Pacific during the diplomatic tensions 
with the US in the 1980s. Kiribati seized their opportunity and secured a fishing 
agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985, with keen interest shown by Vanuatu 
and varying other Pacific states (Dora 1985). This engagement with the Soviet 
Union motivated the US to negotiate a multilateral agreement that, to an extent, 
conceded to the Pacific’s demands (Dora 1985; Gubon 1987; Doulman 1986). 
The security and power balancing concerns brought on by the Soviet presence 
were too great for the US to ignore (Lugar 2004). This creatively produced the 
‘Pacific’s Leverage’ which enabled the Pacific to bargain with unprecedented 
effect. The Pacific was well aware of how much power and impact the Soviet 
engagement had on the US. Proof of this was seen in the early 1980s. In a blunt 
response to the United States, at the height of its diplomatic tensions, the 
Solomon Islands threatened to engage the Soviet Union directly (Gubon 1987). 
Such diplomatic démarche can be termed the ‘Alternate Leverage Strategy’ to 
asserting Article 64 of the UNCLOS, and the universality of international law. 
The Tuna Wars proved the latter to be a weak bargaining point for the Pacific, 
leading to substantive losses from sanctions and embargoes imposed by the 
US. Playing off the strategic interests of the US and the Soviet Union provided 
more effective leverage for the Pacific, which not only pressured the US into 
concessions but also elevated the power of the Pacific. 
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There is no denying that the Pacific successfully utilised this leverage to its 
best possible extent, however it was still subject to the continued competition 
between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, basing the bargaining power 
of the Pacific on this strategic competition was only useful until the Soviet 
Union’s demise in the late 1980s. This also indicated that Pacific diplomacy at 
the time was more reactive to external influences. Such reactive approaches 
provided insufficient space for the Pacific to take full ownership of its agenda. 
For instance, there was no leverage available during the second period of the 
South Pacific Tuna Treaty, from 1993 to 2003, to enable the Pacific to bargain for 
a substantive increase in the financial returns paid by the US. Despite the fact 
that the value of the fishery had already begun to rise, the Pacific was locked 
into a 10-year deal of having to distribute US$18 million amongst 16 countries 
(Aqorau 2014). 
The establishment of the FFA and its links with the UNCLOS reveals two key 
motivations of Pacific diplomacy at the time. One was the Pacific’s assertion of 
ownership over the fish stocks, which was expressed in a united position in the 
UNCLOS — conforming to the position of coastal states against states such as 
the United States, which disputed the interpretation of Articles 61 and 64 of the 
UNCLOS. A second motivation was the economic and financial opportunities 
made available through the fishery. The FFA’s representative force was premised 
on the fact that it comprised all the Pacific Island states. As such, it was able 
to represent the Pacific’s collective position in regard to the UNCLOS. Through 
the tuna treaty, the FFA administered financial returns to the Pacific states with 
various other technical benefits. 
The FFA’s primary function was to help manage fisheries resources within 
the Pacific EEZs while seeking to maximise returns from access agreements 
(Tamate 2003; Tarte 2007). The FFA served to safeguard the Pacific’s interests, 
considering the inherent institutional, diplomatic and technical constraints 
of the Pacific. The FFA helped focus the Pacific’s efforts on the collective 
agenda, which effectively mediated the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) 
‘divide and conquer’ strategy of playing Pacific states off with one another 
(Doulman 1988).
The utility of FFA’s assistance to the Pacific was evident when DWFNs cited 
reservations in negotiating with Pacific states assisted by the FFA. DWFNs stated 
that negotiations were bilateral and only required the two states concerned 
without FFA assistance (Doulman 1988). This demonstrated that the DWFNs 
were recognising the strength of FFA as a galvanising force. 
In characterising the Pacific’s diplomacy at the time, we can see that the FFA 
provided important institutional leverage for the island states which enhanced 
the Pacific’s negotiating position and capability. The emergence of UNCLOS led 
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to the Pacific assertion of jurisdiction over its fishery and resource. It created a 
sense of resource ownership by the Pacific. The establishment of an institutional 
basis for Pacific representation harnessed the collective leveraging capabilities 
in negotiations with DWFN (Rayfuse 2004). Such an approach was necessary 
due to the overpowering influence of the DWFNs in seeking to maximise their 
profits from exploitation of the fishery. 
Negotiating a new Tuna Treaty
The last ten-year agreement of the tuna treaty, spanning 2003–2013, was 
criticised by Pacific countries for its rigidity. This criticism mostly came from 
the PNA states5 which had a larger stake in the fishery, since most of the tuna 
that was caught in their collective EEZs. On the other hand, the non-PNA states6 
were more comfortable with the status quo because, for very little to no effort, 
they would still be getting some return from the treaty (Aquora 2014). It became 
clear that the value of the US tuna treaty, particularly to those countries where 
US tuna vessels mainly operated, was grossly inadequate. This  was evident 
when the fishery’s estimated value rose to US$7 billion (Johnson 2013) and the 
US vessels, through access provided by the treaty, would catch an estimated 
US$500 million worth of tuna (Aqorau 2014). The effort on the part of some Pacific 
countries to pursue bilateral deals outside of the treaty was understandable. 
The negotiations for the renewal of the South Pacific Tuna Treaty began in 2009 
(Ruaia 2014) and at the time of writing are ongoing. The frustrations of the 
Pacific were expressed mostly by the states with the most purse seining activity, 
namely the PNA states. This stemmed from the static nature of the tuna treaty 
and the increasing financial incentives outside of the treaty. Since the US vessels, 
through the treaty, are paying a markedly lower price for access compared to 
other foreign DWFNs (Norris 2013; Aqorau 2014), the Pacific’s ability to fully 
maximise financial returns from the resource is undermined. The treaty also 
created exemptions for US vessels which undercut conservation efforts focused 
on the fishery. This has been through the terms and conditions within the tuna 
treaty which provide immunity from requirements in licensing arrangements 
(Dunn et al. 2006). 
The Pacific’s agenda has gravitated around resolving this challenge and a range 
of related issues. These include the financial returns from the treaty, the full 
application of national laws, and the acceptance of conservation measures by 
5  The Parties to the Nauru Agreement are the tuna-rich states of Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.
6  The non-PNA states are the other states in the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), including 
Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
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the US. While details of the full application of national laws and conservation 
measures are still to be determined, the significant expansion of the financial 
returns in recent years reflects a notable development for the new Pacific 
diplomacy. 
Considering the massive value of the fishery and the lucrative incentives in 
bilateral deals outside the treaty, the Pacific began to push for a much higher 
financial return. It was evident that US$21 million was no longer an acceptable 
rate of return for the Pacific states. This became clearer as statistics revealed that 
on a daily rate the US fees provide for US$330 compared to the Japanese access 
fee to the Pacific of US$3,560 per day in 2011 (Pala 2011). In the negotiations 
which began in 2009, the initial talks were mostly focused on the financial 
returns (Roosen 2013). In 2011, the US offered to increase the rate of return to 
from US$21 million to US$42 million (Aquora 2014). However, this was not well 
received by the Pacific states, since it was still considered to be insufficient. 
Additionally, the US chief negotiator had threatened that the US would end all 
development aid to the region if the Pacific did not agree with the US position 
(Pala 2011). As a result, in April 2011, Papua New Guinea’s acting Prime Minister 
Sam Abal announced:
We formally give notice to withdraw from the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries 
with the US … This hard line stance by PNG on behalf of smaller Pacific Island 
countries is set to send direct signals to Washington that the Multilateral Fish 
Treaty is unsustainable. This is your time, US, to recognize island countries and 
increase license fees for fishing. The PNG Government’s decision is the right thing 
for the nations in the region. It is about time our friends state clearly and fairly 
their interest with us. They must give credit where it is due (Hriehwazi 2011).
This statement challenged the US directly because a withdrawal by Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) would end the existence of the treaty itself. The treaty 
stipulates that in a situation where the United States, Kiribati, Federated States 
of Micronesia, or PNG formally withdraw from the treaty, the treaty becomes 
non-existent (Ruaia 2014). In February 2012, the US offered US$45 million to 
the Pacific Island parties, aimed at persuading PNG to rescind its application for 
withdrawal and termination of the treaty (Islands Business 2012). The Pacific 
had been demanding US$60 million for 7,000 days, while the US was offering 
US$58  million for 9,000  days of access (Larsen 2012). The  negotiations then 
developed to a point where the US was willing to accept 8,300 days for 
US$63 million (Matau 2012). After a transitional agreement of 18 months to allow 
time for the extension of negotiations, the US offered the Pacific US$94.5 million 
(Ruaia 2014). By late 2014, the US had agreed to pay US$90  million, with 
8,300 days, for a period of 12 months, for the year 2015 (FFA 2014). While this 
amount represents a substantial increase over previous offers, negotiations are 
still ongoing to fully resolve the various demands of the Pacific countries. 
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In assessing the recent negotiations, it is clear that the Pacific’s bargaining power 
has substantially increased. This bargaining power has been fortified through 
internal and external sources of leverage. An external leverage for the Pacific 
in this regard is the looming presence of China in the region, which provides 
an opportunity for engagement against the US. Simultaneously, the leverage 
originating within the Pacific, is the PNA Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which has 
elevated and bolstered the Pacific’s negotiating position. 
The US presence within the South Pacific had been on the decline since the 
Cold War, until 2007, which was labelled as the ‘Year of the Pacific’ (Rice 2007). 
This marked an attempt to invigorate American presence in the South Pacific. 
The gradual decline was witnessed through the withdrawal of the US Agency 
for International Development office from Suva and the diplomatic mission 
in Solomon Islands during the 1990s, coupled with a reduction in high-level 
engagement with the Pacific Island leaders (McAslan 2013). The US tuna treaty 
remained the somewhat lone symbol of US commitment to the South Pacific. 
The treaty was able to provide the US with a multifaceted level of engagement 
with 16 countries, 14 of which were Pacific Island countries. The multifaceted 
nature of the treaty not only served the US fisheries interests but also diplomatic, 
political and geostrategic interests. However, while US presence had begun to 
decline, Chinese engagement in the region had begun to increase. This was 
evidenced in the export and import figures in Pacific Island trade, where the 
US accounted for only 2.2 per cent, while China grew to 4.1 per cent (McAslan 
2013). Additionally, China has begun to emerge as a significant aid donor in 
the Pacific, diversifying its assistance and support (Herr and Bergin 2011). 
This growing engagement has worried Washington, with former United States 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating to the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 2011:
We are in a competition with China … They have brought all of the leaders of these 
small Pacific nations to Beijing, wined them and dined them. I mean, if anybody 
thinks that our retreating on these issues is somehow going to be irrelevant to the 
maintenance of our leadership in a world where we are competing with China 
that is a mistaken notion (Quinn 2011).
Similar to the role of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, China’s looming presence 
has appeared to become a source of external political leverage for the Pacific 
states. In amongst the international agreements, laws and regimes, major power 
rivalry provides a useful opportunity for the Pacific. This was evident in late 
2014 when the US offered US$90 million for 8,300 fishing days for 2015, which 
was agreed amongst the Pacific states. But Kiribati withdrew a portion of its 
days offered in the 8,300 days pool, to offer to Asian states, which were alleged 
to have been Taiwan and China (Field 2014). Kiribati has a lot more to gain from 
engaging outside the treaty, considering it has an extensive EEZ and tuna catch 
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capacity. Once again, the weakened financial incentive in the treaty for states 
that can claim a larger return, such as Kiribati, was revealed in such an incident. 
What can be categorised as an economic and financially motivated decision, has 
provided a perceived political outcome, towards the evident competition for 
influence in the region, between the US and China. 
The crucial role played by the PNA underpins the internal leverage of the 
Pacific. The PNA constitutes the tuna-rich states of Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands, 
and Tuvalu (Tamate 2014; PNA 2013). This region is where US purse seine 
activity is concentrated. The PNA’s sub-regional role has provided an important 
basis for the bargaining power of the Pacific states in the treaty. This is in large 
measure attributed to the VDS adopted by the PNA. The VDS is a rights-based 
management mechanism, which was designed by PNA to move to licensing purse 
seiners on the basis of number of fishing days as opposed to vessel numbers, as 
was the strategy under the Palau Arrangement (Havice 2010). This means that 
vessels have to purchase days to fish within waters of the PNA states. It was 
developed to limit vessel numbers creating competition amongst DWFN, and 
enabling higher rates of return for the PNA states. The VDS was developed over 
four years, from 2000–2004, and it went into its implementation stages in 2005 
(Aqorau 2009). So far it has more than proven its benefit to the PNA states. 
In 2010, through the hard limits enforced by the VDS, the revenue gained by 
PNA rose to US$60 million, then US$104 million in 2011, US$229 million in 
2012 and was projected to be US$249 million in 2013 (Aqorau 2014).
Figure 19.2: PNA revenue from access
Source: Adapted from Aqorau (2014a).
Apart from the substantive financial returns, the VDS finally gave the Pacific 
states control over their resource, which translated into bargaining and 
negotiating power. The authority to set the benchmark price on fishing days 
swung the power balance in favour of the Pacific states. 
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The VDS is an internally instigated leveraging tool for the resource owners, 
which has fundamentally transformed the Pacific’s negotiating position. It  is 
unprecedented by being a mechanism owned and driven from within the 
Pacific, and is a crucial marker of the new Pacific diplomacy. The design, 
manufacture and ownership of VDS as an instrument for, of and by the Pacific, is 
a testament of the new-found power in negotiation that is internally motivated 
and controlled.
The combination of the internal and external leveraging exercised by the Pacific 
has elevated its influence in the negotiations with the US, as witnessed by the 
rising financial returns accrued during the treaty negotiations since 2009. 
At the time of writing, the other outstanding issues, such as the full application 
of national laws and conservation measures, were yet to be finalised. However, 
considering the external and internal leverage available to the Pacific states, 
it can be expected the remaining outstanding issues will be resolved in the 
Pacific’s favour. 
Clearly, the Pacific has been ‘flexing its muscles’ (Islands Business 2012) and 
continues to do so with what now appears to be a combination of internal 
and external sources of leverage. The new Pacific diplomacy, as evident in 
the South Pacific Tuna Treaty’s negotiation with its emphasis on a regionally-
owned and controlled diplomacy, has the potential to increase the power of 
the Pacific in global negotiations. Resource specific sub-regional groups, such 
as PNA, using a mechanism such as the VDS, elevate the control, ownership 
and bargaining capacity of the Pacific states. This is aided by external sources 
of leveraging, such as the looming presence of China, which compels the US to 
seek an agreement with the Pacific states. A combination of internal control and 
overarching geopolitical competition has proved advantageous for the Pacific’s 
new diplomacy as seen in the tuna sector.
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In the two decades following the formation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Pacific Island countries have pursued an active trade diplomacy agenda. 
New regional trade agreements have been negotiated and implemented among 
the island countries themselves. Pacific officials have also pursued their interests 
at the WTO, and have proved tough negotiators in trade talks with external 
powers. By driving hard bargains with the European Union (EU), and Australia 
and New Zealand, Pacific officials have shifted the terms of discussion about 
trade and development in the Pacific. They have also broadened the agenda of 
negotiations in the island countries’ favour, to include issues such as labour 
mobility and development assistance.
This chapter highlights the successes of contemporary Pacific trade diplomacy, 
and explores the agency of island policy-makers. It also emphasises that trade 
diplomacy and regional geopolitics are intertwined. For Australia and New 
Zealand in particular, negotiations with Pacific Island countries are linked 
with an abiding concern to remain ‘special insiders’ in processes of regional 
cooperation. To date, new trade agreements have been signed by island members 
of the Pacific Islands Forum, and among members of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group. However Australia, New Zealand (and the EU for that matter) remain 
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on the outer. Pacific officials argue a unique agreement would be required with 
their wealthy neighbours, one that addresses the island states’ unique trade-
related constraints. As long as these arguments continue to fall on deaf ears in 
Canberra and Wellington, trade policy will likely remain an issue-area in which 
the island countries sail their own way. 
Responding to a Changing World
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations which led to the formation of the WTO 
had significant and largely negative consequences for Pacific Island economies. 
Trading partners made commitments that undermined key island exports. 
For more than a century, Pacific countries had relied on preferential access to 
metropolitan markets for export commodities — including sugar, coffee, cocoa, 
oil palm, copra, and canned tuna — and a small range of manufactured exports 
(see Morgan 2014). As destination countries agreed to lower tariffs to cheaper 
producers, Pacific exports were increasingly deemed uncompetitive. For Pacific 
Island governments, the inherent disadvantages of island-based production 
— high costs, poor transport services, distance from external markets, and 
exposure to frequent natural disasters — were also brought into sharper relief.
Pacific governments decided the best way to respond to challenges brought 
about by changes in the global trade regime would be to pursue regional 
trade integration. Melanesian countries led the way with the formation of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement (MSGTA) in 1993. In 1997, 
Pacific trade officials proposed a Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (PARTA) 
among the island country members of the South Pacific Forum. They argued 
closer economic integration would help the island countries remain competitive 
in a liberalised global marketplace. As then General Secretary of the South 
Pacific Forum Noel Levi explained, ‘we feel that the free trade area option is 
the best option for our members to deal with the many issues being raised by 
globalisation’ (Singh 1999). The proposed island-only agreement was particularly 
favoured by Roman Grynberg, who was appointed in 1997 as the inaugural 
multilateral trade policy adviser to the South Pacific Forum.
Talk of a Pacific trade agreement that excluded Australia and New Zealand rang 
alarm bells in Canberra and Wellington. Officials in both countries had long 
viewed a stable regional order in the South Pacific as a pre-eminent geostrategic 
priority. Australia provided funding for regional cooperation, at least in part, as 
a means of maintaining ‘a favourable strategic posture in the region’ (Fry 1981, 
p. 480). Crucially, both countries aimed to be ‘considered by the Pacific states 
to be part of the region, and not part of the “outside”’ (Fry 1981, p. 480). 
If the island countries were to negotiate a trade agreement among themselves, 
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particularly through the auspices of the South Pacific Forum, this could be 
seen as undermining a carefully cultivated perception that they were legitimate 
insiders. Thus, Australian and New Zealand officials pressed hard to be included 
in any new Pacific regional trade agreement. When South Pacific Forum trade 
officials met in March 2000 to consider the legal text of PARTA, the Australian 
and New Zealand delegations brought their own amended text which included 
them as parties principle to the agreement. 
There is considerable evidence that geostrategic concern (as opposed to strictly 
commercial interests) underpinned Australian and New Zealand insistence on 
their inclusion in PARTA. During negotiations around PARTA, Australian Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer ‘instructed his officials to oppose any agreement 
that excluded Australia and said nothing could be called “Pacific Regional” 
unless Australia was involved’ (Kelsey 2004, p. 20). Legal experts tasked with 
drafting the text of a new agreement confirmed ‘the desire of Australia and New 
Zealand to participate as ‘parties principle’ is driven by political rather than 
economic considerations’ (Johnson 2009, p. 195).
Pacific policy-makers remained concerned about the adjustment costs involved 
if they included Australia and New Zealand in any new agreement. However 
they were also sensitive to the political interests of their developed-country 
neighbours. A compromise was proposed. An ‘umbrella agreement’ would 
be negotiated which included Australia and New Zealand as equal parties: 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER).1 A ‘subsidiary 
agreement’ would be the trade agreement among island states: the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). Taken together, the two agreements would 
satisfy Australian and New Zealand political interest to be included in any new 
agreement of the South Pacific Forum,2 and Pacific concerns to avoid (or at least 
delay) costly trade liberalisation. As an official from the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade explained: 
Since Australia had failed to convince Forum island countries of the merits of 
committing to comprehensive trade integration, there was a need to produce a 
structure that would allow these countries to go about their business without 
splitting the Forum permanently, and without alienating Australia and New 
Zealand completely (Peebles 2005, p. 74).
It should be noted that Australian and New Zealand concern to be included 
in any Pacific regional agreement was exacerbated when European officials 
proposed trade preferences for Pacific countries be replaced with a WTO-
compatible regional free trade agreement. In June 2000, Pacific governments 
1  Technically this would not be a trade agreement, but a binding treaty that required consideration of a trade 
agreement at a future date and guaranteed that island states wouldn’t offer better terms to trading competitors.
2  The South Pacific Forum was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. 
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signed a new aid-and-trade treaty between the EU and African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) states. The Cotonou Agreement stipulated WTO-compatible 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) would be negotiated between the EU 
and regional country groupings, including Pacific Island countries. 
By the turn of the century, Pacific Island trade ministers and officials had cemented 
their initial response to changes in the global trade regime — by pursuing new 
trade agreements among themselves. They had also gained experience in trade 
diplomacy by discussing potential agreements with Australia, New Zealand, 
and the EU. In addition, island officials had also pursued their interests in 
multilateral negotiations. 
Pacific Trade Diplomacy at the WTO
During the late-1990s, Pacific Island governments spearheaded a campaign for the 
formation of a new category of states at the WTO. Pacific officials proposed ‘small 
and vulnerable economies’ be formally designated among the member-states of 
the WTO. This would allow developed countries to continue to extend special 
and favourable treatment to Pacific Island countries — including preferential 
access to their markets. Technically, the WTO only allowed preferential 
treatment to be extended to countries recognised by the UN as Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). However, during the 1990s, a number of multilateral bodies, 
including the UN, investigated the unique economic vulnerabilities of Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS). There was an increasing consensus that these 
states possessed characteristics that meant they were uniquely vulnerable to 
economic and environmental shocks. Both the UN and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat proposed that a ‘Vulnerability Index’ be developed to reflect the 
unique needs of SIDS (see Atkins et al. 2001).
Pacific trade officials suggested the unique vulnerabilities of Pacific Island 
countries should serve as criteria for derogation from more onerous WTO 
rules, allowing, for example, preferential access to wealthy markets, or special 
trade-related development assistance. At the 1998 South Pacific Forum Trade 
Ministers meeting, ministers agreed to pursue the agenda of small island states 
at the WTO, and to seek WTO observer status for the South Pacific Forum. 
They resolved to:
…  adopt a common Forum position with the objective of the UN adopting a 
vulnerability index, and with the aim of having such an index included among 
the criteria for determining Least Developed Country status, and for deciding 
eligibility for concessional aid and trade treatment (SPF 1998).
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To pursue their interests at the WTO, Pacific trade officials and diplomats formed 
a strategic alliance with small island states from the Caribbean and the Indian 
Ocean. In the lead up to the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle, the government 
of Fiji, working with officials at the forum secretariat, circulated a petition 
calling for inclusion in the ministerial communiqué language regarding a ‘work 
programme on small states at the WTO’ (Grynberg 2001a, p. 7). However, the 
Seattle meeting was disrupted by 50,000 street protesters and it wasn’t until 
the Doha Ministerial in 2001 that Pacific trade diplomacy achieved its first — 
albeit limited — success when members agreed to ‘frame responses to the trade-
related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies 
into the multilateral trading system’ (WTO 2001, para 35). 
Pacific governments won support for the idea that small island countries faced 
unique trade-related challenges. However, they did not win support at the 
WTO for any new category of states. Without a formal category it would be 
difficult for Pacific countries to request differential treatment in multilateral 
negotiations. Nonetheless, at a subsequent WTO Ministerial in 2005, members 
were urged to ‘adopt specific measures’ to help small and vulnerable economies 
participate in global trade (WTO 2005, para 41).3 Subsequent proposals in WTO 
negotiations included: (some) flexibility in tariff negotiations, special assistance 
for trade facilitation, limited permission to use subsidies (including in fisheries), 
and a  regional pooling of technical assistance required to implement WTO 
agreements (see Smith 2008; Kaukab 2009).
Having established new trade agreements among themselves, and pursued 
their interests in global talks, Pacific policy-makers increasingly turned their 
attention to negotiations with key trading partners from outside the region.
Negotiating with the European Union
Early in the new millennium, Pacific Island countries found themselves 
negotiating regional trade agreements with the EU, Australia and New Zealand. 
These talks proved protracted and controversial. Indeed, by 2015, negotiations 
for an EPA with the EU were effectively a dead letter, and PACER Plus talks with 
Australia and New Zealand were at a stalemate. Given this state of affairs, one 
could be forgiven for seeing both negotiations as a failure of Pacific diplomacy. 
However, a close reading of the motivations of Pacific trade officials suggests 
they pursued a successful strategy. They delayed proceedings and drove 
hard bargains, and in doing so broadened the agenda of negotiations in their 
3  These measures would be proposed for member states on the basis of specific characteristics, and applied 
to all countries which shared those characteristics, thus circumventing the need for a special category of states. 
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favour, to include issues such as labour mobility and development assistance. 
This  contrasts markedly with the experience of other island states. In the 
Caribbean, for example, trade officials quickly acceded to the demands of 
European officials during regional EPA negotiations and signed an agreement 
that was subject to heavy criticism in Caribbean capitals (see Bishop et al. 2013). 
Faced with a decline in the value of trade preferences, which had for so long 
underwritten commodity exports, Pacific governments used regional trade 
negotiations to seek new concessions from wealthy states. As an overarching 
strategy, island officials demanded their unique trading circumstances be 
formally recognised in the design of any agreement. They emphasised that 
they were uniquely disadvantaged in a liberalised global marketplace, and that 
new treaties should be designed with their trade-related constraints in mind. 
Grynberg, who returned to the forum secretariat to help coordinate the Pacific’s 
EPA negotiations with the EU, argued what was needed was ‘appropriate 
interventions that will replicate the results of trade preference while avoiding 
some of the more market-distorting consequences’ (Grynberg 2001b). 
From 2002 to 2006, Pacific officials fleshed out unique proposals for a deal 
with the EU. These included sector-specific strategies to encourage investment 
in Pacific tourism and agriculture; measures to reduce the cost of business 
finance in the Pacific; temporary access to the EU for Pacific Island workers; 
and an agreement linking fishing rights for European vessels with measures 
to encourage downstream processing in island states. These proposals were 
included in a draft treaty submitted to Brussels in July 2006. The European 
Commission, however, was not interested in the Pacific’s proposals. Officials in 
Brussels were keen to push their own regulatory barrow, and to avoid precedents 
that might have implications for their negotiations with other trading partners. 
With few economic interests in the region, a unique trade agreement was simply 
not on their agenda. When European officials presented their own draft EPA in 
mid-2007, it contained none of the proposals developed by island negotiators. 
The forum secretariat lamented that the EU text ‘contained explicit provisions 
setting out the commission’s demands while reflecting almost none of the key 
written proposals of the [Pacific] group nor the positions put forward and key 
interests expressed … during discussions that had been taking place between 
the two sides over the last two years’ (PIFS 2007). 
With European officials refusing to countenance their proposals, Pacific 
officials went cold on a regional agreement with the EU. Discussions turned 
instead to preventing serious disruption to export sectors reliant on European 
trade preferences. A WTO waiver for those preferences was due to expire 
on 31  December 2007 and any tariff increase threatened tuna exports from 
Papua New Guinea and sugar exports from Fiji. During intense negotiations in 
Brussels in late 2007, the EU proposed interim EPAs — covering goods only — 
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that would allow Pacific countries to continue to access EU preferences. Island 
officials were concerned that these interim arrangements were ill-conceived, 
and argued a number of provisions would need subsequent revision or removal 
(Primack 2007). However, in perhaps the only significant gain for the Pacific to 
come from the EPA negotiations, the EU did agree to island proposals to revise 
rules of origin requirements for processed tuna. In effect, these changes meant 
fishing vessels from anywhere in the world could land, and process, their catch 
in a Pacific Island country and gain preferential access to EU markets. In the 
short term it was expected this change would allow for the establishment of 
tuna canneries in Madang and Lae in northern Papua New Guinea.
The breakdown in regional negotiations for an EPA frayed diplomatic 
relations between Pacific Island countries and the EU. When the Cook Islands 
Trade Minister Wilkie Rasmussen explained to a sitting of the ACP–EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly that the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson had 
been insensitive to the needs of Pacific Island countries, Mandelson wrote to 
Rasmussen suggesting he had been misquoted, and that might he consider a 
public correction (Mandelson 2008). This raised the ire of Rasmussen who, in a 
strongly worded reply, told Mandelson: 
the common impression you left on all the Pacific Island Trade Ministers was 
that you are insensitive to our protocols and issues … I can assure you that the 
general feeling is that Papua New Guinea and Fiji initialled the Interim Agreement 
because of fear that they would lose their preferential trade arrangements with 
the European Union (PANG 2008).
Dealing with Big Brothers
Australian and New Zealand representatives insisted they would be more 
sympathetic to the ideas of Pacific officials than their European counterparts. 
In the lead up to a formal launch of PACER Plus negotiations, Australian Trade 
Minister Simon Crean explained Australia had ‘learnt the lessons of the EPA 
negotiations with the European Union … We have learnt from that experience 
and are not going to repeat it … unlike the EPA, PACER-Plus is not just a trade 
agreement’ (Crean 2009). For their part, the Pacific trade ministers resolved 
PACER Plus negotiations could only proceed if Australia and New Zealand 
formally agreed that unique and additional measures would be included in a 
final agreement. They were particularly keen to include measures permitting 
Pacific Islanders to work in Australia and New Zealand on a temporary basis. 
Indeed, island ministers decided that market access offers on goods and services 
would be conditional on ‘a commitment from Australia and New Zealand to 
discuss labour market access, and the broad parameters of that access is agreed’ 
(OCTA 2011, p. 6). 
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As it turned out, labour mobility proved to be the key stumbling block for the 
PACER Plus talks. Pacific officials proposed legally binding measures that would 
facilitate the movement of workers to ameliorate labour shortages in horticulture 
and tourism sectors in Australia and New Zealand. Given Pacific Island countries 
already enjoyed tariff-free access to both countries, many island officials felt a 
treaty without labour mobility would not be worth signing. Initially, Australian 
negotiators seemed to agree labour mobility should be included ‘in the context 
of a comprehensive fully WTO-consistent Agreement’ (DFAT 2006, p. 2). 
However, after further consideration, Australian and New Zealand officials 
became concerned that including labour mobility in PACER Plus would create a 
precedent that would be difficult to contain in other negotiations. Furthermore, 
both countries proceeded to implement labour mobility schemes for Pacific 
Island workers outside of a regional trade agreement. The New Zealand 
Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme, launched in 2007, and the Australian 
Seasonal Worker Program, launched in 2009, both allowed employers to recruit 
Pacific Islanders on a temporary basis.
At the time of writing, intransigent negotiating positions on both sides with 
regard to labour mobility marked a stagnation of the PACER Plus talks.4 
Furthermore political commitment to the negotiations was on the wane. Papua 
New Guinea Trade Minister Richard Maru indicated his country was considering 
pulling out of the talks altogether, labelling them a ‘complete waste of time’ 
(Pareti 2013). Australian and New Zealand diplomats had spent nearly 20 years 
trying to convince Pacific countries of the merits of including them in a regional 
free trade agreement. However, the message from island governments remained 
clear: they would do so only if they deemed such a move to be in their interests.
Trade Negotiations and the New Pacific 
Diplomacy
Pacific Island countries have more agency in international trade negotiations 
than is commonly understood. Many observers have characterised Pacific 
countries as powerless actors in the global trade regime. They suggest island 
governments have had little choice but to adapt to changes in the global 
economy, to embrace trade liberalisation, and to sign free trade agreements 
with metropolitan powers. However, Pacific officials have resisted pressure 
4  As the Pacific’s Chief Trade Adviser Edwini Kessie explained: ‘Australia and New Zealand want to treat 
labour mobility outside of PACER Plus and the Pacific Island countries want legally binding commitments, so 
that is the main issue dividing the parties’ (Radio New Zealand 2013). Or as another regional commentator put 
it: ‘Begun in 2009, PACER-Plus is argued dry … The one thing the Islands want from Australia and New Zealand 
— labour mobility — is the one thing Australia and New Zealand won’t give … Stalemate’ (Dobell 2014).
259
20 . NEGOTIATING POWER IN CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC TRADE DIPLOMACY
to sign orthodox trade agreements. Instead, they have demanded recognition 
of their unique trading circumstances and have argued for concessions from 
wealthy states. This strategy has borne some fruit. European policy-makers 
agreed to changes allowing more fish from the Pacific to enter European markets 
tariff-free, a move that has expanded tuna-processing facilities in the region. 
More significantly, governments in Australia and New Zealand have taken heed 
of arguments that island workers should be allowed temporary access to their 
labour markets. This has seen tens of thousands of Pacific Islanders earn incomes 
abroad, which have been spent or saved at home.
Finally, it should be remembered that trade diplomacy in the Pacific is inextricably 
linked with regional geopolitics. As elsewhere in the world, consideration of 
the economic merits of trade arrangements occurs against a political backdrop. 
In recent years, Pacific Island countries have indicated a greater willingness to 
pursue an independent foreign policy — a trend described in this book as the 
new Pacific diplomacy. Pacific diplomats have pursued their particular interests 
at the United Nations, and with regard to issue-areas such as climate change, 
fisheries management and decolonisation. Discussions on trade have been no 
different. Pacific officials have demanded their unique circumstances be taken 
seriously. Until they are, Pacific governments appear to be in no hurry to extend 
regional trade arrangements to include their wealthier neighbours.
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Pacific Diplomacy and 
Decolonisation in the 21st Century
Nic Maclellan
Introduction
The issue of political independence and sovereignty was a central element 
in the establishment of the South Pacific Forum in 1971, as four independent 
island nations moved out of the confines of the South Pacific Commission. 
Self-determination was extensively debated at the forum throughout the 1980s. 
Today, well into the 21st century and the United Nations’ Third International 
Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, decolonisation has largely faded 
from the international agenda. Despite this, 16 territories remain on the United 
Nations’ (UN) list of non-self-governing territories, including six in the Pacific: 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia (under French administration); Tokelau 
(New Zealand); Pitcairn (United Kingdom); and Guam and American Samoa 
(United States). Developments in these territories are monitored by the seminars, 
missions and annual resolutions of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation.1
1  The generic term ‘territories’ is used for convenience, but these dependencies have a variety of political 
and constitutional structures. France describes its Pacific dependencies as ‘collectivities’, while Indonesian and 
Papua New Guinea governments bridle at the suggestion the provinces of Papua, West Papua or Bougainville 
require ‘decolonisation’.
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Across the region there are also ‘second order’ self-determination struggles 
in postcolonial states that do not fall under the mandate of the UN special 
committee,  such as Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Rapanui (Chile), and West 
Papua (Indonesia).
While the UN is an important institution for setting human rights norms, it has 
limited enforcement capacity. The United Nations can act with the support of the 
administering power, as shown with New Zealand’s extensive work with the UN 
decolonisation unit over Tokelau (Huntsman and Kelihian 2007). But Paris and 
Washington have long ignored UN criticism of their colonial policies, prioritising 
strategic interests such as US military deployments in Guam or France’s control 
of the resources in its seven-million-square-kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone 
in the Pacific (Mrgudovic 2008). Moreover, the UN decolonisation unit is starved 
for funds and staff, and reluctant to implement an assertive agenda.2
Since the end of French nuclear testing in 1996 and the signing of New 
Caledonia’s Noumea Accord in 1998, the Pacific Islands Forum has developed new 
policies on engagement with the territories. New Caledonia (1999) and French 
Polynesia (2004) gained forum observer status, then both upgraded to ‘associate 
membership’ at the 2006 forum meeting in Apia. Tokelau also upgraded its 2005 
observer status to associate membership in 2014. Other nations remain as forum 
observers, including Timor-Leste (2002), Wallis and Futuna (2006) and the US 
dependencies of Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the North 
Marianas (2011). 
The policies of Australia and New Zealand (and, on occasions, other forum 
members) have constrained a more active role for the forum on decolonisation. 
Australia has increasingly backed France’s regional role and proposed that 
territories such as New Caledonia should become full members of the forum, 
even before their final political status is determined.3 This significant policy shift 
was endorsed in the 2013 Morauta Review of the Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Cooperation and Integration, which argues that original forum 
priorities such as decolonisation and a nuclear-free Pacific ‘have either been 
resolved or moved to other platforms for debate and determination’.4
2  For a more ambitious agenda, see Corbin (2010).
3  Interview with Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs Richard Marles, May 2012. See also 
Maclellan (2013d).
4  ‘The contemporary debate about regionalism has rather less intrinsic association with self-determination. 
Most of the issues being debated in contemporary Pacific regionalism (trade and transport, for example) are 
entirely within the mandate of even the non-self-determining territories to resolve, and regionalism would 
be better served by fully including, not excluding, such territories in the debate and in its implementation’ 
(Pacific Plan Review 2013, p. 78).
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For this reason, island leaders have increasingly used other mechanisms to take 
diplomatic initiatives on decolonisation, such as the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG) and Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) ambassadors. 
This chapter documents two recent examples of this new Pacific diplomacy on 
decolonisation: the work of PSIDS for the reinscription of French Polynesia at 
the UN General Assembly; and the MSG’s current debate on self-determination 
in West Papua. 
These initiatives do not guarantee that independence will be achieved — 
indeed, there are many economic, demographic and strategic barriers to 
decolonisation for the remaining Pacific territories. The diversity and small size 
of some territories is a constraint on advancing the decolonisation agenda, and 
significant parts of some local populations welcome immigration rights, federal 
grants and other benefits of territorial status (Firth 2013). In other cases — 
Guam, West Papua, and New Caledonia — indigenous peoples have been made 
a minority in their own country, constraining advances through elections or 
referenda.
Rather than assuming a unified Pacific response to decolonisation, it is important 
to analyse varying reactions by regional organisations and governments. 
Solidarity can be trumped by countervailing influences, such as Papua New 
Guinea’s and Fiji’s relationship with Indonesia or trade ties to the European 
Union. As new players such as Indonesia and Timor-Leste enter Pacific regional 
networks, island leaders are forced to juggle more complex obligations. Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) are active members of the UN Special Committee on 
Decolonisation, but growing ties with Asia affect their actions on decolonisation. 
Melanesian governments have actively supported independence movements in 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, but have maintained a diplomatic silence 
about decolonisation in the US territories. 
Canberra’s strategic support for Paris and Washington is a significant roadblock 
to advancing the decolonisation agenda, but the following two studies of 
contemporary Pacific diplomacy on decolonisation also highlight the tension 
between principle and national interest for island governments. The first relates 
to the campaign to have French Polynesia reinscribed on the UN list of non-
self-governing territories, in the face of French opposition. The second study 
looks at ongoing diplomacy through MSG and PSIDS to deal with West Papuan 
self-determination.
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French Polynesia’s Reinscription with 
the United Nations
For many years, the French State has resisted international scrutiny of its colonial 
policies and ignored international obligations created by UN decolonisation 
resolutions. As noted in a November 1986 internal memo from the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
We have never accepted resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), for which we 
abstained … We have never accepted the legitimacy of the Special Committee on 
Decolonisation, as directed by resolution 1564 (XVI), to propose the inscription 
of territories on the list of non-self-governing territories (Regnault 2013, pp. 
69–70).
In the face of this French opposition, the Pacific Islands Forum played a crucial 
role in supporting the reinscription of New Caledonia on the UN list in the 
mid-1980s.5 The passage of UN General Assembly resolution 41/41 in December 
1986 came at the height of armed conflict between the French armed forces and 
supporters of independence during 1984–1988. 
France launched extensive diplomatic manoeuvres to ignore, delay and then 
derail the 1986 forum initiative, using its political and economic weight to 
encourage countries to abstain or oppose the resolution. Cuba, although a 
member of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, was promised a soft ride at the next UN Human Rights Commission. 
Tunisia and French-speaking African nations were wooed, based on solidarity 
to ‘francophonie’. Newly independent Vanuatu was threatened with aid cuts, 
while Argentina was lobbied with offers of support in their dispute with United 
Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas islands (Regnault 2013, p. 99).
After years of lobbying, Australia and New Zealand only joined their island 
neighbours to support New Caledonia’s reinscription after the election of a 
conservative government in Paris in 1986. Canberra and Wellington shifted 
policy in part due to concerns about perceived Soviet and Libyan advances in 
the South Pacific. Australia’s then Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen had 
stated: ‘If France drags its feet too much over decolonisation, the independence 
movement will become increasingly radicalised and perhaps open to Soviet 
influence and manipulation’ (The Australian 1982). 
5  The list was created in 1946, but from 1947 France refused to transmit information on its overseas 
territories to the General Assembly, as required under Article 73e of the UN Charter. A revised UN list of 
territories in 1963 ignored France’s Pacific dependencies, apart from the joint Anglo-French condominium 
of the New Hebrides.
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Since reinscription nearly 30  years ago, New Caledonia has been scrutinised 
by the UN Special Committee. A UN monitoring mission travelled to New 
Caledonia in 1999 and the governments of France and New Caledonia hosted 
a regional seminar of the UN Special Committee in Noumea in 2010.6 Another 
UN mission travelled to Noumea in March 2014, to monitor the electoral roll for 
New Caledonia’s May 2014 provincial and congressional elections.
Despite this engagement on New Caledonia, France has continued to resist 
decolonisation for French Polynesia. In 2010, then French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy stated that France’s overseas territories ‘are French and will remain 
French’. He stressed that for French Polynesia, there is ‘one red line that I will 
never accept should be crossed: that of independence’ (Sarkozy 2010). Despite 
this, active Pacific diplomacy led to an historic decision on 17 May  2013, 
when  the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to reinscribe French 
Polynesia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories.7
The resolution, sponsored by Solomon Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu with support 
from Vanuatu, Samoa and Timor-Leste, was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
without a vote. It called on the French government ‘as the Administering Power 
concerned, to intensify its dialogue with French Polynesia in order to facilitate 
rapid progress towards a fair and effective self-determination process, under 
which the terms and timelines for an act of self-determination will be agreed’.8 
Even as a symbolic measure, the UN resolution sparked fury in Paris. 
After writing to all member states in an unsuccessful bid to delay the resolution, 
France’s UN Ambassador Gérard Araud boycotted the general assembly session. 
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs raged: ‘This resolution is a flagrant 
interference with a complete absence of respect for the democratic choice of 
French Polynesians and a hijacking of the decolonisation principles established 
by the United Nations’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).
The French government has maintained its stubborn refusal to acknowledge 
any role for the UN over self-determination in French Polynesia, failing to meet 
its obligations as an administering power. Each year, under Article 73e of the 
UN Charter, colonial powers are required to submit information to the United 
Nations relating to the economic, social and educational conditions in their 
6  French Polynesian independence leader Oscar Temaru was refused entry to this UN seminar in New 
Caledonia’s capital, a symbol of ongoing French opposition to Maohi self-determination.
7  This section draws on interviews with former Presidents of French Polynesia Gaston Flosse (Majuro 2013) 
and Oscar Manutahi Temaru (Noumea 2013) and Senator Richard Tuheiava (Suva 2013).
8  ‘Self-determination of French Polynesia’, UN General Assembly Resolution, A/67/L.56, 17 May 2013. 
See Maclellan (2013a).
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territories. France formally submitted information about New Caledonia in 2014 
and 2015, but refused to submit information on French Polynesia in either year 
(UN General Assembly 2015).
The 2013 decision on French Polynesia came after decades of lobbying by the 
independence party Tavini Huiraatira. As leader of the Polynesian Liberation 
Front, Oscar Temaru first lobbied at the UN in 1978. He patiently sought support 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, gaining solidarity from the Pacific Conference 
of Churches and the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement, 
but little action from neighbouring Polynesian governments.9 
Temaru won office as president of French Polynesia in 2004 and despite 
11  changes  of the presidency over a decade, continued to campaign for 
reinscription. In  2011, for the first time, the French Polynesian Assembly 
narrowly voted to support Temaru’s call. 
The governing Union for Democracy and Social Progress coalition (Union pour 
la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UPLD)) looked to the French Socialist Party 
for recognition of the Maohi people’s right to self-determination. The UPLD 
decided to soft-pedal their reinscription campaign during 2012 in order to avoid 
embarrassing Socialist Party candidate Francois Hollande in his successful bid 
for the French presidency. Once elected, however, Hollande began to back away 
from the interparty accord between the Socialist Party and Tavini Huiraatira.
A number of Pacific governments took up the issue of French Polynesia’s 
self-determination at the 2011 ‘Engaging with the Pacific’ summit, a meeting 
initiated by the Bainimarama regime that led to the creation of the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum. The 2011 summit in Nadi ‘welcomed increasing 
social and cultural linkages between French Polynesia/Tahiti Nui and 
PSIDS’, and ‘supported the re-inscription of French Polynesia/Tahiti Nui 
on the UN decolonisation committee’s list as the first step in the process of 
self-determination.’10
With Australia and France signing a Joint Statement of Strategic Partnership in 
January 2012, Canberra was less than enthusiastic about Temaru’s reinscription 
initiative. In 2012, Australia’s then Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island 
9  NFIP supported publication of a booklet in English for Maohi leaders to use in lobbying Pacific 
governments: ‘Independence and sovereignty for Te Ao Maohi / French Polynesia’ (Tavini Huiraatira no Te Ao 
Maohi, Papeete, 1997). After the end of French nuclear testing in 1996, NFIP held its next regional conference 
in Tahiti in 1999. See Maclellan (1999).
10  Section 2, Final communiqué, Engaging with the Pacific leaders meeting, Tanoa hotel, Nadi, 
1–2 September 2011.
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Affairs, Richard Marles, described France as a long-term stable democratic 
partner in the Pacific and reaffirmed Australian opposition to reinscription: 
‘We absolutely take our lead from France on this.’11
Meeting in Rarotonga in August 2012, forum leaders reiterated their support for 
the principle of self-determination but didn’t endorse the call for reinscription.12 
A month after the forum, without the restraining influence of Canberra and 
Wellington, the leaders of Samoa, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu lined up at 
the UN General Assembly, calling for action on decolonisation. 
Vanuatu’s then Prime Minister Sato Kilman called on ‘the independent and 
free nations of the world to complete the story of decolonisation and close this 
chapter’. He urged the UN ‘not to reject the demands for French Polynesia’s 
right to self-determination and progress’ (Livtuvanu 2012).
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi told the general assembly: 
‘In the case of French Polynesia, we encourage the metropolitan power and the 
territory’s leadership together with the support of the United Nations to find an 
amicable way to exercise the right of the people of the territory to determine 
their future’ (Malielegaoi 2012).
Outside the forum, Fiji’s new membership of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) opened the way for Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola to attend 
the 16th NAM Summit in Tehran in August 2012, which issued a new policy 
on French Polynesia’s decolonisation: ‘The Heads of State or Government 
affirmed the inalienable right of the people of French Polynesia–Maohi Nui to 
self-determination in accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).’13
Opinion was also shifting at home. The Eglise Protestante Maohi, the largest 
Christian denomination in French Polynesia, voted for the first time in August 
2012 to support Temaru’s call for reinscription.14 The following month, the 
Central Committee of the World Council of Churches added its voice, calling on 
‘France, the United Nations, and the international community to support the 
reinscription of French Polynesia on the UN list of countries to be decolonised, 
in accordance with the example of New Caledonia’ (WCC Central Committee 
2012; see also Bhagwan 2012).
11  Interview with Richard Marles, May 2012. See Maclellan (2012).
12  The forum communiqué simply welcomed ‘the election of a new French government that opened fresh 
opportunities for a positive dialogue between French Polynesia and France on how best to realise French 
Polynesia’s right to self-determination.’ Item 70, Communiqué, 43rd Pacific Islands Forum, Rarotonga, 
Cook Islands, 2012.
13  Final communiqué, 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, 26–31 August 2012, Tehran, Iran.
14  ‘The re-inscription of Maohi Nui on this list constitutes one way to protect the people from decisions and 
initiatives of the French State that are contrary to their interests’ (EPM 2012).
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With increasing regional support, the formal bid for reinscription was 
relaunched in early 2013, with extensive lobbying in New York by Oscar Temaru 
and France’s then Senator for French Polynesia, Richard Ariihau Tuheiava. 
In January, Temaru addressed a meeting of the NAM Coordinating Bureau in 
New York: 
This is yet another case of David against Goliath, and the reason why we want 
our country back on the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories. Without the 
UN as a referee between France and us, this is once again an unfair and uphill 
battle (Temaru 2013a).
In February, the PSIDS ambassadors for Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru 
formally lodged a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly. France’s UN 
Ambassador Gérard Araud lobbied hard to have the resolution delayed in the 
hope that it would lapse after May 2013 elections in Papeete. In the interests of 
compromise, the sponsoring states issued a revised version of the resolution on 
1 March, but France sought for weeks to keep the resolution out of the general 
assembly. 
In a memo to Paris, Ambassador Araud stated: 
The question raised by Oscar Temaru must remain a franco-French affair, and the 
United Nations should not interfere with French political life, because France 
recognises the right of people to self-determination. France challenges the 
legitimacy of the Decolonisation Committee, as it has done since its creation in 
1961 (Regnault 2013, p. 77).
Some UN member states were astounded by the way France pressed its case. 
Denouncing the ‘violence and condescension’ of Araud’s interventions, Temaru 
wrote to President Hollande on 27 March, calling on him to bring the ambassador 
to heel: 
I would draw to your attention the growing frustration and incomprehension 
over France’s position, which we have been informed of by several UN member 
states … The French pressure towards the President of the General Assembly 
is similarly perceived as the denial of the democracy that is at the heart of the 
General Assembly … If some of your confreres in the P5 [permanent members 
of the Security Council] seem to be accepting the French action on our dossier, 
others have shared their astonishment with us (Temaru 2013b).
French Polynesia’s local elections on 5 May 2013 saw the defeat of President 
Temaru’s UPLD coalition and the return of long-serving leader Gaston Flosse 
(since removed from office for misuse of public funds). After his election, 
Flosse immediately wrote to the president of the UN General Assembly in an 
unsuccessful attempt to delay action on the resolution. France’s ambassador 
boycotted the session on 17 May — but the resolution was passed without 
a recorded vote.
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Britain, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands all disassociated 
themselves from the decision. Fearful of a growing regional debate about 
West Papua, Indonesia’s representative also stressed that the ‘adoption was 
solely based on a specific historical context and should not be misinterpreted 
as precedence by other territories whose cases were pending with the 
Decolonisation Committee’.
Regional Diplomacy and West Papua
The diplomacy of decolonisation has bedevilled Pacific governments and 
regional organisations in recent years. While they have actively supported 
decolonisation for ‘blue water’ European colonies like French Polynesia, many 
governments have been reluctant to address struggles for self-determination in 
postcolonial nations such as Indonesia and PNG.
Since its founding in 1988, the MSG has actively supported the Kanak 
independence movement in New Caledonia. Indeed, the Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front 
(FLNKS)), rather than the Government of New Caledonia, is the full member of 
the sub-regional body. At the 2013 MSG summit, FLNKS spokesperson Victor 
Tutugoro was appointed as MSG chair, taking the role at a crucial time as the 
French dependency moves to a referendum on self-determination, scheduled for 
2018. The MSG has also established an FLNKS unit in its Port Vila secretariat, 
appointing a Kanak activist as political counsellor.
In contrast to this long-standing solidarity with the FLNKS, the MSG had been 
largely silent on the more sensitive issue of West Papua — until now. 
After more than 100,000 deaths in West Papua, there is significant popular 
support for West Papuan independence in the independent Melanesian nations. 
Even after the fall of Suharto’s new order regime, there are ongoing human rights 
abuses by the Indonesian police and military.15 This has led to new advocacy 
across Melanesia, with Facebook and other social media spreading information 
from inside West Papua across the region. This solidarity movement has forced 
a complex and unresolved debate over relations with Indonesia onto the agenda 
of recent MSG summits.
The MSG’s unity has been stressed by this debate, at a time of other trade and 
diplomatic disputes (Webb-Gannon and Elmslie 2014). There have been some 
tensions between the larger states of PNG and Fiji — which are moving closer 
15  Dominic Berger says, ‘Reducing political tensions and ending human rights abuses in Papua remained 
elusive throughout [SBY’s] tenure’ (Berger 2015, p. 230).
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to Jakarta — and Vanuatu and the FLNKS, which openly express solidarity with 
the West Papuan nationalist movement (with the Solomon Islands wavering 
between) (Maclellan 2015b, pp. 10 –11). 
Despite these rifts, the MSG’s new engagement contrasts with the silence of the 
Pacific Islands Forum over the last decade. For nearly 30 years after its founding, 
the forum avoided the issue of West Papua. Action was always constrained by 
governments in Australia and PNG, which reaffirm the ‘territorial integrity’ of 
Indonesia and (incorrectly) state that Indonesia has always held sovereignty 
over West Papua.16 Trade links are growing between Canberra, Port Moresby, 
Suva and Jakarta, adding to other strategic concerns, such as PNG’s control 
of its land border and Canberra’s fixation with boat people. 
Despite this, forum leaders could not ignore the fall of the Suharto dictatorship 
in 1998, Timor-Leste’s independence and the organising by West Papuan 
nationalists that created a brief ‘Papua Spring’ in Jayapura at the beginning of 
the 21st century.17 At the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit in New York, 
Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu were the first countries to declare support for West 
Papuan self-determination at the United Nations. 
Four West Papuan activists were given official delegate status at the October 
2000 forum in Kiribati as members of the Nauru delegation. At the Tarawa 
forum, Vanuatu, Nauru and other countries supported the push for human 
rights in the troubled country, even as they deferred to Australian and PNG 
sensitivities by acknowledging Indonesia’s sovereignty. Forum Chair President 
Teburoro Tito of Kiribati said: ‘Personally, I have great sympathy for the cause 
of the West Papuan people, just on the basis of culture alone.’18 
The forum issued an unprecedented statement calling for peaceful dialogue 
on the future of the country and an end to human rights abuses. At the time, 
Papua Presidium member FranzAlbert Joku welcomed the statement: ‘After four 
decades, we are back in our natural habitat, the South Pacific.’19 
Joku was looking back to earlier pan-Melanesia engagement that existed 
before Indonesia’s 1969 Act of Free Choice. Papuan delegates Marcus Kaisiepo 
and Nicolas Jouwe represented Dutch New Guinea at the first South Pacific 
Conference in 1950.20 Dutch evangelical Christian church Reverends Kabel and 
16  Australian support for Dutch sovereignty in the 1950s is discussed in Lijphart (1966).
17  For details of the Papua Spring, see Chauvel (2005).
18  Interview with President Teburoro Tito, Tarawa, September 2000. See Maclellan (2000).
19  Interview with FranzAlbert Joku, Tarawa, September 2000. 
20  For photos of the West Papuans at the 1950 SPC meeting, see (DFAT 2000).
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Maloali were active at the 1961 Malua Conference of Churches and Missions 
in Samoa (which led to the founding of the Pacific Conference of Churches). 
West Papuans studied at the Fiji School of Medicine in the 1960s.21
In April 2001, the forum decided to accept Indonesia as a post-forum dialogue 
partner. West Papua was discussed at forum meetings between 2001 and 2003, 
but Indonesian repression of the Papua Spring led to an end to discussion at 
the forum (apart from a brief mention in the 2006 communiqué). For a decade, 
forum communiqués have been silent on West Papua, despite possible openings 
for engagement as post-Suharto presidents established a Special Autonomy Law 
and divided the western half of New Guinea into the two provinces of Papua 
and West Papua. 
In recent years, the issue has shifted to the MSG, leading to unprecedented 
debates amongst the five MSG members. This engagement was accelerated by 
the decision of then MSG Chair Voreqe Bainimarama to invite Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste to become MSG observers at the March 2011 summit in Fiji.22 
Following Fiji’s 2009 suspension from forum activities, the Bainimarama regime 
had been extending economic and political links with Asian nations, opening an 
embassy in Jakarta in August 2011. Ties between Suva and Jakarta are growing, 
highlighted by the then Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono 
opening the 2014 Pacific Islands Development Forum and Indonesia’s role in 
co-chairing the Multinational Observer Group for Fiji’s 2014 elections. Fiji’s 
global ambitions — including membership of the NAM and its 2013 role as 
chair of G77 plus China — have introduced new complexities into the regional 
decolonisation agenda, given Indonesia is a key player in both networks.
PNG governments have long juggled competing tensions: public sentiment in 
support of West Papuan rights, growing economic links with Indonesia and 
ASEAN, and border security along the region’s only land border. PNG’s policy 
on West Papua is complicated by concerns over its own resource-rich province 
of Bougainville. With the 2015 re-election of John Momis as President of the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government, complex debates over the reopening of 
the Panguna mine and a five year window before a vote on political status, 
Bougainville will soon pose challenges for PNG’s regional leadership — 
and the MSG.
21  Some West Papuans remained in Fiji after Indonesia’s takeover. Interview with Dr Welby Korwa, 
Suva, 1998. 
22  In February 2011, MSG foreign ministers ‘endorsed applications for observership by Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste and agreed to seek an “out of session” decision from the leaders to allow Indonesia and Timor-
Leste to attend as observers at the March 2011 [MSG] leaders’ summit’. (Fiji Ministry of Information press 
release, February 2011).
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Jakarta’s bid for greater involvement in the MSG reflects Indonesia’s mounting 
diplomatic efforts in the region. For many years, the Indonesian embassy in 
Port Moresby was the main hub for activity in forum island countries, with 
Indonesian officials lobbying the islands from embassies in Canberra, Wellington, 
Beijing and Tokyo (from 1974 until 2002, Indonesian diplomats travelled to Fiji 
from Wellington, until an embassy was opened in Suva). 
Today, Jakarta is deploying more effort on the ground, to build economic 
ties but especially to counter West Papuan diplomacy. Former independence 
activists FranzAlbert Joku and Nick Messet now act as Indonesian diplomats 
and join delegations to regional and international summits, to showcase Jakarta’s 
initiatives and argue against independence.
On the international stage, Indonesia, PNG and Fiji are all members of the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonisation. The two Pacific countries use the special 
committee as a platform to support the FLNKS, but join Indonesia in opposition 
to calls for West Papua to be relisted with the UN.23
In contrast, the Kanak independence coalition has long supported a fellow 
liberation movement in West Papua, wary of Indonesia’s growing role in the 
MSG. Outgoing MSG chair Victor Tutugoro of the FLNKS told the author in 
2015: ‘For the FLNKS, the MSG is an organisation of Melanesian countries. 
As I see it, Indonesia is not part of the Melanesian bloc.’24
Vanuatu too has long backed the West Papuan nationalist movement with 
practical and diplomatic aid, hosting an office for the West Papua nationalist 
movement. In 2011, the Sato Kilman Government briefly moved closer to 
Indonesia, with the signing of a Vanuatu–Indonesia Development Cooperation 
Agreement. These moves dismayed West Papuan activists, especially as the 
cooperation agreement stressed Indonesian territorial integrity and sovereignty 
over West Papua, and prohibited Vanuatu from interfering in Indonesia’s 
‘internal affairs’. This decision contributed to a backlash in Port Vila and the 
election of a new government under Moana Carcasses Kalosil, who proceeded to 
launch a series of attacks on Indonesia in UN forums.25
In March 2013, the Port Vila-based West Papua National Council for Liberation 
(WPNCL) lodged a formal membership application to join the MSG, and the 
existing members began to position themselves.
23  Indonesia provided funds to Fiji for the costs of the UN Special Committee’s 2014 Pacific Regional Seminar, 
held in Nadi. On UN policy on self-determination and the 1969 Act of Free Choice, see Saltford (2002).
24  Interview with Victor Tutugoro, Honiara, June 2015. See Maclellan (2015a).
25  In an interview (Port Vila, July 2013), incoming Justice Minister Ralph Regenvanu stressed that the West 
Papua issue was a central reason for public disenchantment with the Kilman Government (although many 
other issues contributed to its electoral defeat).
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In early June 2013, Fiji’s Prime Minister Bainimarama held a meeting in Nadi 
with Djoko Suyanto, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Legal, Political 
and Security Affairs, and a former commander of Indonesia’s armed forces. 
Soon after, to the disquiet of some delegates, Fiji arrived at the June 2013 MSG 
Summit in Noumea with a roadmap to drive the West Papua debate. 
However, the host organisation FLNKS also formally invited the WPNCL to 
attend the summit. FLNKS representative Caroline Machoro-Reignier told the 
author: 
If this issue came up today within the MSG, it’s because the FLNKS requested it. 
We asked the representatives of West Papua to come to New Caledonia to explain 
the situation to us. We cannot just leave the issue aside, with all the exactions, 
the violations of human rights that West Papua is suffering  …  However this 
is a very sensitive topic that affects relations between Indonesia and the other 
member states in the Spearhead Group.26
Indonesia sent a large delegation to press its case, including FranzAlbert Joku 
and Nick Messet, while a five-person delegation led by WPNCL Vice President 
John Otto Ondawame and Secretary-General Rex Rumakiek arrived to lobby 
for support of their bid for MSG membership. In a striking diplomatic gesture, 
PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill and Foreign Minister Rimbink Pato were 
absent from the summit, leading a large business delegation to Indonesia. 
Their presence in Jakarta as the MSG debated West Papua shows the priority 
given to relations with PNG’s powerful neighbour (Maclellan 2013c).
After extensive lobbying in the corridors, MSG leaders agreed to defer a 
decision on the West Papua application. A decision would only be made after 
a delegation of Melanesian foreign ministers visited Jakarta and Jayapura and 
reported back to the leaders within six months (Maclellan 2013b). WPNCL’s 
Ondawame expressed disappointment about the delay, arguing that the 
Indonesian government and military would stage-manage the MSG mission. 
However, he said he valued the opportunity to address the summit plenary and 
highlighted positive commitments by the MSG leaders.27
Despite these delaying tactics, the MSG summit communiqué included 
unprecedented language on West Papua, supporting ‘the inalienable rights of 
the people of West Papua towards self-determination’ and criticising ‘human 
rights violations and other forms of atrocities relating to the West Papuan 
people’.28
26  Interview with Caroline Machoro-Reignier, FLNKS representative to the 2013 MSG foreign ministers 
meeting, Lifou, June 2013.
27  Interview with John Ondawame, Noumea, 20 June 2013. Sadly, Ondawame died in September 2014, 
a significant loss to the nationalist movement. 
28  Final communiqué, 19th MSG leaders’ summit, Escapade resort, Noumea, 20 June 2013.
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Indonesia then wooed Solomon Islands, with then Prime Minister Gordon Darcy 
Lilo travelling to Jakarta in August 2013 on a trade mission, which the Vanuatu 
government perceived as an effort to undercut the foreign ministers’ delegation. 
Vanuatu later boycotted the mission to West Papua, which travelled to Jakarta 
and Jayapura from 11–15 January 2014, led by Fiji Foreign Minister Ratu 
Inoke Kubuabola. The Vanuatu government was angered by the way Indonesia 
transformed the trip into a trade mission and refused access to pro-independence 
church and civil society representatives during a brief visit to Jayapura.29 
Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts were rewarded at a special MSG leaders’ summit 
in Port Moresby in June 2014, which deferred the WPNCL application for 
membership and agreed ‘to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united 
umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh 
application’.30 The summit agreed on a range of activities to ensure ‘that the 
MSG and Indonesia take a more proactive approach in addressing the issue of 
West Papua and Papua’, broadly endorsing Indonesia’s Special Autonomy Law 
and welcoming the involvement of West Papuans in a range of MSG sporting, 
cultural and development activities.
Despite this, Vanuatu continued to show its support for West Papuan self-
determination. Vanuatu churches and customary chiefs, supported by the 
government, hosted a December 2014 meeting to bring together Jayapura-based 
activists and exiled campaigners and form a united front between competing 
groups. The newly created United Liberation Movement for West Papua 
(ULMWP) unites three strands of the West Papuan nationalist movement: the 
WPNCL, Federal Republic of West Papua, and the National Parliament of West 
Papua, which incorporates the National Committee for West Papua. In February 
2015, the ULMWP resubmitted its application for full MSG membership.
In a major speech the same month, PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill said his 
country needed to do more to address human rights in West Papua. Proposing 
that his country take a lead in discussions with Indonesia ‘in a mature and 
engaging manner’, he added: 
Sometimes we forgot our family, our brothers and sisters, especially those in West 
Papua. I think as a country the time has come for us to speak about oppression of 
our people. Pictures of brutality of our people appear daily on social media and 
yet we take no notice. We have the moral obligation to speak for those who are not 
allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who are blindfolded (O’Neill 2015).
29  Discussions with Vanuatu Foreign Minister Edward Natapei (New Caledonia, June 2013) and Prime 
Minister Joe Natuman (Port Vila, July 2014). The communiqué of the June 2014 Special MSG Summit noted: 
‘Vanuatu was of the view that the Mission’s program would not allow the MSG to obtain credible information 
to fulfil the MSG Leaders mandate.’
30  Final communiqué, special MSG leaders’ summit, PNG National Parliament, Port Moresby, June 2014.
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Indonesia continued to work to blunt the diplomatic advances of the West 
Papuan nationalist movement. In March 2015, during the lead up to the MSG 
summit, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi travelled to PNG, Solomon 
Islands and Fiji. In May, a month before the summit, President Joko Widodo 
visited West Papua and PNG, announcing clemency for five political prisoners 
and making other concessions.31
At a press conference in Merauke, Jokowi addressed longstanding restrictions 
on international media travelling to West Papua: ‘Starting from today, foreign 
journalists are allowed and free to come to Papua, just as they can [visit] other 
regions.’ This pledge was immediately undercut by his Minister for Political, 
Legal and Security Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, who confirmed that foreign 
journalists would still be screened and must obtain permission from the security 
forces to travel to the highlands: 
We’ll allow it, on condition that they report on what they see, not go around 
looking for facts that aren’t true from armed groups … There’s a lot of news out 
there that makes it look like [human rights] violations are taking place here all 
the time, but I don’t think that’s the case (Jakarta Globe 2015). 
The diplomatic issue came to a head at the June 2015 MSG Summit in Solomon 
Islands, where leaders made an historic decision to expand the MSG’s reach. 
With  divergent views continuing amongst the five members, an uneasy 
consensus led to the granting of associate member status to Indonesia and 
observer status to the ULMWP. 
To dodge questions over Indonesian sovereignty, the MSG leaders agreed that 
‘the ULMWP be admitted as an observer under the regional and international 
category representing Melanesians living abroad’ (despite the ULMWP 
representing groups both inside and exiled from West Papua). In the presence 
of a large delegation led by Indonesian Vice Foreign Minister A.M. Fachir, the 
island leaders approved ‘that associate membership be accorded to Indonesia 
representing the five Melanesian provinces in Indonesia’ (Papua, West Papua, 
Maluku, North Maluku, and East Nusa Tenggara). 
Describing the ULMWP as an ‘external non-government organisation’, Fiji Prime 
Minister Bainimarama stated: 
31  Ironically, Jakarta has long argued there are no political prisoners in West Papua. Many prisoners refused 
presidential clemency (which requires an acknowledgement of guilt), arguing that they were falsely convicted 
for political reasons and that alleged acts — such as raising or displaying the Morning Star flag — were 
not crimes.
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Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua cannot be questioned … the MSG has 
no choice but to deal with Indonesia in a positive and constructive manner. The 
best hope for improving the lives of the people of West Papua is to work closely 
with the Indonesian government, one of the most vibrant democracies in the 
world (Bainimarama 2015).
The 20th MSG summit communiqué noted that the ‘Indonesian President is 
someone whom the MSG can dialogue with’.32 But despite recent initiatives by 
President Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s development policies in West Papua will 
continue to drive calls for change, as customary landowners fight to protect their 
land and restrict ongoing immigration. The future role of the five governors in 
MSG is unclear, given the historic difference between Papua and West Papua 
(which remained under Dutch administration until the 1960s) and the other 
three provinces (which were part of Indonesia from independence in 1949). 
Governors Lukas Enembe of Papua and Bram Atururi of West Papua were both 
absent from the 2015 summit; as they seek a different political status within 
Indonesia, more debate is on the cards within the MSG.33
The creation of the ULMWP as a united coalition will also pose diplomatic 
challenges for Pacific governments, as the MSG observer highlights historic 
grievances and ongoing human rights violations. ULMWP Secretary-General 
Octo Mote says observer status is ‘a foot in the door’ for dialogue between West 
Papuan nationalists, Melanesian governments and Indonesia: ‘We’re a nation in 
waiting, and we’re not going away!’34
Conclusion
The recent flurry of diplomatic activity on decolonisation by MSG and PSIDS is 
a striking example of ways that new Pacific diplomatic structures have allowed 
action on questions that governments have been reluctant to address through 
the Pacific Islands Forum for many years.
Over the next five years, there will be major political and constitutional changes 
in two Melanesian nations, as New Caledonia and Bougainville vote on a new 
political status. Under the 1998 Noumea Accord, New Caledonia is scheduled 
to hold a referendum on self-determination in late 2018, with two other votes 
32  Final communiqué, 20th MSG summit, Heritage Park Hotel, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 26 June 2015, p. 6.
33  Indonesian proposals to create even more provinces in the western half of the island of New Guinea are 
disrupting moves towards a strengthened autonomy law known as Otsus Plus. See IPAC (2014).
34  Interview with Octavius Mote, Honiara, June 2015.
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possible up until 2022. In a similar period, Bougainville will come to the end of 
its 10–15 year transition after the 2005 election of the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government. 
These referenda have important implications for neighbours such as Australia, 
New Zealand and the island members of the Pacific Islands Forum and MSG. 
The issue of self-determination will again force itself onto the regional agenda.
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Thinking ‘Outside the Rocks’: 
Reimagining the Pacific1
Hon . Henry Puna
This obvious play on words is a home-grown attempt to capture the way in 
which our region faces enormous challenges in trying to find its own way in the 
world — defining itself while grappling with the constraints associated with 
remoteness, size, and resources. 
A changing world demands changing mindsets, and those demands are pressing 
for a renewed effort on our part to redefine our thinking in ways that reflect who 
we are, and what we want to be, on our own terms. 
Thinking ‘outside the rocks’ is how we need to reverse a self-imposed limitation 
of believing we are simply ‘dots on a map’. For too long we’ve allowed a sense 
of smallness to underscore our outlook and projection to the rest of the world. 
On the contrary, our island nations carry enormous significance well beyond 
tiny volcanic specks and atolls in what is a vast, collective territory of the Pacific 
Ocean. This is our course for the future — thinking beyond the rocks.
1  Address to students of the University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 19 October 2012.
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Reimagining Ourselves
I think the time is right that we take on a more concerted effort, as a region, 
to define ourselves on our own terms. After all, this global community of ours 
is continuing to shrink rapidly, thanks to the marching advancement of internet 
technology and the uptake of mobile devices, which can basically run and 
organise a business or organisation — on the run! 
The conduct of business is evolving in competitive ways that demand new 
thinking. And the structures of professional fields in media information and 
dissemination can no longer be called ‘traditional’ — they’re constantly 
reinventing themselves into challenging spheres of competitive space. Just ask 
dot com! 
For me, as a leader, and us as governments, our collective interests are being 
pressured and shaped toward a new Pacific order — one that won’t necessarily 
meet the expectations of others — or the perceptions of outsiders. What is 
important is that we choose what’s best for us. We have the ability to define 
what’s good, and we have the right to take commanding ownership of our future. 
Large Ocean Island States
I am, of course, partly alluding to the theme of the Pacific Islands Forum this 
year — a theme we chose as hosts to help encourage a greater sense of our 
region as home to large ocean island states. 
And as I made a point of mentioning during the forum opening in August, our 
collective territories are nearly two times the size of Russia, and more than three 
times the size of the People’s Republic of China. It’s time we refocused our lens 
on the world and sharpened our strategy toward greater economic growth and 
sustainability. 
Our thinking — our very identity as Pacific Islanders — must project from a 
more advanced, self-awareness of our presence in the world. And I think we’re 
off to a good start. 
The Pacific Islands Forum is registering higher, more significant levels of 
engagement with the broader international community. Just last month, I was 
joined by several Pacific leaders in the first ever joint dialogue with the United 
Nations Secretary General and his leadership team. This was a very important 
first step in ensuring the Pacific Islands have a firm fix on inroads to the 
UN system. 
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The Pacific bloc of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) plays a key role in 
the UN. As members of the Alliance of Small Islands States, we are bound 
to the processes associated with the ongoing climate change negotiations, 
and adaptation funding mechanisms. 
This ongoing struggle is absolutely crucial to our survival. It’s vital that we 
— as a solid, united front — present our case with an effective voice. And my 
underlying concern is to ensure that all the SIDS are represented equally, 
and  with conviction, in the UN processes, particularly leading up to and 
participating in the 2014 global SIDS summit in our region. 
The forum is also beginning to ignite groundbreaking steps in the sound 
management of our oceans and natural resources, and push the boundaries of 
regional integration to cooperate in new and challenging fields.
For example, international interest in the recent establishment of the 
biggest Marine Park in the world in the Cook Islands has been tremendous. 
The principles of sound management and conservation of our ocean are being 
strengthened across the Pacific as more nations look to strike a careful balance 
between exploiting natural resources and sustaining their value through 
conservation measures.
In renewable energy, many Pacific nations are capitalising on available expertise 
and resources to realise their goals. New priorities for energy security in 
countries like Tonga, Tokelau, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Fiji, have resulted in terrific 
progress, increasing the share of renewable energy generation, improving levels 
of energy efficiency, and slicing back the dependency on environmentally-
damaging fossil fuels. 
The Cook Islands has joined this trend in setting ambitious targets and we 
are poised to commence solar energy projects in our isolated Northern Group 
Islands.  Niue too, recently signed on for major development in renewable 
energy  projects, assisted by the Japan-supported Pacific Environment 
Community Fund.
The forum’s strategic engagement with its external partners is being rewarded. 
Close working relationships and beneficial outcomes are largely due to 
the effectiveness of our cooperative frameworks like the Forum Compact, 
and Pacific Plan.
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Pacific Plan Optimism
And as you may already be aware, the Pacific Plan will be the subject of major 
review in the coming months. My presence here in Suva is to help promote and 
speak to the significance of the plan and what it means to the island countries 
of the Pacific, and their aspirations for the future. 
Yesterday, at the Forum Secretariat Headquarters, I utilised the honour of the 
annual public lecture to highlight my perspectives on an emerging sense of new 
optimism in the Pacific — and that this positive theme should be harnessed 
to instil more dynamism into the Pacific Plan.
Are we thus looking at a new period of renaissance in the Pacific? Perhaps. 
There  may be value in arguing that point although it will be problematic 
to isolate a particular point in time that this new optimism arose. 
Leaders before me have spoken of a Pacific reawakening, a rebirth of sorts, 
particularly as evidenced in the way we celebrate our heritage, culture and 
traditions in the region — through performing arts and crafts festivals, language 
preservation, and voyaging. 
Voyaging as Reimagining
Voyaging and the celebration of migratory peoples across this vast ocean of 
ours, is close to the heart of Cook Islanders, and to many of you also. In fact, 
this centuries-old navigation of the seas has been the subject of its own debate 
in past years for the way it has been revitalised and thrust to the forefront of our 
cultural consciousness. 
Sailing by traditional means is firmly part of our identity — an identity that is 
transported across the Pacific, east to west, north to south. I, for one, was very 
proud to be a part of the welcoming reception of a flotilla of seven vaka that 
arrived in the United States last year — a remarkable voyaging accomplishment, 
which brought many of our nations together as one. 
Traditional voyaging is also firmly entrenched in the way the Pacific region 
has been reimagining itself over many years of dominant ideals and tropes that 
originated from a Eurocentric view of the world. Europeans have imagined and 
constructed the Pacific and its peoples in ways that have endured for centuries. 
But we’re not denying that this is part of who we are. This is part of our history. 
In fact, we would be among those to uphold one of the greatest European 
voyagers of the Pacific: Captain James Cook. 
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This Yorkshire-born navigator of the seas is still making headlines today — 
and not just because our country was renamed in his honour. Cook’s charts and 
maps of the Pacific are everlasting, coexisting today in a world where Pacific 
Islands’ voyagers need only the stars to cross the Pacific. 
These ironies live on, throughout our region today. The very categorisation 
of our  islands into convenient blocs by French voyager Dumont d’Urville, 
for  instance, has long been accepted, reappropriated with robust 
political purpose. 
Today, those European constructs of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia instil 
pride within us all, and evoke a dignity associated with diverse, natural beauty 
and strength. We simply took ownership, and made it ours.
Tourism
And what’s interesting about this twist, is the way that Small Island Developing 
States, which are experiencing economic growth in industries like tourism, are 
essentially delivering a product that was imagined by European Romanticists 
in the 18th century. 
The very notion of an idyllic paradise of sensual beauty and charm is exactly 
how we tend to portray the serenity of our attractive islands and their people 
to the tourist markets overseas today. 
The desire for the Pacific that emerged centuries ago to lure outsiders to these 
shores, is now allowing us the means with which to secure economic strength. 
For the Cook Islands, tourism is the backbone of our national economy, and the 
leader and driver of our potential and growth.
But in the true nature of Pacific paradoxes, tourism is both our strength, and 
weakness. Our unspoilt islands remain vulnerable, fragile to climate change, the 
incessant drive of development in modern infrastructure, and the debilitating 
trend of population drift, which impacts upon our ability to sustain resources. 
The narrowness of our existence in the Pacific requires broadening — a widening 
of both opportunity and the way in which we must take on these tasks.
For these reasons I ask for encouragement to accept this responsibility to think 
beyond the constraints — rise above, explore ‘outside the rocks’, and progress 
with a boldness founded on who we can be, as large ocean island states.
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Melanesian Spearhead Group: 
The last 25 years1
Sir Michael Somare
Much has been said about the achievements of the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG) over the last few months as we celebrated our 25 years anniversary in our 
various capitals. I will therefore not dwell much on them today. However, it is 
fair to say that from what started as a political sub-grouping, MSG’s cooperation 
now covers most areas of human pursuit and endeavour. It is no exaggeration 
that MSG’s cooperative efforts in political and security, trade and economic, 
social, cultural and sports activities have increased and strengthened in ways 
that our founders never imagined.
I am told that even Honourable Ezekial Alebua admitted recently that when 
they first met in Goroka in 1986, he never imagined the MSG would grow from 
a simple political ‘pressure group’ to a vibrant and successful organisation as it 
is today. We are the only sub-regional grouping within the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF) area that has a formal secretariat and headquarters.
MSG into the Future
I was fortunate to be given the opportunity to share my thoughts and listen to 
the Eminent Persons Group established by our leaders to draw up a vision and 
future plan for our organisation. I was encouraged by what I heard: MSG must 
be inclusive. It must be compassionate. It must have integrity.
1  Keynote address by Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare on the occasion of the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
25th anniversary celebrations in Noumea, New Caledonia.
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All our efforts in regional cooperation and integration must mirror these 
principles. Just as important is the principle that MSG must seek to help 
itself first. MSG must only seek outside assistance if its own resources are 
inadequate or its capacity is found wanting. Experiences in our region and 
elsewhere suggest that this approach provides some insurance against outside 
influence — influence that could easily lead to distortion of MSG’s priorities 
and development agenda.
MSG must be in the Driver’s Seat
As we search to find areas of common interest, to pursue our quest for more 
enhanced cooperation and deeper integration, we must ensure that our national 
resources and energies are not wasted. Our MSG Secretariat, that is entrusted to 
help us in our undertaking to better serve our peoples, must be appropriately 
resourced to discharge its responsibilities. To help improve communications 
and implementation of the work program, MSG members should seek to open 
resident representative offices in Port Vila.
The last 25  years have given us valuable experience on collective action in 
pursuit of identified development goals — be they political, economic, trade, 
social, cultural, etc. That many of our neighbours, sub-groups and Melanesian 
communities elsewhere have expressed an interest in joining MSG is a strong 
validation of how well we have organised ourselves. The interest shown manifest 
the value others attach to MSG’s role in the pursuit of common development 
objectives. It is no exaggeration that some critics that initially thought the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group enterprise was overly ambitious now consider 
MSG cooperation as a viable enterprise in sub-regionalism in the Pacific.
MSG is fortunate in that it can, and must, extract lessons from the workings 
of PIF and learn from the experience of other similar organisations elsewhere. 
We  must avoid creating new MSG institutions to provide a public good or 
service if another regional or national institution is already providing them. It is 
no epiphany to suggest that we would be better off accessing the services from 
the existing regional or national institutions. What might be necessary, though, 
is to channel more resources to these institutions to bolster their capacity to 
better serve our collective interests and needs.
We must only create new institutions either because none exists to provide that 




If experience elsewhere, by similar organisations like ours, demonstrate that 
binding ourselves to decisions would improve implementation of our initiatives 
then we should find ways to legally bind ourselves to the decisions we make. 
This would help strengthen MSG’s credibility.
Political and Security
Political and security concerns, namely decolonisation of New Caledonia and 
cessation of nuclear testing in Moruroa were the main reasons MSG was formed. 
New Caledonia’s right to self-determination, and independence, championed 
by the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), was perceived as 
not getting the serious attention it deserved. In addition, the then MSG leaders 
felt that some regional partners were undermining efforts to adopt a stronger 
position within the PIF.
New Caledonia’s reinscription as a non-self-governing territory within the 
purview of the United Nations Committee of 24  is largely due to the change 
in approach and the concerted efforts of the MSG. It is also arguable that the 
Noumea Accord, and the processes leading up to it, would not have come about 
without the deliberate international campaign mounted by the MSG countries 
in support of New Caledonia’s right to self-determination. These included 
persistent representations to the metropolitan power and the United Nations.
The Noumea Accord offers a glimmer of hope for the Kanaky people and their 
aspirations. It would be a sad indictment on MSG’s resolve if we do not ensure 
the FLNKS is positioned to win the provincial elections next year. MSG has that 
obligation and, as a member, FLNKS is entitled to expect nothing less from the 
other MSG members.
MSG’s responsibility extends beyond the FLNKS leadership of today. MSG owes 
it to the FLNKS leaders of yesteryears whose pioneering work has helped us 
come this far. At this juncture, I wish to pay tribute to the likes of Uregei, 
Machoro, Tjibaou, Yéwéné Yéwéné, and the young Kanaks in Ouvéa who paid 
the ultimate price for championing justice and the emancipation of the Kanaky 
people. MSG countries owe it to the Kanaky people to remain true to their 
commitment to defend and promote independence as the inalienable right of 
indigenous peoples of Melanesia as espoused in the agreement establishing our 
organisation.
Political and parliamentary instability in MSG countries continue to undermine 
our efforts in promoting our region as a region of opportunity, stability 
and prosperity. More energy must be directed in the next 25  years towards 
strengthening our governance institutions and good governance processes.
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It is worth clarifying, though, that in many instances in MSG, political and 
parliamentary instability occur as a result of the democratic process at play, 
in particular the exercise of democratic rights. They are not indicative of the 
absence of democracy in MSG but simply reflect symptoms of weak governance 
institutions and processes.
As a group, the West Papua issue will continue to test MSG’s commitment 
to defend and promote independence as the inalienable right of indigenous 
peoples of Melanesia as well as to promote their human rights. There is strong 
and growing support among the MSG peoples for West Papua’s membership to 
MSG and West Papua’s aspirations to self-determination. 
Obviously, Papua New Guinea government’s position on this issue will very 
much weigh on MSG’s considerations in terms of how it deals with West Papua. 
For me personally, I believe that MSG should actively make representations to 
Indonesia to address the human rights abuses in West Papua. MSG must also 
involve West Papua in some of MSG’s cultural events, sporting activities and 
technical skills exchanges. West Papua after all has a significant Melanesian 
community.
But, should the MSG leaders decide on granting West Papua ‘membership’, 
in one form or another, it should be done only on the basis that it is a Melanesian 
community and not because MSG countries recognise West Papua as a sovereign 
independent state.
MSG already has a non-state entity as a member in FLNKS. A not too dissimilar 
arrangement can be found in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) where 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, regarded by many as part of China, participate as 
partners in development with independent sovereign. The point here is that 
we have to be inventive. Again, should a decision be made for West Papua to 
be a ‘member’ of MSG, it is not hard to imagine this serving as a venue for 
both Indonesia and West Papua to engage in dialogue and regularly brief MSG 
countries of developments in West Papua.
Fiji’s current political situation is another case that will continue to test MSG 
solidarity as a group. It is no secret that regional decisions and approaches 
to Fiji have caused polarisation of views in the PIF. Even within our MSG 
grouping, I can sense a tenuous unity of purpose on Fiji. There is a real risk of 
a chasm developing between MSG members if we are not careful. I have always 
maintained that Fiji requires our understanding and support.
Time  should not be the  essence  for Fiji to return to elective government. 
Ensuring Fiji develops a strong culture of enduring democracy, with robust 
democratic institutions, is most important. Melanesian values of dialogue and 
patience, although protracted in process, have the greatest potential to bring 
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about the changes we want in Fiji. This is in stark contrast to the effects that 
condescending tactics and heavy handed punitive actions advocated by some 
have had on Fiji. I would also suggest that the changing geopolitical situation in 
the region is a result of this.
MSG must also resist the temptation of using high ‘moral ground’ reasons to 
justify calls for it to criticise Fiji’s slow return to parliamentary democracy. 
Although pious principles are noble they are very often void of reality on the 
ground. MSG needs to be pragmatic in its approach to Fiji.
With regards to the issue of nuclear testing, MSG will need to continue to be 
interested in the transhipment through our waters of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear waste material.
We must be vigilant over the mechanisms established to compensate coastal 
states in the event of disasters. Even with all the advances made in technology, 
disasters will happen and we need to ensure provision of assistance is predictable, 
swift and adequate under these mechanisms.
The interest shown and the entry by non-traditional powers in our region will 
inevitably reconfigure the geopolitical landscape and usher in new security 
challenges. But the notion of security extends beyond the realms of external 
physical threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty. Globalisation has given 
birth to new security issues. The resulting better communications, and easier 
movement across national borders of capital, goods, services and persons, has 
brought along with it challenges in cybercrime, money laundering, illicit cross-
border trade, human trafficking, health, etc. Lack of food, absence of proper 
sanitation, inadequate housing and unemployment are security threats in 
themselves.
Another security issue concerns our porous borders. Lack of national capacity to 
undertake effective surveillance, means that our rich marine and land resources 
may be exploited in ways that are unsustainable. Even if they are developed 
within the legal limits there is no guarantee that fish-catch data, forest-harvest 
figures and mineral-export statistics reveal the true picture, thus denying us 
optimum benefits from our resources.
These sets of challenges I have just described require us to address them 
collectively as MSG and as a region. They know no borders.
Global warming and sea level rise is posing serious, if not imminent, danger to 
the very survival of our people on our coastlines and the low-lying islands in 
our region. This threat scenario calls for MSG to commit itself, and lead the way, 
in undertaking sustainable development practices. Having the largest landmass 
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in the PIF region — 99 per cent (excluding Australia and New Zealand) — MSG 
countries have a moral duty to resettle climate refugees from the other small 
island countries of the Pacific.
Economic and Trade
Our cooperation in trade and economic activities has become somewhat the 
talking point of many of our colleagues in the region. And rightly so! It is the 
only regional trading agreement that is working in the Pacific. MSG must always 
remind itself of the initial cynicism which accompanied the reactions of many 
of our regional partners when we concluded a trading agreement with only 
three items to trade. The announcement generated considerable scepticism. 
Some, less generous, even suggested that the idea to trade with only three items 
was bordering on delusional.
I only belabour this point, not to disparage our critics, but to encourage us 
to draw inspiration from this experience as we embark on more enhanced 
cooperation and greater integration. There is nothing wrong with having a 
dream. Nor is it silly to be ambitious. MSG efforts in collective bargaining, joint 
provision of certain public goods and services, and general regional cooperation 
and integration will always attract its antagonists. But should we allow this to 
determine what we can and cannot do? I think the answer is obvious: we cannot 
and we must not!
MSG intra-trade continues to grow. Currently all items traded do not attract tariff 
in Fiji and Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea only has a negative list of three items 
and Solomon Islands is working on reducing its tariffs by 2017, a differentiated 
treatment granted to it by the other members because of its least developed 
country status. MSG countries’ trade with the outside world is also growing. 
This is an indication of the positive growth experienced by the MSG over the 
last few years. There is strong indication that these growth trends will continue.
But let us not delude ourselves. It would be naïve to think that trade liberalisation, 
or regional cooperation and integration, are without perils. For the future, the 
challenges that MSG will need to address include diversifying our economic 
activities, growing the SMEs’ (small, and medium-sized enterprises) share of our 
economies and further developing our export capability.
We must aggressively create an enabling environment for investment by 
providing  reliable and affordable infrastructure, such as public utilities. 
This might require time-bound affirmative action by our governments to allocate 
resources to the development and roll-out of public goods and services to the 
rural areas where a large part of our populations reside.
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New Caledonia, from where a member of our group comes, remains outside the 
MSG Trade Agreement. This is an anomaly that requires correcting. With a bit 
of innovation, MSG can extend the benefits of the trade agreement to the New 
Caledonian business community. An idea worth considering is for parties to the 
trade agreement to conclude a protocol with FLNKS. This protocol can provide 
the framework for the business community in New Caledonia to benefit from 
the provisions of the MSG Trade Agreement.
Social and Humanitarian
MSG countries, despite their best efforts, still have data showing their social 
indices to be less than enviable. Thus, improving health, education, water, 
sanitation, transport and communication facilities must continue to receive our 
serious attention. But more importantly, MSG needs to ensure that these public 
goods and services are extended to reach and cover our rural populace and 
disadvantaged communities.
Cultural, Traditional and Sporting
The Framework Treaty on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Culture signed in 2011 is a good starting point for MSG.
The Melanesian Cup must be revived and made more permanent on the calendar 
of MSG. I am happy to note that New Caledonia will host the Melanesian Cup 
next year. The Melanesian Festival of Arts must continue to be a major event for 
MSG. Papua New Guinea plays host to this event next year. We must ensure that 
this occasion provides the opportunity for our peoples to have exchanges with a 
view to promoting better appreciation of the different Melanesian cultures and 
traditions. The educational value of these exchanges must be exploited to the 
maximum by ensuring that both the young and old form part of our national 
delegations so that the old can impart traditional knowledge to the young.
Many of our sacred cultural properties were illegally exported and are currently 
being held overseas in museums and private collections. It would help with 
national efforts if MSG were to develop a common strategy to address this 
issue of restitution. These sacred objects of art, in some cases human remains, 
need to be brought back home to rest. Adequately resourcing our museums 
and cultural institutions to research, document, preserve and promote our 
cultures and traditions would ensure that our future generations continue to 
have a Melanesian identity. Just as important is the need to develop appropriate 
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curricula to teach in our schools. Traditional institutions, such as the customary 
chiefs, and customary practices, such as reconciliation ceremonies, can be better 
leveraged for policy dissemination and conflict resolution.
Conclusion
MSG has come a long way from its humble beginnings in Goroka. But we 
certainly have not reached the ‘promised land’ that our people deserve and 
expect us to deliver. The Kanaky peoples’ dream of emancipation has not been 
realised yet. As we go forward, we must not forget that there are perils associated 
with regional cooperation, regional integration and trade liberalisation.
We must therefore recommit ourselves to the goals and objectives set by our 
leaders. There is need to redouble our efforts towards greater cooperation and 
integration within our national boundaries, between ourselves and with our 
brothers in our region.
MSG cooperation and integration has been successful because there are willing 
partners determined to share resources, best practices and, in certain instances, 
prepared to extend differentiated treatment to one another in recognition of 
their peculiar development needs.
I would further propose that the bigger and more well-endowed of the MSG 
countries, like Papua New Guinea, must accept asymmetric responsibilities if 
MSG cooperation and integration is to be sustained. Those well off in our group 
must be prepared to make sacrifices, forego certain short term benefits, for the 
common good and the long-term solidarity of MSG.
MSG must provide the leadership in advancing wider regional interests and 
concerns. It must provide the building block for wider regional cooperation and 
economic prosperity. Our interests are mutually reinforcing. The willingness 
to extend a helping hand must continue to guide MSG’s approach to regional 
cooperation. In fact, I would venture to suggest that this sense of compassion 
should underpin our every effort in regional cooperation and integration. 
As such, MSG must, wherever possible, employ its size and strength in the 
service of the wider region, especially the small island states. An MSG without 
the Pacific is the weaker, just as a Pacific without the MSG is the poorer. At all 
costs we must resist the temptation of being inward looking — there is so much 
to be gained from being inclusive.
The future of MSG is destined to be nothing but better. We must aim to make 
MSG the paragon of Pacific sub-regionalism. Together we have defied the odds 
and together we shall triumph.
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